NATO Helicopter Attack!!

[Mad Russian]

Why do I always get this picture in my mind as my attack helicopters move forward?? [X(]

Good Hunting.

MR

[zakblood]

because you're above the clouds, instead of being below them, picking green stuff off your rotor blade tips and grass off your skids......

[SwampYankee68]

Reminds me of every time I jump in a helicopter playing BF4....

BTW, Man, I miss Jane's Longbow 2...

[Mad Russian]

Found this article on Air Assault. Thought it was about the best I've ever seen in a single place.

http://www.combatreform.org/fries.htm

Good Hunting.

MR

[jds1978]

The failure of the 'deep strike' helicopter attack at Najaf, Iraq in 2003 is an interesting case study.

[zakblood]

maybe a little bit too easy a target now days with the array of weapons ranged against them. even the heavily armoured ones seems quite fragile and slow moving.

guess it won't be long before either a drone one, or get replaced altogether on the front lines.

Z-10,MI-24 Hind,AH-2 Rooivalk,AH-1W Super Cobra,A-129/T-129,AH-1Z Viper,Eurocopter Tiger,MI-28H Havoc,Kamov KA-50/KA-52,AH-64D Apache Long Bow,

cancellation of the RAH-66 Comanche and replaced by the AH-64D Block III Apache, with nothing released about anything after that, even russia is quite on a replacement front, so has it had it day there also in main line combat.

of course i'm talking for the next 5/20 years mind you, as it takes that long for the current ones to be replaced after a few minor and major upgrades that will be needed....

with maybe they will go on to stealth or more of a scouting role? like the Sikorsky S-97 Raider example maybe?

but tbh i can see them going the same way as the tank, battleship examples etc

[mikeCK]

ORIGINAL: jds1978

The failure of the 'deep strike' helicopter attack at Najaf, Iraq in 2003 is an interesting case study.

That attack was a direct result of a ridiculous law preventing the US Army from possessing any fixed wing aircraft. They convinced themselves that helicopters were just as good at deep strike missions as aircraft designed for such attacks

[Richie61]

The March 24 mission failed because of poor planning and breaches of operational security. The Apache forces did another attack on March 26 and had no issues. Course the attack had
a co-ordinated pre-mission artillery barrage and was co-operation with Hornet strike aircraft and had no issues. [;)]

My daughter's best friends Dad was flying in the March 24th attack and is still pissed at the higher ups in the Army to this day [:@]

[TheWombat_matrixforum]

The prohibition on Army fixed wing assets was and is political, pure and simple. Blame the USAF mostly, and maybe the Army brass for rolling over, but it is just one of those oddities that makes no tactical sense whatsoever.

Though, really, you can make a great argument that the whole Army/Air Force dichotomy is unneeded today. I'm willing to see that the Navy is a bit different, but you could still make an argument for a truly purple, integrated armed forces in this day and age. There are morale and "soft" reasons for maintaining the existing system, but it's hardly efficient.

[mikeCK]

Apaches were never designed for deep interdiction raids. Problem could be solved by allowing the Army to purchase fixed wing ground attack craft. No reason the Air Force should be driving A-10s. That law is left over from 1947 when Congress created the Air Force. Marines have their own air...it forced the Army to try and "reinvent" the helicopter ground support mission by demonstrating they could be used for deep strikes. That same mission could have been accomplished with far fewer casualties using conventional aircraft, EW and arty.

It was a waste and only served to show the limits of helicopters IMO

By the way, on another note...am I the only one that finds Hinds to be almost impossible to deal with? I had. Chaparral unit, 2 vulcans and an infantry unit with stingers in a town, dug in with 90% cover. They landed zero hits on a flight of about 6 Hinds (at dawns early light) while the Binds took out the Vulcan, the infantry and 3 M1's parked in a woodline nearby. The choppers were over fields. Maybe NATO choppers are the same?

Seems a bit odd...

