Shattered Sword book reviewed

[Ellsid]

I had picked up a copy of the Battle of Midway, "Shattered Sword" last month...and it got me back to playing WITP. It enlightened me on a few facts and nailed down what I thought was definitely true but had not read it anywhere.

I'm curious if anyone who has read it, which I'm sure many WITP players who are Pacific war history buffs have, what are your thoughts on the authors conclusions?

For me what really stood out from almost everything else was the poor Japanese operational planning of "Operation MI". The inability of the Japanese command to modify or change actions once the operational plans inertia got started. That the whole operation hinged on the amphibious assault taking place on June 6, 1942.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Ellsid

I had picked up a copy of the Battle of Midway, "Shattered Sword" last month...and it got me back to playing WITP. It enlightened me on a few facts and nailed down what I thought was definitely true but had not read it anywhere.

I'm curious if anyone who has read it, which I'm sure many WITP players who are Pacific war history buffs have, what are your thoughts on the authors conclusions?

For me what really stood out from almost everything else was the poor Japanese operational planning of "Operation MI". The inability of the Japanese command to modify or change actions once the operational plans inertia got started. That the whole operation hinged on the amphibious assault taking place on June 6, 1942.

That sort of thing was characteristic of both sides throughout the war, and in fact is how things are done even today. It's also the reason for the funny operations mechanism in Victory Games' Pacific War. (I was chief systems engineer for a corps-level command and control system that had the planning of amphibious landings as one of its primary functions.) I've tried to do it playing the Japanese, but the game engine tends to disrupt the detailed timing. [:@]

[wild_Willie2]

A lot of players read the book, and it shows indeed a lack of flexibility and over complex planning on the Japanese side.
It also shows how lucky the allies got...

[marky]

i saw it in barnes n noble but didnt snatch it up, and never got around to going back for it 

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: wild_Willie2

A lot of players read the book, and it shows indeed a lack of flexibility and over complex planning on the Japanese side.
It also shows how lucky the allies got...

[&:] [&:]

i thought it showed the opposite... books like Miracle at Midway and Incredible Victory strongly implied it was (mostly) luck that the USN won... Shattered Sword showed the poor planning and preplanned disaster waiting for the IJN at Midway (at the very least, the later book points out the slaughter that would have taken place had the Japanese actually attempted a landing.)

[wild_Willie2]

The allies got lucky in the strike that nailed 4 IJN CV's.

The Japanese would have indeed been masacred IF they would have tried to land on Midway. Their Landing boats could not have gotten over the reefs surrounding the island at any tide.
They would have had to either line up to go through the reef at the few (heavily defended) existing gaps, or would have had to land their troops on the edge of the reef to let them wade the last 400 yards (under fire) upto the (heavily defended) beach......

[cantona2]

Great book, great read and a great introduction and education to those of us more used to the Russian steppe.

[rtrapasso]

The allies got lucky in the strike that nailed 4 IJN CV's.

Possibly - although the "the" strike was actually a series of air strikes, and only one of them "got lucky"* and got 3 CVs (the 4th was hit the next day)... The Japanese carriers were under more or less constant attack for several hours, leading up to the dive bomber attack that finally scored the fatal hits on 3 carriers... this was a different story than what had been believed in the Western literature (the Japanese had written about the discrepancies in fact long before Shattered Sword.

The book points out that luck was consistently running against the USN that day and debunks many of the myths that Fuchida told his interrogators after the war... he basically told the Allies what they wanted to hear.

*EDIT: To paraphrase a British Admiral commenting on another battle in another war: it is hard to characterize a concentrated effort on finally obtaining a desired objective as "luck".

[John Lansford]

Shattered Sword is an excellent book from the IJN's side of the battle, that showed how small issues, when added cumulatively to other issues, eventually turn into battle losing mistakes. 
 
For example, since the IJN didn't have air search radar and very few radios in the fighter planes, they spread out their TF so much that the ships couldn't work together to ID incoming attacks.  The fighters couldn't coordinate, they all went after any planes that could be seen, so there weren't any at DB height when the Dauntlesses appeared overhead.  Meanwhile, the small elevators on the carriers meant the attack planes had to be serviced in the hangar deck and brought up one by one to the flight deck, but since the fighters were constantly landing and taking off (no coordination again) the armed bombers were kept on the hangar deck, waiting.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: wild_Willie2

The allies got lucky in the strike that nailed 4 IJN CV's.

The Japanese would have indeed been masacred IF they would have tried to land on Midway. Their Landing boats could not have gotten over the reefs surrounding the island at any tide.
They would have had to either line up to go through the reef at the few (heavily defended) existing gaps, or would have had to land their troops on the edge of the reef to let them wade the last 400 yards (under fire) upto the (heavily defended) beach......

"Luck" is almost always a factor in naval battles..., and usually comes about when one side stumbles on a weakness of the other's. Had the Japanese "system" been more flexible and better thought out in defensive terms, they wouldn't have found themselves with ALL thier CAP out-of-position when the US Dive Bombers put in their belated appearance.

