World in Flames is the computer version of Australian Design Group classic board game. World In Flames is a highly detailed game covering the both Europe and Pacific Theaters of Operations during World War II. If you want grand strategy this game is for you.
ORIGINAL: Extraneous
After the “Doolittle Raid April 18, 1942” Capt. Edward J. York had his plane and crew interned at Primorsky Krai, Siberia.
So I don’t believe Stalin would have allowed Corps size units to operate in the U.S.S.R.
Well, he was interned to maintain neutrality with Japan -- I don't think that that one event really answers the question. I can't imagine how much more desperate things could have gotten for the Soviets then in late 1942. Since the Soviets didn't make serious requests for such direct support then it is doubtful any such later request would have come or by the time it was made would even have been feasible.
Stalin used alot of nationalities that he hated as cannon fodder ... like troops from the east and the Caucasus. he really hated the Georgians [&:].
he also used troops from countries he had been at war with. Poland, Runamia, Bulgaria.
so I think that he would have used any kind of troops to save him self.
and another point. we really don´t know. if he have send a request for CW troops. but it was off course declined as CW was on the brink of defeat in 1941
The British had to threaten to stop sending aid convoys to Murmansk because their few personnel stationed in Murmansk were so mistreated by the Russians initially. This rose to the level of Churchill's attention even, though of course he was well-known for looking into seemingly minor details everywhere in the UK war effort, this really got him worked up for a time.
After the war, any Russian that had been 'contaminated' by contact with the West via being a prisoner or otherwise displaced by the Nazis (forced labor of non-military people), faced death or a grim future in Siberia if the NKVD discovered a person had such experiences.
Allowing Western troops to contact Soviet civilians would be too much of a risk for Stalin and the CCCP; they were desperate to conceal how much the population hated them before and early in the German attack.
Operation Barbarossa was launched on June 22, 1941.
Total Axis forces available for Barbarossa were therefore in the order of 3.9 million. On 22 June, the German Wehrmacht achieved a local superiority in its initial assault (98 German divisions), including 29 armoured and motorized divisions, some 90% of its mobile forces.
According to Mikhail Meltyukhov, by the start of war, the Red Army numbered altogether 5,774,211 troops: 4,605,321 in ground forces, 475,656 in air forces, 353,752 in the navy, 167,582 as border guards and 171,900 in internal troops of the NKVD (316.5 Divisions with 25,700 tanks and 18,700 aircraft).
The Red Army possessed 23,106 tanks, of which about 12,782 were in the five Western Military Districts (three of which directly faced the German invasion front). However, maintenance and readiness standards were very poor; ammunition and radios were in short supply, and many units lacked the trucks needed for resupply beyond their basic fuel and ammunition loads. The Red Army had also partly dispersed their tanks to infantry divisions for infantry support.
The German Wehrmacht had about 5,200 tanks overall, of which 3,350 were committed to the invasion. This yields a balance of immediately available tanks of about 4:1 in the Red Army's favor. The best Soviet tank, the T-34, was the most modern in the world, and the KV series the best armored. The most advanced Soviet tank models, however, the T-34 and KV-1, were not available in large numbers early in the war, and only accounted for 7.2% of the total Soviet tank force. But while these 1,861 modern tanks were technically superior to the 1,404 German medium Panzer III and IV tanks, the Soviets in 1941 still lacked the communications, training and experience to employ such weapons effectively.
The Red Army was dispersed and unprepared, and units were often separated and without transportation to concentrate prior to combat. Although the Red Army had numerous, well-designed artillery pieces, some of the guns had no ammunition. Artillery units often lacked transportation to move their guns. Tank units were rarely well-equipped, and also lacked training and logistical support. Maintenance standards were very poor. Units were sent into combat with no arrangements for refueling, ammunition resupply, or personnel replacement. Often, after a single engagement, units were destroyed or rendered ineffective. The army was in the midst of reorganizing the armor units into large tank corps, adding to the disorganization.
The number of aircraft was also heavily in the Soviets' favor. However, Soviet aircraft were largely obsolete, and Soviet artillery lacked modern fire control techniques. Most Soviet units were on a peacetime footing, explaining why aviation units had their aircraft parked in closely-bunched neat rows, rather than dispersed, making easy targets for the Luftwaffe in the first days of the conflict. Prior to the invasion the VVS (Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily, Soviet Air Force) was forbidden to shoot down Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft, despite hundreds of prewar incursions into Soviet airspace.
