Are BB undervalued by WITP

[Mike Scholl]

Actually Java Sea was where the Japanese discovered that the long range of the "Long Lances" wasn't that usefull. Their Destroyer squadrons fired dozens and dozens of torpedoes at realitively long ranges during the day and hit nothing. The devastating salvos were fired by the two heavy cruisers from much closer range as night fell. Only the type of "Decisive Battle" so beloved by Japanese planners would have made the extreme range of the "Long Lance" a usefull adjunct.

What was important during the war was it's high speed and lack of a visable wake.

[John Lansford]

If you look at what happened when LL torpedoes hit ships bigger than destroyers, they turned out to be nowhere near as lethal IRL as they are in the game.  There's not a single example of a 10000 ton treaty cruiser being sunk by a single LL hit; plenty got crippled, but that could be said about ships being torpedoed by British and US weapons as well.  Houston took numerous torpedoes, Helena got hit by 2 or three, Canberra got hit by 2, etc, etc.  They were certainly destroyer killers, but other than the mini-cruisers like Perth, De Reuter and Atlanta, cruisers being hit by LL torpedoes were only damaged, not sunk.
 
I think the reputation the LL has gained over the years is overblown, based mainly on the surprise factor they introduced in 1942 to the USN due to their speed, range and invisibility to being spotted.  The range was certainly extremely long but not all that useful, which is why I said the Japanese would have done better trading out some of that fuel for increased warhead size.  They would have probably sunk a few more CA's IRL had they done so.

[tsimmonds]

No 10,000 ton cruiser was never going to be sunk by a single torpedo hit no matter how large the warhead. This is because a single hit will result in flooding only in two or possibly as many as three major compartments. This will never be enough flooding to sink such a ship. Now, that ship may very well be left dead in the water, almost certainly leading to further damage, but that is another story.

A number of IJ CLs succumbed to a single torpedo hit. This was mainly due to the fact that these ships all had centerline bulkheads, which resulted in asymmetrical flooding and capsizing.

[John Lansford]

IJN CL's were also typically big destroyers, running about 5000-6000 tons displacement. 
 
And on your claim that no 10000 ton cruiser will sink from "any single torpedo hit", I present exhibits A and B:
 
IJN Kongo, and HMS Ark Royal.  Oh, and Exhibit C, IJN Taiho.  While none of them were "10000 ton cruisers", all three were considerably larger than any cruiser, with better watertight compartmentalization, yet they all sank from one hit from a torpedo smaller than the Long Lance.
 
Either the LL's warhead wasn't big enough for what they were trying to accomplish, or it should have been smaller and created the same results.  After looking at its historical performance, I'm not all that impressed with it as a weapon.  The LL required dangerous fuel stored onboard the ship (resulting in at least two cruiser losses in combat when they exploded from damage), were huge (IJN DD's were topheavy and their CA's way oversized just to hold the LL), yet their performance wasn't that much better than contemporary weapons in other navies.

[Iridium]

In general I tend to think the Type 93's range to be ahead of it's time. It needed a targeting system to make them use the range advantage. If Japan had somehow come up with an active sonar homing kit for such a device it would have been a truly devastating weapon. That said, for simple point, shoot and pray torpedoes they were very advanced.

What I find interesting is that Japan did not save it's Type 93's for the "decisive battle" along with their BBs. One could say that they even wasted them at ranges which were rather absurd. I'd say that the weapon itself was very successful, the way it was deployed was less than worthy of it.

[tsimmonds]

I believe that the story about Kongo sinking after a single hit is a sea-fable. Check out this link: Kongo Solved? Be sure to follow the additional link at the bottom of the page.

Long story short, Kongo (which already had suffered waterline damage during the Leyte Gulf actions) was hit by at least two and possibly three torpedoes. She was able to continue under way for some time, but progressive flooding and increasing list eventually brought her to a halt. She eventually capsized and exploded a la Barham.

We all know about Taiho. A fluke of unrefined fuel and ineffective damage control.

The loss of Ark Royal was due largely to poor discipline regarding watertight integrity and delay in beginning effective damage control procedures. Slow progressive flooding eventually caused her to lose all power. She took over twelve hours to sink. Given that no 10,000 ton cruiser was ever lost to a single torpedo hit, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Ark Royal could and should also have survived that hit.

