On 5 April 1986 terrorist supported by the government of Libya detonated a bomb in a Berlin night club causing the death of one American soldier and injuries to several others. The United States government has proof that this incident was directed by Libya's Qadhafi. In addition, evidence is mounting that the government of Libya is attempting to develop a global terrorism campaign against Americans and US interests. The Department of Defense has been directed to execute retaliatory operations as a result of these developments.
The Libyan Air Force consists mostly of modern Soviet fighters: MiG-23 (Floggers), MiG-25 (Foxbat), and Su-22 (Fitter). They also have a few squadrons of French Mirage fighters. However, the Libyan Air Force rarely flies at night. The rare night flights they conduct are done by contractor pilots.
Libyan air defenses consist of Soviet radars and SAM systems and some French Crotale SAMS. Both Tripoli and Benghazi have an integrated air defense network consisting of multiple SA-2 (Guideline) and SA-3 (Goa) SAMS. These will be supported by shorter range SA-6 (Gainful), SA-9 (Gaskin), and Crotales SAMS and more AAA than you can count. There is also an SA-5 (Gammon) around Sirte that may be able to engage the F-111's heading for Tripoli International Airport.
Inflict damage to headquarters associated with terrorist activities, terrorist facilities, and military installations that support Libyan subversive activities.
Twenty-four USAF F-111's, five EF-111's, and supporting tankers will sortie from the United Kingdom. Six F-111's and one EF-111 will be in air spares and will return to base approximately 90 minutes after takeoff. F-111's will maintain complete radio silence with their transponders off. Any required communications will be handled by accompanying tankers. The strike force will cruise at FL23-26, well below the altitudes used by commercial airliners.
US Navy carrier battle groups will make speed runs from the Tyrrhenian Sea to approximately 200 miles north of assigned targets.
USAF aircraft will hit targets in Tripoli supported by aircraft from the USS America. Aircraft operating from the USS America and USS Coral Sea will strike targets around Benghazi.
Will be composed of the airfield attackers (PUFFY and LUJAC). Five KC-135A's and a single KC-135Q (DOBBY 31-36) will launch from RAF Mildenhall and refuel the attackers mother ships (DEBAR 81 and 82).
Will launch from RAF Fairford. KC-10 DEBAR 51 will serve as the mother ship for the EF-111's (HARPO) from RAF Upper Heyford. KC-10A DEBAR 52 will be a reliability tanker, an airborne spare and an extra source of fuel. KC-135A's DOBBY 61 and 62 and KC-10A DEBAR 53 and 54 will be their refuelers.
Will launch from RAF Mildenhall to support the Tripoli barracks (REMIT, ELTON, and KARMA) and the terrorist camp (JEWEL) attackers. DEBAR 83, 84, 85 and 90 will be the pre-strike refuelers. DEBAR 86-89 will serve as the mother ships. DOBBY 91 will launch as a precaution in case of an emergency with one of the returning spare aircraft requiring them to remain airborne longer than planned.
KC-10A's DEBAR 55 and 56 will launch from RAF Fairford about an hour after the first three waves as reliability tankers. They will be topped off by DEBAR 57 also from RAF Fairford.
Around midnight Zulu, KC-135E DOBBY 37 and KC-10A's DEBAR 71 and 91 will launch from RAF Mildenhall. They will be post-strike refuelers and orbit off the southeast coast of Portugal. They may return to Mildenhall if it is established that the returning aircraft have enough fuel to complete the mission.
