Extending torpedo reform: effective midget subs

[el cid again]

I decided to look at the midget submarines (invented for RHS as game devices). After reports that torpedos work
much better using effective range (= 50 % of maximum range ) in x.784, I decided to reduce the range of midgets.
In the process, I figured out how to penetrate harbor defenses - for the very first time - ever. From now on, the RHS midgets should work (occasionally) both at sea and vs targets in port. The major problem with them is - there are not very many! The most you ever get is 12 on a converted seaplane tender. Otherwise, mainly you get one at a time.
I think the 12 on the tender should be shown as 4 with 3 shots - because they were able to offload only at that rate (albiet at full speed).

[DuckofTindalos]

My biggest problem with using midgets as devices is that there will be too many of them. The midgets were not constructed in very great numbers, certainly nowhere near as many as torpedoes.

[el cid again]

There is no reason to have a large number of them. And they actually were built in large numbers - so I am not sure where the impression comes from they were not? There were several different modes of use contemplated - surface ship delivery - submarine delivery - coastal basing. The surface ship delivery was attempted only at Midway - as far as I know - and since a surface action did not occur - they were not expended. Each vessel carried no less than 12! In RHS I limit you to only one ship so fitted, but for a while there were three. This was the least used method. Submarines delivered several (1 each) that were used with effect at Pearl Harbor (I accept current scholarship USS Tennessee was hit), Sydney and Diego Suarez. The last method was most used: as many as four successes are credited to Midgets in the Philippines - all cases wrongly attributed to other types of submarines (according to The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II if I remember the correct source). Late in the war vast numbers were built for similar use in Japan - something like 800 just in one photograph - and there is no reason to think they might not have been able to find targets in a massive landing operation. In spite of this use, I have only succeeded in getting Soviet coastal subs to work - and at the moment I have none for Japan.

Some vessels were designed for midget use and then converted. In BBO family you have a giant submarine class in its original form - with two midgets on board.

It appears that the midgets of Japan were the finest in the world in that period - but in spite of that they were flawed in significant ways - most notably too small an opening to flood water when torpedoes were fired. They not only usually broached (something even large submarines can do on firing), they went wildly off course - and it was not possible to fire the second round in a timely way at the same target. The best treatment of these matters is in Midget Submarines of the Second World War (covering all nations) and Submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Both are too dated to include the material on the latest discoveries (we now have recovered all the Pearl Harbor subs, and we now have a number of forinsic studies of a photograph of I-68TOU firing there). So the best material on that is in a new book First Shot - although it was originally disclosed by Burl Burlingame, curator of the Army Museum on Oahu, and author of Advance Force Pearl Harbor.

I think the midgets are technically very interesting vessels, but like all midgets, they require the most intense training of crews for success - and this is why those that hit something did so well - they had well trained crews. I don't think this would have been practical to provide in great numbers - so if the number of midgets the Orazaki factory could turn out was large - and the number by shipyards vast - I must agree that they could not have been used in more than modest numbers. I also don't think they would be effective in many conditions - and this game lacks the detail to properly represent them. In more elaborate games, I know players who love to mess with this sort of chrome - but it is my view they are nitche weapons. The basic problem is that submarines are lousy defensive weapons: they cannot react fast enough and only by dumb luck are in the right position to see anything useful. They are much more useful offensively, but delivering midgets offensively is problematical.

The story of Japanese midgets is not well and completely told. One midget was found on a beach in Panama in July 1945. It was NOT a weapon at all - but a "reconnaissance type" - and it had a compartment loaded with raw silk (to sell??) in place of warhead or torpedos forward. It was sent to Hawaii for years, but eventually returned to Japan, where it is on display. Yet - in spite of this physical evidence - with a proper evidence trail dating to 1945 (a US Army patrol found it) - it is only mentioned in one book I know of (Advance Force Pearl Harbor) - and NO ship reference I have seen (and I think I have them all) admits the existence of "reconnaissance type" midgets or kaiten. One must wonder if "reconnaissance" type vessels were used in their design role - for recon?

[Hoplosternum]

Yes Terminus is right. By trying to add realistic features in to the game you actually risk making the game far less realistic. Either the midgets will be effective and used far more than they were historically (possibly with fairly serious concequences for game balance that won't be immeadiately apparent). Or they will be not very effective and not used.

