H042.2 Midway Movie – What They Got Wrong Sam Cox, Director of Naval History, 15 February 2020 The recent Midway movie was a commercial success, and for the first time in decades a sizable number of the American public had the rare opportunity to view a mostly-accurate movie about real U.S. Navy heroes instead of comic book heroes, and for that reason alone I believe the movie producers did a great public service. Hopefully, this will encourage more movies to be made about our great Navy heroes. Naturally, some of my historian comrades had to complain about the inaccuracies in the movie, and mostly miss the forest for the trees. However, practically every movie made about Navy subjects is chock full of historical inaccuracies, and even documentaries on Navy subjects almost always cause me to groan out loud. For the 1976 Midway movie (with Charlton Heston, Henry Fonda, etc.) – great cast, but I could write a PhD dissertation on what that movie got wrong. But for those who really want to dive in to what the recent Midway movie got wrong, I offer my three primary responses to the movie producers in my, often unsuccessful, attempt to improve the historical accuracy of the movie. Comments after viewing Director’s Cut – Sep 2019 From: Cox, Samuel J SES USN NHHC WASHINGTON DC (US) Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2019 7:18 AM Subject: Midway Movie Feedback John, most of my previous feedback to the script and the rough cut was not incorporated so I’m not going to recreate that again.  I still think it’s a great movie, and there is a very long list of things I think are superb about it.  It just could have been better, without losing any of the drama.  At this point it sounded like there was very little that could be changed.  So, you can pass this back. The depiction of the attacks on the Japanese carriers by aircraft from Midway is a complete hash, but better than the 75 movie which left them out completely.  One thing they might be able to change because it would just be a reordering of scenes;  In the movie the attacks by Enterprise Torpedo Squadron 6 (Lindsey) and Hornet Torpedo Squadron 8 (Waldron) are out of order.  VT-8 attacked at 0920 and all were shot down, with ENS Gay as the sole survivor.  VT-6 attacked at about 0940 and most of them were shot down, including Lindsey.   Yorktown Torpedo Squadron 3 (Massey) attacked just before the Enterprise and Yorktown dive bombers commenced their attack, and almost all of them were shot down, but don’t think there is any way to depict that at this point, and VT-3 was the real reason the Japanese fighters were down on the deck, but VT-8 should at least get credit for the first attack by US carrier aircraft on the Japanese carriers, given their ultimate sacrifice. Several of the more noteworthy errors, that any WWII buff will notice; - ARIZONA rolling on her side at Pearl Harbor - Too many Nevada/Pennsylvania-class battleships at Pearl Harbor, instead of Tennessee/Colorado classes - Japanese battleship (and mountains) in attack on Roi-Namur (a flat atoll) - Doolittle B-25’s indiscriminately bombing Japanese city (they split up and went after military targets) - Lexington at Coral Sea depicted as a burning/sinking Yorktown-class carrier – Halsey being there to see it; not even close. - The B-26 attack on the Japanese carriers is all wrong (except that one nearly did decapitate Nagumo and his staff.)  Depicted as a high altitude horizontal bombing – that is what the four-engine B-17’s were doing, and hitting nothing.  There were only four B-26’s and they were conducting a low-level torpedo attack. - When Nautilus raises her periscope to see the Arashi leaving, what is depicted is a Japanese Kongo-class battleship not a destroyer. - The last attack by Best on the Hiryu will make any living dive bomber pilot gag.  The dive bombers did in fact plant four bombs on the forward flight deck of Hiryu, a couple right through the “meatball” but not by skimming the flight deck as depicted. - The incident with Gaido and his pilot being thrown overboard occurred days later (and neither talked and both were thrown over the side, with weights, not a perfectly good anchor.) - At the end, 10,000 Chinese killed as a result of the Doolittle raid is about the lowest estimate I have seen.  - Among many others. I guess if you view the special effects more as an impressionist painting rather than realistic it is easier to take.  They are really cool though. Sam Samuel J. Cox RADM, USN (retired) Director of Naval History Curator for the Navy Director, Naval History and Heritage Command 202-433-2210  samuel.cox@navy.mil Comments After Reviewing Rough Cut – May 2019 Midway Movie: Comments on Historical Accuracy, 24 May 2019 Rear Admiral (retired) Sam Cox, Director Naval History and Heritage Command. General: This is already probably the best navy movie ever made and I applaud the lengths that the script writers and special effects teams have gone to be accurate. I also recognize that in order to condense the story to run in acceptable time some fictionalization of events and timelines is required. I provide the following comments only for the sake of historical accuracy. I recognize that it is probably impractical to re-shoot scenes but there is possibly ample opportunity to make special effects changes. Despite the number of comments, I love the movie and am pleased that it is being made. I would be more than happy to assist further. The following are combined comments of myself and NHHC Historians Robert J. Cressman and Peter Luebke; Cressman is the Editor, Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships and lead author/editor of “A Glorious Page in our History: The Battle of Midway, 4-6 June 1942, “Steady Nerves and Stout Hearts”: The USS Enterprise Air Group and Pearl Harbor, (w/J.Michael Wenger) and “That Gallant Ship”: USS Yorktown (CV-5). MIDWAY CONTINUITY WIP 05/22/19 REEL 1 DC v 22 Scene 1. OK (Cressman: Interesting, unexpected scene. Very good.) Scene 2. OK Scene 3. OK, although a junior officer would have been more deferential to such a senior officer, even a foreign admiral, so a few “Sir” and “Admiral” from Layton would have made it more accurate. Cressman: I agree. Both Layton and Yamamoto were products of their respective Naval Academies.) Scene 4. (Cressman: See comments for 5-7. McClusky would most likely not be the man who ordered the flight deck cleared; it probably would have been the flight deck officer, whose territory that was in the shipboard hierarchy.) Scene 5-7. Flight characteristics are far too exaggerated, approach far too steep. Any pilot attempting maneuvers so extreme would have had their wings pulled for endangering not only themselves but everyone else on the flight deck and the ship. Any carrier aviator watching this will go, “Hollywood.” Making practice landings with no-standard flap configurations is plausible, but would not have been done on an ad hoc basis. (Cressman: In the pre-war USN carrier community, anybody trying this probably would’ve been grounded. At the time, all of the principal characters in this scene were with different squadrons: McClusky in Fighting 6 (he seems to have been made Air Group Commander here), Dickinson was with Scouting 6, and Best in Bombing 6. Markings inaccurate on aircraft: should be small red-centered white star on blue circle with 6-B-whatever his individual number is (6-B-10) in BLACK, not white. Same type star on upper port wing ONLY, and on lower starboard wing ONLY.) Scene 8, 8A. OK (Cressman: McClusky would not have been the one who was upset, but LCDR Howard “Brigham” Young, who was Commander Enterprise Air Group (CEAG) at the time.) Scene 9AA, 9 Japanese Zeros at Pearl Harbor did not carry bombs. The first bombs came from Val dive bombers and would have come from planes diving from near vertical directly overhead. The first dive bombers hit targets ashore on Ford Island (the sea plane base). The Val dive bombers would strafe as they came out of the dive from forward firing guns and the rear seat gunner. Then almost immediately torpedoes from Kates would hit the battleships on the outboard side of battleship row. Arizona did not get hit by any of the torpedoes as all the Kates launched their torpedoes at the battleships ahead of the Arizona. The next bombs came from Kates flying at high altitude in level flight, one of these planes dropped the bomb that caused Arizona to explode. Just before the bombs hit, Zeroes would strafe the ships with guns to suppress any anti-aircraft fire and then after the bombs hit would conduct follow up strafing attacks when it became apparent there was effective U.S. opposition by fighters. Roy would have been in whites rather than service khaki, and uniform for the crew would have been white pants white T-shirt, except engine room in dungarees. (Luebke: Japanese Zeros would not be bombing or dropping torpedoes. The large oval object under the Zero seen in most photographs of the Pearl Harbor attack is a centerline auxiliary fuel tank.) (Cressman: Roy going to a “locker room” is odd, since as a ship’s officer, particularly a lieutenant, he would have probably been living on board in a double stateroom with a room-mate, thus a “locker room” would have not been necessary. Plus he would