Russian surrrender

[doomtrader]

I was not able to find any documents which would prove that nationalists tendencies in Byelorussia were as high as in Ukraine or Croatia.

[aspqrz02]

OK, fair enough.

I would note, however, that was an (unsuccessful) revolt against the Russians in the 19th century, struggles continuing against russification into the 20the century.

There was also a distinct Belarus language and culture, at least as distinct as Ukrainian.

The fact that there was massive fighting through and over the area, massive evacuation (20% of the population) by the Russians in the face of the German advance, and massive destruction in general on a larger scale than in the Ukraine may have had something to do with the situation.

Not as high a chance as Ukraine, but if we're talking a "milder" German policy, perhaps there should be a "mildest" one, which encourages the formation of a puppet, as they did in WW1 at a low level of probability, at least as an option.

After all, Not Hitler would have done it [;)]

Phil

[rodney727]

First let me start of by saying <sigh> then let me say it again <sigh>. I have read Wages of Destruction, by far the best book you have listed. the other two books you wrote down are so popular that they have zero reviews on Amazon. <sigh> Back to the point at hand Tooze states that the US bombing of the Ruhr stopped Hitlers economy it it's tracks. There is more of course. Yes the war was won on the Eastern Front, but it's deeper than that as Bellamy points out....i.e aid from the allies a second front, and so on. But again I say to you ANY book written by an economist is Theory only. It's not a science at all. You could have 10 economist in the same room and get 10 different theorys and points of view. Their main point is this, if you run out of money, print more. So any book or person that pushes econ on people I always take with a grain off salt. end <sigh>

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

ORIGINAL: rogo727
You give no sources, and you seem to be ranting about some sort of fantasy that I have? Try reading these books (note not coffee table books)

Tooze, "Wages of Destruction"
Harrison (Ed), "The Economics of WW2: Six Great Powers in International Comparison"
Harrison & Barber, "The Soviet Home Front, 1941-45: A Social and Economic History"

come off the top of my head. There are others, as well as journal articles.

ORIGINAL: rogo727
Absolute War by Chris Bellamy- Soviet Russia in the second word war.
The Russo-German War 1941-1945 by Albert Seaton
The Rise and Fall of the Thrid Reich by William Shirer

Absolute War is fine, but, of course, Bellamy makes the point that WW2 was won on the East Front. By the Russians. Not what you seem to be saying he is claiming at all.

Seaton is OK, but also dated, as I noted a lot of this stuff only starts to get out of very specialist literature in the last 20 years or so. And Seaton, writing a broad general history of the Eastern Front is, of course, not really going to get it, since he's writing 19 years ago. It would be interesting to see what he might add to a revised, updated, and rewritten version.

Shirer? A journalist. In a book written 50 odd years ago. Before the information in the books I have cited was available widely?

Oh, I see, you're joshing me.

ORIGINAL: rogo727
Also you state that Hitlers greatest blunder was the the attack on Russia ........even the smartest economist will tell you that it was Germany's declaration on the united states that lead to Germany's defeat.

And even Bellamy, whom you cite, disagrees with you.

And the thing Hitler feared so much that he attacked in the West in 1940 to avoid it was a two front war, as he knew that the relative strength of the Wehrmacht vis a vis the Red Army was declining rapidly.

Look, seriously, I'm not intending to dis you, and I apologise if you mistakenly see it that way. I am merely pointing out that the sort of books *you* are citing, are, well, not really the specialist works *I* have read and which support what I am saying.

Make of that what you will <sigh>

Phil

[RandomAttack]

"Hitler screwed up by attacking Russia in the first place."

<sigh>

<holds head in hands>

Where to begin?

Oh, the histrionics! The false humilty! The condescension to the ignorant masses!

So, the wheels of history are virtually inevitiable. Studies show each event was virtually pre-ordained, and couldn't have possibly (in any realistic sense) played out in any other way. After-the-fact analysis proves it so. Well, I'm throwing the B.S. flag. I don't believe anything is/was pre-ordained where PEOPLE are involved. It is perfectly realistic for any of the leaders to have chosen reasonable alternate paths (I'm talking REASONABLE here, not the UK attacking France w/Germany, etc). Indeed, many paths actually chosen seem UN-reasonable in the present day. I utterly reject that all these decisions were made for "good reasons". The people making these decisions were imperfectly human. Then, as now, decisions weren't always made "rationally", and were OFTEN affected by personal biases, bad/incomplete info, incompetence, etc.

