Japanese submarines and aircraft

[el cid again]

Which untruth was that?

Or did you miss that I have yet to get caught in one. Since, on principle, I never lie (except in a combat situation),
you are going to have to work long and hard to catch me in one. You haven't done so yet.

I am not sure how you managed to miss the elementary facts of life - but it is perfectly possible for someone to know something you do not - it is perfectly possible for a person to disagree with you about what information is more correct without lieing about it (and those who read the original documents are more likely to be right than those who are stuck in translation) - and there is no honor whatever in breaking the rules and conditions for participating on the board or wasting time calling people names

[m10bob]

As for information which is "public", a few years ago, the History Channel was showing a program about an Indian registry ship loaded with American troops which had been sunk by a German guided missile in WW2.. I have always been a student of WW2, the ETO especially as I was the very proud son of one of its' true heroes.
Having read hundreds of books on WW2 by the time I was in my 40's, I thought the idea of a troopship being sunk by a German guided missile sounded both fantastic (outlandish), and too "sci-fi" for my interests.
About 18 months ago, quite by accident, I located my long MIA uncle George Sortwell, who had been killed when his troopship, of Indian registry, the RMS Rhona was sunk by a German guided-missile.
Indeed, the man had been listed as "MIA", and even though this event which was now "public", only approx 50 of the next of kin of over 1200 families have learned of the fate of their departed loved ones from this one single incident.
Fifty years after the fact, when the secrets were released, it was not felt "practical" to search for the next of kin.

Just because we never "heard of it", does not mean it did not happen.
Another book called I-Boat Skipper tells of the explosion of Nagato's sister ship(can't remember the name) blowing up and sinking due to experiments it was conducting with some powerful and new kind of shell which was intended to be fired/launched over an enemy fleet, to sink the enemy fleet, (with this single projectile.)
The Japanese author explains it was of course covered up at the time, and the cover up was accepted as truth by the victorious allies.

Maybe there is still a quantum of racial bigotry to even now believe the Japanese were incapable of such scientific thought?

I wasn't there....

[DuckofTindalos]

Has NOTHING to do with racial bigotry, but with simple economics. Japan was barely able to find the economic resources to support their conventional military once the war got underway; where did the resources come from for the wonder weapons?

And don't compare this situation to Germany, which was a highly industrialized major power. Japan was not.

"Racial bigotry"...[8|] That's far too PC coming from you, Bob...

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Well, the French had the Surcouf, which Alikchi put into Iron Storm II, and the US experimented with submarine-launched float planes in the twenties, but very quickly gave it up again, seeing it for the bad idea it was...

Which then means the research invested in a US version of the I-400s - with 3 jets no less - was entirely stupid?
What killed the idea was the advent of the cruise missile

What killed the idea of a US version of the I-400 was it's utter impractability. The I-400's were researched by the US simply because they were examples of the latest Japanese sub tech and the USN wanted to examine it all just as they did the Germans post war. They quickly lost interest though certain aspects were noted that could be of use. As a whole, the I-400 was a dead end.

[herwin]

I suspect those boats were loud.

Also, the crews on the nuclear boats probably would have glowed in the dark.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Dili

I think all open sea recon is overpowered - in other hand radio intelligence is underpowered. This has diverse resons one of them is the aircraft availability Vs frequency of operations, crew fatigue etc, then for float planes there is also the recover times (for CS and AVs) , sea state, and gasoline. Anyone knows how many missions a Glen could make from a submarine, and if they had an engine replacement?

The open sea recon is vastly overpowered. A VP squadron was not good for 360 degree coverage except at very short range. More like 100 degree coverage.

The SIGINT model is definitely underpowered, although I've found I can track the KB through Japanese rear areas with some reliability as long as I use the MST algorithm.

[DuckofTindalos]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Well, the French had the Surcouf, which Alikchi put into Iron Storm II, and the US experimented with submarine-launched float planes in the twenties, but very quickly gave it up again, seeing it for the bad idea it was...

Which then means the research invested in a US version of the I-400s - with 3 jets no less - was entirely stupid?
What killed the idea was the advent of the cruise missile

What killed the idea of a US version of the I-400 was it's utter impractability. The I-400's were researched by the US simply because they were examples of the latest Japanese sub tech and the USN wanted to examine it all just as they did the Germans post war. They quickly lost interest though certain aspects were noted that could be of use. As a whole, the I-400 was a dead end.