have been wearing whites, not khakis. He could have been wearing civvies (suit) because officers could wear civvies when not on duty, not so enlisted men (they had lockers ashore to change). Sailors would have been bringing up benches, not individual chairs. Sailors would have been wearing white shorts and white t-shirts; engine room force would have been wearing dungarees, however, because of the nature of their work. The burn casualties at PH were precisely because the crewmen were not protected. The interaction between Pearce and Sully seems a bit inappropriate, the sailor complaining too much (one did what he was told then and groused to a shipmate) and Pearce responding to him by using language that a USNA man probably would not have used. All the PH bombing scenes seem too reminiscent of “Pearl Harbor” of a few years ago, with almost “Star Wars”-type flying between the ships, which would never have been done. Scene 9A pt2 OK. Hollywood. (Cressman: This seems like a Hollywood invention. From the placement of the ship moored in the distance, the Bests would have been living in Chief Petty Officer’s quarters. Most officers were renting in Honolulu, etc., or those environs.) Scene 9. See remarks above. Japanese planes flying between the battleships is unrealistic; they were moored too close together. Zeros would have strafed down either side. Most of the battleships in the scene appeared to be Arizona clones. Although different class, Nevada and Oklahoma would have looked nearly identical to Arizona, but California, Tennessee, Maryland, West Virginia were very different looking (although two different classes, those four look almost identical). Pennsylvania, sister ship of Arizona, was in dry dock on the other side of the harbor. (Cressman: Most of the CGI battleships seem to be Arizona-look-alikes, when they were four different classes (two of which had distinctive “cage” masts), plus they seem spread too far apart. The main battle line of the Pacific Fleet was actually in a very small area: California by herself, Oklahoma and Maryland side by side, and West Virginia and Tennessee side by side, then Arizona, with the repair ship Vestal (nicely done in this movie, BTW), then Nevada at the end all by herself (which gave her the freedom to move). The geography of PH seems to have been changed to accommodate these battleships being spread out.) Scene 10. OK. (Cressman: Layton’s attire: would he have been in civvies or uniform of the day (i.e., whites). Scene 11. OK Scene 13. This explosion was much more catastrophic and instantaneous than depicted. (Cressman: The hit that destroyed Arizona hit FORWARD, not AFT as implied by the explosion behind Roy and Sully. Neither of them would most likely have survived it.) Scene 13A, 14. OK Scene 15. This scene is based on real incident but didn’t happen this way. Six badly burned sailors climbed down a line thrown from the Vestal; all made it across, although two died shortly afterwards from their burns. (Cressman: The fires would most likely have been too fierce at this level (oil in water, etc.) to transfer people this way; how Arizona sailors climbed hand over hand from then foremast to the Vestal would have been quite an evolution.) Scene 16, 17. (Cressman: Again, markings on the SBD should be as in Scene 5-7; Dickinson was flying 6-S-4, McCarthy, his wingman, was flying 6-S-9. McCarthy was shot down, bailed out, his radioman, Cohn, went down with the plane, same as Dickinson’s scenario. Miller (tall country-boy from NC) expended all of his ammunition during the fight (SINGLE-MOUNT .30-caliber Browning machine gun, NOT twins) and emitted a “blood-curdling scream” just before he died. When Dickinson bailed out, the slipstream tore the goggles from his head.) Scene 19. Best wouldn’t have been in the radio room. (Cressman: Best was sitting in Bombing SIX’s ready room. The talker (enlisted man) near the front of the room, standing by the blackboard, blurted out: “Pearl Harbor has been attacked. This is not – repeat not – a drill.” Pilots exchanged mystified glances.) Scene 18 pt 1. Roy is using a 20mm Oerlikon which weren’t on US ships until mid-1942. He would have been using a .50cal mounted browning machine gun. Actually based on his location on the ship he would have died in the magazine explosion, but for the sake of drama… (Cressman: Roy’s firing the wrong gun at the wrong location: Arizona had eight .50 caliber water-cooled Browning machine guns, four in a “birdbath” at the top of the mainmast, and four in a battery on the foremast just below the fire control top. 20 mms are not appropriate for PH, being installed early in 1942 to mid-1942.) Scene 20. OK (Cressman: No problems here although Zeroes seem to be everywhere. Dive bombers strafed, too (fixed landing gear, two guns in the cowl firing forward, plus a gun in back for the plane commander). Scene 21. Actually Kimmel did listen to Layton. The operational ships in Pearl Harbor were at a higher condition of readiness than normal (equivalent to “Wartime steaming” rather than normal inport readiness.) Layton was right that the Japanese carriers were missing and unaccounted for, and Kimmel and others on his staff were very concerned about it. All of them however, including Layton, were expecting war to break out in the Far East (which it did.) Although they all considered an attack on Pearl Harbor as a possibility, they were not expecting that the Japanese would attack with all six carriers. (Cressman: Don’t have a problem with this although the major problem at PH was lack of communication between Army (which was responsible for protecting the fleet) and the Navy. No one expected Japan to put a six carrier task force off Hawaii.) Scene 18. Pt. 2. Scene shows Arizona rolling on her side. Arizona settled right side up, her forward half engulfed in massive flames. (Oklahoma, which looks nearly identical to Arizona, was farther forward on Battleship Row and did capsize.) (Cressman: Quite a dramatic scene but totally fiction. Arizona settled on an even keel, burning intensely (she burned for two days). Vestal, alongside, had some of her decks cleared by the cataclysmic explosion of Arizona. Oklahoma DID capsize, West Virginia sank upright thanks to excellent counterflooding by a well-trained crew.) Scene 22. I don’t remember the scene. (Cressman: How could a petty officer locate the Japanese Fleet?) REEL 2 DC v22 Scene 23. OK. Technically this would be an “ambiguous bearing.” Direction finding equipment at the time would result in two bearings, one toward the target and one opposite to the target. It was up to the operator, depending on the tactical situation, to assess which bearing was to the target and which was the opposite reciprocal bearing. Scene 24. OK. Using dive bombers to create a smoke screen for the torpedo bombers was a pre-war tactic, and in this case the dive bombers launched with smoke. The tactic was never used in battle afterwards. (Cressman: Sending smokers to lay smoke for torpedo planes was the accepted tactic. Who’s giving the orders here? McClusky was a fighter squadron skipper, not Commander Enterprise Air Group. Only CO’s left on ship were Hollingsworth (Bombing SIX), Lindsey (Torpedo SIX) and McClusky (Fighting SIX). Air group commander (Young) at PH, Scouting SIX CO and XO (Hopping and Gallaher, respectively) at PH as well, having been on the scouting flight ahead of Enterprise (that Dickinson was on). VB-6 contributed four of it’s a/c to the morning scouting flight.) Scene 25. OK. Scene 32. OK. Scene 26-29. OK Scene 31. OK. Enterprise official log does not record the “torpedo ride” but a couple books do. Borderline unbelievable. (Cressman: Checked out this story, first appeared in a wartime publication (Eugene Burns), then was picked up by another author (Edward Stafford). Have checked Enterprise deck log and there is NO record of this event. Best getting in Lindsey’s face? Best has been flirting with getting busted at least twice by this point in the movie. Dick Best was USNA Class of 1932, Eugene Lindsey USNA Class of 1927. McClusky Class of ’26. Those hierarchies were observed in the pre-war Navy. Scene 33. OK. Some sunken/burning ships not in correct locations. (Cressman: Enterprise is coming into PH the wrong way, smaller ships could have come up the channel toward the Navy Yard but carriers would have gone clockwise around Ford Island. Enterprise moored at berth F-9, which is on the west side of the island. (Sunk or burning ships seem quite scattered, which was not the case). Workmen cutting into the Oklahoma (which would not have been seen from the Enterprise since she came in on the opposite side of the island) – the bottom of the ship should be red anti-fouling paint. She’d gotten a brand new coat when she was in the yard on the west coast a short time before, and survivors of PH made a note of observing how bright it was. Also the OKIE looks almost too big. There are pics of this.) Scene 35. OK (Cressman: An interesting plot point, but Best and Dickinson were in different squadrons. Scene 36. OK Scene 37. OK Scene 38. OK. Scene 39 OK. Scene 40. Yamamoto never actually said this, but it was consistent with his belief and has become common lore. (Cressman: What Yamamoto says about awakening a sleeping