Hitler attacked Russia solely for economic & strategic reasons, huh? Of course, the calculus wasn't impacted at all by the fact he considered them "sub-human", and therefore was as overconfident as we would be stepping on a bug. And thus the totally unforgivable oversight of failing to prepare for the first winter-- "soldiering 101". So much for the "brilliant" General Staff. How "illogical". We are all free to surmise what Stalin would have done if Hitler hadn't attacked--but we don't KNOW. Did he actually have the balls to attack Germany? Was he so secure in his own position?

The game models combat and logistics in a reasonable manner (and is being improved), the FUN is in exploring reasonable alternatives-- i.e., the human factor.

It's kinda like being attacked by a 2 year old throwing a tantrum. What on Earth makes him think he can win, and why is he doing it? It's an irrational world sometimes... [:)]

[RandomAttack]

You could have 10 economist in the same room and get 10 different theorys and points of view

Not so-- you would get at LEAST 11 theories... [:'(][:'(][:D][:D][:D]

[freeboy]

thats the old joke I heard way back in college, 5 econimist 6 theories and no working models

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: RandomAttack

So, the wheels of history are virtually inevitiable. Studies show each event was virtually pre-ordained, and couldn't have possibly (in any realistic sense) played out in any other way. After-the-fact analysis proves it so.

Nope. Didn't say that.

Not even close.

What I said, and what the post said, and what all my posts have said ... if you read them ... is that there were certain real world factors (military-logistic, economic, political and what have you) that constrained the acts of the participants in WW2 to act in certain ways with a high degree of probability ... and which would, inevitably, have had consequences, negative ones mostly, if they had been ignored.

So, the Germans were constrained to act in certain ways and there were inevitable consequences if they had not.

That's well understood by most people.

Let's take a couple of examples that most people (here, at least) seem to accept as underpinning their choices ... insofar as the designers have chosen to incorporate them in their soon to be (hopefully) released patch ...

* AI limited to producing fleets only of historical size
* German casualties for Amphibious operations increased and cost of Amph points increased

Looking at the first, the Germans came up with their Naval Rearmament program, the Z Plan, in 1937 ... massive fleet build. Many BBs, CAs, CLs, DDs, 2+ CVs, 400+ Submarines ... to be complete by 1949/50.

Why did they not get further than they did? What prevented them? Or made it less likely?

Real World Constraints.

See, the German Economy in 1937 was a Command Economy, in many ways like that of Stalinist Russia. Goering was in charge of all resource allocation.

The resources available, especially factory space, skilled workers, and, most importantly, steel, were available in finite amounts ... and they had almost all already been allocated. To the Wehrmacht's Panzers, Artillery and etc. and the the Luftwaffe's fighters, bombers and transports.

To build more ships would, inevitably, have led to building less ... much, much, much less ... tanks, guns, planes and the like.

You simply cannot have it both ways.

Still, yes, the Nazis *tried* ... they allocated an adequate Budget to build all the needed vessels.

Money.

What they didn't allocate ... couldn't, because there wasn't any excess to allocate ... were workers, factories, and, more importantly, resources.

Now, historically, as it turned out, even capturing Poland, France, Belgium, Holland etc. didn't really change that. Sure, more factories, more skilled workers ... but, really, no more steel or oil or anything else on the scale that was needed to fuel and supply them. And, of course, the workers in said factories weren't exactly willing to produce military stuff for the Germans that worked all that well.

A lot of the resources they used before they were conquered were imported. And then moment they were conquered, all those resources, unless in internal stockpiles, went "poof" as the RN blockaded them and stopped all further trade.

Now, ToF models this relatively poorly in some ways ... hence the need for limits on AI choices to build German ships ... because PPs are so generic. In reality, either the cost of producing German vessels and amphibs should be increased massively for human players or the same limits should apply to them as to the AI, because PPs don't adequately represent the reality on the ground.

If this is unacceptable, then it should be that you are as ready to accept unrealistic results for the allies as well as for the Germans ...