I probably shouldn't be amazed that cid got so defensive about this. Some time ago, another forum member posted an idea for a what-if Dutch airplane cruiser, basically a Tromp-class CL with six seaplanes. Cid attacked it immediately as a "dead-end technology"... What a hypocrite...[8|]

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: herwin

I suspect those boats were loud.

Also, the crews on the nuclear boats probably would have glowed in the dark.

And that early on, nobody knew the deadly effects of radiation poisoning. Note the use of American troops openly deployed in blast areas stateside!
Oft noted are the many stars who died from cancer after filming the John Wayne film in which he portrayed Ghenghis Khan?

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

As for information which is "public", a few years ago, the History Channel was showing a program about an Indian registry ship loaded with American troops which had been sunk by a German guided missile in WW2.. I have always been a student of WW2, the ETO especially as I was the very proud son of one of its' true heroes.
Having read hundreds of books on WW2 by the time I was in my 40's, I thought the idea of a troopship being sunk by a German guided missile sounded both fantastic (outlandish), and too "sci-fi" for my interests.
About 18 months ago, quite by accident, I located my long MIA uncle George Sortwell, who had been killed when his troopship, of Indian registry, the RMS Rhona was sunk by a German guided-missile.
Indeed, the man had been listed as "MIA", and even though this event which was now "public", only approx 50 of the next of kin of over 1200 families have learned of the fate of their departed loved ones from this one single incident.
Fifty years after the fact, when the secrets were released, it was not felt "practical" to search for the next of kin.

Just because we never "heard of it", does not mean it did not happen.
Another book called I-Boat Skipper tells of the explosion of Nagato's sister ship(can't remember the name) blowing up and sinking due to experiments it was conducting with some powerful and new kind of shell which was intended to be fired/launched over an enemy fleet, to sink the enemy fleet, (with this single projectile.)
The Japanese author explains it was of course covered up at the time, and the cover up was accepted as truth by the victorious allies.

Maybe there is still a quantum of racial bigotry to even now believe the Japanese were incapable of such scientific thought?

I wasn't there....

The sister ship of Nagato was Mutsu. She indeed blew up sitting in harbor. However, a remarkable number of captial ships have done the same thing - something like 1 in 20. It is quite likely that a magazine explosion was the cause. Indeed, many ships (and modern unarmored ships are included here) suffer magazine explosions after some event triggers them: even if this story is true - the generally accepted explanation is probably also true insofar as the magazines went up in sympothetic detonation. It is also known that Japan had unusual shells - in particular anti-aircraft and anti-submarine shells - and they certainly had cause to be concerned with both. The story might be true. Finally, I Boat Captain, while non-scholarly, was written by a noted Japanese officer who later in life co-authored a more scholarly work in English by USNI (The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II). I don't recall this tale in either - but I will see if I can find it.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Has NOTHING to do with racial bigotry, but with simple economics. Japan was barely able to find the economic resources to support their conventional military once the war got underway; where did the resources come from for the wonder weapons?

And don't compare this situation to Germany, which was a highly industrialized major power. Japan was not.

"Racial bigotry"...[8|] That's far too PC coming from you, Bob...

In Danger and Survival, McGeorge Bundy takes this view. He finds the "mere existence" of Japanese atomic research quite amazing. Turns out it was early, and also better informed about Allied research than either the German or Soviet programs were. [It obtained samples of soil from near the first prototype reactor in Chicago and spirited them to Mexico for radiological instrument measuring a short time after it became operational. It obtained plans for at least one - and possibly several - of the US bomb designs from Los Alamos - which may explain why the first Japanese design was "just like ours" in the words of three Manhattan Project scientists. Not quite - it was more weaponized - a typical sign of reverse engineering - as you can always do the same thing better the second time around. US intelligence also has evidence they obtained something - I forget - from the University of California site. Supporting this view that intel was good are surviving records of briefings of the Japanese head of state throughout the war on the progress of the Allied program: they were always correct.]

I have twice worked with an author (Robert K Wilcox) who is working on the third edition of a book on the Japanese atomic program. I also worked with a British nuclear engineer who has written three books (so far) on Axis atomic research (Philip Henshall). I myself have collected about 10,000 pages of documents (in addition to several feet of bookshelf space) of related materials and written to surviving participants in these projects (sometimes being replied to by children if they were no longer able to write - I got a book from one and a chapter of a book from another). Wilcox is in daily contact and would certainly confirm this - and possibly some other consulting we (that is both of us) have done with an official contractor.