The game mechanics won't let you restrict the numbers if they are a device. Nor adequately allow you to give a high supply cost to reflect extra resources the Japanese could possibly have put in to have more midget subs. So even if you can create a realistic midget sub within the game you can't reflect the real logistics of them.

[el cid again]

Actually - they have so far not been effective at all except in carefully orchestrated tests designed to see if they EVER work? I hope they are effective rarely - and it is not yet clear if that will be the case? If they happen to be too effective (which seems very unlikely) I can reduce the accuracy rating still farther (it isn't good now).

But I have had no trouble limiting numbers. Although I have been artificial about it - and only in EEO am I increasing them. I only put one midget carrier at sea - Mizuho I think - although there were three. The number of subs with them is very small - but worse - they only carry one - and a single shot is not likely to work - as you know. They have less impact than a regular torpedo (I treat them like 18 inch torpedoes, because that is what they fire, and I permit only one hit, because none ever scored two, and the firing mechanics preclude a salvo shot). Their only advantage is they have more range - and now they can (theoretically) penetrate a harbor of 3 or more rating. But don't hold your breath: it might happen, but it probably will not, due to the severe limits on numbers. I use 1 shot and ROF = 1 for the subs. Pretty awful. But rarely they should work. If you send several subs, you might get 1 hit - just as IRL.

The problem with ship delivery is - how can you know where a surface battle will be? How can you insure your midget carrier is not hit by heavy shells before it can get the midgets to effective range? It never happened as far as I know, and it also has never happened in the game. I give players one carrier so they can try (and usually fail) - for fun and to proove the problem.

The problem with coastal delivery is that no sort of submarine is effective in a defensive role. My one effective micro sub device has NEVER scored - because Japan never has entered a port where they defend. If they did, odds are pretty good they would never know they had been fired upon by these subs. If hit, the only way it MIGHT be noticed is that some vessel had rather more damage than usual by a coast defense fort. I have to run large numbers of these devices to proove they will rarely hit. They are chrome - pure and simple - ineffective as coast defenses (because they were pretty ineffective IRL in such a role). And the one time I tried to do it for Japan it didn't work at all. I have slot limits that make it very difficult - but I might try again now I have a new device type to mess with.

[m10bob]

If you can make them, what prevents the Kaiten carriers,(Oi and Kitakami)?
Won't time availibility itself make them somewhat limited?

[el cid again]

OK - lets be clear about this: RHS has BOTH midgets and Kaitens - and the Oi and Kitakami will convert to Kaiten carriers in all issued scenarios (but probably will not in EEO - because I am not a fan of Kaiten - I will use the ships in what I regard as a more effective way).

We can and do have Kaiten - and in the later part of the war many submarines - and more than a few surface ships - convert into Kaiten carriers. They are probably more effective than midgets because more are carried - from 4 to 6 depending on the submarine - and similar or larger numbers for surface vessels. Also - the Kaiten have bigger warheads - being 24 inch torpedoes at their foundation. But it is almost impossible to see from a Kaiten - far worse than from a midget conning tower - a Kaiten has no such thing. Kaiten pilots - including both inventers of the concept - mainly died unable to close their targets - blowing up at the end of the run automatically. Midget pilots expected the likelyhood of myrterdom was high (9 of 10 at Pearl Harbor died, and all died at Diego Suarez and Sydney). But there was a chance of survival, and the submarine would not blow up of its own accord! This is a totally different concept than a Kaiten - although in the event high command tried to make it the same - insisting there be a way for a pilot to bail out - it was never believed in by the troops and apparently never attempted. Philosophy and psychology aside, the Kaiten concept is flawed because it was not properly worked out at the sensor end: practice in the sheltered Inland Sea didn't approximate operational conditions most of the time - and you simply cannot see from the inside of a mostly submerged 24 inch torpedo via a tiny periscope that is moving in all axis.

Kaiten are in all forms of RHS so far because they are strictly historical, not because I believe in suicide weapons. So is the Baka - and it is also in stock and CHS. But Kaiten are in RHS as chrome - and for those who believe in them to see how well they work? Not because they are going to replace proper submarine tactics. There is almost no follow up on this concept - except in the Soviet/Russian navy - which can be said to have some gigantic torpedoes - albiet more attention to the guidance problem. And PRE WWII torpedoes are still carried by RN submarines - and trusted more than the modern fancy ones - and effective. Nor is that the only navy with old torpedoes in service. The Kaiten was an attempt to create a guided torpedo - and it was not fully developed. The German idea of letting a human guide it via wires was better - but still getting the bugs worked out of it.