giant was in a book authored by Ladislas Farago, whose reliability is very questionable.) (Luebke: Does not sound as if the geisha uses the proper verb forms or honorifics) Scene 41. OK. The U.S. carriers weren’t there, so Nagumo couldn’t have attacked them even if Tamon Yamaguchi had advocated. Scene 42. OK, but overstates Nagumo’s caution. There were many good reasons why Nagumo made the decisions he did at Pearl Harbor. Although the convention wisdom of Nagumo at Midway is that he was indecisive, when in fact he was overly decisive and overly aggressive. (Cressman: Nagumo’s caution at PH was understandable; he didn’t like the idea of going into lion’s mouth and was glad to have gotten away with the losses he had suffered. He was responsible for six carriers and, I suspect, getting them home in one piece.) Scene 45. (Cressman: Nimitz’s entrance, his diary says “We [he and his aide, Lamar] stopped at the [Navy] Department only long enough to see Stark [the Chief of Naval Operations] a minute and then the Secretary [Frank Knox] and then to the station…” Whoever wrote the screenplay should have used Potter’s Nimitz bio because it’s quite concise: 16 Dec was when Sec’y Knox visited the White House and FDR told him he wanted Nimitz for CINCPAC. Knox went to Main Navy and sent for Nimitz…great quotes and a great scene.) Scene 43. OK. Scene 46, 47. King wasn’t CNO yet. He actually never said the “son’s of bitches” quote but it is widely attributed to him and certainly fit his personality. King had been appointed Command-in-Chief U.S. Fleet when Kimmel was relieved (Kimmel was both U.S. Fleet and Pacific Fleet. King was Commander-in-Chief of Atlantic Fleet at the time, and the title of CINC U.S. Fleet, passed to King as next senior.) A meeting between King and Nimitz is plausible, but Nimitz actually would have been informed by CNO Harold Stark (the senior officer in the Navy.) But, hey, it’s a great scene. (Cressman: King did not become CNO until March 1942! This scene is total fiction. SecNav Knox gave Nimitz the news, not King.) Scene 44. OK. This is correct (most accounts get it wrong). Yamamoto decided on Midway before Doolittle raid, but had not yet convinced Imperial General Staff yet. Scene 48, 49. OK (Cressman: A rather large cemetery with rows of white crosses visible from the Pearl Harbor channel is rather far-fetched. They needed the land for the living to carry on a war. There were no burials on Ford Island or near the waters thereof. This is an invention.) Scene 50. Smith’s Union Bar was hangout for Arizona enlisted sailors. Wasn’t a place officers would go. (Cressman: Officers did not need to go into Honolulu to drink, they had an Officers Club.) Scene 51. Hollywood, but OK. Officers got drunk too. (Cressman: Best’s character by this point has three strikes against him as far as insubordination, etc., goes. Don’t believe this scene to be plausible in the Navy of the time.) Scene 53, 54 pt. 1. OK REEL 3 DC v31 Scene 53, 54 pt. 2. OK. Scene 55, 56. OK (Cressman: Each squadron had a ready room (each sqdn 12-18 planes) not just one. McClusky is giving the briefing like he’s the air group commander – he’s the fighter skipper. He would’ve been briefing his own pilots, not the bomber and/or torpedo pilots.) Scene 57. Aircraft markings. For Pearl Harbor, Roi and Coral Sea scenes, USN aircraft had red ball in center of white star, and red-white stripes on tail redder. For Midway scenes, for USN aircraft all red had been removed to make sure no chance if accidental misidentification with Japanese red ball. (Cressman: Markings on the aircraft by this stage of the war were red-centered stars in six positions on the wings, on the fuselage, and rudder stripes (red alternating with white). These changed as the result of early wartime experience that by Midway the rudder stripes were gone and the red centers were out of the stars. No red in the mkgs at all. Squadron letters and numbers were pretty much down to a letter depicting the squadron, i.e., B for bombing, S for scouting and T for torpedo, with individual [plane number following: i.e., B-10, S-14, F-9, etc.] Also, Murray was one of the more senior radiomen in the outfit, he wouldn’t have needed much reassuring. In real life, Murray was not flying with Best anyway.) Scene 58, 59. Scene shows a Japanese battleship as target. Largest ship at Roi was light cruiser. (Cressman: At Kwajalein, SBDs (VB 6 and VS 6) and TBDs (VT 6) from Enterprise sink transport Bordeaux Maru and damage light cruiser Katori, submarine I-23, minelayer Tokiwa, auxiliary netlayer Kashima Maru, auxiliary submarine chaser No.2 Shonan Maru, submarine depot ship Yasukuni Maru, oiler Toa Maru, tanker Hoyo Maru, and army cargo ship Shinhei Maru; in the bombing of shore installations, Rear Admiral Yatsushiro Sukeyoshi (Commander Sixth Base Force) becomes the first Imperial Navy flag officer to die in combat when an SBD scores a direct hit on his headquarters. Off Wotje, gunfire from heavy cruisers Northampton (CA-26) and Salt Lake City (CA-25) sink gunboat Toyotsu Maru; destroyer Dunlap (DD-384) shells and sinks auxiliary submarine chaser No.10 Shonan Maru.) Scene 60, 61. Roi-Namur is an islet on Kwajalein Atoll. Atoll is flat, only a few feet above sea level. There are no mountains. (Cressman: Also, Best and Dickinson were in two different squadrons and would thus not be attacking together unless squadron discipline had broken down completely. Also Taroa was attacked by FIGHTERS twice as well as gunfire from the ships of the task force. Fighters opposing our fighters were NOT Zeroes but were in fact Mitsubishi Type 96 (Claude), fixed-landing gear, single-engine. Machine guns in engine cowl. Type 96s were all they had in the Marshalls and Gilberts.) Scene 62. OK. Scene 63, 65. (Cressman: Dive bombers did not attack Taroa until a third time later in the afternoon; Best led the nine-plane strike (eight SBDs from Bombing SIX and one from Scouting SIX), and he was attacked by three Type 96 fighters. No Zeroes there.) Scene 69. The Japanese bombs are actually hitting too close to the ENTERPRISE. Near misses that close would cause serious damage. The approach of the bomber damaged bomber was a much shallower glide slope. Crewmen would not have been standing around the flight deck watching this. After the Japanese plane cut off the tail of Gaido’s plane, he got out and used an extinguisher to put out a flaming pool of gasoline. Then he went and hid, worried that he would get in trouble for leaving his battle station (in one of the catwalks) to hop in the plane. A search party had to find him and bring him to Halsey. (Cressman: One bomb landed 30 yards to port of Enterprise; fragments started a fire that was quickly put out. The bomber that approached the Enterprise astern was “in a flaming mockery of a landing approach…” (Lundstrom, The First Team). Light AA fire, Enterprise heeled sharply, bomber did not match the turn and clipped the flight deck. At the time, Gaido was a plane-pusher, not air crew, so he would have had a station on the flight deck. He was wearing a flying helmet (no goggles), a sweatshirt (probably yellow), and dungarees.) Scene 70. OK Scene 71-72A. OK Scene 73. OK Scene 74. OK Scene 75-78. Halsey gave the order to launch after the US task group was sighted by a Japanese fishing boat that was being used as a picket boat, and after U.S. radio intelligence confirmed it had sent a message. Aircraft from ENTERPRISE bombed and sank the trawler, although machine gun fire damaged one SBD enough that it had to ditch and pilot was rescued. Trawler was sunk by gunfire from light cruiser Nashville. (Cressman: The Enterprise SBDs (VB 3, VB 6) and F4Fs (VF 6) attacked Japanese guardboats ("picket" boats) encountered near TF 16, damaging armed merchant cruiser Awata Maru and guardboats (converted trawlers) Chokyu Maru, No.1 Iwate Maru, No.2 Asami Maru, Kaijin Maru, No.3 Chinyo Maru, Eikichi Maru, Kowa Maru, and No.26 Nanshin Maru. Guardboats No.23 Nitto Maru (the one that spotted the task force) and Nagato Maru, also damaged by SBDs and F4Fs from Enterprise, are sunk by gunfire of light cruiser Nashville (CL-43). Doolittle’s aircraft (if my memory is correct, seeing it only for the first time) carries elaborate “nose art,” which is totally incorrect at this stage of the war. Only two or three of the Doolittle planes had any kind of markings at all other than the standard U.S. star in four positions (upper left wing, lower right, and fuselage both sides), and the serial in yellow on the tail, and U.S. Army under the wing: U.S. under the right and ARMY under the left wing. Scene 85A, 85B. OK Scene 86 PT.1. OK (Luebke: Does not sound as if the guards for Hirohito use the appropriate language for speaking with the Emperor) Scene 86 PT. Scene shows planes bombing Tokyo indiscriminately. The planes spilt up, flew at much lower altitude, and bombed military targets (such as Yokosuka shipyard) in multiple different cities, although a few bombs missed and hit civilian targets, and some machine gun fire hit a schoolyard. Japanese propaganda greatly exaggerated the civilian casualties. (Cressman: B-25s bombed targets in Tokyo, Yokosuka, Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagoya; one B-25 bombed and damaged carrier