The big problem with the Japanese program was nuclear fuel. Asia is uncharacteristically poor in uranium. The only pitch blend primary ore mine ever available was not on stream until the war was almost over (and it is in use today by North Korea). Uranium mines take typically 10 years to develop - and doing one in 3 years was remarkable. Most Japanese uranium came from China - where there was also a uranium refinery at Shanghai - for the ceramic industry (it had 1000 tons of ore). Japan paid high prices for uranium ores and got more than a little from surface mining by Chinese - even on the "wrong side" - it was typical of wartime China it could buy critical ores from anywhere if the price was right. Another source was Malaya - the only time in history Malaya exported ores with uranium (and Thorium) was to wartime Japan - about 6000 tons of it. [This item is cited by Ninninger in Materials for Atomic Energy - a book written about 1954 for prospectors when he was undersecretary of the AEC. But he had been in the program since Manhattan days and was the foremost US expert on the subject.] This led Japan (and later India) - and also wartime Britain - to consider Thorium as a nuclear fuel. This is a very hush hush subject - for different reasons in different countries:

a) Japan does not like to admit serious atomic research - for domestic political reasons atomic bombs being unpopular. [Note, however, the release of a number of documents in the last decade - triggered by a US academic who had one set of them sent by a Japanese in 1945 - and a number of Japanese newspapers efforts - because it would sell newspapers I guess]

b) UK does not like to admit it had a parallel program to the Manhattan project - although in the event distrusting the US was justified - and we did lock them out of the program in 1946 for some years. The UK - lacking major sources of uranium - also went the thorium route - and there is evidence - including a US citizen resident in Australia sworn testimony during the war (to a US consular official) - the UK tested such a bomb in Australia. [Since neither the citizen nor the official knew about atomic science, the document almost has to be true - they lacked the technical knowledge to fabricate it]

c) The US fears thorium technology might be useful for terrorists. It permits one to make a nasty device - one 'not suitable' for a classical deterrence weapon - without costly enrichment of uranium - at relatively low cost. [This is partly speculative - it is known the US keeps this stuff secret aggressively - if you walk in with all forms of clearence to the classified section of the Library of Congress - and Presidential authorization - DOE or DOD will pull what you ask for moments before you get your hands on it "for examination" - and it may then never return. But every person with such experiences I know thinks this is a good guess about why.] While every person I respect in the scientific, scholarly, military and intelligence communities thinks there is "no excuse" for keeping history secret after this much time - and in clear violation of US law - nevertheless we all agree not to write in detail in one place how to make a "thorium bomb" - in spite of the fact non of the details are classified as individual items. Talking about general principles is not the same thing as writing a technical manual - let bad guys do their own homework.

The other thing that hurt the Japanese - who got farther than the Germans or the Soviets did during the war - was division. There were at least 5 programs - and until very late none were jointly sponsored or funded by the two services. The very first program - a JAAF one - was not aimed at conventional power nor at atomic weapons nor at radiological weapons - but at aircraft propulsion! [We spent many billions of dollars on this in the 1950s - including an atomic powered bomber - an atomic powered cruise missile - and an atomic powered ballistic missile. None of them worked out - but we did end up with a powerplant for space satellites. By 1960 we went the other way - designing a cruiser powered by atom bombs as such - and the son of the lead physicist (Freeman Dyson) has now written a book on the matter in English - Project Orion.] The Japanese concluded (in a meeting at Navy Park, Tokyo, in the summer of 1942) they had a better shot than Germany - and I tend to agree. Japanese theoretical physicists were first rate - and they often solved problems on the blackboard we had to spend a long time on in the field (our program not being run by theoriticians but by experimentalists). They also first concieved the idea of fusion - again entirely in theory - and this is widely admitted in English histories.

