The French Army

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The French Army is coming

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1 The French Army

France participated in 50 of the 125 major European wars fought since 1495; more than any other European state. It is followed by Austria which fought in 47 of them; Spain in 44; and England in 43. Out of the 169 most important world battles fought since 387BC, France has won 109, lost 49 and drawn 10. The French Army was reputed to be one of the strongest in the world, certainly every bit a match for the Germans. Along the eastern frontier ran the supposedly impregnable Maginot Line, a series of more than 50 ultra-secure fortresses. When war broke out in May 1940, the French army found itself saddled with a defensive doctrine that was incapable of breaking the German assault. France used the interwar period to bolster its military and was well prepared to fight a war against Germany—but only if the Wehrmacht fought the war on French terms. As a result, few defeats were as rapid or as devastating as the May–June campaign in Western Europe. It is estimated that between 50,000 and 90,000 soldiers of the French army were killed in the fighting of May and June 1940. In addition to the casualties, 1.8m French soldiers, from metropolitan France and across the French empire, were captured during the Battle of France and made prisoners of war. France surrendered to Germany in 1940 for complex reasons. The proximate cause, of course, was the success of the German invasion, which left metropolitan France at the mercy of Axis armies. How did that happen? How could France, considered at the time a great military power, lose so quickly? The Battle of France is one of the most dramatic defeats in modern military history. Yet, most people seem not to really know what caused it. Making sense of the French defeat as well as the more general question of the origins of choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines requires casting aside traditional theoretical approaches. Neither the civilians nor the military behaves as hypothesized by structural or functional analyses. Instead, changes in military doctrine are best understood from a cultural perspective. Despite all the above, by the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, France had 1,250,000 troops, 10 divisions of which were fighting in Germany and an expeditionary corps was created to liberate French Indochina, then occupied by the Japanese.

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2 Legacy of Verdun

The lessons of World War I seem to explain why a functional explanation cannot account for French doctrine. The 1920s and 1930s were an exceptional period: emerging from the carnage of the Great War, the subjective offense/defense balance was so skewed that an otherwise accurate generalization—that military organizations prefer offensive doctrines—appears to be incorrect. Given the French army's doctrine in 1939, it seems plausible that the leadership of the French army, marked by the bloody experiences of World War I, had prepared for a rematch of the previous war. Devastated by the disastrous results of the offense a outrance, and influenced in particular by the battle for Verdun, the French officer corps had learned their lesson and prepared to fight the next war behind the reinforced concrete of the Maginot Line. Although this is the most popular explanation of the origins of the French army's defensive doctrine, this argument fails to recognize the considerable debate in the French army in the decade following the signing of the Versailles Treaty. The French army eventually adopted a doctrine reminiscent of the trench warfare in World War I, but this was not the only lesson available, nor the only alternative considered. The extent to which offensive options were not only considered but also endorsed becomes clear by examining the debate about the potential use of fortifications, the war plans, and the discussions about the future of mechanization. According to a functional argument, offensive doctrines are powerful tools in a military organization's pursuit of greater resources, autonomy, and prestige. Furthermore, without civilian prompting, military organizations ostracize those officers who advocate a more offensive orientation and willingly and dogmatically endorse defensive doctrines. An integral aspect of the French army's excessively defensive doctrine before World War II was the concept that the French termed the methodical battle. Instead of allowing for initiative and flexibility, “la bataille conduite” ensured tightly controlled operations in which all units adhered to strictly scheduled timetables. Asa German officer explained, "French tac-tics are essentially characterized by a systematization which seeks to anticipate and account for any eventuality in the smallest detail." The French army's defensive doctrine maximized the centralization of command and reduced spontaneity to a minimum.