But I could be wrong [;)]

[John Lansford]

WWII torpedoes on surface craft were knife-fighting weapons; you had to be close enough to see your opponent (radar helped extend this range) and the closer you were, the less time they'd have to avoid the torpedo.  Having a direct fire weapon (that's what an unguided torpedo is) with a 40,000 yard range is a waste; no way are you going to hit anything at that range unless you're very, very lucky or you're firing SCADS of them.
 
If that was the IJN's plan (firing scads of them to get 1-2 hits), then their whole operational plan for their use was full of FAIL.  They would have been better off cutting the range in half and either increasing the speed/warhead size or decreasing the overall size of those behemoths.
 
With the LL, the IJN had a huge, powerful weapon but could only carry a relatively low number of them on each warship.  Even the big CA's carried only 16 tubes, and could fire only 8 in a single broadside.  They could have stayed with conventional 21" torpedoes, carried more of them per ship (plus reloads!) with probably as good as if not better results than with the LL.

[Nikademus]

I think "Kaigun" summed it up pretty good. Awesome weapon....but the plan attached to it aka the Decisive Battle proved overly optimistic for any unguided muntion.

[Shark7]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

No 10,000 ton cruiser was never going to be sunk by a single torpedo hit no matter how large the warhead. This is because a single hit will result in flooding only in two or possibly as many as three major compartments. This will never be enough flooding to sink such a ship. Now, that ship may very well be left dead in the water, almost certainly leading to further damage, but that is another story.

A number of IJ CLs succumbed to a single torpedo hit. This was mainly due to the fact that these ships all had centerline bulkheads, which resulted in asymmetrical flooding and capsizing.

Actually that isn't quite true, it really depends on what gets hit when the torpedo strikes. Fuel storage, ammo storage or engineering/steering hits are all effective 'kills'. They may not send the ship to the bottom, but those hits will take it out of the fight. A ship that can't manuevre is useless to the battle line.

[tsimmonds]

ORIGINAL: Shark7

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

No 10,000 ton cruiser was never going to be sunk by a single torpedo hit no matter how large the warhead. This is because a single hit will result in flooding only in two or possibly as many as three major compartments. This will never be enough flooding to sink such a ship. Now, that ship may very well be left dead in the water, almost certainly leading to further damage, but that is another story.

A number of IJ CLs succumbed to a single torpedo hit. This was mainly due to the fact that these ships all had centerline bulkheads, which resulted in asymmetrical flooding and capsizing.

Actually that isn't quite true, it really depends on what gets hit when the torpedo strikes. Fuel storage, ammo storage or engineering/steering hits are all effective 'kills'. They may not send the ship to the bottom, but those hits will take it out of the fight. A ship that can't manuevre is useless to the battle line.

Soft kill, sure. But not sunk.

[Nikademus]

IIRC, "soft" kill was a large part of what the Japanese wanted with their Night force (including the LL) so as to parry down the superior US numbers allowing their BB's to win the following traditional Jutland type duel. Even after Dec7, Japan still considered their battleline to be the instrument of decision on which they'd live or die by the sword.

[John Lansford]

If all they were trying to do was "whittle down" the USN battlefleet through night combat and torpedoes, then they didn't need 40,000 yd range torpedoes.  They could have put in double the number of tubes for smaller torpedoes with conventional ranges (15000 yds would have been fine) and warheads the size of the US/British weapons, and done just fine with this strategy.  After all, a ship with torpedo damage wasn't going to stay with the fleet whether the damage was done with a 1100 pound warhead or an 850 pound one.
 
No, just like their huge superbattleships and heavy cruisers, the Japanese decided that having the biggest, fastest, longest ranged torpedoes would somehow equate to decisive results when it came to fighting the US.  They wanted ship-killing torpedoes, and for a certain sized ship, that's what they got.  However, that size was for ships smaller than 6-7000 tons, hardly worth all the effort and trouble they got for the result.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: John Lansford

If all they were trying to do was "whittle down" the USN battlefleet through night combat and torpedoes, then they didn't need 40,000 yd range torpedoes.  They could have put in double the number of tubes for smaller torpedoes with conventional ranges (15000 yds would have been fine) and warheads the size of the US/British weapons, and done just fine with this strategy.  After all, a ship with torpedo damage wasn't going to stay with the fleet whether the damage was done with a 1100 pound warhead or an 850 pound one.

IIRC I think they were looking at ranges closer to 20-25K and it was felt necessary to help both preserve their forces and incur the element of suprise. Certainly more than one Allied captain was "suprised" to learn they were under torpedo attack on more than one occasion. (They thought they were hitting mines)

[John Lansford]

Well, while this is certainly hindsight, the majority of engagements where torpedoes were used took place at night, at much shorter ranges than they expected to use their Long Lances.  IIRC only the Java Sea battle happened during the daytime at ranges they thought were ideal for those torpedoes, and only after firing a LOT of them did they get any results.
 
