British Expeditionary Force, Poland. September, 1939 (by Thayne)

[Thayne]

I was going to wait until 8.2 to start playing this game. But, I decided to give it a try this weekend anyway.

I hope you don't mind.



1. A Place in History

The British Expeditionary Force - Poland (BEF-Pol) was not intended to fight in any war. It was intended to prevent war. After all, there was hardly anything that a reinforced company or armored cars could do in Poland that would shift the balance of military power in that region.

By stationing a British military unit in Poland, Chamberland sought to make it clear to Hitler that an attack on Poland would be considered an attack on England. He wanted there to be no doubt that the age of appeasement was over. With BEF-Pol standing between Germany and the Polish capital of Warsaw, Hitler would not be able to move into Poland without taking on British soldiers.

There has long been speculation that Winston Churchill and his political allies were responsible for this decision. However, it is difficult, at best, to imagine Churchill being responsible for something for which he did not eventually take credit. Yet, he never mentions BEF-Pol in any of his post-war writings.


2. Captain Meriweather Wadsworth

Even more speculation has surrounded the question of why Captain Meriweather Wadsworth was given command of this unit.

The official assessment of Captain Wadsworth's command ability said, "[Captain] Wadsworth, though possessing a keen mind and a natural ability to inspire his men, seems to be completely lacking in battlefield intuition. He is a meticulous planner who does very well i as nothing disrupts his plan. However, when faced with even a minor set-back, he tends to respond with spur-of-the moment decisions (if he responds at all) that are almost certainly the wrong thing to do at the wrong time."

To be fair, Captain Wadsworth was far from incompetent. He possessed his own strengths. After enlisting in the Army, his superiors noticed that he was a natural leader -- quickly organizing others in his platoon into a pack to help each other make it through basic training. When they made him squad leader, he took the plans he had created for his pack and expanded them to the whole squad. Due to his accomplishments, he was nominated for officer's training.

Wadsworth also showed himself to be gifted at planning and organization. Shortly after obtaining the rank of 2nd Lieutenant, he was placed in charge of organizing the rotation of a regiment of troops out of Hong Kong. He planned the mission to the smallest detail, anticipated everything that could go wrong and had contingency plans in place, and executed the plan flawlessly. Later, he was placed in charge of delivering materials for the construction of radar installations near Dover. Again, his supervisors noted that the job was done with the minimum of supervision.

However, in combat simulations, the instant something happened that was not according to Wadsworth plan, the world fell apart. In the words of one of his reviewers, "Wadsworth seems keenly adept at identifying exactly the worst thing he could do, and executing it flawlessly."

Military scholars have long been intrigued about the fact that a person with this type of command recommendations could become the leader of the BEF-Pol forces. Of course, it helped that Wadsworth spoke Polish and was familiar with the Polish culture, since his father had been stationed there for a number of years. But he was not the only British officer with these credentials.

Speculation has ranged from the suggestion that Wadsworth's father, General Terrence Wadsworth, sought to push his only son into the limelight (Burke, 1993), to the possibility that this was a joke carried too far by some of Wadsworth's peers (Bradford, 1982; Olzewski, 1960; Pikes, 1947). Zimmerman (1999) argues that Wadsworth himself asked for the command in order to prove that those assessments were wrong, while Bradford (2001) suggests that Wadsworth was sent to Poland to give the Poles tips on how to organize their own military.

Whatever the reason, on August 11, 1939, BEF-Pol, commanded by Captain Meriweather Wadsworth, disembarked from its transports into Danzig.


3. The BEF-Pol Force

The BEF-Pol force was built around a core that consisted of an armored car company. The company itself had 21 armored cars, each equipped with a machine gun and a BOYS anti-tank rifle. The vehicles could easily hold their own against a line of infantry. However, the anti-tank rifles were effective only against the most lightly armored vehicles.

To supplement this force, and to provide some defense against armor, Wadsworth had command of two motorized infantry platoons. Each was reinforced with a towed anti-tank battery with 37mm guns. He also had a battery of four Howitzers for artillery support.

One of the principles that those who organized BEF-Pol insisted on was mobility.