[CapnDarwin]

mikeCK, The AD units should be working better in 2.04. We fixed a couple of sighting/firing issues. I've had Chaps take out Hinds now.

[mikeCK]

Ok, thanks. NATO AD doesn't strike me as having been a strong point in real life but a few stinger guys would be nice...lol. Looking forward to 2.04, thanks for the reply!

[jds1978]

ORIGINAL: Richie61

The March 24 mission failed because of poor planning and breaches of operational security. The Apache forces did another attack on March 26 and had no issues. Course the attack had
a co-ordinated pre-mission artillery barrage and was co-operation with Hornet strike aircraft and had no issues. [;)]

My daughter's best friends Dad was flying in the March 24th attack and is still pissed at the higher ups in the Army to this day [:@]

DING DING DING.....We have a winner!

It seems the Army wanted to show case it's new Longbow Apaches, and had a new doctrine to play with. I think there was also a SNAFU regarding logistics (Gordon and Trainor devote an entire chapter to the event in Cobra II)

[mikeCK]

Well hopefully they learned a lesson...you learn more from a defeat can you do a victory

[MR_BURNS2]

Interesting stuff, reminds me of the author of Stealth Fighter who was, during Allied Force, at times at the HQ in Vicenza. He mentioned that a certain general fancied helicopter raids into Serbia to get on with the war and show some results to the press. Army experts at the HQ were horrified at the prospect of a helo attack against a very competent and elusive IADS, and in the end they thought better of it.

[TigerTC]

Institutional inertia. The USAF is more worried about maintaining its role and funding than it is with serving a role that is best for America.

We don't need a separate air force and we don't need two land services. We only need the Army and the Navy.

[KatTsun]

ORIGINAL: mikeCK

Apaches were never designed for deep interdiction raids. Problem could be solved by allowing the Army to purchase fixed wing ground attack craft. No reason the Air Force should be driving A-10s. That law is left over from 1947 when Congress created the Air Force.

Actually the law is merely an MOU between the US Army and USAF setting a limit on aircraft weight sizes, there is nothing about limiting the US Army from owning fixed-wing aircraft. It owns quite a few (something like 50), and they are quite useful for what they do.

What the memorandum does limit is the weight of fixed-wing aircraft at 5,000 pounds, meaning it cannot operate something as big as an A-10. On the other hand, the memorandum allows the US Army to use helicopters for ground support, something the USAF tried to co-opt in a vein similar to what is happening to the British Army and RN having their helicopters and fixed-wing aviation handed over to the RAF. In reality, the 1952 memo was a huge benefit for the US Army, because despite not being able to operate wholly independent air arms like the USMC and USN, it let it have essentially total independence in helicopter development.

If it hadn't happened, it's likely the USAF would control both fixed wing and rotary wing assets for the US Army, with the latter left to use a meager amount of helicopters for liaison, mapping, and transportation roles like it does its fixed-wing aircraft.

ORIGINAL: BROJD

Institutional inertia. The USAF is more worried about maintaining its role and funding than it is with serving a role that is best for America.

We don't need a separate air force and we don't need two land services. We only need the Army and the Navy.

This would be the most optimum formation tbh.

A similar argument could be made for the defunding of B-52/B-1 and Minuteman force and replacement with SSBN-X in vein of Burke's CNO admin. Both land-based bombers and silos are superfluous tools given the capabilities of modern SLBMs like Trident II, and all except for B-2 whose mission is too unique to be replaced by SSBNs can be safely discarded with minimal loss of capability.

[mikeCK]

Actually, to be accurate, that was an extension of the Key West agreement order by the SecDef in 1951 (think the date is right). Limited the army to helos and fixed wing recon aircraft only. BUT, that agreement was mandated basically by those in congress who wanted to avoid duplication of resources. That was necessary because in 1947, congress removed the Army Air
Corp

Either way, I just think we have passed the point where this should be an issue. Interoperability is the key. The army has no interest in air superiority or strategic air assets...they just need to have the same capability the USMC has...a native tactical fixed wing air arm