ORIGINAL: glvaca
ORIGINAL: Apollo11
German preparations were irrelevant... the British preparations is what mattered... [;)]
An interesting view on the matter [;)]
Like Robert wrote above - German preparations were surely meticulos - but what actually mattered in this case is how the British would respond!
Also German generals and admirals never believed in Sea Lion - not in 1940 and not after WWII (even Hitler who loved such daring plans never actually liked it)... [;)]
The British knew that for successful invasion the Germans would have to have intact harbor with certain amout of cargo capacity used for off loading.
Quite, but you fail to mention that until the last days of August, the British thought the invasion would be directed against their East Coast (directly from Germany), not in the Channel. As such most of their combat ready divisions were deployed there. Quite interesting preparations, no?
The Sea Lion was never envisioned before September - so this is not really a big issue.
Also British forces could have been quickly deployed elsewhere if it was necessary (and there were other units apart from regular combat reafy units - those wold have serverd as a "stop gap") - never underestimate the British resolve and that even such units would have been useful!
Eventually it all bears down to that - the harbor (or harbors) where the German supply ships would be unloaded!
Yes, it certainly would have had a major impact and there was a limited amount of them close to the invasion beaches. Certainly, they would have been damaged and would have to be repaired. However, the barges were scheduled to be unloaded directly on the beaches. They were modified to have a front "opening" (don't know the correct English word) and would be towed in by tuggs. Transports would be unloaded through the use of barges. This was certainly not ideal!
IIRC the British at that time thought that German division needed about 300 tons for each day of fighting (and even more it it is Panzer division).
If the 1st wave would consist of 5 division + 5 divisions in the 2nd wave that would mean at least 3000 tons of supplies (ammo, food, fuel etc.) delivered for every single day of fighting.
That would mean about 10-15-20 barges daily (if we approximate river barge sizes).
The problem would then be:
a)
Get those barges intact over the channel.
b)
Manually offload them without a dock (i.e. just by manual labor).
c)
Transport those supplies to actual combat units that were away from the beach.
This is impossible task even for Germans... [;)]
The RAF in 1940 (including Fighter Command and Bomber Command) was at least 1:1 vs. Luftwaffe.
I'm not sure where you got those numbers. Occording to my copy of "the defence of the United Kingdom" part of the United Kingdom official history of the Second world war series, the following numbers are printed.
Germany:
Luftflotte 2&3
Long range bombers: 1.131
Dive-bombers: 316
Single Engine fighters: 809
Twin-Engined figthers: 246
Luftflotte 5 (several of it's units were redeployed to France during the campaign)
Long range bombers: 129
Single Engine fighters: 84
Twin-Engined figthers: 34
UK:
Single engine fighters: 600, 2/3rd Hurri's, 1/3 Spitfire (defiants and Blenheim Sq. excluded).
Coastal command: around 300 mostly obsolete.
Bomber command: hardly more than 500 and also not really very capable. This includes Battle Axes which were cut to pieces over France.
I'll let you do the math yourself. If you have different sources to back up your claim then please share.
So... the Germans did with the "Battle of Britain" after all with such great numerical advantage!
Oh wait!
But they didn't... [;)]
The British had integrated air defense system and they were able to concentrate where and when it was needed - the Germans lacked that - the on-paper numerical superiority Germans had meant littele in teh actual "Battle of Britain"!
To think that Bomber Command would not be able to smash into pieces any port seized by Germans and make it useless is irresponsible - they would do it regardless of losses and they had hundreds of bombers manned with determined crews to do it!
Yes, I suppose that history is irresponsible then as bomber command tried to do just that at the embarkation harbours in France and failed, misserably. Bombing a port out of commission in 1940 was not such a straightforward thing. As the course of the strategic bombing offensive on Germany demonstrates all to well.
The invasion barges were not placed in ports - IIRC they were dispersed in river estuaries on the French coast.
Attacking harbor with docks and cranes is one thing - the RAF Bomber Command was most certainly capable of that - attacking dispersed barges is another...
Leo "Apollo11"