The French, in particular, had been arguing for some time that Poland was building its defense too close to the German border. With 1200 kilometers of frontier to defend, its units were too widely scattered to stand up to a concentrated German attack.

However, Polish command would not listen. To set up a shorter line of defenses would mean leaving a large part of the country, including nearly half of its citizens and most of the industrial capability, undefended and surrounded by hostile neighbors. The English, at least, gave Wadsworth enough vehicles to retreat every element in his company to that shorter line when the call to retreat finally came, and enough fuel for every vehicle. Nobody would have to walk.

Wadsworth took this as a hint that he was not to engage in a toe-to-toe fight with the Germans, at least not in the early part of the war. He was to preserve his strength for the mid-game.



4. September 1, 1939

"The Germans are coming!"

Wadsworth had a habit of waking early. He wanted to have the day's activities fully planned before the first of his officers rose to disturb him. He was in his office at 5:00 on the morning of September 1 when the news came to him.

As recently as the previous morning, he had drilled for the rapid deployment of his force. He wondered for a moment if this was another false alarm, like the one that had gone off the week before. The Germans had launched a number of small attacks the previous Saturday, but that seemed to be nothing more than an attempt to give Poland a small fright.

Wadsworth would not take chances. He gave the order to execute Mad Scramble, the plan to make the unit ready to travel in 30 minutes. In the mean time, he sought orders from above.

Wadsworth's company was not a wholly independent unit; he reported to the commander of the 26th Infantry Division, Colonel Brzechwa-Ajdukiewicz. While his troops engaged in Operation Mad Scramble, Wadsworth reported to headquarters. Colonel Brzechwa sounded relieved to have a unit ready to move out so quickly. He commanded Wadsworth to find out exactly where the Germans were.


5. North

Wadsworth decided that he did not want to get in the way of the main line of the German assault. The German armor would turn his reinforced company into roadkill. He looked instead to hit the softer flank of the German advance. Besides, a solid kidney-punch in the supply lines could contribute a great deal in weakening the Panzers' punch.

His organization, pre-planning, and drills meant that he only had to pick a destination, and BEF-Pol could move out. The armored cars would travel in the lead, ten kilometers or so ahead of the main body, with one troop of three cars a few kilometers ahead of the rest. If they encountered resistance, they would radio back an assessment. If the decision was to stand and fight, the infantry would dismount and set up, and the armored cars would retreat back to the infantry. If the decision was to run, as it would be if the armored cars saw a Panzer battalion leading the charge down the road, the trucks would have time to turn around and hunt for a new target.

The streets were largely vacant at 5:30 am. However, the constant buzzing of planes overhead, and frantic phone calls as citizens spread rumors across the country, was alerting people to the danger. Some civilians had planned ahead and were on the road, heading away from the German advance in vehicles piled high with personal belongings, by 6:00am. In the towns, others frantically threw what they could into their vehicles and carts, or stood in shocked disbelief, whispering their fears to their neighbors.

Shortly after 7:00am, the lead troop reported that there was Polish armor in the town ahead. It wasn't much; a heavy armored car squadron and a hastily organized platoon of Polish militia. The seven Ursus armored cars looked like armor plated Mack trucks without the trailer, with hats. However, their 37mm guns significantly increased Wadsworth ability to handle a fight against light German armor and would prove crucial in the battle ahead.

Wadsworth had been made an honorary Major in the Polish army, though he preferred to use his British rank, so he outranked the commander of the Polish garrison, Captain Mazurowski. However, Wadsworth was not about to start any rivalry. He approached Mazurowski with a mind toward negotiating what they would do next.

Mazurowski had been gathering information from the civilians entering town, and from private citizens who phoned friends closer to the German border. He was able to give Wadsworth a fair amount of detail as to what lay ahead.


6. Situational Awareness

The Germans were not far away. In the growing light of day, Mazurowski himself had seen German plans bombing targets to the west, probably providing close air support for the advancing German soldiers. Phone calls to people living in the region turned up news of German columns heading through town. There were some tanks, but mostly infantry in halftracks.