The Japanese Navy programs were somewhat less exotic - and possibly more soundly oriented towards ship propulsion (and "large machinery" on land - factories?) If uranium was scarce, and oil fuel in short supply, blowing up all the uranium you have in one shot makes less sense than using it for years does. Once again, however, fuel shortages led them to concepts of thorium fuel, and thorium is very superior as reactor fuel. [See the final experiments at Shippingport]
If you combine natural or slightly enriched uranium with thorium, the thorium converts to U-233, which then replaces the "burned" U-235, and you "breed" replacement fuel - with no need to separate it or process it. This concept is finally getting serious large scale research - mainly in India and a US funded program in Israel using ex Soviet scientists.
But it was never a bad idea - and only the unexpected wide scale discovery of uranium after we figured out we could find it by hiring prospectors and educating them in the late 1950s prevented its earlier adoption on more than experimental scale. Even so, Japan did manage to design and build gun type atomic bombs - using exactly the same concept of a cut down three inch AA gun as Little Boy did. What is interesting is they skipped the long gun method tried both in Germany and the US (before Little Boy). They also didn't attempt an implosion device - which required rather more complicated mechanisms. [The long gun method was tried for plutonium bombs - and we figured out it would usually not work - while the Germans seem never to have figured it out. The original US atomic bomb - the one we thought would be first - was Tall Man.] The US also had two different implosion concepts - cylindrical (not developed until after the war - for artillery shells) and spherical (Fat Man type). You can learn almost all you need to know about US programs in a book with materials declassified by court order (several of them): US Nuclear Weapons by Chuck Hansen.

[Dili]

Yeah that's my point Herwin. Besides i can put a Patrol squadron at 100% -whatever that means it should not sustainable for more than 2 weeks- and i can have it that way forever.
 

If we assume that a search aircraft transits a hex twice in a turn (outbound and inbound) - and that it on the statistical average is on the centerline of the hex - that means it must be within 30 nm or less of any possible target at least once - and statistically will be within 15 nautical miles or less 50% of the time - typically twice during the search period - but at least once. The search results are not very unreasonable in such conditions.

 
But at 10 hexes distance how many planes do you need for a 90% search probability and dont even factoring weather?
 
 
I suspect that since the game doesnt allows for search areas, they went for a 360º degree search capability that turns it too perfect for maybe 180-270º,  but even that doesnt explains the fatigue model.
 
 
Btw in my plays my Glens House Rules is that i can put them in the air 10 days per submarine mission(which is roughly 10-20 missions) but i would like better info about that.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Well, the French had the Surcouf, which Alikchi put into Iron Storm II, and the US experimented with submarine-launched float planes in the twenties, but very quickly gave it up again, seeing it for the bad idea it was...

Which then means the research invested in a US version of the I-400s - with 3 jets no less - was entirely stupid?
What killed the idea was the advent of the cruise missile

What killed the idea of a US version of the I-400 was it's utter impractability. The I-400's were researched by the US simply because they were examples of the latest Japanese sub tech and the USN wanted to examine it all just as they did the Germans post war. They quickly lost interest though certain aspects were noted that could be of use. As a whole, the I-400 was a dead end.

Au contraire, mon ami, the US was too bigoted to believe in Japanese submarine technology in 1945/6. We assumed, falsely (see US Submarines Since 1945 by Norman Friedman) the German submarines (XXI) were superior - and promptly sank all the captured Japanese guppys - in spite of the fact they were "based on superior hydrodyanmic technology." Nor does the I - 400 represent an exceptional case - for we did NOT initiate a research program at that time - but nearly a decade later. We came to believe in "strike from the sea" being submarine based after the Soviets obtained atomic weapons much sooner than the "decades at least" expectation set by Gen Groves. And the design concept more or less made it all the way to hardware - except the jets were replaced by winged pilotless cruise missiles.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

I suspect those boats were loud.

Also, the crews on the nuclear boats probably would have glowed in the dark.

It is the HEN crews that suffered that fate. Framed by 2x4s no less, with remarkably little shielding. Nevertheless - you are substantially correct: the Japanese reactor segment was not shielded to US standards. But they were adequate - and the big problem was core life - not crew life. The second core of the Japanese prototype reactor at Konan ran until 1948 - and the operators are not known to have suffered from radiation sickness. They used beryllium as a reflector, lead and steel - not too bad.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

ORIGINAL: herwin

I suspect those boats were loud.

Also, the crews on the nuclear boats probably would have glowed in the dark.

And that early on, nobody knew the deadly effects of radiation poisoning. Note the use of American troops openly deployed in blast areas stateside!
Oft noted are the many stars who died from cancer after filming the John Wayne film in which he portrayed Ghenghis Khan?

Not just stars - everyone present.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Dili

Yeah that's my point Herwin. Besides i can put a Patrol squadron at 100% -whatever that means it should not sustainable for more than 2 weeks- and i can have it that way forever.

If we assume that a search aircraft transits a hex twice in a turn (outbound and inbound) - and that it on the statistical average is on the centerline of the hex - that means it must be within 30 nm or less of any possible target at least once - and statistically will be within 15 nautical miles or less 50% of the time - typically twice during the search period - but at least once. The search results are not very unreasonable in such conditions.

