OT: Something I've been meaning to bring up.

[BBfanboy]

From what I have read, the US only had enough material for one more A-bomb and it would take a year or so to produce enough for more.

Japan was already in a state of near starvation - malnutrition was already an issue. They had been surviving on food brought in by their enormous fishing fleet, but US subs had started routinely sinking those with gunfire or setting them afire. Even the Sea of Japan was no longer safe as the US subs had a new sonar that allowed them to navigate through minefields. This was a shock to the Japanese who counted on this safe area for bringing in resources and food from Korea and the sea. Then the entry of the Russians into the war meant there was an air threat to the Sea of Japan as well.

The civilian population, including women and children, had been training to attack with sharpened bamboo sticks and the like in the guerilla warfare that you mentioned. I don't know how devoted the Japanese were to their Emperor to sacrifice themselves and their children in this way, but other wars have shown us that when women and children start attacking soldiers, the soldiers simply kill all of them on sight rather than treating them as non-combatants initially. It would have been ugly, and psychologically very hard for the Allied soldiers. PTSD is very much involved when everything you believed was good (like mercy for non-combatants) is swept away by war conditions.

And then there is the financial cost of the war - Americans were running out of men and money to keep the war effort going. They had subsidized all the other Allies and had yet to receive repayment of lend-lease loans. Britain was broke, Russia was devastated but building up its industrial capacity to oppose the Western Allies in a post-war world. It is questionable that the Allies could grind away for another year.

So it appears there are factors that could have driven the history of the war in many directions. As Warspite 1 posted, who knows what could have happened? The will of leaders and followers would play a part in whatever was going to happen and it appears the Emperor's will was shaken enough to call it off. I suspect some OSS contact may have verbally signaled that the US might allow the Emperor to avoid war crimes charges to help him make up his mind. MacArthur certainly knew that it was an important concession to prevent resistance during occupation of Japan.

[Platoonist]

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy


The civilian population, including women and children, had been training to attack with sharpened bamboo sticks and the like in the guerilla warfare that you mentioned. I don't know how devoted the Japanese were to their Emperor to sacrifice themselves and their children in this way, but other wars have shown us that when women and children start attacking soldiers, the soldiers simply kill all of them on sight rather than treating them as non-combatants initially. It would have been ugly, and psychologically very hard for the Allied soldiers. PTSD is very much involved when everything you believed was good (like mercy for non-combatants) is swept away by war conditions.

Yeah, there definitely would have been some nightmarish PTSD scenario material.

[Jorge_Stanbury]

what most people don't understand is that the decision to accept the terms of the Potsdam declaration was a very close call

there was an attempted coup, the Kyūjō incident, before the surrender and a second one, the Matsue incident, afterwards... it was a 50-50 chance, and it was only because the senior IJA officers decided against it that there was a surrender

good movies on this topic:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor_in_August
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiroshima_(film)

[Lokasenna]

Japan wanted a surrender with conditions that would allow them to retain some of their empire - a negotiated peace. That was always what they wanted, from day 1: a negotiated peace.

Once the Soviets rolled over the border it became obvious that that was not going to be possible.

Also, communism was antithetical to Japan's system of government. Surrendering to the Americans without conditions suddenly became palatable when the alternatives included surrendering to the Soviet Union.

Dan Carlin covered this pretty nicely in one of the two most recent episodes of his Supernova in the East series. The bomb thing is kind of a myth, IMO - Japan's cities (and Dresden, etc.) were already being firebombed and destroyed, it just took more than a single bomb to do it. But the end result was basically similar.

[Bo Rearguard]

ORIGINAL: Lokasenna
The bomb thing is kind of a myth, IMO - Japan's cities (and Dresden, etc.) were already being firebombed and destroyed, it just took more than a single bomb to do it. But the end result was basically similar.

American general Curtis LeMay regarded the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks as nothing more than an addition (and in his opinion a redundant and unwelcome addition) to a campaign his B-29s had already won. LeMay didn't have the slightest moral qualms abut the atomic attacks, but was quite annoyed that they diminished the credit given to his conventional bombers in flattening Japan. I'm sure in his rather strong and blunt opinion neither the atomic bombs or the Soviet invasion of Manchuria would have gotten any acclaim.