The next town up the road, and the terrain around it, formed a simple triangle. The base of the triangle was a short ridgeline running east and west. The highway Wadsworth had been traveling on ran up the northeast slope of the triangle. There, it was lined on both sides with the buildings of a small town. The road then made a sharp left turn and came back down the northwest slope of the triangle. The buildings there were more widely scattered, and backed by a thick forest. Then, just before reaching the hills again, the road turned west. That was the direction the Germans were coming from.

In the middle of this triangle, there was nothing but a wide open field.

Wadsworth and Mazurowski negotiated a plan. Mazurowski wanted to fight Germans, so he did not mind taking the left flank of the operation. This would put his armored cars and infantry in the open field south of the triangle, where it would be closest to the advancing Germans. Wadsworth would station his armored cars on the hills at the base of the triangle, and his infantry in the village that formed the right-hand slope of the triangle. Hopefully, the road would feed the Germans into the triangle, where the two British units could catch them in a crossfire.


7. Execution

The first thing that Wadsworth wanted to know was that the Germans had not yet entered the triangle. He commanded Captain Underwood to send a patrol into the town, and Underwood selected Troop H, under First Lieutenant Picton, to take a look.

Underwood was one of those leaders who thought it was an officer's job to actually lead his men into battle. He climbed up into his command car and joined Troop H on its mission. Mazurowski had some civilians who could serve as translators climb into the command vehicle as well.

Underwood had to drive against the current of civilians starting to crowd the road. Few people in Poland actually owned vehicles. They were pulling carts, or simply carrying their supplies as fast as they could away from the German army. What they started with proved too heavy or awkward after a while, and abandoned possessions littered the sides of the road.

Underwood had no patience for these obstacles. He urged his driver to proceed at a cautious pace, but not to slow down for civilians who could not stay on their own side of the road. The driver nudged one cart whose owner did not move aside quickly enough. Its wheel snapped off as the Morris armored car pushed it aside.

In town, he saw no sign of the Germans. The translators, talking to the civilians, said that there were no Germans nearby. Underwood then had the translators tell the civilians to clear the street -- to get into their basements or whatever shelter they could find, surround themselves with mattresses and stay there until the shooting stopped. He then reported to Wadsworth that it was safe for the rest of the company to advance.

Underwood continued through town, and set up his armored cars at the peak of the triangle. This troop would not be sitting on the hill with the others. It was to add its firepower to the units defending the right flank of Wadsworth’s defensive line.

A few minutes later, Underwood was radioing to Wadsworth the first piece of bad news. Sergeant Tomlin's vehicle, moving off of the road and into a protected position between a pair of buildings, crossed a soft piece of ground that gripped the left rear wheel up to the axel. It was stuck. But, at least, it was in position, facing the field that Wadsworth hoped would become the kill zone.

The convoy carrying the infantry entered town a few minutes later. The street that had earlier been crowded with civilians became crowded with British infantry dismounting from their trucks. They went to the southwest edge of town, carrying their machine guns and mortars, and found useful places to hide among the buildings. Translators advised civilians to move to the other side of town or, better yet, to just leave. In a few minutes, the town would become the focus of German artillery, and there would be no safe place among these buildings.

Once they were emptied, the trucks were ordered back down the road to avoid getting caught in the shelling. Lieutenant Evans, overcome with sympathy for the civilians, allowed them to climb on board so he could carry them away from the battle. Some people insisted that he wait while they load his truck with furniture and other important possessions, and nearly rioted when he said he would only take people and he would not wait.


8. Tanks

Just as they were getting settled in their positions, Captain Mazurowski reported that a platoon of tanks were coming straight at him. When asked to identify them, Mazurowski answered simply, "I don't know. They look pretty big to me."

According to press accounts of the battle, this was when Wadsworth gave the famous order, "They're only Panzers. Kill them!" In reality, the situation was quite different.

Wadsworth was ready to run if his company encountered Panzer IVs. If, which was more likely, this was a platoon of Panzer II, then they would be in an even fight with the Polish Ursus. A second platoon, however, could overwhelm those defenses.