As a result, although on paper the Red Army in 1941 seemed at least the equal of the German army, the reality in the field was far different; incompetent officers, as well as partial lack of equipment, insufficient motorized logistical support, and poor training placed the Red Army at a severe disadvantage.
Divisions 1.1 to 1 Soviet advantage
Personnel 1.3 to 1 Axis advantage
Guns and mortars 1.4 to 1 Soviet advantage
Tanks (including assault guns) 1.38 to 1 Soviet advantage
Aircraft Soviet 2.6 to 1 Soviet advantage
Operation Barbarossa was postponemed from its original date of May 15, 1941 due to the intervention against an anti-German coup in Yugoslavia and Greek advances against Italy's occupation of Albania. Couplle that with the late Russia spring of 1941, compounded by particularly rainy weather in June 1941 made a number of roads in western parts of the Soviet Union impassable to heavy vehicles. During the campaign, Hitler ordered the main thrust toward Moscow to be diverted southward to help the southern army group capture Ukraine. This move delayed the assault on the Soviet capital, though it also helped secure Army Group Center's southern flank. By the time they turned to Moscow, the Red Army's fierce resistance, the mud following the autumn rains and, eventually, snow, brought the advance to a halt.
The USA is not in the war and Britain is fighting in North Africa jusr whom would you ask for the troops?
Now couple that with the successful winter offensive using the Siberian units and Stalin’s distrust of USA and Britain due to the “Polar Bear War”.
No, Stalin would not have allowed USA or British units in USSR.
University of Science Music and Culture (USMC) class of 71 and 72 ~ Extraneous (AKA Mziln)
Stalin used alot of nationalities that he hated as cannon fodder ... like troops from the east and the Caucasus. he really hated the Georgians [&:].
Why would he hate the Georgians, given that he was Georgian himself? Russian wasn't even his mother tongue, Georgian was. Sure, he had plenty of enemies there after the Georgian Affair, but he had plenty of enemies everywhere...
Stalin used alot of nationalities that he hated as cannon fodder ... like troops from the east and the Caucasus. he really hated the Georgians [&:].
Why would he hate the Georgians, given that he was Georgian himself? Russian wasn't even his mother tongue, Georgian was. Sure, he had plenty of enemies there after the Georgian Affair, but he had plenty of enemies everywhere...
Warspite1
Why would he hate Georgians?
The fact that he was Georgian himself meant absolutely nothing; it was almost like he had to over-compensate for his lack of "Russianess" by exhibiting utter ruthlessness in dealing with enemies of Russia; and that included his own people.
Remember this was the man that had some of his family, some of his closest friends and acquantances murdered for his own purposes (how many of those were Georgians?). He oversaw the mass starvation of Ukrainians, and the forceable deportation of Tartar's, Chechyns et al. He had ex-prisoners of war, many who had fought bravely for the Soviet Union, executed upon their return to the Soviet Union. Trying to understand this man or rationalising his actions is a far from a straightforward process......
Now Maitland, now's your time!
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
Of course he hated Georgians, but I'm not sure he hated THE Georgians, implying all Georgians. I'm sure he feared anyone against his power position and in his paranoia that turned into hatred of Georgians and many other people, but I'm not so sure he hated any particular ethnicity (other than Jews, the victims of everyone's hatred)...
Anyway, why am I rambling about this, I'm gonna look at my Japanese build strategy instead... [:D]
I think Georgia was the last part of the Caucasus conquered by the Tsarist empire, and had to be re-conquered all over again by the Red Army in 1920. I just finished a large history of Russia from Novgorod/Kiev days to the rise of Breznhev; it mentions the struggle in Georgia by the Red Army as being 'particularly bitter'. Stalin's personal motivations on anything are sometimes mystifying; I now seek to find a good biography of the man.
Also, the British deployed 3 Hurricane squadrons in Murmansk to protect war supplies which were constantly over-stockpiled by the inefficient Soviet dock & transportation systems there. When convoys would resume after a summer break, there would still be material sitting in Murmansk from 4~6 months prior deliveries; Archangel had much better through-put. The RAF was only in Murmansk for 3 months.
A prime result of lend-lease was increasing the Red Army's off-road mobility with American vehicles such as Jeeps and Trucks, allowing the Russians to keep AT assets so close to the advancing front that finally by 1944 the Germans couldn't simply counter-attack any successful Russian infantry advance with their own tanks. I also read an interesting comment on that mobility as it allowed Russian artillery to become increasingly dominant: "as infantry forces became less available..."
