Gary Grigsby’s War in the East: The German-Soviet War 1941-1945 is a turn-based World War II strategy game stretching across the entire Eastern Front. Gamers can engage in an epic campaign, including division-sized battles with realistic and historical terrain, weather, orders of battle, logistics and combat results.
The critically and fan-acclaimed Eastern Front mega-game Gary Grigsby’s War in the East just got bigger and better with Gary Grigsby’s War in the East: Don to the Danube! This expansion to the award-winning War in the East comes with a wide array of later war scenarios ranging from short but intense 6 turn bouts like the Battle for Kharkov (1942) to immense 37-turn engagements taking place across multiple nations like Drama on the Danube (Summer 1944 – Spring 1945).
Some very interesting statistics. Even if Germany couldn't fully exploit the soviet oil fields if they captured them, the Soviet Union would have ground to a halt. That depending on the size of the Soviet above ground stock.
The Soviets would have been begging for peace in 6 months to 2 years.
As a highly developed industrial state, Germany was dependent even in peacetime on external sources for an adequate supply of oil. Even though Germany’s 1938 oil consumption of little more than 44 million barrels was considerably less than Great Britain’s 76 million barrels, Russia’s 183 million barrels, and the one billion barrels used by the United States, in wartime Germany’s needs for an adequate supply of liquid fuel would be absolutely essential for successful military operations on the ground and, even more so, in the air.1 For Germany, it was precisely the outbreak of the war in 1939 and the concurrent termination of overseas imports that most endangered its ability to conduct mobile warfare.
German oil supplies came from three different sources: imports of crude and finished petroleum products from abroad, production by domestic oil fields, and syntheses of petroleum products from coal.
In 1938, of the total consumption of 44 million barrels, imports from overseas accounted for 28 million barrels or roughly 60 percent of the total supply. An additional 3.8 million barrels were imported overland from European sources (2.8 million barrels came from Romania alone), and another 3.8 million barrels were derived from domestic oil production. The remainder of the total, 9 million barrels, were produced synthetically. Although the total overseas imports were even higher in 1939 before the onset of the blockade in September (33 million barrels), this high proportion of overseas imports only indicated how precarious the fuel situation would become should Germany be cut off from them.2
At the outbreak of the war, Germany’s stockpiles of fuel consisted of a total of 15 million barrels. The campaigns in Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France added another 5 million barrels in booty, and imports from the Soviet Union accounted for 4 million barrels in 1940 and 1.6 million barrels in the first half of 1941. Yet a High Command study in May of 1941 noted that with monthly military requirements for 7.25 million barrels and imports and home production of only 5.35 million barrels, German stocks would be exhausted by August 1941. The 26 percent shortfall could only be made up with petroleum from Russia. The need to provide the lacking 1.9 million barrels per month and the urgency to gain possession of the Russian oil fields in the Caucasus mountains, together with Ukrainian grain and Donets coal, were thus prime elements in the German decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941.3
The smallest of the Russian oil fields at Maikop was captured in August 1942, and it was expected that the two remaining fields and refineries in Grozny and Baku also would fall into German hands. Had the German forces been able to capture these fields and hold them, Germany’s petroleum worries would have been over. Prior to the Russian campaign, Maikop produced 19 million barrels annually, Grozny 32 million barrels, and Baku 170 million barrels.4
While it might have been possible to capture the oil fields, I seriously doubt they would have been intact - and the chances of Germany moving any significant quantities of oil out of the Caucasus back to Germany were slim to none. The infrastructure didn't exist, nor did the tankers (which were already stretched just trying to supply the front), and they would have been prime targets for partisans anyway.
That's not to say the capture of those fields would not have put a serious crimp on Russian fuel supplies - but unlike Germany, Russia had allies that could have at least attempted to pick up the slack. Again, not to say it isn't a scenario that would overall benefit the Germans, but they would not have been able to put that oil to use.
Never Underestimate the Power of a Small Tactical Nuclear Weapon...