Ryuho (being converted from submarine depot ship Taigei) at Yokosuka. Of the 16 B-25s launched, 15 are lost in occupied China, where brutal reprisals by Japanese against Chinese populace (Chekiang province) ensued; one B-25 landed intact at Vladivostok where it and its crew are interned by the Soviets. The scene here shows B-25s in formation, which did not happen; they were launched one by one from a carrier pitching in very heavy weather.) Scene 86D. OK Scene 87, 88 OK (I’m not sure Layton’s wife was even in Hawaii, as most Pacific Fleet wives remained in San Pedro, CA since the fleet move to Pearl Harbor in 1940 was supposed to be temporary. Layton’s book doesn’t mention his wife, although she was instrumental after his death in getting it published.) (Cressman: No problem with scene in and of itself, but how many of the staff wives were still on Oahu? Kimmel’s was not there to start with because he didn’t want to be distracted.) REEL 4 DC v30 Scene 88A-88E. OK (Cressman: No problem, although emphasis on the Halsey-Doolittle Raid slows down the Midway story. The H-D Raid seems almost gratuitous and I think slows the story down. Scene 94-95A. OK. Scene 88G. OK. Scene 97, 97B OK. Condensed. Scene 98, 99. ENTERPRISE was turned around before reaching Coral Sea. Never saw Lexington or Yorktown. Scene shows three Yorktown-class carriers; Lexington was different class. Even YORKTOWN was out of sight before LEXINGTON sank. (Cressman: This scene is invented, Halsey’s task force (Enterprise AND Hornet, not just Enterprise) did not come within sight of Yorktown and Lexington. All carriers appear to be Yorktown-class; Lexington was altogether different!) Scene 100. (Cressman: McClusky became Commander Enterprise Air Group on 21 March 1942, relieving Howard Young. Not sure when Best was promoted to CO, relieving Hollingsworth. The fact that Murray starts riding with Best after mid-April indicates Best may have been promoted to CO about that time.) Scene 100A. Japanese wouldn’t have committed that many bombers to a village, but bombing and strafing civilians and committing atrocities were real enough. Scene 101, 102. This one’s hard to believe, but true. Scene 105. OK. Scene 106. OK. Scene 107. OK. Scene 108. OK. The musicians were actually just extra manpower to run the tabulating machines that were available because their ship had been sunk during the attack on Pearl Harbor. That there were there because musicians might have code-breaking skills is an urban legend, although a lot of people believed it then and now. Scene 109. Rocheforte was much more straight laced than he is depicted, smoking jacket and slippers notwithstanding. It’s a better portrayal than Hal Holbrook though. Popping amphetamines for the whole bunch of them was true. (Cressman: Problem I have here is that Nimitz is visiting Rochefort circa April 1942 – Nimitz wanted to see (and DID) see him right after N arrived at PH! Layton did not take him to see Rochefort, RADM Claude C. Bloch, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, introduced them. The meeting BTW, did NOT impress Nimitz, nor Rochefort, who was busy at the time of the visit. See Carlson’s book.) Scene 109A. (Cressman: Should perhaps have occurred earlier in the story.) Scene 110. Wouldn’t have burned the message like that. Scene 111. The transmission in the clear by Midway was deliberate, although from the winks and nods that appears to come across in the scene. (Cressman: Rochefort’s suggestion of the in-clear message could be worked in, as well as the use of the secure underwater cable, since Midway could be told in plain language to send a message about their water problem.) Scene 111A. OK. (Cressman: Ford and McKenzie arrived on Midway on 29 May 1942.) Scene 104. (Cressman: The only “Willie” I know of was Willie West, who was in Scouting SIX at the time. He was lost in a plane crash at sea but not in this fashion, post-Coral Sea (21 May I believe). Scene 112. OK Scene 113-116. OK. Scene 117. OK. Nice touch with Doris Miller in the group getting awards (first African American to receive Navy Cross.) Scene 118. (Cressman: This appears to show Nimitz visiting Halsey. Halsey, junior to Nimitz, reported to Nimitz, who saw what Halsey looked like and acted accordingly. REEL 5 DC v30 Scene 120. OK Scene 121, 122. Damage was internal; flight deck hole had been patched. (Cressman: No problem except the damage to Yorktown shows a very large gaping hole in the flight deck, which was not there.) Scene 123. OK Scene 125. (Cressman: Lindsey made a bad landing, hitting the ramp (too low), then went over the port side. Mkgs should be blue/white stars, no rudder stripes. Scene 126, 127. (Cressman: Lindsey had internal chest injuries and apparently hit the gunsight as he had facial scars (visible in the photo of his being transferred from the destroyer that picked him up to the Enterprise). Scene 128, 128A. OK. Scene 129. ENTERPRISE and HORNET operated in the general vicinity of each other. YORKTOWN operated as separate Task Force, so this scene wouldn’t have happened as depicted. (Cressman: Artistic license, as Yorktown operated in a separate task group from Enterprise and Hornet.) Scene A130, 130. OK. Scene 132. The planes were taking off in reaction to the first sighting report of the Japanese carriers by a Midway based PBY Catalina and a few minutes later by a report from another Catalina reporting that a large Japanese strike was heading toward Midway. It would have been obvious to Ford that Midway was preparing for an air raid. (Cressman: Ford had been asked to take station atop the power house, which was a good vantage point to assess the size of the incoming strike (being a motion picture director gave him the ability to estimate crowd size and the like). Scene 140. OK (Cressman: Enterprise wardroom was quite a palatial affair. Stewards in white, etc.) Scene 132. The Japanese air raid was not a surprise, Midway knew it was coming and it was met with far more anti-aircraft fire than the Japanese were expecting. The special effects have too many planes flying too close together (this is generally true throughout the movie.) Scene 132B. Again, too many planes too close together. Scene 133B. Nimitz received the PBY sighting report (which confirmed Layton’s estimate) before the Japanese air raid on Midway commenced, so would recommend moving this scene forward. The way it comes across is that the Japanese carriers were sighted after their planes were already bombing Midway, which isn’t much of a warning. (Cressman: Nimitz would not have to order an attack because he’d given Frank Jack Fletcher, the Officer in Tactical Command (who’s totally ignored in this movie – unfairly), that responsibility. Scene 134. This scene is the biggest historical mistake in the movie. When Midway received warning of the incoming Japanese raid, everything on the island that could fly was launched. First were Marine Wildcat and Brewster Buffalos to intercept the Japanese strike; they surprised the Japanese but almost all the Marine fighters were shot down or severely damaged. Before the dogfight, six US Navy TBF Avenger torpedo bombers took off and headed straight for the Japanese carriers. Immediately following the TBF’s were four US Army Air Force B-26’s which also headed straight for the Japanese carriers, and being slightly faster than the TBF’s wound up attacking the carriers at almost the same time from slightly different direction. After the B-26’s took off, the Marine dive bombers (about half SBD Dauntless and half older Vindicators) took off, but with very inexperienced pilots it took them almost an hour to form up and they didn’t attack the Japanese carriers until almost an hour after the Navy TBF’s and the Army B-26’s did. The Japanese had never seen TBF’s or B-26’s before and they proved to be very difficult to shoot down, but eventually the 30 Japanese fighters airborne shot down five of the TBF’s (three got close enough to drop torpedoes) and one of the B-26’s (two of the B-26’s dropped torpedoes.) The Japanese fighters had to come inside their own shipboard anti-aircraft fire in order to complete the destruction of the U.S. aircraft. Japanese shipboard anti-aircraft fire was impressive looking but very inaccurate. Although many U.S. aircraft were damaged by ship anti-aircraft guns, almost every U.S. aircraft that was lost was shot down by Japanese Zero fighters, or crashed on the way back due to damage and loss of fuel. In the special effects of the Japanese task force, there are too many ships, too close together and include types of ships that weren’t with the Japanese carriers (only two Japanese battleships were with the Japanese carriers, the rest were still 600 miles away.) The same comment is true for the U.S. task groups; too many ships, too close together, and a couple shots have U.S. pre-WWII battleships (of the kind at Pearl Harbor.) No U.S. battleships of any kind were at Midway. Japanese escort ships would be stationed at the horizon in order to provide maximum warning to the carriers (since the Japanese did not have radar.) The Japanese carriers would then engage in wild maneuvering to try to spoil the aim of dive bombers and torpedo bombers, and the other Japanese ships would stay well clear so as not to