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3 Intelligence Failure

Even before the campaign was fought, the French faced a disadvantage because of an utter intelligence failure. The French made a dramatic mistake when it comes to intelligence. Not only did they not regularly re-evaluate German intentions, they also failed to notice many pieces of information that indicated what Germany was planning after January 1940. For instance, many German reconnaissance planes were flying over the Ardennes area; a captured German pilot confessed that his mission was to reconnoiter the area around Sedan; there was an unusual amount of German “tourists” going to Luxembourg; French intelligence had learned that one of the Abwehr’s best operatives was tasked with surveying the area from Sedan to Amiens – which would turn out to be the location of the main thrust of the German offensive; and Enigma intercepts suggested a higher probability of an attack through the Ardennes. French intelligence never addressed the questions Why? or What is really going on? Rather, they left those questions to the strategic decision makers, who were expected to develop their own conclusions. No one had the task of assimilating intelligence and relating it to operational planning. Consequently, there were no French intelligence officers whose job was to think of what might be happening on the other side of the border among German forces. The French intelligence officers were not actually analyzing collected intelligence. They did not put such information into perspective and correlate data. Moreover, the structure of the French intelligence services was not adapted to ensure a good flow of information towards the relevant decision makers. Another issue was that all of the French intelligence officers were made from the same mold, which very likely reduced the chances of having diverse opinions and analyses, and there was no room for civilian experts to provide additional insight, notably when it came to the industrial, political, diplomatic, and economic aspects. Furthermore, the bureaucracy among French intelligence services prevented the circulation of new information which questioned the pre-accepted dogma. There was no joint intelligence committee overseeing all the different intelligence services, such as in the United Kingdom. Instead, they were under the jurisdiction of different ministries (Foreign Affairs, War, Navy, and Air), without having an overarching entity coordinating their efforts other than the government itself. Consequently, there was no direct link between the key civilian decision makers and the intelligence officers.

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4 Methodical Battle

Many of the issues in the French army were directly or indirectly due to French doctrine. It was not tailored for fast-paced warfare, it did not encourage officers to improvise, and it made the French extremely slow. Doctrine probably is the most critical factor in explaining French defeat. Following France’s great loss of lives in the First World War – about 40% of the active male population – the French military rejected the idea of improvised, unprepared offensives. Indeed, they thought that a hasty attack against a well-prepared position was probably doomed for failure, and that the only way an attacker could succeed would be thanks to a greater concentration of fire with three times as much infantry, six times the artillery, and fifteen times the ammunition. The French also believed that evolution in firepower made centralized control much more important than ever. Consequently, the complexity of such an effort dramatically reduced maneuverability and required rigorous coordination. From then on, the battle would be methodical. The French preferred to have a step-by-step battle in which units obediently moved between phase lines and adhered to strictly scheduled timetables. They preferred a time-consuming, intricate process that prized preparation rather than improvisation. Unit movement was also limited by artillery range; artillery fire acted as a protective umbrella under which every action had to be planned and performed, and beyond which nothing would happen. Counterattacks would typically rely on the use of firepower rather than maneuvering. But for such counterattacks to succeed, the French would need to move units in front of a penetration faster than an enemy attacker could advance. Because this doctrine required great coordination, the French believed that the locus of decision-making had to remain at the higher level. As a result, battlefield commanders had little flexibility or room for initiative – which was the complete opposite of German doctrine – and the entire system was designed to be very top-down. This meant that the French military establishment was unlikely to respond flexibly to unforeseen situations and could hardly capitalize upon gains made by lower-level units. A byproduct of French doctrine was slowness. Because it tried to remove as much friction as possible from the battlefield, “methodical battle” doctrine gave very specific requirements and instructions to conduct an assault, based on different factors such as width, depth, and timing. Procedures were heavy and formal and took a long time to put in place. There was a sort of battlefield bureaucracy, under which all the staff were organized to methodically foresee all the operations on the ground.

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5 Inflexible Command and Control

One of the main issues of French doctrine was its requirement of a very vertical command structure. Local battlefield commanders had very little flexibility. At the tactical level, officers were not trained nor used to improvise, and were not encouraged to develop initiative. The French believed that the higher-level leaders had to be in charge, since they were the only ones that had the required perspective to manage and coordinate all the different soldiers and materiel on the front. Consequently, if officers at the operational and strategic levels were unable to devise sound solutions to respond to the German assaults, the French soldiers on the ground would likely be doomed. A critical issue was that in the kind of fast-paced warfare that the Germans imposed to the French, tactical leaders were key. Indeed, since the situation on the frontline was prone to very quick, if not constant changes, local battlefield commanders were the ones in the best position to assess what the enemy was doing, how they were doing it, and what were the immediate effects of their actions. They were the ones who could take the quickest decisions to adapt to the circumstances. But since French doctrine favored a very top-down command structure, the operational and strategic leaders had to be very efficient to compensate for the lack of the tactical leaders’ flexibility – if that were even enough. Since French doctrine did not allow tactical leaders to be flexible, the outcome of the entire campaign relied heavily on the top French military leadership. The problem was that at that time, there were seemingly very few senior and general officers who had the boldness to innovate, knew how to improvise, and had the personality of a leader. On the other hand, the French Right demanded the retention of a professional army and felt that a long term of service would allow the officer corps to instill an esprit As cops in the troops and thus detach the allegiance of the men from the society at large and forge a collective identity that would unquestionably follow the orders of the commanders. A shorter military service was sufficient to train soldiers, but more time was needed to create the necessary “obéissance passive”. Whereas the French Left sought to avoid a deep divide between the army and society by minimizing the length of conscription, the Right wanted to keep the conscript under arms for at least two years. As the Germans were approaching Paris in 1940, General Weygand revealingly declared, “Ah! If only I could be sure the Germans would leave me the necessary forces to maintain order!”