But at 10 hexes distance how many planes do you need for a 90% search probability and dont even factoring weather?


I suspect that since the game doesnt allows for search areas, they went for a 360º degree search capability that turns it too perfect for maybe 180-270º,  but even that doesnt explains the fatigue model.


Btw in my plays my Glens House Rules is that i can put them in the air 10 days per submarine mission(which is roughly 10-20 missions) but i would like better info about that.

What we know about GG and WITP from disclosures indicates a tendency to qualify everything with die rolls. Further, every algorithm explained (or otherwise figured out) tends to have multiple inputs. I bet you are wrong - weather is factored in directly or indirectly - by one - or both - of these mechanisms. As for sustainability - dynamic situations are not entirely sustained - big search planes with long ranges have relief pilots - units often have up to 50% extra aircrew and on search missions they often do not fly all the planes at one time. I am a nit picker and a detail freak - but we would not have this game if it was done to my taste: Matrix got a product to market in a way it is continuing to be improved (meaning funded). Good job I say.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Dili

I think all open sea recon is overpowered - in other hand radio intelligence is underpowered. This has diverse resons one of them is the aircraft availability Vs frequency of operations, crew fatigue etc, then for float planes there is also the recover times (for CS and AVs) , sea state, and gasoline. Anyone knows how many missions a Glen could make from a submarine, and if they had an engine replacement?

The open sea recon is vastly overpowered. A VP squadron was not good for 360 degree coverage except at very short range. More like 100 degree coverage.

The SIGINT model is definitely underpowered, although I've found I can track the KB through Japanese rear areas with some reliability as long as I use the MST algorithm.

What is the MST algorithm?

[Dili]

Further, every algorithm explained (or otherwise figured out) tends to have multiple inputs. I bet you are wrong - weather is factored in directly or indirectly - by one - or both - of these mechanisms.

 
I was talking generaly not in game terms. How many planes needed to search at 10 hexes not factoring weather?
 
 

As for sustainability - dynamic situations are not entirely sustained - big search planes with long ranges have relief pilots - units often have up to 50% extra aircrew and on search missions they often do not fly all the planes at one time.

 
Well for the 100% to have any meaning it should mean an extraordinary not sustainable mission profiles.
 
 

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Au contraire, mon ami, the US was too bigoted to believe in Japanese submarine technology in 1945/6.

I'm sure there was bias. I don't need Friedman to confirm that. I only need Blair's forward in Vol one of Hitler's Uboat war. I did say that elements of Japanese sub design were viewed with interest. The I-400 concept as a whole in WWII however was not practical and they would have been hideously vulneable to Allied ASW.

We came to believe in "strike from the sea" being submarine based after the Soviets obtained atomic weapons much sooner than the "decades at least" expectation set by Gen Groves. And the design concept more or less made it all the way to hardware - except the jets were replaced by winged pilotless cruise missiles.

If your referring vaguely to US submarine design postwar, it was not based on I-400.

[DuckofTindalos]

Wonder how long the Sen Toku's took to submerge? The Surcouf took over 15 minutes...

[ChezDaJez]

Cid said:

Also - in all navies since WWII - submarine reactor fuel is not 20% enriched uranium. Indeed, reactor fuel is higher than the HEU used in nuclear weapons. It is 97% enriched. Indeed, it would not be possible to fuel any nuclear reactor ever built since WWII with 20% uranium - they would need to be much larger than they are. Only the French attempted a natural uranium reactor in this period - and it turned out so big the submarine (which still exists as a test ship for missiles but without a nuclear plant) was unable to carry it. It may be the Japanese natural uranium reactor is the only practical one ever actually completed - although until the British work is declassified we cannot be sure. The Soviets did capture one of these reactors and exported it to the USSR for study. One series of reactors in the USSR might be related to it in some ways - but the submarine reactor program indeed elected not to use the same technology. Nevertheless, the first design studies were based on that reactor - and the specification for plant size never changed. When the Russians learned we planned to build a 15,000 hp plant in Nautilus (it didn't end up quite that size), they took the simple expedient of using two reactors (of 12,500) to give them a total power advantage (at 25,000). Presumably by then the plant design was too far along to change its rating. And also the Soviets no doubt liked the principle of redundancy.