[Alamander]

I am not an expert in this aspect (or any really) of military history, but my understanding is that there are simply not many primary sources available to say with certainty what transpired in the senior levels of the Japanese government in the final months of the war. A colleague of mine some years ago was writing his dissertation on the post-war Japanese economic recovery. He was fluent in Japanese, had married a Japanese woman, and spent significant time doing archival research in Japan. He lamented numerous times that the archives for anything pre-1946 were close to non-existent, especially everything that would have been housed in Tokyo.

We do know for certain that Tojo and many of the most militant factions of the army administration had long ago begun to fall out of favor with both the emperor and the population and that a significant portion of the senior staff officers were in favor of surrender long before the bombs fell. Senior staff were discussing surrender after the Marianas. No one could agree, however, on what terms they wanted and as they debated among themselves, the war dragged on to its conclusion at Nagasaki and Hiroshima without a formal surrender offer emerging prior.

[fcooke]

IMO Potsdam declarations were not helpful to ending the war. When negotiating it is generally not a good idea to back your counter party into a corner. Keep your options open. And any student of Japan would realize that keeping Hirohito around was a pretty big deal. But yes, A-bomb vs firebombing, same results. Though the 'how did just one bomber do that' had to have a fairly dramatic impact.

[fcooke]

I believe the next a-bomb would have been available in three months....but that would signal to Japan that the thing were not exactly running off the assembly line. After that I am sure production would pick up, but by then the invasion of Japan would have happened and all the outcomes of that. The decision to use the two available in quick order IMO was a good strategic decision. More fire bombing in the interim might have killed more people (though LeMay was running out of targets). And as someone mentioned earlier, Allied soldiers bumping into civilians armed with spears would have been ugly.

[Alamander]

So far as I know (which again is not much and I have not read much of the literature on this subject) the best account of senior Japanese government and military discussions late-war is contained in Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. It is very well researched book, though I suspect the author, like so many modern historians, has an argumentative "revisionist" bent in which he is determined to create a narrative that never really existed (that Hirohito was a pacifist railroaded into war by militant extremists) and then destroy it by presenting new evidence. Whatever the case, it is a good read (when not being needlessly argumentative) and is based on all (so far as I know) of the extant archival sources for late-war Japan. https://www.amazon.com/Hirohito-Making- ... 0060931302

[Ian R]

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

From what I have read, the US only had enough material for one more A-bomb and it would take a year or so to produce enough for more.

I have seen reference to 6-8 bombs available by the time of Olympic (may nave been through to Coronet, so about one per month). Possibly in Polmar & Allen's "downfall". There was some discussion about dropping them on the invasion beaches and then landing the troops 2 hours later. The radiation effects were not well understood.

Edit - it was expected to be a lot more than one per month -

The production rate of 3 bombs per month in August was expected to rise to 5 bombs per month in November, and 7 bombs per month in December.

National Security Archive link

[Bo Rearguard]

ORIGINAL: fcooke

IMO Potsdam declarations were not helpful to ending the war. When negotiating it is generally not a good idea to back your counter party into a corner. Keep your options open. And any student of Japan would realize that keeping Hirohito around was a pretty big deal. But yes, A-bomb vs firebombing, same results. Though the 'how did just one bomber do that' had to have a fairly dramatic impact.

The funny thing is that the Potsdam Declaration was riddled with conditions, some of them beneficial to Japan. especially points 9 to 12.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

The Potsdam Declaration was more a ultimatum falling short of a demand for unconditional surrender, since it included guarantees that ordinary Japanese soldiers would not be interned indefinitely; that Japanese industry would not be eliminated and Japan would be given access to raw materials; and that the occupation would not be indefinite and the main Japanese home islands would eventually regain their sovereignty. In addition, the Declaration placed the blame for pursuing the war on "self-willed militaristic advisers" rather than the Emperor. While falling far short of guaranteeing the status of the Emperor as formal head of state in the postwar government, this assignment of war guilt at least suggested the possibility that the Emperor could be retained.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: fcooke

IMO Potsdam declarations were not helpful to ending the war. When negotiating it is generally not a good idea to back your counter party into a corner. Keep your options open. And any student of Japan would realize that keeping Hirohito around was a pretty big deal. But yes, A-bomb vs firebombing, same results. Though the 'how did just one bomber do that' had to have a fairly dramatic impact.