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6 Tanks as Tactical Infantry Support

Another doctrinal issue lied with the employment of tanks. In the French army, tanks were not part of an independent branch. Instead, they were subordinated to the infantry, and were first and foremost a means of supporting it. As a result, the French saved their tanks mostly to accomplish the infantry’s tactical objectives, and the latter was free to use them as it saw fit. Consequently, tanks were used piecemeal; since French armor was disseminated among infantry units, they were spread out throughout the frontline. For instance, at Stonne, the French used the 3rd Armored Division not as a single, big armored formation, but instead split it to reinforce several divisions of the 21st Corps. An illustrative example of the differences between French and German tanks was the the B1 bis. This French tank outgunned its German counterparts and had more armor. However, it was slower and had limited range because of its poor fuel capacity. Furthermore, the top turret was designed for a single person, which meant that the tank commander not only had to lead, but also to shoot and reload his gun. German tank commanders, on the other hand, could focus only on leading. Since each local commander wanted to use tanks for tactical objectives, tanks could not be used to accomplish wider, operational goals. Isolated, tactical actions did not allow for large armored maneuvers that might have had a chance of countering the Germans at the operational level. Furthermore, French officers and armored units were not trained to wage operational maneuvers with tanks. They only knew how to use them for tactical maneuvers, unlike the Germans. On top of these issues, there were, in the French army, no command principles, directives, trained staff, or adequate communication systems to perform operational counteroffensives. As a result, the French could not muster their armored units to meet the German offensive other than locally, and had a hard time trying to gather the previously disseminated tanks for a larger attack in one area. Without bold and innovative-enough leaders to compensate for all these issues, the French could not use tanks efficiently to stop the German onslaught.

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7 Poor Senior and General Leadership

The French military leadership was overall poor at the operational and tactical levels. Doctrine contributed to extremely poor leadership, but not only; for whatever reason, some of the French leaders “simply” made bad decisions and acted “objectively” poorly. The seeds of bad leadership were seemingly planted in the interwar period, following the victory of the Great War. The French military school of Saint-Cyr did not encourage its students – the future officers of the French army – to think outside the box. They were instead encouraged to follow the prescribed doctrine without questioning it. French officer André Beaufre, for instance, who attended the school at this period, recollected that they were being taught a “narrow,” strict doctrine. According to him, tactics were simple and consisted of following a group of guidelines to the letter. As a matter of fact, before the campaign, the Germans had expected French commanders at every level not to act before receiving minute instructions that would be given only slowly. These elements are indicators which help to explain why French officers were simply unable to react to German assaults. Particularly at the beginning of the campaign, the French senior and general military leadership was unable to efficiently react to the German onslaught. They misunderstood the type of warfare that was being waged against their forces, and the doctrine they were following did not encourage them to innovate. Consequently, the French military leadership repeatedly made mistakes – most notably in the first few weeks of the campaign – which hindered the ability of their forces to repel the Germans, and which served the German objectives. French officers very often reacted extremely slowly, not knowing how to quickly muster their forces to attack, were unable to adapt to changing circumstances, and showed poor individual leadership skills. Such poor leadership on the battlefield can be explained by doctrine, poor individual decision-making, or a mixture of both. For instance, on May 13th, General Lafontaine, leading the 55th Infantry Division, was ordered at 2000 hours to counterattack. However, instead of doing so immediately, he asked for more detailed orders from corps command. As Karl-Heinz Frieser states,General Lafontaine had a mission, but he wanted an order. At 0100, five hours after he had received his mission, he went himself to corps command – which was to the opposite side of the frontline – from which he only came back at 0400 hours, eight hours after his superior officer, General Grandsard, had instructed him to counterattack. Only then did he start giving orders to his division. Even then, Lafontaine was still hesitant because he had not received a written order from corps command; General Grandsard had given the order over the phone. Finally, after 0500 hours, General Lafontaine finally gave the order to counterattack. Nine hours had been wasted.