Then there's German Amphibious Operations ... aka Sealion ... which, basically, every single serious examination agrees was impossible and would have been a disastrous failure for the Germans, and, indeed, agree that German planning was of the "this is complete wish fulfilment fantasy" level. The few scenarios (massively outweighed by those who see it as a fantasy) that treat it as a possibility, if you examine them closely, assume the Germans magically get ashore somehow and then magically supply themselves by ignoring the existence of the RAF and RN.

Since the AI seems to handle things Naval so badly, then, again, there should be some constraint that makes German amphibious operations extremely difficult ... increased cost of Amph points for a start, increased casualties from Amphibious operations, increased supply costs for Panzers by Sea ... and, actually, this is really not even close to how tough it would have been in reality ... for a start, the presence of even a single naval unit (not Fleet with many units, a single *unit*) belonging to the allies in the Channel Zone should automatically interdict all supply and reinforcement, and, probably, prevent any passage by German units, unless first destroyed by ... something ...

Which would require a much bigger than historical Luftwaffe and a much bigger than historical Kriegsmarine ... which would mean a much smaller than historical Wehrmacht ... the resources available constrained German options here, as in so many other areas.

ORIGINAL: RandomAttack

Well, I'm throwing the B.S. flag.

It's kinda like being attacked by a 2 year old throwing a tantrum.

Ignoring reality because you, personally, don't believe it to be reality? Yep.

Look, no-one, least of all me, is telling you that you have to play a closely historical scenario ... I think its fine that you want a gamist one, if that suits you ... but it doesn't suit me, so how about the courtesy of allowing those of us who actually want something close to historical constraints applied in ways that don't suit you, personally, to have the option of such.

Possibly, I guess, the designers could make adding historical constraints to the AI side the "balance" factor for "Hard" and "Very Hard" advantage in the game system, or simply add "Historical" as the level beyond "Very Hard" ... which would keep you and the gamer folk happy, and allow those of us who want historicity to have the option.

No need to be so defensive, since you're not being told you have to play it that way.

Phil

[Greyshaft]

What I said, and what the post said, and what all my posts have said ... if you read them ... is that there were certain real world factors (military-logistic, economic, political and what have you) that constrained the acts of the participants in WW2 to act in certain ways with a high degree of probability ... and which would, inevitably, have had consequences, negative ones mostly, if they had been ignored.

Absolutely correct!!! So I still do not see how you can model WWII without the Sealion scenario being a factor in the minds of the wartime leaders. We know that historically Germany allocated PP to prepare for it and Britain allocated PP to prepare against it. If you make Sealion impossible in game terms then you remove any motivation for the players to duplicate those investments. Some of those real world factors caused Adolf to assemble barges and Winston to build pillboxes. If you provide the knowledge at the start of the game that Sealion is impossible then the leaders will then ignore the historical constraints. Perhaps in opposing a chance for a successful Sealion you have hoisted yourself by your own Petard [trans. for non-English readers: been proved wrong by your own argument] or more likely we just have a Paradox which leaves us D@mned if we Do and D@mned if we Don't.

Hmmm... how about this solution to cut the Gordian Knot:

• provide a checkbox on the startup screen that makes Sealion impossible (basically provides historic RN/RAF coverage over the Channel).
• if the box is not checked on startup then the RN/RAF will provide a proportion of their historical coverage over the Channel which then gives the Germans an unknown fighting chance to control the Channel and win Sealion.

Players can agree on this setting before the game and everyone will be happy

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: Greyshaft

What I said, and what the post said, and what all my posts have said ... if you read them ... is that there were certain real world factors (military-logistic, economic, political and what have you) that constrained the acts of the participants in WW2 to act in certain ways with a high degree of probability ... and which would, inevitably, have had consequences, negative ones mostly, if they had been ignored.

Absolutely correct!!! So I still do not see how you can model WWII without the Sealion scenario being a factor in the minds of the wartime leaders. We know that historically Germany allocated PP to prepare for it and Britain allocated PP to prepare against it. If you make Sealion impossible in game terms then you remove any motivation for the players to duplicate those investments.