That a city had been destroyed was not new, but the radiation effects of the bomb were horrifying to the Japanese. Those survivors closest to the bomb began showing horrible effects throughout their bodies within a day or two, but others gradually emerged with effects for weeks afterwards. No one knew how long this would go on or how many people might have been affected (some in the downwind plume might already have shown radiation poisoning). Even years afterwards, victims with radiation disfigurements were shunned by the rest of the Japanese people, partly out of fear that they could still contaminate other people.
Just another psychological blow that suggested surrender was not the worst outcome for them.

[Jorge_Stanbury]

The Japanese peace proposal was on fantasy land, they were willing to accept the following:
- withdrawal from former colonies
- disarmament, but not under Allies supervision
- no Allied occupation of Japan
- no Allied prosecution of war criminals (they were to be tried, but by Japan itself)
- no "regime change", keep the Emperor and the militarists in power

that was obviously not going to work,

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: rustysi



Was the end of the war brought about solely by the dropping of the atomic bombs or did the DoW by the Soviet Union have anything to do with it?

Discuss...

And play nice.[:D]

Lot's to unpack here.

Did the Soviet DoW have an impact? Yes, a substantial one. Elements of the Japanese leadership considered a Soviet mediation as the best way to avoid the defeat that was staring them in the face in 1945, despite the fact that this was unrealistic in the extreme (which was about the norm for the Japanese leadership). For the Soviets to enter into the war slammed that door firmly shut, meaning the choice was to accept Potsdam or mass starvation across Japan.

As for the the role of the atomic bombs, they contributed to what was already an impossible military situation for Japan, and the timing was probably key is pushing Japan over the edge.

Interesting article for those interested - https://www.abc.net.au/religion/back-to ... s/10096982

[Lokasenna]

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

The Japanese peace proposal was on fantasy land, they were willing to accept the following:
- withdrawal from former colonies
- disarmament, but not under Allies supervision
- no Allied occupation of Japan
- no Allied prosecution of war criminals (they were to be tried, but by Japan itself)
- no "regime change", keep the Emperor and the militarists in power

that was obviously not going to work,

And they decided they would rather be occupied by the Americans than by the Soviets, hence the surrender post-Soviets.

MM also mentioned that what they wanted vis-a-vis the Soviets was for them to mediate a peace between Japan and the USA. Obviously, that wasn't going to happen anymore when the Soviets invaded.

[Alamander]

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

The Japanese peace proposal was on fantasy land, they were willing to accept the following:
- withdrawal from former colonies
- disarmament, but not under Allies supervision
- no Allied occupation of Japan
- no Allied prosecution of war criminals (they were to be tried, but by Japan itself)
- no "regime change", keep the Emperor and the militarists in power

that was obviously not going to work,

There was really no consensus as to what they wanted as part of a negotiated peace, and we lack the documents to confirm exactly who was advocating for what. Whatever consensus there was basically revolved around making any further advances as difficult as possible for the U.S. and her allies in order to improve what little bargaining position they had.

Bix (Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan- Pullitzer Prize Winning history of Hirohito's reign) and his Japanese research assistants (who have probably done the most research of anyone on this subject) tend to make the case that Hirohito himself was the architect of this consensus: to make the going as tough as possible in order to win better terms. It seems the idea was to discourage the U.S. from trying to invade and occupy Japan and hopefully to retain control of Manchuria.