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8 Intellectual Infrastructure

Under French doctrine, every action had to be carefully planned and had to be performed only after a clear order was given. General de Gaulle advocated the establishment of seven armored divisions com-posed of 100,000 soldiers serving a six-year tour of duty. De Gaulle envisioned that these highly mobile divisions would be capable of immediate action into enemy territory and would return the offensive to the battlefield. De Gaulle was convinced that the defense and ultimate grandeur of France depended on the adoption of a new offensive doctrine, yet he endorsed these offensive operations only if they were coupled to a force of professionals serving six years of military service. As a product of the organizational culture of the French arm, is Gaulle could not imagine entrusting young, unseasoned troops with the tasks involved in mechanized warfare. Only professional soldiers possessed the skill and training to implement lightning attacks by armored units. De Gaulle stuck with this proposal even though he was well aware of the political hurdles to the creation of a professional force of long-serving soldiers. The reception that de Gaulle's ideas received in the French army further reveals the linking of a professional army with an offensive doctrine in the organizational culture of the French army. One critical issue was that the French leadership was unable to react other than tactically. The only occasion in the entire campaign where the French had a concrete opportunity to mount an operational counteroffensive on May 14th-15th was a complete failure. The French officers were simply unable to properly coordinate the attack. They threw in their units piecemeal. Even General Flavigny – considered to be one of the most apt officers to mount an offensive – despite curiously overseeing only two of the several divisions meant to attack, failed to properly coordinate the actions of his units. Doctrine surely was part of the reason why, but one can imagine that with more organized, dynamic, innovative, able-to-work-under-pressure, and bold senior and general officers, things might have been, at least in some situations, different. Of course, French officers as individuals were not the only reason why their leadership was poor. There were no command principles, directives, trained staff, or adequate radio equipment to perform operational counteroffensives. As Karl-Heinz Frieser states, there was no operational “intellectual infrastructure,” since there was no training in this regard. Even a great officer might have had a hard time performing very well under such circumstances. Still, senior and general French officers overall appeared not to try hard enough at times.

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9 Lack of Effective Combined Arms

Another critical issue which helps to explain French tactical inferiority was the lack of effective combined arms. Too often, the French failed to efficiently integrate infantry, armor, and air power to conduct operations. Tanks tended to act with little to no coordination with the infantry, and air units were too rarely able to directly support ground units. There are reasons for such a lack of effective combined arms. The circumstances on the ground, the lack of adequate materiel, and the air military structure and doctrine, are some of the main reasons why it was so difficult for the French to wage efficient combined arms operations. There are several examples where French tanks were unable to efficiently coordinate their effort with the infantry or the air force, unlike the German units. For instance, on May 14th at Chémery, the 3rd Tank Company, which had the mission of supporting the 213th Infantry Regiment, attacked without having received instructions from the latter. On May 15th at Flavion, the French faced a German assault combining tanks, artillery and air power, while they only had tanks. Between May 15th-17th at Stonne, the French armor repeatedly repelled the Germans and even caused panic among them, but their attacks were ill-coordinated with the infantry. As a result, the French actions at Stonne ultimately were little more than isolated actions whose success could not properly be exploited. On May 17th at Montcornet, a bold offensive led by then-Colonel De Gaulle showed some initial success, but was stopped notably by the Luftwaffe, while the French had no air cover. As a matter of fact, De Gaulle had not even attempted to contact the French air force to support his offensive. One of the primary reasons for rejection of de Gaulle's ideas was that the creation of the specialized corps would, in the command's view, cut the army in two. An article in L'Esprit states explicitly the reason for his opposition to de Gaulle's ideas: "This leader, having collected in his hand all the armed force of the country, multiplied indefinitely by the technological possibilities, having in hand hired killers, each of which possesses all the aptitudes of murder and all the extraordinary instruments to kill—when will this leader then march on Paris?" One notable issue was communications; almost all the light tanks had no radio since they were meant to move with the infantry, so they used flags instead. Heavy and medium tanks had radio equipment which came too late, was incomplete, and sometimes inadequate. Consequently, French tank radios were often dead, which led to incoherence and disconnect between tank leaders and their subordinate units, unlike German tank units. Combined with other factors such as various local circumstances or fuel-related issues, tanks tended not to offer effective combined arms integration.