After the Ursus started to exchange fire with the German tanks, Mazurowski reported that the main weapons on the approaching tanks were only machine guns. Here, according to reliable reports, Wadsworth answered, "They are only Panzer Ib's. Kill them!"

However, the country, needing a hero, decided to give a more colorful spin to the events of that morning.


9. Heat

The battle escalated rapidly. The Germans brought in artillery and air support to suppress the Polish armored cars. The air assault proved devastating, destroying one of the cars in Mazurowski's leftmost troop and buttoning up the rest. Lieutenant Sokol had his hands full holding his formation together.

Wadsworth also had a surprise on his right flank. German halftracks and armored cars were entering the triangle, not by traveling on the road, but by entering through the forest on the triangle’s northwest slope. Lieutenant Fitzgibbons was in charge of holding that line, and opened up on the halftrack with his 37mm guns. In just a few seconds, the armored car and the halftrack were destroyed.

Wadsworth received a description of the German armored car, and concluded that it was most likely an open-topped 222. Where there was one, there was bound to be others, and he expected to see three or four more entering the field shortly. He passed the news along to Lieutenant Baldwin that if he sees more of them, it may be useful to lob a grenade down the top. The 222 did not have a top hatch.

Wadsworth had the foresight to recognize that his right flank was hanging out and vulnerable to attack. He sent scouts out to the north to make sure that the enemy was not trying to outflank him, and had ordered Lieutenant Fitzgibbons to refuse his right. As a result, most of the platoon was in position to engage the enemy coming through the forest. The anti-tank guns targeted the halftracks, while smaller weapons focused on the infantry that dismounted from the vehicles.


10. On the Left Flank

On his left flank, Lieutenant Statch of Mazurowski’s unit fired a 37mm shell through the turret of one of the Panzer Ib's, causing it to erupt in a satisfying burst of flame and steel.

Mazurowski's left troop had been rendered largely worthless as a result of an air assault. A German Henschel 123 blew apart one of the armored cars, and rained machinegun bullets on another that destroyed one of the machine guns and the main gun, and rattled the crew so much that they were nearly worthless. Only Lieutenant Sokol's car was functioning.

But the Germans were putting their pressure on Mazurowski's right troop, which was still fully operational. The German armor took advantage of the cover available behind a pair of farm houses to get up close to the Polish line. However, Lieutenant Stach had taken advantage of the same cover, and placed one of his cars up close to the buildings where it would be difficult to see. One of the German tanks came around the building, allowing Sergeant Maslowski to get in a point-blank shot straight into the side of the tank. It erupted with a resounding pop.

The surprise caused another German tank to turn and run, exposing its vulnerable rear to Sergeant Wawrzyniak, who shot a shell into the engine, then fired on the crew as it tried to bail out.

Artillery took out the next tank. It was sitting in the field as artillery shells fell around it. Then, the front end of the tank jumped two feet in the air and came down with a bounce, and the tank simply took no further part in the battle.

If not for the air support, Mazurowski could almost rest easy. Yet, another German plane came over, this time targeting Mazurowski's own command vehicle. The pilot was able to zero its machinegun fire right on Mazurowski's open turret. Mazurowski dove out of the way. One of the rounds cut a fuel line and set the vehicle on fire. The gunner made it out of the vehicle. The driver could be heard screaming for a minute or more before one of the shells exploded, silencing him.

This left Mazurowski alive, but without a vehicle.


11. On the Right Flank

Halftracks continued to deliver German infantry against the right flank. Second Platoon greeted the halftracks with 37mm fire that had so far destroyed four vehicles and forced the abandonment of two others. Only one armored car had been seen so far, and recon units on the right reported no attempt being made to outflank the defenders.

Before the firing had started, Second Lieutenant Higgans had moved forward into a stone house outside of town. From there, he was directing mortar fire against the Germans forced to dismount from their burning vehicles. The only thing he was able to report was a mass of explosions, smoke, and flame. The amount of return fire coming from the direction of the vehicles suggested that the Germans were learning to keep their heads down.

But they were not defenseless. They called artillery and air strikes onto the British Second Platoon. At one time, one of the buildings at the edge of town had a small shop in the back yard. A mortar shell splintered the side and caught the building on fire. The air strikes did not do any material damage, but they were having a devastating effect on the morale of the soldiers, forcing them to ground.