Well it is quite a question. But I'm inclined to think the capture of Baku would have knocked the soviets out of the war. Hitler only needed a fraction of what the Caucasus could offer to fuel the European economy.
Could the US have taken up the slack? That's contingent on the US being able to move up to 200,000 barrels a day to the Soviets and the Soviets being able to redistribute that from somewhere like Archangel.
I don't think this could have been achieved overnight.
Hitlers aim after knocking the the Soviets out was the capture of the middle east and its vast oil reserves. This would have been the trump card against US native oil.
At the time that was where the Soviet Union was getting almost all its oil. No, after that the Soviets would be depending on the ready stocks of oil they had. The question is how extensive were they and how long would those last?
Could soviets have supplied their forces with oil if they had lost those 3 fields in the south???
The Caucasus accounted for the bulk of the Soviet Oil up to 1942 and it was also where most of the Oil field related know how was concentrated. But after late 41, Oilfields East of the Urals were developed at a very rapid pace and the Caucasus became of marginal importance from 43 onward.
I suggest you read Antonucci's Blood for Oil. Every nation the Germans conquered in Europe was a net importer of oil. So their overall situation got worse the more they conquered. Having Italy become an active ally made things much worse.
The U.S. was the world's largest exporter of oil during the WW2 years. Any Russian shortage would have been made up by them, and/or exploitation of the Iranian/Iraqi oil.
The Russian oil supply became threatened when the Germans reached the Volga at Stalingrad, for the simple reason that much oil was shipped by river barge traffic on the Volga. As a result, in 1942 the Russians quickly built the railline from Baku to Astrakhan to permit another way of shipping the oil from Baku. The Germans were shocked when a distant recon force accidentally discovered the railline, since it was not on any of their maps.
"Military operations are drastically affected by many considerations, one of the most important of which is the geography of the area" Dwight D. Eisenhower
If what could have happened is limited purely to what did happen, there'd be no reason to play war games. I think there is an excessive dependency on "official records" as relates to Germany's Petrol industry during WW2. Granted, I see a lot of these things in "conspiratorial terms" - i.e. Standard Oil and Shell's relationships with IG Farben. This is not to say that Germany was not handicapped in terms of oil, but if they really wanted more oil, there were companies selling it - and Germany had plenty enough war booty to buy it... of which there's still plenty that still has not turned up. Whether the records indicate that or not can be compared with unofficial sales from a company like Gazprom in conjunction with various offshore companies.
Leastwise, according to several intelligence reports, Germany didn't have enough oil to last the duration of 1942, say nothing of 1943 or 1944. If everything was based upon "official records" they probably would have collapsed by the end of 1942. But, most governments are not that transparent, much less Hitler's regime (or more to the point, the corporations behind his regime). Not to be inflammatory, but if we have the kinds of things going on today in an era of "openness and transparency" (cough) we can guess that a fair amount of the same was going on back then.
The whole oil issue really should be broken down into the drilling and refining/production. Considering that the production and refining would need to be done at or close to the site, we can forego the need to transport it back to Germany for all but the higher grade fuels.
So, let's start with the drilling. At Baku, up through the 16th century, there were hand-dug wells producing naptha as shallow as 35 FEET. Large scale oil drilling started in 1872 sponsored by a collection of international investors (British, Belgian, Swedish, etc.) - and by 1900 there were over 3,000 wells; 65% of which were producing on an industrial scale - and at that time, accounted for half the world's oil production. Easy money, just ask the Rothchilds. So, even if the Russian Army was able to destroy, completely and irrevocably each and every last one of those drills... had the Germans reached Baku, they would only need to be drilling down 100 - 200 feet (and they had enough documents from Shell to know where to look).
It's obviously easier to set up a drill today then back then. Today, a 2,000 foot well can probably be dug in a week and completed in 3-4 weeks; but we're talking a fraction of that kind of depth. A couple hundred feet could've been excavated by hand if Germany wanted to put POW's or anyone to be placed in concentration camps to work. Either way - figure some combination of salvaging some portion of those 3,000 wells (some of which might have not been blown), getting new drills in, and in some cases, and maybe just plain massive digging - and Germany has more oil.