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10 Air Power

Regarding air power, there are several reasons why it failed to provide strong support to ground units. First, a doctrinal reason. Close air support was not the French air force’s priority in 1940. During the interwar period, the air force had sought autonomy and had rejected the concept of close air support in favor of air superiority and strategic bombing. Air officers, therefore, tended “by nature” to be reluctant to provide close air support. Furthermore, when it came to air superiority, the French air force was not so much focusing on winning it, but rather on contesting it. Finally, the French had envisioned a war in which saving their forces for the long-term would pay off. As a result, they were reluctant to send the bulk of the air force “early.” Second, the “air military structure” was inadequate to efficiently counter the German attacks. There was a heavy bureaucracy which prevented quick air reactions, and sorties were not centralized. About 40% of the French fighter force was split among several armies, which prevented France from using its airplanes in an efficiently concentrated fashion. Third, the French air force was simply too weak to efficiently face the Luftwaffe. The vast majority of the air fleet was obsolete, and France lost over 40% of its fighter pilots in the first half of the campaign. France simply did not have enough trained pilots to fly its aircrafts. According to John Buckley, the French air force’s “reactive stance and its notion of parceling air units out in small quantities to provide localized air cover across the front was untenable in the face of the Luftwaffe’s concentrated approach.” The French air force was unable to support units on the ground to efficiently repel and push back the Germans. The French did conduct combined arms. The issue was that in addition to German tactical skill, one or several elements were always or almost always absented or lacking for them to be efficient. For instance, proper coordination or air support were too often missing. Perhaps the best French combined arms action in the entire campaign was the one conducted by General Charles de Gaulle on May 28th-30th at Abbeville. But even this action, despite achieving some success, eventually failed.

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11 Poor Communications

One issue among the French forces was communications: the French were very reluctant to use radios, which made them even slower. As a matter of fact, the Germans had assessed before the campaign that the French would be slow in part because they emphasized communications security, which meant that they had few radios or other means of receiving urgent orders. They were right: to prevent communications intercepts, the French privileged the phone, along with telegrams and couriers. Because of this and the above-mentioned doctrinal elements and their byproducts, the French reaction time was dreadfully slow. When an important order reached the units concerned, it was often already too late. Units on the move could seldom be contacted, and on average – at least during the first eight/nine days of the campaign, when General Gamelin was commander-in-chief – about 48 hours were spent before an order arrived from the Grand Quartier Général to the frontline units concerned. The situation of the 9th Army is a good example of the consequences of the French “communications doctrine.” On May 12th before midnight, German and French troops exchanged fire to the left flank of the 11th Corps. Yet, it took its commander, General Martin, several hours to be aware of this: he knew about it only at 0500 hours. General Corap, the leader of the 9th Army, was aware of this engagement only at 1200 hours, and the French high command was informed at 1330 hours that the Germans had crossed the Meuse river. On May 13th, General Doumenc, leading the 18th Infantry Division, reported that the liaison between the divisional and regimental command posts were difficult: phone lines had been cut, the radio was not functioning, and there were no motorcycles to send couriers. Reports from 9th Army’s units reached General Corap way too late. By the time the information went all the way up to him, the situation on the ground had already changed. As a result of such a confusion, Corap actually went himself from division to division, trying to find out what was going on. Consequently, when his superior officers Generals Gamelin and Georges (commander of northeast theater) tried to contact him, or when a local French commander “became desperate enough” to use a radio to get reinforcements from 9th Army’s headquarters after having spotted a “mile-long column of tanks,” they had received no answer. Corap and his staff were in the field, trying to see for themselves what was going on and whether the whole army group line had been breached. This situation was most likely similar in many different units, given the quick German advance and the dramatically slow reaction of the French overall. Finally, privileging the phone over the radio meant that communications could be critically fragile since they were concentrated in one spot. For example, when the Germans reached Abbeville on May 20th, where the phone centers were located, they cut the lines, preventing phone calls and telegrams between the Grand Quartier Général and the armies in northern France.