In EEO I will let you see what you can do with submarines NOT converted to Kaiten carriers? Because I think that is more likely to be useful operationally. It isn't the torpedoes that matter - they always worked and still work. It is getting the submarine into firing position that matters - and not getting sunk on the way. To that end snorkels and radar may help late war submarines.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

OK - lets be clear about this: RHS has BOTH midgets and Kaitens - and the Oi and Kitakami will convert to Kaiten carriers in all issued scenarios (but probably will not in EEO - because I am not a fan of Kaiten - I will use the ships in what I regard as a more effective way).

Ship upgrades are not mandatory. players can choose to not upgrade a ship. Why not leave the conversion in and let players decide if they want to upgrade?

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

My biggest problem with using midgets as devices is that there will be too many of them. The midgets were not constructed in very great numbers, certainly nowhere near as many as torpedoes.

Boyd and Yoshida in "The Japanese Submarine Force and World War Two" state that no more than 100 of the Tye A-C midget subs were built. The type D, planned for coastal defense use only, were being built in large number late war.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior

ORIGINAL: el cid again

OK - lets be clear about this: RHS has BOTH midgets and Kaitens - and the Oi and Kitakami will convert to Kaiten carriers in all issued scenarios (but probably will not in EEO - because I am not a fan of Kaiten - I will use the ships in what I regard as a more effective way).

Ship upgrades are not mandatory. players can choose to not upgrade a ship. Why not leave the conversion in and let players decide if they want to upgrade?

You are quite correct - and in all forms of RHS this has been exactly what I did. If I play, I won't convert to a Kaiten carrier. But I am only permitted to have ONE upgrade path - so for EEO - which is an attempt to create a more EFFECTIVE Japanese military - we will use things likely to actually work.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior

ORIGINAL: Terminus

My biggest problem with using midgets as devices is that there will be too many of them. The midgets were not constructed in very great numbers, certainly nowhere near as many as torpedoes.

Boyd and Yoshida in "The Japanese Submarine Force and World War Two" state that no more than 100 of the Tye A-C midget subs were built. The type D, planned for coastal defense use only, were being built in large number late war.

They are correct - the total below is 76 - and there were also 2 prototypes - well below 100. This is not to say more could not have been made by the dedicated factory at Orazaki however. They made as many as were required - and stopped - until different kinds were required. This was a specialized plant for serial production, and it could have produced many more. Due to slot limitations, the imporoved Type D and later models are still represented by Type A in RHS - at least so far.
Carpenter and Polmar, in Submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy (which I was able to persuade USNI to put back into print), record 62 Type A midgets completed, 16 Type B and C completed (they are identical but B was the prototype name), 115 Type D completed, and 244 Kairuy completed. That excludes 382 Type D which were under construction and 168 Karyu which were under construction. Vastly greater numbers were contemplated, but I restrict myself to those actually realized in metal: which is to say 437 completed and 558 building. I also do not include any of the wierd or exotic projects - of which there were many - and no Kaiten - but only proper midget submarines with some military role. There was also a significant NON weaponized midget (a near sister was built in 1970 called "No 001": the design "proved capable of a depth of nearly 1000 ft") "Sensui Sagyo-sen" - sort of an ancester of our rescue midgets - and a hydrodyanmic test bed (No 63) (again maybe more - Orita says there were more than just one) - and two pre midgets destroyed to preserve secrecy before the war. M Kanamono was a Type C variant for minelaying of harbors that could "walk" on the bottom. 14 U Kanamono were turned over at Kure - they are a lot like the Civil War era David - you couldn't really submerge but attacked deck awash. S Kanamono was a prototype for the Kairyu. Japan also built - and used - numbers of submersables not as weapons but as stores vessels. The capacity of Japan to build midgets was significant, and the yards that built Army submarines over in Korea also could have built them. There were far more serous problems producing torpedoes or skilled crews than producing midgets themselves. It is only secondary logistic considerations of this sort - and lack of slots - that means we should not consider putting them in in numbers. The potential for greater numbers than we met in the field was significant.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior

ORIGINAL: Terminus

My biggest problem with using midgets as devices is that there will be too many of them. The midgets were not constructed in very great numbers, certainly nowhere near as many as torpedoes.

Boyd and Yoshida in "The Japanese Submarine Force and World War Two" state that no more than 100 of the Tye A-C midget subs were built. The type D, planned for coastal defense use only, were being built in large number late war.