But, then - it's not just a matter of having the oil - but the right quality/purity/composition. How long would it take to set up a refinery? That's where what I know ends, but I think for starters Germany's engineers would be taking an incremental approach. Diesel would not likely be a problem, but Germany's vehicles didn't use diesel (most of Russia's did though). For a tank... I don't have a clue - but would guess that low grade vehicle fuel would not be particularly difficult and could be done in some volume starting fairly fast. It's not like they were running the kind of high performance engines we run today. Aircraft fuel would be a completely different story.
Here's the kicker though... Baku was not always a happy part of the Soviet Union. Baku is the capitol of Azerbaijan and is a mostly Muslim oriented culture and history, having been part of Persia. Azerbaijan was made part of Russia in the early 1800's following two wars with Russia. Following the collapse of Tsarist Russia, it declared its independence (briefly in conjunction with Armenia & Georgia) - 1918. Lenin had other plans, asserting that the Soviet Union could not survive without Baku's oil - and invaded it (again), costing 20,000 Azerbaijan lives in 1920.
Anyways - it is worthwhile to point out that Grozny (the second major oilfield) is the capitol of... Chechnya.
Aside from Hitler's regime having relatively "very good" relations with several Islamic sects/groups/organizations, there's the simple fact that from this region of the world - Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkestan, Kazakhstan, etc. - some 400,000 volunteers/conscripts were raised in and fought alongside Germany AGAINST RUSSIA/US/England. (Though not always with enthusiasm, some certainly did). Azerbaijan had a population of about 4 million, but from that were drawn enough men to fill over a dozen battalions... and probably a lot more would have volunteered for Axis service had they not already been conscripted by Russia and under the supervision of NKVD and commissars.
So, there's a very good question as to whether or not "ALL" of those oil wells would have been blown - Russian Army or not. 750 or so of them were shut down which cut production down by about half. If the Axis forces were that close to Baku - one could surmise that native Azeri's would not be thrilled seeing their entire industry collapsed by a government that was itself collapsing (in such event as Germany was approaching).
Even if the Russian Army did manage to destroy 90% of all the wells and production in Baku, that would still have left 2 million (maybe 3 million) metric tons per year, probably more with German efficiency - if the fields were retained. That equates to about 1/3rd of total German oil production from all sources, including synthetic.
There's no lack of oil in Azerbaijan, it's still producing oil today, lots of good contracting jobs there (including a need for English Teachers), and has the second longest oil pipeline in the world.
So, everything considered as relates to the need for oil to run a war machine, the shot at the Caucasus was not quite as far fetched as it may seem. A logistical nightmare of epic proportions? Yes, but one can imagine that if Germany sank as much into the effort to reach Grozny and/or Baku as it did just to take Stalingrad, I think it comes really close to a 50-50 situation for Baku and an absolute certainty for Grozny.
Well the quoted article makes it clear that Germany only needed a fraction of what Baku produced to make the difference. Given a certain amount of time Germany would've made that happen.
We can really see the Germans scraping for oil after 42. Until then they'd remained buoyant enough with reserves and captured stocks. After that they were moving out of trucks back to horse drawn traffic and their armor was reduced to mobile pill boxes and their air power greatly curtailed.
The Russian advances from Kursk onwards weren't based on the Russians being so much better as the Germans having become so bad off. Best remembered that the Russian loss of life had been immense compared to what the Germans suffered.
Keeping on track with the subject , a time ago I had an exchange win bletcleygeek about the effects IN GAME of axis seizing Baku. He had the theory -that I fully support- that even when they take no part of the production and giving back the city next turn (to avoid a caucasus disater) would mean about 50 turns of soviet oil production (according to Emir Agic production diagrams 80% fuel/oil production comes from Bakuhttp://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=2685466&mpage=1&key=Economic%2Cmap%2Cresources�)
That would make a real (albeit probably too far away) target for a 42 onslaught.