impede the carrier or collide. Japanese ships were very good at dodging bombs and torpedoes even if their anti-aircraft guns were mostly ineffective. (Cressman: Agree with Adm. Cox’s comments in their entirety.) Scene 135. The Navy TBF’s attacked the Hiryu, Tamon Yamagushi’s flagship, and the ship had to dodge a couple torpedoes. When the Marine dive bombers reached the Japanese carriers and hour later half of them attacked the Hiryu. Since the U.S. pilots were inexperienced Henderson led them in a glide bombing attack rather than the steeper dive bombing profile, yet even so straddled Hiryu with multiple near misses. Even the Japanese were surprised that none of them hit. Most of the Marine planes were shot down by fighters either before they dropped their bombs or as they were trying to get away after dropping their bombs. Scene 136, 137. The Marine bombers didn’t miss by much (see above). Scene 138. The Akagi was attacked by the three remaining B-26’s (of the original four) at the same time Hiryu was being attacked by the Navy TBF’s. The B-26’s were carrying one torpedo each (the first and only time US Air Force aircraft ever did). One B-26 was shot down by Japanese fighters before it could reach the Japanese carriers. The first B-26 launched a torpedo at Akagi, but Akagi avoided it. The second B-26 did the same, but buzzed the Akagi’s deck lengthwise a few feet above the deck and the B-26’s gunners shot up the Akagi’s flight deck (didn’t do much damage but definitely got Nagumo’s attention.) Both the B-26’s were badly damaged and barely made it back to Midway. The third B-26 was crippled before it could drop a torpedo and it came straight in at low level, missing Akagi’s bridge (and Nagumo) by only a few feet. This is the key event of the battle as it convinces Nagumo that he needs to launch a second strike on Midway, setting in motion the re-arming fiasco. If the VT-8 Midway detachment is not going to be depicted in the movie, which was one of the most heroic attacks in the history of the United States Navy, at least give the U.S. Air Force credit for attacking the Japanese before the Marines did, and changing the course of the battle. It was also the smoke from the TBF and B-26 attacks that led the Nautilus to the Japanese carriers. (Also during this period US Army Air Force B-17 bombers conducted high altitude attacks on the Japanese carriers, but none of them hit anything.) Scene 139. Even though most of the U.S. planes from Midway had been shot down, they had given the Japanese a real scare. Nagumo had to choose between dealing with what had proven to be a very real and dangerous threat from Midway Island or what to him was a hypothetical threat that a U.S. aircraft carrier might be near, which none of his scout planes had found yet. He didn’t know that Midway had shot it’s bolt; there was hardly anything left on the island that could still fly. Scene 145. OK. Scene 141. Too many U.S. ships, too close together, including battleships that weren’t there. Scene 143. As soon as Nagumo received the report of U.S. ships (where there weren’t supposed to be any) he immediately grasped the danger and ordered the planes that he had just ordered be re-armed for a second Midway strike to be halted and re-armed for a ship strike. He also aggressively turned toward the U.S. ships. If he had cautiously turned away, he would have been out of range of Enterprise Air Group, McClusky/Best’s strike. Scene 147, 152A. Japanese destroyers at the time did not have side-throwing depth charges. Depth charges were rolled off the stern. The Japanese did not realize how deep US submarines could go, so their depth charges were usually set too shallow and would explode above the U.S. submarine. Scene 149. OK. Scene B147-147BC. Same comment as above on depth charges. Scene 146, 146A. OK. Scene 147. Near missed by depth charges. A direct hit would sink the submarine. Scene 148. OK. Scene 152AB. OK. Scene 152. Near miss. Scene 155, 158. The TBD torpedo bomber squadron from Hornet (VT-8) attacked the Japanese first. All 15 planes were shot down, with only one survivor, ENS George Gay. Lindsey’s squadron (VT-6) attacked about 20 minutes later, and almost all the planes were shot down. Lindsey’s was one of the first to go down as Japanese fighters would deliberately concentrate on the leader. Both VT-8 and VT-6 had become separated from their fighter escort and they were shot down by Japanese fighters, only a few got close enough to drop torpedoes, but none of the US torpedo bombers turned away. The Japanese carriers were able to avoid all torpedoes that were launched. Yorktown’s torpedo squadron came in after Lindsey (and slightly before the dive bombing attacks) and 10 of 12 of those planes were shot down. Scene 159. Lindsey’s squadron attacked Akagi. Yorktown’s squadron attacked Hiryu. (Hornet’s squadron had attacked Soryu.) REEL 6 DC 30 Scene 153. OK Scene 152B, 152BB. OK. Scene 154, 154A. OK. By this time, many of the aircraft in McCluskey’s flight don’te have enough gas to get back to the carrier, so this is a real gamble. (Cressman: The second CO involved, Gallaher (Scouting SIX) doesn’t even figure in the story! We’ve got two squadrons of Dauntlesses and one three-plane section (McClusky and his two wingmen). BTW, the SBDs engaged at Midway (except the Marines, who you don’t see) had twin guns in the after cockpit (air cooled .30-caliber Brownings), as did all the TBDs.) Scene 156, 160. Title misidentifies this as Yorktown Torpedo Squadron 8. Torpedo 8 (VT-8) was on Hornet and attacked the Japanese before Lindsey, so this scene should be come before Lindsey’s attack and be correctly titled. Scene 161. Nagumo and Yamaguchi already had this figured out. As soon as U.S. ships were sighted by the scout plane, the Japanese assumed there had to be a U.S. carrier with them. The big surprise for the Japanese was how many. Hornet’s torpedo bomber attack indicated there was one US carrier. Lindsey’s attack meant there was a second US carrier and Yorktown’s torpedo squadron attack meant there were three. What this meant to both Nagumo and Yamaguchi was there had to be six squadrons of dive bombers from three US carriers heading their way. But the sacrifice of the U.S. torpedo bombers, although unintended, kept the Japanese from bringing their strike on deck to finish rearming and launch because they had to keep the decks clear for the fighters to land, re-arm, refuel and launch again, plus the wild maneuvering to avoid torpedoes also delayed the preparation of the strike aircraft. (Of the six U.S. dive bomber squadrons, the two from Hornet missed sighting the Japanese and one from Yorktown was held back in reserve. The two Enterprise squadrons would have missed the Japanese too were it not for Arashi. The two Enterprise squadrons and one Yorktown squadron (Bombing Three) arrived at the same time (by coincidence) over the Japanese carriers from almost opposite direction. (Cressman: Bombing Three, some of whose pilots – including the CO, LCDR Max Leslie -- had accidentally dropped their bombs because of an electrical malfunction in the arming switches attacked even without their bombs to draw fire away from others.) Scene 160. OK. Scene 162. That’s what the Japanese were trying to do, but the need to defend against the attacks by the torpedo bombers prevented it. Scene 163. This had been going on for over two hours by this point. Scene 165. Too many Japanese ships, too close together, and included some wrong types (like Yamato). McClusky as the air group commander is in charge of both Enterprise dive bomber squadrons. Best is in charge of one of them. Whether Best or McClusky caused the mix up is a matter of historical dispute, but for whatever reason, both dive bomber squadrons go after the same carrier (Kaga.) Realizing the error, Best breaks off with two other planes to attack Akagi (while about 27-28 attack Kaga.) Had Best not done this, and had Akagi not been hit, the whole course of the battle could have been changed. Scene 164. OK. Scene 166, 168 Only one U.S. plane was shot down by Kaga’s anti-aircraft fire, although many were damaged, and a number of those were unable to get back to Enterprise. Scene 167, 169, 170. OK. Scene 171. OK. Although Hiryu was pretty far from Akagi and Kaga, and hidden from the U.S. strike. Soryu is under attack from Yorktown’s dive bombers squadron which arrived about the same time as the two from Enterprise. Scene 175-178. All three planes would have dropped nearly simultaneously from a much steeper angle than depicted (although it wasn’t textbook near vertical). The planes would release their bombs, and then start to pull out of their dives. As depicted it is too much like Luke Skywalker hitting the Death Star. Scene 179. OK. Scene 180. OK. Scene 182. Sucks to be him. Although some were able to land on Hiryu for a temporary reprieve. Scene 183-185. OK. Don’t over-do the number of planes blown of the flight deck. There were only a few fighters refueling and rearming. The dive bombers and torpedo bombers were all still below in the hanger decks. Scene 186. OK. Scene 188. OK. Scene 189. OK Scene 190. OK, although this event actually occurred several days later after both Gaido and O’Flaherty refused to talk. Both were thrown over side