Gentlemen,
As announced previously, I'll try to work my way down the points Wirraway_Ace raised in his last post, but I think we need some foundations first:
I think that there is potentially one significant difference of viewpoints with respect to my current operations. I’ll try to explain what I mean.
When the game starts, I frequently struggle to define relevant operations that can be executed quickly. One example for the type of operation I seem to be unable to come up with is what Nemo did in his AAR against 1eyedJack. I simply lack the operational skills to put together the assets available on the map in such a way that I can implement (or improvise) this.
As a consequence, I need time to shape the map for an operation I plan – move fuel and supplies, build up relevant bases, shuffle units into place. In other words, I lack the skill to match the operation to the conditions that are present (which Nemo clearly possesses, which is why he can pull off all kinds of operations that common knowledge teaches to be impossible), and thus need to match the conditions to my operation. Three months game time is a typical value of the time I require.
In a standard GC game, usually this is at least partly compensated by intense defensive maneuver, because the “required” (or rather the presumedly required) targets for the Japanese are sort of well-defined, thus I try to throw a spanner into the clockwork of Japanese operations, prepare and should be ready to go by March/April42, ahead of the historical time line.
The May 42 start sort of adds to that problem, because it puts me under some pressure on the time line. The reflex when making myself familiar with the starting conditions was that I need to arrange this and that, gain experience for lots of units, upgrade UK and commonwealth troops once the equipment gets available – so maybe by August we can start operation watchtower.
But this would be bad for my timeline, because even relying only on brute force Japan could use these three months to push the perimeter a bit out if it avoids reproducing historical mistake, making me fall back on the timeline, while simultaneously digging in. In addition, how do I realize the attrition/physical destruction of Japan’s armed forces in this case?
The question is what are my alternatives, especially bearing in mind that restricted units must be bought with PP before crossing a national border? Northern Oz and Aleutians are not developed, New Caledoina, Suva, Pago Pago aren’t either, bases near the border to Burma are not developed either, Australian and Indian LCUs are essentially in the sorry state they are in when you open your GC game and the Monsoon (sp?) is about to kick in. It is so tempting to sit back and start a systematic approach – which I believe would be the wrong way to go. I need to make better use of these first three months.
What you may conclude from the above is that right now we are in a special phase of the game, during which I run things differently, with a different aim than in later phases that are governed by planned operations (which may, of course, be extremely badly planned looking at my skills or rather the lack thereof[8D]).
a) I made a lot of “useless” attacks (like naval bombardments and relatively small air strikes (due to the need to build-up AFs) on irrelevant bases) in order to improve my units.
b)concurrently with a), I tried to use the window of opportunity that is present while the defense of relevant bases, which one is in fact supposed to set up, is not in place yet (which it is not at the beginning of the scenario), and
c) while I feel unable to go toe to toe with the enemy, I try to go for “backhand blows” (in order to throw in a big term, well known in the armchair generals club). Let the enemy expand and expend his energy, then hit him on the return leg. Make him feel he does not need the added protection he provides at first and then hit him once his guard is down. Try to damage his supporting base in order to increase at least wear and tear and/or time needed for the removal thereof on the units he used for his expansion.
In that respect, PM has worked quite well for me so far (even though I had expected a naval bombardment of PM to support the invasion and had assets in place to try and intercept the bombardment TF on its way back to Rabaul, when it has essentially spent its ammunition, which never happened and even though I may have received some help from aztez).
This phase will come to an end once the 1st imperial shock army and the 1st congressional shock army, which has also been formed, are in place and ready for operations.
Now, with this background in mind let’s turn to Wirraway_aces comments, which I reordered a bit:
While I am not familiar with the details of the May 42 start, The strategic situation in the Pacific Theater should be one of approaching balance of forces and any Japanese operations to expand the "Barrier" of throw the "Javelin" as part of Phase II operations should be employing a preponderance of force.
Agreed. This is why I do not intend to meet them head on and rely at the time being for backhand blows.
Looking at it from the enemies perspective, Rangoon, Rabaul and Kwaj are not locations to stage ground forces nor the associated naval transport assets for Phase II offensive operations.
I do not really disagree and am willing to admit that the use of the word “staging” I used in an earlier post may have been inappropriate. They are definitely not the point where the troops emerge from. But at least currently, these (or at least Rangoon and Rabaul) are the “closest significant supporting base” to which ships may return to refuel and rearm and to repair enough damage to make the trip home after they have been used. In addition, Rabaul is currently the major supporting air base for Japan in the region.
In addition, if I had either a second wave waiting for deployment or a TF loaded with support troops for the base I try to conquer with my first wave, these would most likely the places where I would let them linger until they are sent to the respective target (buit this may be a mistake as well).
Rangoon is too exposed to 4E attack from India.
This is a GC based observation. If you have had the opportunity to bring enough 4Es to India before May 1942, yes. If you start with 7th BG/9th BS on its own in India with 7th BG/436th BS to join them, I would be less optimistic. I do not think there is a way to get more 4Es to India at this point of time in the game (except, perhaps, transfer through Soviet union and China).
Rabaul is in the malaria zone and, until significantly built up, not immune.
Aye, thus no staging in the above sense, but still under the current conditions of expansion the base that is most suitable to provide support near the front line in the Solomons/New Guinea area and thus a key base as early as now.
Kwaj is easily raided and there are other, less predicatable staging areas in the Marshalls so the IJN players with whom I am familiar quickly move out of Kwaj.
Aye, but to move out, you have to move in first – which means a window of opportunity to intercept transport/amphibious TFs.
I would normally expect to find DDs and TBs rearming and refueling at these forward bases only, not major shipping or troop concentrations. Obviouisly, if the front lines were pushed further outward, any or all these bases could become a more major player.
As mentioned above, what I am currently interested in in view of the preponderance of force to be expected is not preempting the enemy move but sort of reducing the chances to support returning surface units and in some cases to provide meaningful air support and inducing a perceived threat.
Protecting his bases in the tactical and operational zone from raids is not going to be a significant diversion of resources. That is what you are supposed to do. He can easily remind you of the same need...
Aye, but if you present a danger while he is setting up the protection (which, as mentioned above is not present at start), there is a chance that the set up is influenced.
Like bomber aircrews in the game, the crew should have to make a morale check before actually making the run in. Of course, in the case of Phoenix, you simply saved her from a one-sided encounter with Conqueror 40 years later...[:D]
Actually, I think they sort of do (threat tolerance settings and their effects bear wittness of that)- probably not the crew but the skipper. That's why the skipper skipped the raid and one of the raids did not go in, as reported above.
I am still at a bit of a loss when you note, " I did not intend to characterize the pressure I put on Rabaul as an example for deep battle, but rather as a general example for a transfer of a principle from ground combat to AE." Under what doctrinal framework and set of principles of ground combat? I chose deep battle because it is the most detailed doctinal framework of modern ground combat, but indeed, not the only one...
Probably my problem is too basic to be recognized as a problem. When discussing deep battle etc, we have mainly land/air-land combat doctrines. I am still not sure about the projection onto a) naval combat and b) the situation of the game. My general quest is looking for the right projection. My specific question was whether the “general idea” of counterattacking an enemy thrust/a salient at its base (which I assume to be part of many doctrines) can be translated into “counterattacking at the closest base of support” in the framework of the game.
Just my thoughts, as always I am eager to hear advice, opposite views and criticism.
Thanks for your interest.
Hartwig