That's entirely true. However, the amount of resources that were actually allocated *specifically* and ^only* to Sealion were actually, if you check up on it, quite minimal.

The Germans ...

* Allocated ground forces for the invasion, not all of which were ever deployed for it. This actually costs nothing ... except, perhaps, the Strategic Movement cost of moving them all to the Eastern Front (or wherever else you choose to deploy them as Germany!)

* Allocated Luftwaffe forces for the Battle of Britain which were, substantially, the same ones to be used for supporting Sealion, the only real addition being the ATPs for the Paras ... historically, these were the leftovers from Fall Gelb. So no real additional PP there, either.

* Allocated Naval forces to screen the Invasion fleet. None of these were new construction, except in the sense that some may have already been scheduled to come off the slipways if the timeframe for Sealion had been different. So no actual PP spent.

* The Invasion Fleet. This is where the Germans went hog wild. But, in reality, they didn't actually build any Amphibs at the time except, IIRC, almost literally, a few prototypes that weren't ready for any realistic Sealion attempt and couldn't have been built in the required numbers anyway. What did they actually do? The repurposed and converted existing Merchant Ships (loosely classified) and Canal Barges.

In game terms, this probably is best represented as converting Shipping Points and Strategic Movement Points to one shot 'Phibs. Or pretty close to one shot. Even here, the allocation of resources was minimal.

Depending on which of the several iterations of the German plans you think most realistic, well, this would represent enough Strategic Lift for anywhere from a single Infantry Division equivalent (actually, elements of three, landed widely separately) to three Infantry Division equivalents (actually, elements of nine, also widely separated in three separate landing areas). In any realistic plan, in any realistic timeframe, they might have landed a handful of Panzers [ignore the numbers converted, none of them reached any of the units involved], but not enough to be represented by a Mechanised or Panzer Division.

So, the actually PP cost would be whatever you consider the cost of converting Sea Movement and Strategic Movement points into limited use Amphib points. Not very much, I would guess.

The Brits?

Very little of what they did is representable by the in game expenditure of PPs. They built lots of aircraft they were going to build anyway. They built lots of ships they were going to build anyway. They built and trained lots of ground units they were going to build anyway.

They built some fortifications, but I don't think you could realistically represent them as even a 1 point fortification. They tried out some anti-invasion measures that often didn't work, well or at all, like the flaming oil.

So, no real PP expenditure.

Sure, in terms of opportunity cost ... not doing specific things in the order or to the degree they might have if there had been no Sealion planning/fear of Sealion ... yes, both sides made the commitments I have noted (and others as well I haven't) that don't really represent well as PP. I dunno what you do about that. I don't think its realistic to do anything, but YMMV.

ORIGINAL: Greyshaft
Some of those real world factors caused Adolf to assemble barges and Winston to build pillboxes. If you provide the knowledge at the start of the game that Sealion is impossible then the leaders will then ignore the historical constraints. Perhaps in opposing a chance for a successful Sealion you have hoisted yourself by your own Petard [trans. for non-English readers: been proved wrong by your own argument] or more likely we just have a Paradox which leaves us D@mned if we Do and D@mned if we Don't.

Hmmm... how about this solution to cut the Gordian Knot:

• provide a checkbox on the startup screen that makes Sealion impossible (basically provides historic RN/RAF coverage over the Channel).
• if the box is not checked on startup then the RN/RAF will provide a proportion of their historical coverage over the Channel which then gives the Germans an unknown fighting chance to control the Channel and win Sealion.

Players can agree on this setting before the game and everyone will be happy

That would work well enough.

Perhaps another option ...

I don't think that Sealion can be represented by actual player actions in the context of actually building units for it and then actually staging it ... there seem to be problems with the Game Engine, at the moment, especially with Naval Combat and Interception that make it unlikely that it can be modelled (I am pretty sure there are deeper problems with the underlying assumptions about the relative strengths of the various at start forces on both sides, but that's neither here nor there at the moment).

And consider what Hitler's initial purpose, and probably actual always purpose, was for Sealion ... it seems it was a huge bluff to get those damned Englanders to surrender or sue for peace. That was what all involved understood. Until he got pissed off when the damned Englanders didn't surrender or sue for peace ... and even then, there are doubts as to how serious he was with pursuing it.