They are correct - the total below is 76 - and there were also 2 prototypes - well below 100. This is not to say more could not have been made by the dedicated factory at Orazaki however. They made as many as were required - and stopped - until different kinds were required. This was a specialized plant for serial production, and it could have produced many more. Due to slot limitations, the imporoved Type D and later models are still represented by Type A in RHS - at least so far.
Carpenter and Polmar, in Submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy (which I was able to persuade USNI to put back into print), record 62 Type A midgets completed, 16 Type B and C completed (they are identical but B was the prototype name), 115 Type D completed, and 244 Kairuy completed. That excludes 382 Type D which were under construction and 168 Karyu which were under construction. Vastly greater numbers were contemplated, but I restrict myself to those actually realized in metal: which is to say 437 completed and 558 building. I also do not include any of the wierd or exotic projects - of which there were many - and no Kaiten - but only proper midget submarines with some military role. There was also a significant NON weaponized midget (a near sister was built in 1970 called "No 001": the design "proved capable of a depth of nearly 1000 ft") "Sensui Sagyo-sen" - sort of an ancester of our rescue midgets - and a hydrodyanmic test bed (No 63) (again maybe more - Orita says there were more than just one) - and two pre midgets destroyed to preserve secrecy before the war. M Kanamono was a Type C variant for minelaying of harbors that could "walk" on the bottom. 14 U Kanamono were turned over at Kure - they are a lot like the Civil War era David - you couldn't really submerge but attacked deck awash. S Kanamono was a prototype for the Kairyu. Japan also built - and used - numbers of submersables not as weapons but as stores vessels. The capacity of Japan to build midgets was significant, and the yards that built Army submarines over in Korea also could have built them. There were far more serous problems producing torpedoes or skilled crews than producing midgets themselves. It is only secondary logistic considerations of this sort - and lack of slots - that means we should not consider putting them in in numbers. The potential for greater numbers than we met in the field was significant.

I rather suspect, and from what I have read on the subject, that the reason more were not built were because they were not seen as being very effective.

[el cid again]

The IJN had spent a great deal of money on submarines of all sorts, and on ships to support them. The midgets were what the Chinese would call "a mace weapon" - and regarded as a very powerful tool - and a great deal of tactical thought was devoted to them. Similarly, the Advance Force was expected to accomplish more than the Kiddo Butai at Pearl Harbor - but its only claim of great success (one not generally recognized as such in the West) was the torpedoing of Saratoga, sending her back for repairs instead of operations (which was more than Kiddo Butai did to any carrier). Many factors intervened to prevent most of the submarine concepts from working out very well. Not least of these was the absence of senior officers on naval staffs - and the junior submarine officer assigned was there mainly to convey orders to the submarines - not to lend his expertise to the staff. Another problem was the torpedo doctrine: even a tanker rated only a single torpedo. [Note that when USS Wasp was sunk, the captain dared to fire a full spread of six. This was not SOP - and indeed is the only occasion I am aware of on which it was done. USS Yorktown was sunk by two salvos of two, for example. That is the way it was usually done.] Then there was the fixation with the "decisive battle" - something I myself believe in - but not in the sense it became a religeous dogma in IJN. This combined with lack of submarine expertise on the actual staffs planning operations to insure grossly inefficient and/or inappropriate tasking. To that add the strategic error of inconsistent operational concepts: IJN engaged in no less than SEVEN DIFFERENT kinds of submarine operations as primary mission at different times (see Carpenter and Polmar, Japanese Submarines of World War II). Related to that inconsistency in strategic mission concepts was an equally dismal inconsistency in funding submarines: plans might call for this or that, but could you get the steel, the motors, the yen? That Japan didn't fund midgets consistently is (ironically enough) completely consistent with the way it funded almost everything! Instead of reflecting strategic or operational thought or analysis, it just reflects the almost unbelievable sense of disorganization (or cross purpose organization) of Imperial Japan. There was no shortage of similar nonsense in the USA, but Japan took it to Olympian proportions. In fact, the people making decisions probably did not know about the midgets at all! The IJN took extraordinary precautions - banning cameras from towns near them - and naming them "fittings" or "targets." This caused so much confusion the JNAF wanted to get some of those "targets" to practice on! The impact of this extreme secrecy was that neither those controlling funding, nor those controlling operations, had any idea what was to be built or used!