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12 Contrast of doctrines

Both the inadequate doctrine and all its byproducts, such as poor operational and tactical leadership, lack of effective combined arms, and poor communication systems, resulted in dramatic operational and tactical inferiority. Because of these issues, especially doctrine, the French forces were unable to improvise, quickly react to changing circumstances and had no clue how to quickly organize large counterattacks involving more than a few units, and were dreadfully slow. Such issues were critical in the kind of fast-paced warfare that Germany imposed on France in 1940. As a matter of fact, the Germans had, before the campaign, rightly identified slowness as a byproduct of French doctrine. Indeed, they had anticipated that the French had a naturally slow action or response rate. The French simply could never stop the Germans with lasting effects. The best the French could do was to temporarily stop the attackers at the tactical level. Beyond this level, the French were unable to do anything. The only actual attempt at an operational counterattack in the entire campaign ended up an utter failure. On the defensive, the French could hold off the enemy for some time, but with a doctrine that did not favor improvisation and a leadership unable to muster their forces and innovate to counter the Germans, it was only a matter of time before the latter found tactical solutions to overcome even the best French defenses. Operational and tactical inferiority, bred by inadequate doctrine, poor operational and tactical leadership, terrible communications, and lack of effective combined arms integration, was the critical reasons that explain the French failure. The dramatic impact of all described issues, notably doctrine and poor leadership, on the tactical and operational efficiency of the French forces contrast sharply with the German doctrine. The contrast with German forces at the time is absolutely striking. As an illustration, between May 13th-14th, French General Lafontaine took a total of 11 and a half hours to prepare his units to attack, while his German counterpart, General Kirchner, had needed 10 minutes.

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13 Strategic Leadership

The French strategic leadership in 1940 was bad to terrible. The two commanders-in-chief of the campaign, Generals Maurice Gamelin and Maxime Weygand, along with the civilian leadership – especially Philippe Pétain – behaved in a way that greatly impaired France’s ability to successfully fight the war against Germany. One mistake Gamelin made was to sacrifice a significant portion of the French strategic reserve – the 7th Army, which contained some of France’s best and most mobile troops – thus impeding the French from responding to an unexpected German move in case of operational surprise. Gamelin had seemingly good reasons to do so. However, he made a terrible mistake by ignoring a basic military principle: always keeping enough reserves to cope with an unforeseen event. Such a dramatic mistake meant that the French would not have many reserve units to face the unexpected German thrust through the Ardennes. Further, Gamelin apparently failed to use intelligence to support the French plan to plunge into Belgium. While the validity of such a plan had seemingly been confirmed by the Mechelen Incident in January 1940, there is no evidence that he made any apparent effort to reassess his plan with the support of post-January intelligence elements. There is no sign that Gamelin based his plan on sound intelligence analysis, or that he even met with the top intelligence officers for counsel. The mere fact that he apparently did not seek to extensively use intelligence to support his plan is a grave mistake for the commander-in-chief of any army. Moreover, Gamelin showed a critical lack of energy. Instead of quickly giving orders left and right to change the situation after the breakthrough at Sedan, reinvigorate his officers and heighten morale – in other words, do what would be expected of the commander-in-chief of any army – he acted with little energy to reverse the critical situation France was in. Another testimony to bad strategic military leadership was Gamelin’s replacement, General Maxime Weygand. Weygand replaced his predecessor on May 19th, after the latter was sacked. If Maurice Gamelin’s faults were imprudence and lack of energy, Maxime Weygand’s was defeatism. As soon as May 25th, less than a week after his nomination, he showcased pessimism which could have been interpreted by some as defeatism.