Of course he hated Georgians, but I'm not sure he hated THE Georgians, implying all Georgians. I'm sure he feared anyone against his power position and in his paranoia that turned into hatred of Georgians and many other people, but I'm not so sure he hated any particular ethnicity (other than Jews, the victims of everyone's hatred)...
Anyway, why am I rambling about this, I'm gonna look at my Japanese build strategy instead... [:D]
Feel free to post that strategy in the Japanese AI thread. I am sure that it will be appreciated.
Have a bit more patience with newbies. Of course some of them act dumb -- they're often students, for heaven's sake. - Terry Pratchett
A government is a body of people; usually, notably, ungoverned. - Quote from Firefly
I think Georgia was the last part of the Caucasus conquered by the Tsarist empire, and had to be re-conquered all over again by the Red Army in 1920. I just finished a large history of Russia from Novgorod/Kiev days to the rise of Breznhev; it mentions the struggle in Georgia by the Red Army as being 'particularly bitter'. Stalin's personal motivations on anything are sometimes mystifying; I now seek to find a good biography of the man.
That history of Russia sounds interesting. Can you recommend it and if so what is the titel and author?
Have a bit more patience with newbies. Of course some of them act dumb -- they're often students, for heaven's sake. - Terry Pratchett
A government is a body of people; usually, notably, ungoverned. - Quote from Firefly
It was basically a college textbook, with a set of 10 'problems' to consider from multiple viewpoints every few chapters. I borrowed it from a co-worker on a job I just finished (and am headed for home), so I may not ever see the book again. I could recommend it particularly for the way it synthesizes many historical viewpoints including Tsarist historians of the 19th Century; I mostly wanted to read a good overview on Kiev/Novgorod. However it is a general history and if you are interested in the details of things like Russia during Napoleonic times there would be better volumes focusing on smaller amounts of time. Here is a link to a new, updated version; I read the 1970s edition:
For what it is worth, I just finished reading a 1947 "I was there" book, Roosevelt and Hopkins by one of FDR's speechwriters.
The author says that, in 1942, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin agreed to create a US/Commonwealth manned Air Force to be stationed in the Caucacus, but by the time the route through Iran was secured, and the planes were available, the crisis has passed.
WitP-AE -- US LCU & AI Stuff
Oddball: Why don't you knock it off with them negative waves? Why don't you dig how beautiful it is out here? Why don't you say something righteous and hopeful for a change? Moriarty: Crap!
1. Whether the UK/US could have deployed substantial ground forces into the USSR if asked
2. Whether Stalin would have ever made such a request
The answer to #1 seems no, at least in 1941-1944. The UK was hard pressed to defend its empire. The US needed to gear up its war machine from scratch. They could send materiel, which they did.
The answer to #2 is unknowable. Every argument about Stalin's intentions is based on the the historic situation. The Soviet Union, although in desperate straits in late 1941 and again to a much lesser extent in late 1942, never reached the point where a total collapse loomed. Unlike 1812, Moscow never fell. Leningrad held on by the barest margins. The likelihood of total Soviet defeat- which was probably the trigger point if Stalin was going to ask for ground help - evaporated when the Red Army launched their winter 1941 counteroffensive. By 1942, although they awaited the German offensive with trepidation, the Red Army was in a much better position to resist. The success of the German invasion, increasingly revealed as a desperate gamble that had failed, now rested on Hitler's wildly ambitious 1942 plans. Stalingrad put an end to any reasonable notion the USSR might lose (assuming no Nazi nuclear weapons). Now the only question was how long it would take to win. Seen in retrospect, if there was a window for Stalin to grasp at any help he could, it was a very narrow one that had closed by 1943. How the USSR treated the Doolittle Raiders, British sailors in Murmansk, B-17 air bases in 1944 in Ukraine, etc. doesn't provide a solid guide for answering question two - the circumstances of all those are explicable in other terms and/or occurred when the Soviets were no longer desperate.
The Prime Minister had met Premier Stalin once before in the autumn of 1942, when he journeyed to Moscow to explain to him why it was impossible for the United States and Britain to invade the continent of Europe from the west that year.
University of Science Music and Culture (USMC) class of 71 and 72 ~ Extraneous (AKA Mziln)
