By 0213 Tripoli time, all Air Force and Navy strike aircraft, except the missing KARMA 52, reported feet wet to the E-2C's and for the F-111's to the command KC-10A.

The main concern after clearing the gauntlet of Libyan SAMs and AAA was pursuit by Libyan fighters. Libyan pilots rarely flew at night; however, the LAAF often employed contract pilots from Syria and elsewhere, who may have been night qualified. There are reports that the commander of Benina Air base disobeyed orders to attack the departing Navy aircraft.

The delousing plan, distinguishing the returning strike aircraft from any trailing Libyan fighters, had been worked out between the Navy and Air Force ahead of time. The F-111's would head north on a pre-briefed flight plan toward the delouse ship, the guided-missile destroyer USS Farragut (DDG 37), at a set altitude and speed and avoiding a direct overflight. After flying another few miles further north they would begin to climb to their tanker. To conserve fuel some aircraft slowed and started their climb soon after passing the ship.

Expecting detailed instructions to their tankers from the E-2C's, the F-111 crews were surprised to only be directed to "head north,” which they had already figured out on their own. However, with need to maintain operational security now gone, they were able to use their radios to aid in rejoining with the tankers if needed.

Many of the F-111's where low, some desperately so, on fuel due to the use of afterburners during the strike. After a few hair-raising moments all the F-111's rejoined a tanker, although not necessarily the planned one, and began to take on fuel.

By 0253 all Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, other than the aircraft supporting the search for KARMA 52, were reported safely back on deck.

After multiple calls it was confirmed that KARMA 52 was missing. The Air Force aircraft orbited near Sicily for more than an hour in the forlorn hope KARMA 52 would rejoin. At 0314 the strike force reluctantly began the long flight back to England.