The Soviet DoW obviously made this latter request superfluous, and I suspect atom bombs or no, given a bit more time, Japan would have surrendered with only 2 conditions: no occupation and the emperor retaining power. I think it is important to understand that many in senior positions were not enamored with the idea of democracy, especially Hirohito, and were, at heart, monarchists. They were battling, not just for Japan or her sovereignty, but for the retention of monarchy, and traditions of the feudal moral code upon which the Meiji Restoration rested, in the face of an ever-encroaching democratic, and in some cases, socialist world order. If one views the last year of the war in these terms, it is probably easier to understand their obstinance and their differing opinions: as some were more sympathetic to democratic reforms than others.

They were not simply fighting to preserve an "empire;" rather they were fighting to preserve a way of life that they viewed as specifically Japanese, as opposed to Western, and many felt that a U.S. occupation would destroy this way of life forever, regardless of what place Japan was given in the post-war world order. As it turns out, from their perspective, they were right. The occupation did fundamentally alter Japanese society and, in some cases, their culture. As a proper historian, it is sometimes best not to say whether such things were for the better or the worse: merely to explain why people did what they did.

[RangerJoe]

Just think of the situation before the war when the US wanted the Japanese to leave China. Japan may have been willing to leave China but not Manchuria. But the Americans did not mean Manchuria and the Japanese did not ask if the Americans also meant Manchuria. Maybe the whole war in Asia could have been avoided. But that is something else.

One other thing about the atomic bombs and the surrender, many of the Americans - and I presume other Allied military personnel - in the Pacific said "Now I know that I will survive."

[Alamander]

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe


One other thing about the atomic bombs and the surrender, many of the Americans - and I presume other Allied military personnel - in the Pacific said "Now I know that I will survive."

My grandfather fought in the Pacific. He had the opposite opinion (of course, he was a contrary fellow and often differed in his opinion from others). He felt, throughout his entire life, that Truman was a war criminal and should have been put on trial at Nuremburg. He was of the opinion that that the U.S. could have easily blockaded Japan for a few months and received the same terms without much loss of life. He was opposed, in general, to war all of his life after his experiences in the Pacific.

[Jorge_Stanbury]

ORIGINAL: Alamander

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

The Japanese peace proposal was on fantasy land, they were willing to accept the following:
- withdrawal from former colonies
- disarmament, but not under Allies supervision
- no Allied occupation of Japan
- no Allied prosecution of war criminals (they were to be tried, but by Japan itself)
- no "regime change", keep the Emperor and the militarists in power

that was obviously not going to work,

There was really no consensus as to what they wanted as part of a negotiated peace, and we lack the documents to confirm exactly who was advocating for what. Whatever consensus there was basically revolved around making any further advances as difficult as possible for the U.S. and her allies in order to improve what little bargaining position they had.

Bix (Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan- Pullitzer Prize Winning history of Hirohito's reign) and his Japanese research assistants (who have probably done the most research of anyone on this subject) tend to make the case that Hirohito himself was the architect of this consensus: to make the going as tough as possible in order to win better terms. It seems the idea was to discourage the U.S. from trying to invade and occupy Japan and hopefully to retain control of Manchuria.

You are right that Japan never propose peace terms, they only made an offer to the Soviets to negotiate
those points I mentioned are what they discussed on internal meetings

[Bearcat2]

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/project/nuclear-vault


The third bomb was to be dropped on August 17th or 18th weather permitting and pending approval from Truman; Marshall thought that it wouldn't be as effective as using it tactically against Japanese troops. They planned to use 10 bombs of the "Fat Man" type in November, 1945 several days before the landings.
US was capable of producing 3 bombs a month, starting Sept, 1945.

The bombs gave Japan a way to end the war: Diary of Prince Konoye "In the unforeseen and unanswerable bomb, Hirohito saw a face saving excuse for Japan's fighting men, one which could be used to ease the humiliation of defeat and smooth the pathway to surrender"
Whether the Russians declaring war or the bombs were the final straw; the bombs did give Japan an excuse to end the war. I am grateful for this as my father in law was Marine combat infantry who had already participated in 2 invasions and my father's Bomber unit was in the process of going from Europe to the Pacific War when the war ended.