So.

How do you represent it in game terms?

I don't think its a good idea to have some sort of random event triggered puppeting the UK or forcing an armistice. Not even against an AI. I don't think there was a realistic chance of either ... and, as other posters have indicated, this seems to be generally accepted.

What's the most likely outcome? A German failure of some sort. The only details are how bad and how much damage the Germans do to the UK.

So, have an Event that allows the Germans to stage several levels of Sealion, all based on the amount of PPs they're prepared to commit ... and roll the die and see how many PP they lose.

This could be in the form of destruction of units in the production pipeline, reduction of strength of units on the ground, destruction and removal of German naval units ... and then roll to see how much damage the British Army, RN and RAF takes and make a like distribution of the damage ... the proviso being, of course, that the PPs lost by the Germans will far outweigh those lost by the UK even on the best possible roll ... maybe 10 German PP lost for a single UK PP at best ... while the worst result will actually be a 100% German PP loss for no or minimal UK PP loss.

But there would be other possible outcomes.

The Germans will lose prestige, in the form of Diplomatic Points, making it less likely that the Axis Minors will actually become Active. And any chance of, say, Spain or Portugal or Turkey coming in on the German side becomes less than nil. If they gain PP through trade with any of these, that's likely to crash and burn as well.

The UK will gain Diplomatic prestige in inverse proportion.

However, if the Germans manage some sort of least awful defeat, then, possibly, it could retard US entry ... or at least retard US preparation for entry (Joe Kennedy and his ilk really thought the UK was going down in flames, and misinterpreted every positive sign through their own jaundiced eyes ... so it's not impossible) ... or, maybe, give the Germans some additional Diplomatic Points, not a lot, for other things.

That's the best sort of outcome I can see, and a possible way of modelling it without getting too ridiculous ... in fact, it would probably be possible to do what you suggest, somewhat modified, and do something like what I suggest ... perhaps three options ... Historical Sealion, No Sealion, Anything Goes Sealion for example

YMMV of course.

And, of course, for those who want only a gamer style scenario, tick the "Anything Goes Seallion" Box, which will keep them happy, and old fogeys like me will tick the "Historical Sealion" Box, which will keep us happy.

Hopefully, anyway [:D]

Phil

[Greyshaft]

I recall something about Franco promised to declare war on the Allies the day the first German soldier landed in Britain.... so there should be 'x' German prestige for attempting the invasion and maybe two times negative 'x' German prestige when the last of the invasion force surrenders. That extra prestige could be enough to pressure Spain into the war (assuming the Axis wants them).

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: Greyshaft

I recall something about Franco promised to declare war on the Allies the day the first German soldier landed in Britain.... so there should be 'x' German prestige for attempting the invasion and maybe two times negative 'x' German prestige when the last of the invasion force surrenders. That extra prestige could be enough to pressure Spain into the war (assuming the Axis wants them).

Yes, that would be valid ... but, in return, Franco wants, immediately, huge amounts of PP ... now, and every turn thereafter ... you know that Hitler said, of his meeting with Franco at Assaye (?), that he would rather spend an afternoon with his dentist!

[:D][:D][:D]

This is another what if often trotted out in shw-i ... there are a whole slew of reasons why Franco's Spain is a millstone, rather than a milestone, for the Germans, all to do with logistics

So, yes, the Germans get Franco ... and they're welcome!

(And, no, it shouldn't make taking Gibraltar all that easy. For a whole slew of reasons, all to do with logistics) ... and the congested approach over open terrain which was, IIRC, not even a klick wide. I don't know how this would be represented in the game ... doesn't the map show Gib as having a two hexside frontage with Spain? It shouldn't! And no armour bonus for attackers, either!

Phil

Phil

[Numdydar]

This is in tresponse to Post 26 in this thread.

Just as a comaprision, in the old SPI War in Europe game, I actually tried Sea Lion one time [X(]. I had produced enough Amphs (which took 10 MONTHS to build and could ONLY spend 10% of my TOTAL production on Naval units. This was to represent the resource restrictions that Phil pointed out in his post) to lift 1 PZ div and 2 Inf divs. I also produced enough Surf points (i.e. ships) to screen the invasion fleet for the initial landing. I started this build up at the very start of the game (9/39) as to get enough Amphs in time to do Sea Lion in 1940, they had to start building right away. I also had to completely ignore Norway as I did not want to waste my limited naval forces there.