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14 French colonies

When things seriously started looking bad for France, he could have at least attempted to pursue the fight from North Africa and from the other French colonies. Yet, Weygand mocked the idea of retreating to North Africa, and considered the option unrealistic. The issue is that he seemingly never even seriously considered such a possibility. He even claimed that it was impossible since there were “no ships” to transfer troops there, which was completely wrong. Not only was the French Navy almost intact, but also Winston Churchill himself had offered any British ship necessary to transport French soldiers and materiel there. Weygand seemingly made no serious analysis regarding the North African option. Instead, he seemed to be motivated by emotion and intuition; he qualified the French colonies as “childishness,” and in his assessment – obviously without any tangible elements to back it up – the United Kingdom would sue for peace within “eight days” after France gives up fighting. He flat out expressed his refusal to pursue the fight outside continental France, excluding any attempt to do so. Such a behavior was completely out of place for the commander-in-chief of a democracy’s military. Moreover, he agitated the spectrum of disorder and chaos to convince the other decision makers to rally his opinion. In a cabinet meeting, Weygand claimed that a communist insurrection had broken out in Paris, and that an armistice should be requested to control civil disorder. Following this claim, the minister of the Interior, Georges Mandel, phoned the Paris police chief, who indicated that all was quiet. It is unclear if Weygand genuinely believed his own claim, or if he was willfully lying about it to get his way. Either way, even in good faith, the commander-in-chief of a democracy’s military should not try to influence the civilian leadership and decision-making process by agitating the spectrum of insurrection if it is not based on a sound and realistic analysis – which was obviously not the case there. It can be said of Weygand that he crossed the line and did not respect his role of commander-in-chief in a democracy. Instead of sticking to managing military operations, leading his troops, and giving unbiased military advice to the civilian leadership, he overstepped his boundaries to ensure his opinion would prevail, quickly became defeatist although he had seemingly not even seriously considered an evacuation to the French colonies, and took sides without offering objective military advice to support the civilian decision-making process. In times of dire need, France needed an optimistic military leader who would genuinely attempt everything to turn things around – which in this specific situation could have even meant just continuing the fight another day from elsewhere. Instead, France got a pessimistic leader who thought that his opinion was the only one which was right.

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15 Civilian Leadership

The French strategic civilian leadership also had flaws which impaired France’s ability to win the war in 1940. The French President of the Council (the Premier), Paul Reynaud, was not decisive enough and failed to emerge as a strong figure who could give a clear direction to France in such critical times. He would have liked to keep fighting from Brittany or North Africa, but he was never able to quiet down the opponents to such ideas, most notably Philippe Pétain and General Weygand. He did not impose his will to others, and was too hesitant regarding the decision to pursue the fight or not. He was no Winston Churchill, who probably was the type of strong-willed figure France most needed at the time. While Reynaud suffered from a lack of strong will and indecisiveness, his successor, Philippe Pétain, just like Weygand, was a clear defeatist. He was first called into government on May 18th by Paul Reynaud to serve as Vice-President of the Council (Vice-Premier). However, Pétain willfully undermined the efforts of those who wanted to keep fighting in North Africa, advocating instead for an armistice. Behind the Premier’s back, Pétain discussed the possibilities of a post-occupation regime with other ministers, and even started promising future positions in a later government. Pétain became the Premier on June 16th, following Reynaud’s resignation. The next day, on the radio, he openly asked for an armistice. However, it was a dramatic mistake because the French government did not know how its German counterpart would react to this offer: no serious negotiations had been initiated. Further, the announcement was vague and did not clarify whether the French soldiers should stop fighting now or later, or if the project of an armistice was a decision or a suggestion. Either way, the French head of government had publicly announced to all French soldiers and citizens, and indirectly to Hitler and the German military, that France was unlikely to hold much longer – before even engaging in serious talks with the German leadership. As a result, while the French units were supposed to keep resisting the German assaults, their morale naturally took a hit, even among the units which had remained coherent thus far, whose fighting ability “notably diminished.” Consequently, upon Pétain’s nomination as Premier, France’s very top leadership, both civilian and military, was composed of two defeatists. It is hard to imagine how any country could pursue a war when both the head of government and the commander-in-chief refuse to do so. At the time, the idea of an armistice likely appeared as a reasonable option to many. The issue is not the idea of an armistice per se, but that France’s leaders took the decision to give up way too quickly, that they did not actively try to pursue the fight another day and from somewhere else when it was a possible option, and failed to objectively assess all their options before declaring that all was lost.

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16 Supposed a Lack of French Bravery