| Type | Callsign | ATD (Zulu) | ATA (Zulu) | ASD | Mission |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KC-135A | DOBBY 31 | 14-Apr 17:09 | 14-Apr 21:26 | 4:17 | DEBAR 81 refueler |
| KC-135A | DOBBY 32 | 14-Apr 17:11 | 14-Apr 21:28 | 4:17 | DEBAR 82 refueler |
| KC-135Q | DOBBY 33 | 14-Apr 17:13 | 14-Apr 22:55 | 5:42 | DEBAR 81 refueler |
| KC-135A | DOBBY 34 | 14-Apr 17:16 | 14-Apr 23:00 | 5:44 | DEBAR 82 refueler |
| KC-135A | DOBBY 35 | 14-Apr 17:18 | 14-Apr 23:47 | 6:29 | DEBAR 81 refueler |
| KC-135A | DOBBY 36 | 14-Apr 17:20 | 14-Apr 23:49 | 6:29 | DEBAR 82 refueler |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 81 | 14-Apr 17:23 | 15-Apr 07:41 | 14:18 | PUFFY mother tanker |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 82 | 14-Apr 17:26 | 15-Apr 07:44 | 14:18 | LUJAC mother tanker |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 83 | 14-Apr 17:45 | 15-Apr 00:00 | 6:15 | DEBAR 86 refueler |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 84 | 14-Apr 17:48 | 15-Apr 00:03 | 6:15 | DEBAR 87 refueler |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 85 | 14-Apr 17:51 | 15-Apr 00:06 | 6:15 | DEBAR 88 refueler |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 90 | 14-Apr 17:54 | 15-Apr 00:09 | 6:15 | DEBAR 89 refueler |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 86 | 14-Apr 17:57 | 15-Apr 05:49 | 11:52 | REMIT mother tanker |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 87 | 14-Apr 18:00 | 15-Apr 05:52 | 11:52 | ELTON mother tanker |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 88 | 14-Apr 18:03 | 15-Apr 05:55 | 11:52 | KARMA mother tanker |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 89 | 14-Apr 18:06 | 15-Apr 05:58 | 11:52 | JEWEL mother tanker |
| KC-135A | DOBBY 91 | 14-Apr 18:20 | 15-Apr 21:00 | 2:40 | Spare |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 91 | 14-Apr 23:30 | 15-Apr 06:20 | 6:50 | Wave 3 post strike |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 71 | 14-Apr 23:35 | 15-Apr 06:.55 | 7:20 | Wave 1 post strike |
| KC-135E | DOBBY 37 | 15-Apr 00:00 | 15-Apr 06:20 | 6:20 | Wave 2 post strike |
| Type | Callsign | ATD (Zulu) | ATA (Zulu) | ASD | Mission |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KC-10A | DEBAR 51 | 14-Apr 18:12 | 15-Apr 06:52 | 12:40 | HARPO mother tanker |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 52 | 14-Apr 18:13 | 15-Apr 06:54 | 12:41 | Med reliability tanker |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 54 | 14-Apr 18:18 | 15-Apr 04:08 | 9:50 | DEBAR 52 refueler |
| KC-135A | DOBBY 61 | 14-Apr 18:22 | 14-Apr 21:12 | 2:50 | DEBAR 51 refueler |
| KC-135A | DOBBY 62 | 14-Apr 18:24 | 14-Apr 21:13 | 2:49 | DEBAR 52 refueler |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 53 | 14-Apr 18:26 | 14-Apr 22:58 | 4:32 | DEBAR 51/2/4 refueler |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 55 | 14-Apr 19:34 | 15-Apr 09:55 | 14:21 | Wave 3 post strike |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 56 | 14-Apr 19:54 | 15-Apr 10:15 | 14:21 | Wave 3 post strike |
| KC-10A | DEBAR 57 | 14-Apr 19:55 | 15-Apr 05:16 | 10:01 | Wave 3 tanker refueler |
D-Day: 14 April 1986.
Desired TOT Window: Hours of darkness not earlier than 0000Z 15 April (0200 Libya time 15 April 1900 Washington time 14 April).
Normal peacetime rules of engagement apply with the following additions.
Minimize collateral damage. Make every reasonable attempt to limit damage to other than designated military targets.
Aircraft will abort if all combat systems are not fully operational.
Attack aircraft are authorized to make only one pass over the target area in order to minimize risk to flight crews.
Each attack aircraft must positively identify target prior to dropping bombs. If target is not positively identified the aircraft will abort attack.
Surprise is essential for minimizing US losses. Indicators which will convey us intentions will be monitored and should be closely controlled.