with weights tied to them (not a perfectly good anchor, those cost money.) Scene implies that O’Flaherty was going to talk; neither of them gave up any information of value. Scene 191. Hiryu launched two strikes. One composed of dive bombers, followed later by another of torpedo bombers, which took longer to re-arm. But, the bravery and skill of these last pilots was incredible as they nearly sank the Yorktown, and with a little luck might have sunk two U.S. carriers. (Cressman: One plot point that might have been interesting was that the dive bomber strike ran into a group of Scouting SIX Enterprise planes, ironically under a former Yorktown pilot, that put up such a good fight they thinned out the Japanese fighter cover that made it easier for the Combat Air Patrol to get at the dive bombers attacking Yorktown. Another interesting plot point would have been the fact that the leader of the dive bomber attack had not flown at Pearl Harbor because his engine wouldn’t start.) Scene 191A. Both Japanese strikes attacked Yorktown. Neither saw Enterprise or Hornet, and no one on Enterprise would have seen Yorktown being hit. Scene 192. OK. Scene 193, 194. OK. Best leads some of the planes on the strike on Hiryu, but he is not the overall strike leader (Wilmer Gallaher of Enterprise VS-6 was.) The strike is a mix of the remaining Enterprise aircraft and refugees from Yorktown which could not land on Yorktown due to the damage. Hornet also launched a strike against Hiryu, but it did not get there until after the Combined Enterprise/Yorktown strike inflicted fatal damage. REEL 7 DC v28 Scene 195. Hollywood. (Cressman: I would say this is a MAJOR problem. They would have gotten to know each other very well, and I doubt VERY seriously that Murray would have not have wanted to go into battle again. It’s inconceivable that a senior enlisted man of Murray’s stature and experience would have told his CO, with whom he’d been flying since 20 April, and all of May and the first few days of June, that he wasn’t going to fly again? Inconceivable. These men were made of sterner stuff.) Scene 196. OK. Scene 197. OK Scene 199. OK. Scene 200. OK. Scene 201, 202. Drop bomb from near Vertical, then pull out of dive. Scene 206-208. OK. Scene 205. OK. Scene 209. OK. Scene 211. Hollywood, but OK. Scene 212. Actually, as the bow of Hiryu burned out of control, about 700 of the crew were assembled on deck for a ceremony cheering the emperor before abandoning ship. It’s a Japanese thing. Both Tamon Yamaguchi and Captain Kaku go down with the ship. (Cressman: An interesting sidelight of the Hiryu’s story is that some of the engine room staff was still alive at that time, essentially left for dead. They managed to find a way out and came out topside and located an undamaged boat. Spotted by a PBY, they were picked up by the seaplane tender Ballard. The Japanese enlisted men were on the verge of throwing their senior officer (a lt.Cmdr) overboard because he was consuming too much of the beer in the survival rations. Scene 211A. OK. Scene 213. OK. Scene 214. OK. Scene 215. OK Scene 216. OK Scene 217, 218. OK Scene 220. OK (not supposed to be alcohol on board but it happens) Scene 222. OK. Deleted scene. Scene 80. This is how Japanese escorts would provide warning of the direction of incoming air attack, since the Japanese ships didn’t have radar, and most of the Japanese fighters didn’t have radio. Comments on Midway Script 7 May 2018 Rear Admiral Sam Cox, U.S. Navy (retired) Director of Naval History The script as written is still the most accurate Hollywood treatment of a Navy subject I have seen. Even if no changes are made, I believe the script still catches the essence of the battle and deserves maximum Navy support. That said, there are still a significant number of historical inaccuracies. Very few are actually “show-stoppers.” The vast majority of any contemporary audience will not detect most of these discrepancies. However, if the producers want the first statement “This is a true story” to be true, they should consider making many of these changes. As it stands now, it is “based on true events.” The most significant discrepancies include; having Ensign George Gay in the wrong torpedo squadron. This will be noted by anyone with some familiarity with the Battle of Midway, and significantly detract from the movie’s credibility. The other major discrepancy is the inaccurate treatment of the initial attacks by the Midway-based aircraft, the Torpedo 8 detachment TBF Avengers, the US Army Air Force B-26’s and the later Marine dive bombers (which conducted glide bomb attacks due to their inexperience.) The near simultaneous attacks by the TBF Avengers and the B-26’s are key to how the battle unfolded, and both are an extraordinary example of the heroism and sacrifice of the U.S. aircrews. There is no question that McClusky’s dive bombers (and the concurrent and coincidental arrival of Leslie’s Yorktown dive bombers,) changed the course of the battle, the war, and arguably world history, and deserves to be center stage. Nevertheless, the sacrifice (and slaughter) of the Midway-based aircraft and the three carrier-based torpedo squadrons, enabled the success of the dive bombers. There is no reported case of any U.S. aviator turning away in the face of overwhelming odds or even catastrophic losses; every one of them did their duty until the end. If the movie accomplishes nothing more than memorializing that kind of courage, then it will be a success in my view. I concur with the comments made by Hill Goodspeed, and I have tried to avoid duplicating them. My comments follow: Page 5 Scenes 5-8: This describes a carrier landing that would have been impossible to execute with an SBD Dauntless on the 1942 Enterprise. The LSO would have waved him off because it would endanger the ship and the crews working on the aircraft parked forward on the flight deck. An SBD pilot closing in on the stern of the carrier has the aircraft in a nose high curving turn at just above stall speed with advanced throttle, ‘hanging from the prop’. The pilot keeps the Landing Signal Officer in sight and is guided to a landing by the LSO. The pilot responds to the LSO by use of the throttle in his left hand to maintain proper speed and altitude; the right hand on the control stick between his knees to handle the rolling turn and the altitude of the aircraft. The right foot holds a strong right rudder to compensate for the torque of the spinning propeller. It is all a delicate balance of forces requiring a pilot’s total concentration. Closing in on the ramp the pilot rolls out of the turn keeping focused on the paddles of the LSO coming up fast on the left. The LSO controls the landing with his paddles. ‘Too High, Too Low, Too Fast, Too Slow, Move Right, Move Left. If all is well the LSO gives the pilot a ‘Cut’ by slashing a paddle across his throat. The pilot closes the throttle and the aircraft drops to the deck and catches a wire. The pilot has no control over which wire he catches. He certainly has no time to chat with his radioman/gunner (Walsh comment.) Page 7 Scene 9: The flag on ARIZONA had not been raised yet. Morning colors was at 0800. Arizona was first strafed at 0756. The colors detail and band would have been assembled, but scattered when the first strafing runs occurred. Page 9 Scene 10: Layton makes no mention of his wife Miriam in his account of the morning of Pearl Harbor. Not sure she was even in Hawaii, as many wives were still in San Pedro after the fleet shifted locations in 1940. No one else will probably know either, so this is probably safe. Page 10 Scene 11: Mrs. Crosley was driving the car. (Layton mentions this, but nothing about his own wife.) Page 11 Scene 13/13B: A number of ARIZONA anti-aircraft guns were manned and ready and opened fire almost immediately. They then ran out of “ready use” ammunition, so firing stopped. The gun directors were also manned almost immediately, but the technology was inadequate to deal with dive bombers and the horizontal bombers were too high to reach (it was a bomb dropped by a horizontal bomber (Kate) at 0806 that detonated ARIZONA’s magazine. Page 11 Scene 15: LT Clifford Janz was last seen directing men to safety below the armored deck when the magazine exploded at 0806. The explosion of ARIZONA’s magazine blew the commanding officer of VESTAL, Comander Cassin Young and many of his crew over the side. By 0816 Young was back on board and trying to get his sinking ship underway to beach in shallow water. At 0816, VESTAL Boatswain’s Mate Second Class Joseph George, who was cutting the lines between VESTAL and ARIZONA with an ax, heard the shouts from six survivors on the ARIZONA’s anti-aircraft director platform. These were the only survivors in the forward section of the ship. ARIZONA’s foremast had already tilted forward by this time. George threw a line to the anti-aircraft platform and tied it down, while going about cutting other lines. All six badly burned survivors made it down the smoldering rope; two later died from their burns, and two are still alive today (Don Stratton and Lauren Bruner.) There were numerous Sailors who were killed by the burning oil in the water, but none in the “lifeline” incident. Bruner’s book “Second