The Axis never even got close to Baku. They may as well have been trying to conquer the moon. Therefore, this entire discussion is moot.
The whole go for the oil strategy was just plain chuckleheaded.
Thats your option, which is counter to the facts poeple have posted that know what they are talking about.
Taking the oil fields were easly doable IF the right mix of forses were sent that way in June 42. The distance is really not that far if you take 5 secs and look at the rail net. The hole flank is easly defendable because of the limited sullpy net for the russians.
The rail lines can easly be converted to support the advance if started in easly summer. Who needs trucks to transport oil when you have railcars, lol. Why would they use trucks? And partisan effects were next to zero for the germans. How much supplies were stopped because of them? The hole partisan thing is a huge myth poeple still by into.
Stalin killed more of his own before Hitler invaded then Hitler killed during the war. Most Russian were happy the germans invaded. Hitler was a bonehead when it came to this huge advantage he throw away. He could have had another million men if he had promises the western russian states there freedom in exchange for oil. Better to fight for the murder you know then the one you don't.
Its not that German needed the oil, but that Russia would be with out it. It would be like someone shutting off the oil from the gulf area to the US. Total collapse of the econemy withen a few weeks.
That would have been the end of Russia anyone with an open mind can see that.
I dont try for it during early 42 because I have to pocket russian units to weaken the red machine. Most russian player just like Russia do not put many troops south of Rostov.
Taking it in wite would be very easy in most cases, but not worth the cost. Because the effects are zero as with most things in this game. Hvy/resoures have no effect on the game because of design and the same goes for oil.
Taking it in wite would be very easy in most cases, but not worth the cost. Because the effects are zero as with most things in this game. Hvy/resoures have no effect on the game because of design and the same goes for oil.
Its window dressing
are you sure Pelton? Even for the infantry heavy red army having all those tank and mech corps without fuel for 50 turns does not seem "window dressing"dressing, do you think fuel reerves are so masive as to compense that?
I've just always thought that you were misinformed and angry, Pelton, but clearly you are just an Axis fanboy(explains all your rants). I doubt anyone can seriously suggest that Axis were anywhere near to taking Baku. Then again, you are not interested in any of the facts, so that alone makes the discussion moot since you will simply repeat your usual facade.
Historical speculation and reality aside, would the game be more fun if seizing Baku and connecting it gave the Axis a big bump in oil, fuel, or VP? I've always wanted to be able to use captured factories etc. somehow.
I also suspect Ploesti and Baku were removed as magic bullet wins early on in testing, for obvious reasons.
Farfarer
Historical speculation and reality aside, would the game be more fun if seizing Baku and connecting it gave the Axis a big bump in oil, fuel, or VP? I've always wanted to be able to use captured factories etc. somehow.
IMHO it would be throwing any historical reality and credibility to the bin. On the other hand punishing the soviet economy and mechanized operative capacity accordingly would by "per se" a sufficient bonus to the axis.
The big question is why did the production of Baku decrease by nearly 50% by 1945 since it was never bombed by the Germans. Is this a result of a failure to repair or replace essential equipment in the oil fields as well as a failure to drill new wells when existing ones ran dry? Or perhaps something as simple as a labor shortage?
Quite simply civil demand for oil fell as much of the Soviet Union had been reduced to a wreck by the war.
Fuel oil is about 7.15 traditional barrels (1 barrel = 159 liters) This can vary from 6 to 8 barrels depending on the weight of the oil.
We see the changes in production 1940/1945 in millions of tonnes.
Crude 31.1/19.5
....................
Petrol 4.4/3.2
Kerosene 5.5/3.2
Diesel 0.63/0.52
Motor Fuel 1.5/0.53
Fuel Oil 9.9/6.1
Looking at Germany the 1941 annual requirement was for 12 million tons (approx).
However only 3/4 of that was being produced and the rest made up of stocks.
Ultimately the Germans needed to find another 3 million tons p.a. just to maintain consumption....let alone the additional requirements for industrial expansion.