Still incorrect, Cid. Early generation Soviet submarine reactors used uranium-235 enriched to about 20%. The US reactors installed in Nautilus were of similar enrichment. Third generation Soviet reactors (Sierra, Oscar, Akula, Typhoon) are only enriched to about 40%.

4.1.3 Fuel
A minimum level of reliable information is essential for evaluating the safe and secure handling and protection of excessive stocks of naval fuel – which are often stored under highly unsatisfactory conditions. Among the most important is the enrichment level. The need for selfsufficiency, strong power-outputs and limited reactor sizes may require the use of highly enriched naval nuclear fuel [Gagarinski]8 However, for submarines of the first generation, the enrichment of the uranium of the fuel elements of the pressurized water reactors seems, in general, to have been about 20%, as suggested by Sivintsev in the IASAP report. This is consistent with the Russian prosecutor's article on the stolen HEU in 1994 [Yaderny Kontroll]. The amount of U-235 is here said to be 283.3 grams out of overall uranium content of 1,448.9 grams, enriched to 19.9% and corresponding to the fuel enrichment in the Russian naval training reactor in Paldiski [Oelgaard2], and data on earlier US submarines [Eriksen].9

However, the overall figures presented as part of the IASAP report have been discussed and corrected by other Russian official sources [Rubtsov1]. In the case of a reactor compartment with two reactors (without fuel) dumped near Novaya Zemlya in 1965, the fuel enrichment is presented as being 6%. This was K-3, the first Russian nuclear submarine, which got a new reactor compartment due to several design weaknesses [Oelgaard1]. If this enrichment
information is correct, the reactors of the first nuclear submarine, and possibly a few others, may have had a lower enrichment, more like that of the civilian icebreaker Lenin. The complete set of data presented by Rubtsov et al., both in the draft paper for the IASAP Source Term Working
Group and in the Russian journal Nuclear Energy, is given in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Fuel data on Russian reactors dumped at Novaya Zemlya, as presented by Rubtsov et
al. for the ISAP Source Term Working Group and in the Russian journal Nuclear Energy

(Basically, this table lists U-235 enrichment levels for these particular November class submarines ranging from a low of 5.45% to a high of 21%. It also lists a Yankee at 21% for comparison.

I tried to include this table as it would have been very enlightning but I couldn't get it to format correctly. Its on page 32 of the link I listed below)

The above came from the following source: "Russian Nuclear Powerplants for Marine Applications" and was published by the Nordisk kernesikkerhedsforskning (Nordik Nuclear research Safety) office in April 2006.

The link is : Russian Nuclear Powerplants for Marine Applications

Cid said:

We all have to be careful not to divulge things not in open sources. In my case, I always have every source in my collection - and from time to time I am invited to show them to official investigators - who are often amazed at what is open source. At US Senate hearings, Oppenheimer described in open hearings things everyone believed was classified - but when called on it he said he merely had quoted what he read in the Encyclopedia Britannica that morning. Note, however, that just because a source is scholarly and/or official, or classified, does not make it correct. It only means that is what was known or believed at the time it was written. And in matters nuclear, sometimes what is officially written is known to be false, for various reasons. If you want to stir up a firestorm, try to get your hands on the official chemical analysis of the nuclear cargo of U-234 - which a neighbor of mine - a famous Manhattan Project Oak Ridge chemist - did a few years ago. Never mind the theory of automatic declassification - never mind that it hardly matters at this late date - it is still something that can produce remarkable (and contradictory) official statements.

I am quite well aware of what I can talk about and what I can't. That is why I use open source material to back up anything I say in regards to nuclear submarines or modern-day ASW tactics. The source I quoted above is a recognized authority on Soviet nuclear powerplants. Much of their data came from the Russians themselves. Read the article, Cid. Its 94 pages long and full of technical details on Soviet submarine reactors. After you've read it, please name the articles you have that contest the veracity of the statements in the above article.

As a former ASW expert, my job was to learn every possible detail concerning Soviet submarines from engineering specifications, performance capabilities, their tactics and weapons. I think I got pretty good at it over my 26-year career. I may not be much up to speed on the latest submarine classes launched since I retired 9 years ago but Type 1 nucs (H, E-I, E-II, N classes) were my bread and butter for many, many years. I recognize the correctness of open-source data when I see it. And this article, my friend, pretty closely matches what I learned about these boats.

Cid, you have expertise in many, many fields that I do not but this is one field that I feel very sure about. Not trying to pull your chain, just trying to correct some inaccuracies.

Chez