to the Last to Leave USS ARIZONA” has unsparing descriptions of the horror on ARIZONA resulting from the explosion and fire. Page 13 Scene 18: After the magazine explosion, ARIZONA settled on an even keel. She did not capsize. The six survivors coming down the rope were strafed, but not hit, and none fell in. The “tower” had already collapsed by this point. Page 15 Scene 23: A “Fix” requires at least two lines of bearing. U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence got a “line of bearing” on the Japanese. However, with the direction finding equipment of the time, a single line of bearing is ambiguous; the signal could be either in front of or behind the receiver, hence the “bilateral reading.” Normally the operator would know the general direction of the enemy and discard the bogus bearing. In this case, the operator had no frame of reference to know which of the two bearings was the actual bearing. Page 16 Scene 24/25: U.S. Navy doctrine at the time would have been for the dive bombers to hit the target just before the torpedo bombers attack. This would draw off fighters from the more vulnerable torpedo bombers, and the hits and obscuration from near misses by the bombs would suppress the target’s anti-aircraft fire, further aiding the torpedo bombers. Sending dive bombers into enemy fire to drop smoke bombs is not likely, although will check with some dive bombing experts to see if this ever happened. Also, although live fire tests were rare, Lindsey would have known there were technical problems with U.S. torpedoes. Page 18 Scene 29: Lindsey’s fears were justified. Several ENTERPRISE aircraft attempting to land at Pearl Harbor after dark were shot down by jittery U.S. gunners. Page 19 Scene 30: ENTERPRISE’s newly installed CXAM-1 radar did not have a “scope” as depicted. There was an instrument that indicated range to contact and a separate instrument that indicated bearing. Page 20 Scene 31: Riding a torpedo like a bull? Sounds like “Hollywood BS.” Perhaps after the torpedo had mostly come to a stop on its own and preventing it from rolling in to something. Page 21 Scene 32: Kimmel showed the spent shell to Layton the evening of 7 Dec. He made the famous comment earlier in the day, but conceivable he mentioned it again to Layton. At that time, the Japanese were landing in Malaysia and Hong Kong, but bad weather delayed the attack on the Philippines, and Singapore had not been attacked yet. Page 26 Scene 42: “Nagano” typo, should be “Nagumo.” Page 28 Scene 47: At this time, King had not been selected to be Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet, and he would not be dual-hatted as the Chief of Naval Operations until spring of 1942. Nimitz would be getting his orders from Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold “Betty” Stark. King later said he never said the “sons of bitches” comment, although it became a widely held belief that he did, and certainly fit his personality. ***Page 30 Scene 50: CRITICAL COMMENT: Smith’s Union Bar was a favorite hang-out of ARIZONA Sailors, although officers not likely to be there. ENS George Gay was assigned to Torpedo Squadron EIGHT (VT-8) embarked on USS HORNET which had not arrived in the Pacific yet. Page 33 Scene 54: Kimmel did take Layton’s warning seriously, but a combination of insufficient numbers of long-rage reconnaissance aircraft and the weather front that covered the Japanese carriers prevented him from doing anything about it. This is a very complex and nuanced question, but it would be good not to perpetuate the myth that Kimmel did not take warnings seriously. The Japanese just had a really good plan. Page 36 Scene 58: There was no Japanese heavy cruiser during this attack, but ship recognition was notoriously poor (by both sides.) Even so, mistaking a freighter for a heavy cruiser is unlikely, so Lindsey most likely would have referenced “a large target.” Page 41 Scene 69: In Morison’s account, the bombers are identified as G4M “Betty” bombers not “Nells” but both are twin-engine land-based bombers (the Betty was newer). The bomber that attempted to crash the Enterprise had been seriously damaged in the first run and turned back to attack ENTERPRISE in a deliberate sacrifice. After Gaido shot the plane down, (and doused the flames with a fire bottle) he disappeared from the flight deck, worried that he would get into trouble for leaving his assigned battle station to man the SBD. A search party had to find him and bring him to Halsey. Page 47 Scene 80: NASHVILLE was a light cruiser (Brooklyn class) not heavy cruiser. Page 51 Scene 100: Best became commanding officer of Bombing Squadron Six (VB-6) in March 42 (before Coral Sea) when the CO Holly Hollingsworth received transfer orders. McClusky had been a fighter pilot (and Fighter Squadron Commander) and switched to SBD dive bomber when he became Air Group Commander in April 42 (also before Coral Sea) and also as part of normal transition. Page 64 Scene 108: The CALIFORNIA band provided manpower to Station Hypo, such as operating punch card and tabulating machines. They were not code-breakers, although this story has been very widely told. There was some discussion amongst the Station Hypo staff that the musicians might have some innate ability in this regard, so the dialog is possibly true, even though they didn’t actually perform that function. Page 68 Scene 111A: Should be “Eastern” Island not Easter. Page 78 Scene 132A: Nells were land-based bombers and were not in range of Midway. The attack on the morning of 4 Jun was by carrier-based Val dive bombers, Kate torpedo bombers (being used in an alternate high-altitude horizontal bombing role) and Zero fighters. ***Page 79 Scene 133: CRITICAL COMMENT: U.S. PBY Catalina reconnaissance aircraft sighted and reported the Japanese carriers, and another PBY sighted and reported the inbound Japanese raid. So Nimitz would have received the sighting report first, and word of the attack on Midway second. Layton wouldn’t have been the one reporting launch of Midway aircraft; an operations officer would do that. The first U.S. attack aircraft to launch from Midway were six brand-new TBF Avenger torpedo bombers flown by a detachment of USS HORNET’s Torpedo Squadron Eight aircrew that had been left behind the States to transition from the obsolete Devastator; the detachment had arrived in Pearl Harbor after HORNET departed, and had then made their way to Midway Island. The Avengers (led by LT Langston Fieberling) were followed by the four faster US Army Air Force B-26 twin-engine bombers rigged to carry a torpedo (led by Captain James Collins.) Both flights reached the Japanese carriers about the same time. Five of the six Avengers were shot down by Japanese fighters (which had to fly into Japanese shipboard anti-aircraft fire to do it,) and one heavily damaged Avenger made it back to Midway. Two of the TBF’s got close enough to launch torpedoes, which HIRYU avoided. Of the four B-26’s, the tail end plane was shot down by Japanese fighters. The first two B-26’s dropped their torpedoes which AKAGI avoided. The second (flown by First Lieutenant Jim Muri) actually buzzed Admiral Nagumo’s flagship AKAGI at bridge level and shot up the flight deck with machine guns before successfully escaping. The third B-26 was seriously damaged and was either out-of-control or deliberately tried to crash into AKAGI, missing the bridge by a few feet, almost killing Nagumo and his staff. This was the critical moment of the battle that caused Nagumo to concur with the assessment of the flight leader of the Midway strike who had radioed that a second strike on Midway was necessary. This set in motion the decisions that led to disaster for the Japanese. ***Page 80 Scene 13: CRITICAL COMMENT. The Marine aircraft (VMSB-241) launched from Midway after the Navy Avengers and USAAF B-26’s and took longer to form up. They did not reach the Japanese carriers until over 45 minutes after the Avengers and B-26’s. Their attack was valiant, they scored numerous near misses, but no hits, and almost half were shot down. The courage of the Marines deserves to be remembered, but to not include the attack by LT Fieberling’s VT-8 detachment Avengers and to get the B-26 attack out-of-order does a major disservice to the “true story.” The smoke from these attacks is also what attracted the submarine NAUTILUS to the Japanese force, setting in motion the sequence events with the destroyer ARASHI. Page 84 Scene 145: Lindsey was a Lieutenant Commander, not Lieutenant. Aviators were less formal, but Best most likely would have addressed him as “Sir” or “Commander” but certainly not “Lieutenant.” Page 84 Scene 146: The NAUTILUS made multiple attempts to reach the Japanese carriers, but did not get a shot at a carrier until late afternoon, on KAGA, after KAGA had already been hit by bombs (and only one NAUTILUS torpedo hit the KAGA and it failed to explode – Japanese sailors in the water near KAGA used part of the torpedo as a flotation device.) NAUTILUS did play deadly hide and seek with the Japanese escorts and screen ships for many hours, and attempted to attack a battleship (KIRISHIMA.) While at periscope depth with her scope up, she was strafed multiple times, bombed by an aircraft, and fired