I was able to land the three divisons, actually took Southampton too [:)]. Unfortunately could not keep them supplied or reinforce them due to the massive presence of RN forces in the sea area, so they all died. Needless to say, we did NOT finish that game [:D].

In order for Sea Lion to even have a remote vialibility, the game would have to start MUCH earlier in time aka HoI 3 or MH2. Then a strategic decision must be made that war and defeat of England is the main goal of the war, not Russia. Starting in 1939 and THEN deciding 'hey let's invade England now' should never be possible given the decisions made by Germany's leadership in the years leading up to the war. So if anyone REALLY want's a viable Sea Lion AND have historical constarints in a game then ToF is not going to be that game in it's current state. Fun? Absoulely. Realistic? Fanasty Land unfortunately [:(]

[aspqrz02]

Indeed. And, of course, if you think back, WiE had an absolute maximum number of Panzer and PanzerGrenadier Divisions (and Air Points, IIRC) that Germany could produce ... the number available in the counter mix ... which was also meant to represent real world constraints on German production (of course, Countermix limits applied to all countries ... but tended to be more generous for the Western Allies, forex).

Phil

[doomtrader]

Just on the side question about the limit of Panzer Divisions. Does it counts just the number of divisions, or maybe the total number of tanks/battalions within?
10 divisions with 10% strength is much less power than 10 fully reinforced divisions.

It is not a problem to put such limit in straight numbers, but this should be done wisely. There should be different limit if Germany is at the gates of Moscow and completely different when the Soviets are close to Warsaw on their march to Berlin. And here is the point where everything becomes complicated.

[RandomAttack]

No need to be so defensive, since you're not being told you have to play it that way.

For what it's worth, I wasn't referring to you or anyone with the 2 yr old comment. My point was (and is) that people, even national leaders, make irrational decisions (like a 2 year old attacking an adult out of anger-- he isn't going to win, but he just doesn't care. [:)]). Or bad decisions based on incorrect assumptions, or desperation, or megalomania. I have never argued that Sealion was realistic/feasible, or even addressed it. That doesn't mean he couldn't have decided to try it-- and probably fail gloriously! But you never know.

Our fundamental difference is this: You are still primarily concerned with social/economic/political factors driving the action to a high probability. MY point is that real people don't always (or even often) feel constrained by them.

Plus, I have no doubt there were plenty of "industrialists" on all sides that just outright LIED-- to this day there is a very powerful human tendency to tell the boss what he wants to hear. Even more so when a negative report can result in your being shot. Like Goering promising to supply the army at Stalingrad by air (yeah right). We might know TODAY that it was virtually impossible-- but Hitler chose to believe it, and we don't know whether he "really" believed it or not at that instant in time. My bottom line is that war is fought by people, and numbers can only ever tell part of the story. Leaders are more than capable of acting like geniuses one moment and morons the next. "If it's stupid but it works, it ain't stupid". It's a pretty fine line sometimes.

This discussion really doesn't have much impact on actual gameplay from my point of view, as it's easy to mod certain aspects in or out. We obviously aren't going to convert each other, so I'll cease & desist so as not to further derail the thread.

[Numdydar]

For those that may be interested [:)], here is the breakdown of the units, their production cycle (in Months), and the maximun that could be built (i.e on the map and in the production queue) in WiE.

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: doomtrader

Just on the side question about the limit of Panzer Divisions. Does it counts just the number of divisions, or maybe the total number of tanks/battalions within?
10 divisions with 10% strength is much less power than 10 fully reinforced divisions.

It is not a problem to put such limit in straight numbers, but this should be done wisely. There should be different limit if Germany is at the gates of Moscow and completely different when the Soviets are close to Warsaw on their march to Berlin. And here is the point where everything becomes complicated.

If you look at the changing TO&Es of German Panzer and PanzerGrenadier Divisions from 1939 to 1945, the number of tanks per Division always went *down* but, IIRC, the number of Tank Battalions/Regiments remained the same ... they found that the optimum number of tanks to get an "armour bonus" was considerably lower than they thought in 1934-38.