One of the most die-hard myths about the Fall of France concerns French bravery. As a matter of fact, the Battle of France features many examples of French military gallantry. Upon the declaration of war, French commander-in-chief General Gamelin was glad, and there were signs that the French population was confident. Upon mobilization, soldiers overall were not happy about the war, but they accepted the task ahead with resolve, sometimes even with a good mood. On May 14th, the morale of several French units was described as “magnificent” and “splendid.” They were anxious to see their first fight, and their officers were encouraging them. The French could also be very tenacious. For instance, between May 15th-17th, the hamlet of Stonne saw some very heavy fighting: it was taken back-and-forth by the French and the Germans seventeen times. For instance, in Lille, the French resisted for three days between May 28th-31st through heavy fighting despite being surrounded by seven enemy divisions. The defenders only surrendered after they were out of ammunition, and their remarkable resistance was acknowledged by the Germans themselves, who allowed the defenders the honors of war. The French marched out of the city in formation, carrying their weapons. While facing an overwhelming force, French forces conducted pre-emptive assaults to spoil the German initiative. On June 2nd, the French launched a vigorous counterattack and recaptured an area east of Hoymille which was previously occupied by the Germans. Attacking with 550 men and supported by two reconnaissance groups and six Somua S35 tanks, only 65 survived unharmed and withdrew, unable to hold the ground regained. A counterattack made by the French 150th Infantry Regiment even netted 60 prisoners. On June 1st-2nd in the Dunkirk area, the French, and in particular the 68th Infantry Division, repulsed several large German assaults. The soldiers’ morale did not collapse despite the critical situation which they were facing. In other instances on June 5th, the first day of Fall Rot, several French positions were surrounded and fought on until they ran out of ammunition. There are several instances where the French forces – including soldiers from the French colonies – only surrendered after they exhausted their ammunition. Between June 14th-25th, on the Alpine front against Italian troops, while the French defenders were outnumbered (with ratios ranging from 1:3 to 1:10 depending on the sector), the attackers suffered over 6,000 casualties, against 274 for the defenders. “Awful weather” helped and frostbite was responsible for a big chunk of the Italian casualties, but regardless, French defenses on the Alps were very strong. Indeed, in addition to individual skill, the French benefitted from a solid network of fortifications and good artillery support, along with good morale.

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17 Valor and Determination

France was not defeated due to military cowardice, nor did its soldiers lack the guts to resist their attackers, and certainly did not prefer to give up rather than fight another war. There are many cases of French bravery and determination in 1940 that illustrate that French soldiers overall were very far from being cowards or easy-to-surrender. French soldiers and frontline officers on the ground could have hardly done any better. In battle, frontline junior officers and non-commissioned officers often fought with “valor and determination.” Even senior and general officers could show courage, just like Colonel Cazeilles, commanding the 21st Colonial Infantry Regiment, who died while personally leading a charge against the enemy.150 General Deslaurens, commanding the 60th Infantry Division, was killed while conducting a rearguard action to allow some of his troops to evacuate, personally operating his unit’s last functioning light machine gun. They overall did what was asked of them, and performed as best as they could, given the critical circumstances they were facing. On the other hand, other factors, such as some units’ poor training, would unlikely have had a dramatic impact on the campaign if corrected. For instance, better training for reservists would probably have improved some of the units’ chances of holding their ground or inflicting more casualties. But in the campaign, even the best French troops were unable to decisively overcome the Germans in the long term. Given the overall situation, the best they could do was temporarily repelling the attackers and occasionally conducting local counteroffensives. Consequently, both more and better training would likely not impact the course of the war. Similarly, French airpower is a secondary factor because even with better planes, more trained pilots, and better air doctrine, it is unlikely that it would compensate for the impact of the three main factors (intelligence failure, operational and tactical inferiority, and poor strategic leadership), which would still have resulted in France’s demise.

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18 Military power

The French military leadership was unable to devise effective solutions to counter the Germans at the operational and strategic levels, and the French strategic leadership – both civilian and military – ended up being made of defeatists who were too keen and quick to surrender. Not considering the factors on the German side, France mainly lost because of three, intertwined reasons: an intelligence failure, operational and tactical inferiority, and poor strategic leadership. These three main factors are the most important ones when determining why France lost. They are decisive because if one of these factors is changed and all its related issues are corrected, France’s chances of at least resisting longer could have dramatically improved. For instance, if the French had correctly guessed that the main German thrust would be through the Ardennes forest, they likely would not have rushed their best units into Belgium, and might have been able to progressively slow down the Germans, avoid massive encirclement, and resist longer. Similarly, if the French had a different doctrine and were not that operationally and tactically inferior to the Germans, maybe they could have managed to better resist the enemy even after plunging into Belgium and being encircled in northern France, and performed efficient operational counterattacks. Finally, if the French had a better strategic leadership made of strong, optimistic, decisive, and energetic figures, perhaps a united French government and all the French armed forces would have been able to continue the fight from the colonies despite losing the metropolitan territory. Studying why a prime military power lost so quickly, especially against an enemy who very seriously doubted its prospects of success, should bring insight, questions, and possible answers to civilian and military decision makers alike. Military power is not only measured by the number of soldiers, tanks, and aircrafts, nor by pure firepower. If only these elements mattered, France could have won in 1940.