While I found the writing both pedantic and bombastic, Shattered Sword offered a number of new insights into the weaknesses of the IJN which showed that the "Miracle at Midway" was much less divine intervention, and much more systemic weakness, catching up to the Japanese. A must for anyone interested in the Pacific War.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Ellsid

... For me what really stood out from almost everything else was the poor Japanese operational planning of "Operation MI". The inability of the Japanese command to modify or change actions once the operational plans inertia got started. That the whole operation hinged on the amphibious assault taking place on June 6, 1942.

The OP MI ruse was so deliberately elaborate that the kido butai was left alone and vulnerable; that proved a severe disadvantage as the IJN never emphasized defensive tactics, always offense.

Then there was the add-on plan to attack the Aleutians; both plans suffered from the IJ losses at Coral Sea.

It wasn't as much bad planning as over-planning, and once those plans went into effect, in the oriental martial mindset, nothing could stop them; I think it was a matter of avoiding any personal responsibility and saving of face.

Or was MI just a wet Market Garden? I thought MG was at least feasible, just a long-shot.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

and got 3 CVs (the 4th was hit the next day)...

I thought that was an error in many US histories (and movies like Midway) that was corrected long ago. The 4th carrier (Hiryu) was actually sunk late on the same day.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

and got 3 CVs (the 4th was hit the next day)...

I thought that was an error in many US histories (and movies like Midway) that was corrected long ago. The 4th carrier (Hiryu) was actually sunk late on the same day.

Right! It was Mogami & Mikuma that got a pounding on the 5th...

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Ellsid

... For me what really stood out from almost everything else was the poor Japanese operational planning of "Operation MI". The inability of the Japanese command to modify or change actions once the operational plans inertia got started. That the whole operation hinged on the amphibious assault taking place on June 6, 1942.

The OP MI ruse was so deliberately elaborate that the kido butai was left alone and vulnerable; that proved a severe disadvantage as the IJN never emphasized defensive tactics, always offense.

Then there was the add-on plan to attack the Aleutians; both plans suffered from the IJ losses at Coral Sea.

It wasn't as much bad planning as over-planning, and once those plans went into effect, in the oriental martial mindset, nothing could stop them; I think it was a matter of avoiding any personal responsibility and saving of face.

Or was MI just a wet Market Garden? I thought MG was at least feasible, just a long-shot.

Ever watch Kagemusha?

[timtom]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

and got 3 CVs (the 4th was hit the next day)...

I thought that was an error in many US histories (and movies like Midway) that was corrected long ago. The 4th carrier (Hiryu) was actually sunk late on the same day.

She was scuttled! [:D]

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso
and got 3 CVs (the 4th was hit the next day)...

I thought that was an error in many US histories (and movies like Midway) that was corrected long ago. The 4th carrier (Hiryu) was actually sunk late on the same day.

And all of them were administered the coup de grace by long-lance torpedoes!

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Ellsid

... For me what really stood out from almost everything else was the poor Japanese operational planning of "Operation MI". The inability of the Japanese command to modify or change actions once the operational plans inertia got started. That the whole operation hinged on the amphibious assault taking place on June 6, 1942.

The OP MI ruse was so deliberately elaborate that the kido butai was left alone and vulnerable; that proved a severe disadvantage as the IJN never emphasized defensive tactics, always offense.

Then there was the add-on plan to attack the Aleutians; both plans suffered from the IJ losses at Coral Sea.

It wasn't as much bad planning as over-planning, and once those plans went into effect, in the oriental martial mindset, nothing could stop them; I think it was a matter of avoiding any personal responsibility and saving of face.

Or was MI just a wet Market Garden? I thought MG was at least feasible, just a long-shot.

Ever watch Kagemusha?

No, assuming that's a Japanese film.

[EWGuttag]

I've read Shattered Sword (and will re-read it at some point).  It is a great, great book that "shatters" or at least raises issues about supposedly settled "dogma" about what happened at Midway (one being whether the KB was ready to launch planes when the US SBDs made the attack that eventually sent the Akagi, Soryu and Kaga to the bottom), especially from the Japanese perspective.  I, for one, didn't mind the detail, including the interesting discussion of Japanese doctrine.
 
One of the co-authors, Jon Parshall, is a fellow Carleton College grad who has studie the IJN since childhood (my younger brother Mark, also a Carleton grad, knew Jon and also brought Shattered Sword to my attention), so maybe I'm partial to a fellow alum.  Whether or not you agree with the conclusions in Shattered Sword, it does point out many, many problems with the conclusions of prior descriptions of Midway (including the movie) which simply don't match up with the facts.  This book is also extensively researched based on Japanese operational reports, something prior books from the US side didn't have or don't use.  Definitely a "must have" book for any interested in the Pacific War.

[John 3rd]

ORIGINAL: marky

i saw it in barnes n noble but didnt snatch it up, and never got around to going back for it 

Marky--I love your shot of Enterprise!

[Christof]

Well honestly.

For me there was a "before" and "after" reading Shattered Sword...

Before: thought that the US had just been plain lucky winning this battle

After: today I think that the only piece of "luck" that day for the US was the fact that some SBD jockey managed to completly disable the Akagi with one single bomb hit - which in fact was almost a near miss...

Great book!