The real limitation on the number of Panze/PanzerGrenadier divisions for the Germans should, in any case, be trucks, not tanks. And that's a problem the Germans never were able to deal with or resolve ... not even by pressing into service Czech, Polish, Dutch, Belgian, French and etc. trucks captured in their various holiday excursions across Europe ... and the fact that they had to rely on such expedients right to the end is indicative.

Phil

Phil

[aspqrz02]

Indeed. Speer for example. Lied to Hitler. Lied to the Allies.

Thing is, as I was pointing out, the facts I was referring to have only just started to come into the general literature in the last 20 odd years amongst other things for exactly that type of reason ... Barber and Harrison were working without real access to Soviet post 1989 sources such as have been available to people like Glantz (who, of course, has less than no interest in economuc factors [;)]) yet we now understand their assessments were largely correct.

Tooze is the first big splash that could be regarded as "general" without pushing that definition too far out of shape ... and that's barely, of course!

Thing is, yes, people didn't understand the lies told to them during the war until recently ... and almost all general studies of the war still rely on those lies.

Even Glantz hasn't gone fully beyond them with the access he has to Soviet era resources, since he really, as I noted, has no interest in the economics.

So, based on what's been coming out in the last 20 years or so in the specialist, and, now, in something approaching the generalist literature, well, we have a much better handle on things ... to an extent that makes your arguments less arguable than they would have been based on what we thought we knew 20 years ago.

Which is my point, perhaps expressed badly.

And, like I said, I don't see any conflict ... it should be possible to have a Gamers scenario with play balance a factor, and a Historical Realism scenario with it much less so, if at all.

Phil

[rodney727]

I agree, and I must admit I am Tooze fan.

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

Indeed. Speer for example. Lied to Hitler. Lied to the Allies.

Thing is, as I was pointing out, the facts I was referring to have only just started to come into the general literature in the last 20 odd years amongst other things for exactly that type of reason ... Barber and Harrison were working without real access to Soviet post 1989 sources such as have been available to people like Glantz (who, of course, has less than no interest in economuc factors [;)]) yet we now understand their assessments were largely correct.

Tooze is the first big splash that could be regarded as "general" without pushing that definition too far out of shape ... and that's barely, of course!

Thing is, yes, people didn't understand the lies told to them during the war until recently ... and almost all general studies of the war still rely on those lies.

Even Glantz hasn't gone fully beyond them with the access he has to Soviet era resources, since he really, as I noted, has no interest in the economics.

So, based on what's been coming out in the last 20 years or so in the specialist, and, now, in something approaching the generalist literature, well, we have a much better handle on things ... to an extent that makes your arguments less arguable than they would have been based on what we thought we knew 20 years ago.

Which is my point, perhaps expressed badly.

And, like I said, I don't see any conflict ... it should be possible to have a Gamers scenario with play balance a factor, and a Historical Realism scenario with it much less so, if at all.

Phil

[Greyshaft]

ORIGINAL: Greyshaft
I still do not see how you can model WWII without the Sealion scenario being a factor in the minds of the wartime leaders. We know that historically Germany allocated PP to prepare for it and Britain allocated PP to prepare against it. If you make Sealion impossible in game terms then you remove any motivation for the players to duplicate those investments.

I need a life outside of computer games ... I literally woke up this morning with this thought in my head...

The real cost to Germany of BoB wasn't the attrition of the Luftwaffe (a.k.a. cost in PP) - it was the opportunity cost incurred by telling the Luftwaffe and Heer to stay in France and prepare for Seelowe rather than sending them where they could do more effective work. Hitler tabled "Directive No. 16; On the Preparation of a Landing Operation against England" on 16th July 1940 and on 13th October he postponed the invasion "until the spring of 1941".

That's three months where the Axis beat their heads against a brick wall. Consider what they might have done if they had explored other opportunities... Malta? Gibraltar? Yalta? Alexandria? A 1940 conquest of Yugoslavia which lets Barbarossa start on schedule in mid-May 1941? So what could Germany have achieved if they had decided that BoB would be a dud and they should hunt some other game?

(I notice that Phil touched on this concept in his response but we didn't explore it in detail. )