The fact that the IJN trained hard at night combat tactics tells me that they recognized the long range of the LL wasn't all that great a benefit.  In fact, all their light and cruiser forces were optimized for night fighting (flashless powder, huge search binoculars, excellent target discipline and formation keeping, rapid fire weaponry, etc) at close range, except for these super-long range torpedoes.  You don't need a weapon with a 30k yd range when your fighting takes place under 12000 yards.
 
BTW, other than at Sunda Strait vs Houston and Perth, is there a documented instance where the Japanese torpedoed one of their own ships during a battle?

[Iridium]

ORIGINAL: John Lansford
You don't need a weapon with a 30k yd range when your fighting takes place under 12000 yards.

If I recall correctly, Type 93s had multiple settings for speed/range. Shortest (fastest) setting being somewhere around 48kts and 20k yards. A 1080 lb warhead was still massive at the war's end so I'm not sure how much better it could have been made...

Even if you were to parse the range down on the Type 93, to say 15k yards at max and 5k yards as the shortest setting (@48knts) what warhead size would that get you? maybe another 200lbs? Is that really worth it?

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: John Lansford

Well, while this is certainly hindsight, the majority of engagements where torpedoes were used took place at night, at much shorter ranges than they expected to use their Long Lances.  IIRC only the Java Sea battle happened during the daytime at ranges they thought were ideal for those torpedoes, and only after firing a LOT of them did they get any results.

The fact that the IJN trained hard at night combat tactics tells me that they recognized the long range of the LL wasn't all that great a benefit.  In fact, all their light and cruiser forces were optimized for night fighting (flashless powder, huge search binoculars, excellent target discipline and formation keeping, rapid fire weaponry, etc) at close range, except for these super-long range torpedoes.  You don't need a weapon with a 30k yd range when your fighting takes place under 12000 yards.

BTW, other than at Sunda Strait vs Houston and Perth, is there a documented instance where the Japanese torpedoed one of their own ships during a battle?

The Japanese did train hard for night actions, but i'd say it was more of an "in general" type thing because of the inherent difficulty of doing such coupled with their absolute need to be as good as they possibly could be given the importance of their role in the DB.

[Nikademus]

I may be wrong as i'm digging deep into the synapses at this point while sitting in Ye Olde Cubicle....but the massive range of the Type93 was more a byproduct than a design intent. They wanted range of course, along but the other desired traits were the even more drivers IIRC...(wakeless or "more" wakeless + speed and a big warhead + good range)

I don't think any credible IJN officer felt that anything short of blind luck would occur beyond 30k

[John Lansford]

Given that I doubt a DD could even see further than 20-24k yds in daytime due to earth's curvature, I have to wonder why even practice for such long range torpedo firings.  After all, even at 40 knots a LL torpedo would take nearly 6 minutes to reach a target at 20000 yards.  Given how hard it was for a 16" shell to hit something at 20,000 yards due to trying to predict the target's movement, hoping for a torpedo hit at that range has to fall under the category of "miracle".
 
ISTM that outfitting their surface ships with the 21" Type 95, with its 12,000 m range and high speed, would have been more than sufficient and allowed the DD's/CA's to carry even more of the things. 

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: John Lansford

ISTM that outfitting their surface ships with the 21" Type 95, with its 12,000 m range and high speed, would have been more than sufficient and allowed the DD's/CA's to carry even more of the things. 

Given the size difference I seriously doubt that. The 24inch gave the Japanese more bang for the buck which was what they needed given the Japanese preference for maximum firepower on a limited displacement.

[John Lansford]

But the "bang" wasn't worth the extra weight and size, IMO.  The LL didn't sink larger ships than smaller torpedoes did, but they certainly took up more space on the ships carrying them.  The Type 95 had an 893lb warhead and was 21" in diameter; the Type 93 was 60% heavier and had an armored launcher, adding even more weight, plus it was 6' longer, all for only 200 lbs more warhead.
 
Now, the Type 93 Model 3 torpedo is more of what I was talking about.  It was developed during the war and traded range for warhead; it could travel 15,000 m at 50 knots and carried a 1720 lb warhead.  It went into service in 1944, too late for any effective use, but it would have been devastating had it been introduced in 1942.
 
Source:  http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTJAP_WWII.htm