Major General Morgunov – chief of armoured forces South-western Front – 5th August 1941 Extract : From the very first day of the war, the mechanized corps were deployed incorrectly, because, while the mechanized corps (I'm no talking about all of them) were really a front level asset, all of them were assigned to [field] armies. Naturally, cases of reassignment of an individual mechanized corps directly to an army should have been possible, but [only] in instances when situation really demanded it, and it should have been done by grouping them into strike forces. All operations of mechanized corps were conducted without thorough reconnaissance; some units were completely unaware what was happening in their immediate vicinity. There was absolutely no aerial reconnaissance assigned specifically for the mechanized corps. Control of the mechanized corps by commanders of all arms [armies] was poorly organized; units were widely separated, and by the time of the offensive, were not in contact with each other. Headquarters of Armies were completely not ready to control such large mechanized formations as the mechanized corps. Infantry, as a rule, acted independently, and the overall situation did not permit organization of combined operations. Headquarters of armies completely forgot that equipment has a limited lifespan, that it needs maintenance, minor repairs, refuelling, and rearming. Mechanized corps completely lacked air cover during the road marches, as well as after combat. Information, top to bottom, as well as with neighbouring units, was established very poorly. The war, from the very beginning, assumed fluid character; the enemy turned out to be more mobile. The main features of his actions is the wide use of encirclements and flank attacks. Germans avoided head on attacks and immediately would employ mobile anti - tank assets, while encircling around one, or in most cases, both flanks. Our command personnel were poorly trained during peacetime for these very operations; trying, therefore, to defend in close contact with neighbour, while there were no adequate forces to establish such a defence. There were many shortcomings committed directly by commanders of mechanized formations such as; 1. Headquarters of mechanized corps, tank divisions and regiments did not yet possess operational tactical Know - how. They could not reach right conclusions and completely failed to understand plans of army and front commanders. 2. Command personnel is lacking sufficient initiative. 3. Not all the mobile assets, which the corps possessed, were utilized 4. There was no manoeuvrability - there was listless - sloth in carrying out orders. 5. Operations, as a rule, were demonstrated by head - on attacks, which led to unnecessary loss of equipment and personnel. This happened because commanders at all levels neglected reconnaissance. 6. Inability to organize combat operations along the routes which would interfere with enemy movements, who advanced mainly along roads. 7. Obstacles were not utilized; cooperation with combat engineer groups was non - existent. 8. There was no attempt to deny the enemy the opportunity to bring up fuel and ammunition. Ambushes along the main enemy route of advance were not employed. 9. Enemy pressure on our flanks led to fear of being encircled; while the tank units should not fear encirclements. 10. Large population centres were not utilized to destroy the enemy and inability to operate in them was discovered. 11. Control, starting from platoon commander to senior commanders was poor; radio was seldom utilized. To much time was spent on encoding and decoding messages. 12. Crews were extremely poorly trained in preventative maintenance. There were cases when crews abandoned their vehicles with ammunition still in them. There were individual case where crews left their vehicle and retreated. 13. All units lacked sufficient means of evacuation. The ones that did have them, could support mechanized corps and tank divisions only during offensive operations. 14. Personnel was not familiar with new equipment, especially KV and T-34. and was completely untrained in conducting repairs in field conditions. Repair facilities of tank divisions turned out to be incapable to conduct repairs during retrograde operations 15. Large percentage of command personnel did not know missions, did not have maps, which led to instances when not just individual tanks, but whole units would wonder around aimlessly. 16. Existing organizations of rear echelons is to cumbersome. Commanders technical deputy, instead of working with combat material, as a rule, would remain behind in the rear echelon. The rear support echelons need to be reduced, leaving only those vehicles employed in delivering fuel, ammunition, and food 17. There was no, as a rule, army staging areas for emergency vehicles, and nobody oversaw their operations. Lack of organic evacuation assets on army and front levels, led to inability to evacuate combat equipment 18. Headquarters turned out to be poorly trained staffed, as a rule, with officers not having experience working with tank units. 19. Too many people oversaw mechanized formations; front would assign missions, army would assign missions, commanders of rifle corps would assign missions. Employment of the 41st Tank Division, of the 22nd Mechanized Corps, is a vivid demonstration of this issue. 20. Some commanders of mechanized corps turned out to be not up to the task and completely lacked understanding about mechanized corps operations.