upon by Japanese escorts. The depth charges would occur when she went deep. Basically, if depth charges were dropped close-aboard from a Japanese ship with the submarine at periscope depth the result would have been fatal. For a submarine to survive a depth charge attack the surface ships have to have lost the exact location of the submarine. ***Page 89 Scene 156: CRITICAL COMMENT. Ensign George Gay was in Torpedo Squadron 8 (VT-8) embarked on USS HORNET not Lindsey’s squadron. Most anyone who knows anything about the Battle of Midway will know this and it will significantly detract from the credibility of the rest of the movie and negate much of the extensive effort to be accurate. Torpedo Eight reached the Japanese carriers about an hour before McClusky’s dive bombers. All 15 VT-8 Devastator torpedo bombers were shot down by Japanese fighters. Only Gay’s TBD got close enough to launch a torpedo (at SORYU) which SORYU avoided. Gay was shot down by fighters on the other side of SORYU and his gunner/radioman did not survive. Lindsey’s squadron (14 TBD’s of VT-6) arrived on the heels of VT-8 having taken a different and more direct path to the carriers than McClusky did (this was pure accident.) Japanese fighters were low on fuel and ammunition after shooting down VT-8, so more of Lindsey’s squadron survived and reached torpedo launch points. Five of Lindsey’s squadron survived the attack, but one ran out of gas on the return to the ENTERPRISE. YORKTOWN’s torpedo squadron (VT-3 under LCDR Massey) arrived slightly before McClusky, and slightly before YORKTOWN’s dive bombers (VB-3,) which has also taken a different and more direct path than McClusky . Japanese fighters concentrated on YORKTOWN’s torpedo bombers, resulting in both ENTERPRISE and YORKTOWN dive bombers being unopposed until after they dropped their bombs. Of the 41 carrier-based Devastator torpedo bombers, only five survived. (to which should be added the 6 Midway-based VT-8 detachment TBF Avenger torpedo bombers, of which only one survived.) Every one of these torpedo bombers pressed home their attacks until they were shot down or dropped their torpedos (although none hit;) NOT ONE OF THEM TURNED AWAY, despite the staggering losses. The sacrifice of the torpedo bombers was not planned, it was pure happenstance, but this enabled to dive bombers to get through. While it was the dive bombers that won the battle, the courage and sacrifice of the torpedo bombers deserved to be remembered and depicted accurately, in some form. Page 90 Scene 159: Captain Kaku would be giving the orders to evade torpedoes, not the admiral. Page 91 Scene 163: Nell’s are land-based bombers. AKAGI would have been switching bombs on the Kates for torpedoes. The Kate and Val bombers were in the hanger decks, because the flight deck needed to be clear to continuously launch and recover Zero fighter aircraft in order to deal with the near constant stream of US attacks – Avenger- B26 – Marine SBD and Vindicators – USAAF B-17 – VT-8 (Hornet TBD) – VT-6 (Enterprise TBD) – VT-3 (Yorktown TBD). Contrary to myth the Japanese flight decks were not full of airplanes waiting to take off when the US dive bombers struck; there were a few fighters, but the Vals and Kates were still below. Page 92 Scene 165: Neither Best nor McClusky had any idea where YORKTOWN’s aircraft were. No U.S. aircraft saw all four Japanese carriers at the same time. That YORKTOWN’s dive bombers arrived over SORYU and HIRYU at the same time as McClusky’s group arrived over AKAGI and KAGA was pure fluke. McClusky’s group attacked the two carriers they saw; AKAGI and KAGA. They did not see the other two. Scene 173-176: Here is another statement to question. It probably originated from Page 240 of Shattered Sword. Page 94 Scene 173 – 176: The V-shape formation by Best has made its way into contemporary histories, but is probably not true. According to Page 4 of the Barde interview of Dick Best at his home in Santa Monica, Sunday, 15 May, 1966; “He readied for dive, about 150 feet behind each other in a 700. So close were they in a dive, that when Kroeger, #2, released his bomb, Best was in his bombsight”. From this we may conclude that the normal attack procedure was followed, wing men following the leader, not a V section attack in formation as described. The Japanese reported that the 1st bomb of Dick Best was a near miss. It was the 2nd bomb striking amidships that inflicted the mortal damage. This would have been dropped by Lt. (jg) Edwin Kroeger. Another reason for reducing the role of Dick Best. The US Navy never employed V formation dive bombing attacks. It would have been very unproductive. Anyone familiar with dive bombing as a weapon would know this. (Walsh comment) Page 95 Scene 175: Only a handful of ZERO fighters would be “blown off” AKAGI’s deck. The other aircraft were still in the hangar bays; the conflagration in the bays was intense as Japanese carriers had no way to vent an explosion in the hangar bay to the outside as did U.S. carriers. Page 99 Scene 190: Bruno and O’Flaherty were both thrown over the side, several days after Midway. Nevertheless Bruno’s story deserves to be told, so this anachronism is reasonable. The Japanese claimed to have gotten useable intelligence from these two (and one other) captured U.S. aircrew, but the intelligence the Japanese claimed to have gotten from them (force dispositions on Midway) would not have been known to them. It is therefore unlikely that either Bruno or O’Flaherty gave up any intelligence of real value before they were executed. Also of note, O’Flaherty was flying with a small group of six damaged straggler aircraft that had joined together for mutual protection (led by LT Charles Ware) when he ran out of gas. The Japanese fighters escorting HIRYU’s first afternoon strike (VAL dive bombers) broke away and attacked this group instead of staying to protect the Japanese dive bombers. As a result YORKTOWN fighters were able to shoot down many of HIRYU’s first strike, which quite possibly saved YORKTOWN given how many times she was hit by the HIRYU Vals that got through. Page 100 Scene 191: Tamon did not know for sure how many carriers they were facing, but by this time he was aware the Japanese carriers had been attacked by three carrier-based torpedo squadrons (which would mean three carriers,) so his statement is plausible. Page 101 Scene 191 A: YORKTOWN was not visible from ENTERPRISE and HORNET, which is why neither ENTERPRISE nor HORNET were attacked by any Japanese aircraft during the battle. Page 101 Scene 192: Although it is conceivable Browning might have made a derogatory remark about HORNET’s air group, they were not “lost.” HORNET’s Air Group knew where they were. They did not see the Japanese due to a combination of visibility (cloud conditions,) Japanese course changes, the time elapsed between the last good position on the Japanese carriers, and HORNET Air Group’s course. HORNET’s torpedo squadron did find the Japanese, and paid the price. Page 105 Scene 198: Due to distance and cloud conditions, the strike on HIRYU would not have seen the three burning Japanese carriers, which by this time were much further south. Page 107 Scene 201: Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG) N. Jack “Dusty” Kleiss of ENTERPRISE Scouting Six (VS-6) also hit both KAGA and HIRYU, and then the heavy cruiser MIKUMA two days later. Also the afternoon strike on HIRYU was led by LT Wilmer “Earl” Gallaher of Scouting Six, and was a composite group that included planes from multiple carriers (ENTERPRISE and aircraft from YORKTOWN that recovered on ENTERPRISE after YORKTOWN was hit) and multiple squadrons, since so many had been lost or damaged in the morning strikes. The script makes it appear that Best led the mission on HIRYU, which was not the case. Page 112 Scene 212: Captain Kaku stayed on board HIRYU and went down with Tamon Yamaguchi. The HIRYU’s abandon ship “ceremony” is one of the more bizarre events of the battle, but demonstrated the extreme discipline of Japanese sailors. Page 112 Scene 213: Captain Kaku was on the bridge with Tamon Yamaguchi. There were some HIRYU crewmen trapped below decks when she was hit by Japanese torpedoes. Some of them later were able to find their way out and ultimately became some (34) of the very few Japanese sailors that were rescued and captured by the U.S. Page 116 Scene 222: Layton (and Rochefort) were both regular Line Officers. There was nothing on their uniforms that would distinguish them as serving in an intelligence billet. There was no Intelligence Officer Specialty until after WWII, and there was no distinguishing device for officers until 2010. Page 117 Scene 224: Ensign Gay was the sole survivor of VT-8’s 15 carrier-based TBD Devastators. Ensign Albert “Bert” Earnest (and one of his two aircrew/gunners) were the only survivors of VT-8’s Midway-deployed detachment of six TBF Avenger torpedo bombers (see comment above), so he was a VT-8 survivor too. Ernst would actually receive two Navy Crosses; one for his unsuccessful attack on Japanese carriers (believing his plane was about to crash, he launched his torpedo at a Japanese light cruiser, but it was avoided) and another one for bringing his badly shot-up plane back to Midway.