In one of these air strikes, Wadsworth lost one of his officers. First Lieutenant Picton, who was the one selected to scout out the town and then stand firm on its northern flank to reinforce 1st Platoon. He was killed in a staffing run against his car.

Eventually, the combination of air power and artillery put Second Platoon in an untenable situation. Surrounded by fires and blinded by smoke, Lieutenant Fitzgibbon reported that his squad was literally burning alive in its positions. Consequently, Wadsworth gave him permission to withdraw into town. Away from the fire and smoke, the soldiers were able to gather their wits about them.


12. Forward Observer

The problem with retreating Second Platoon was that part of its job was to cover the fire lanes approaching Lieutenant Higgins' position. Higgins was stationed in a stone building outside of town, directing artillery fire into the open fields that surrounded his location on three sides. Second Platoon controlled the approaches on the right side, and First Platoon controlled the approaches on his left.

Of the two, Second Platoon also had the best line of fire against units coming directly down the middle. On the other hand, First Platoon's positions angled back, obstructing their view.

When a German company came charging across the field toward Higgins, there was very little to get in their way.

Higgins called down every piece of artillery he could name to saturate the field in front of him, and Wadsworth approved the request. Sergeant Abbott was still active on Higgins’ right, and sprayed the charging infantry with machinegun fire from his armored car. First Platoon fired at what little it could see.

However, the armored cars that had been standing patiently on the ridge at the base of the triangle could see as far as Higgins’ field. Though they were firing at extreme range, there was hope that the hissing of bullets would at least scare a few Germans back to the safety of their forest.

None of the Germans were shooting at Higgins. They probably did not know that he was there. They just wanted the building.

Shells started falling right on the charging German company. Machine gun fire from the armored cars cut through the dust and smoke. By the time the smoke cleared, Higgins found himself alone again. In the distance, he could see a few squads of Germans hiding along the tree line, but none were close enough to cause him any concern.


13. The Center

Though Wadsworth's right flank had retreated into town, and his left flank had suffered the functional loss of four out of seven armored cars, the Germans made their next attack at the center, against the British units that were still the strongest. They walked into the killing zone.

From the middle of the field, the Germans faced a wall of twelve armored cars on their right. On their left, First Platoon lined up in the buildings on the edge of town, and augmented their firepower with four anti-tank guns.

The Germans brought in more air support and artillery to try to suppress the defenses on both sides. They managed to destroy one of the cars in J Troop on the hill, but that did little to weaken the defenses.

No Germans actually made it into the middle of the killing field. The two halftracks had just started to enter the field when a Boys rifle sent one up in a column of smoke, and an anti tank gun from First Platoon ripped through the second. Wadsworth’s company then focused their light weapons on the infantry, and drove them back off of the field.


14. Vistor

The scouts north of the battle zone announced the approach of a single armored car. By this time, Mazurowski's unit had destroyed the last of the Panzer 1b’s on his side of the battle, and was looking out across empty fields. Mazurowski himself, having lost his vehicle, was no longer in command. Wadsworth ordered the lieutenants in charge of the remaining vehicles back and around to engage the armored car.

When the German 222 broke through the field, Lieutenant Sokol was there to meet it, and quickly to put an end to its participation in the battle.


15. Probes

The Germans continued to probe the defenses throughout the morning, but they were without any further air support. The British and Polish soldiers were able to have a restful morning picking off the random German soldier.

Yet, Captain Wadsworth knew that this could not last. The German commander in charge of the unit he had defeated would, no doubt, have reported back to his commander about the stiff resistance ahead. The German military would have started to put together its intelligence reports. Pilots would have reported what they had seen, and German infantry that had engaged the enemy and survived would be interrogated to determine who shot from where and with what.

The Germans would return, and in much larger numbers.

Wadsworth might have been convinced to stay and hold the line, if the Poles had been meeting with success in other parts of the campaign. In many places, the Germans were continuing to advance. If Wadsworth had stuck to these positions, even if he held, he would have found himself surrounded.

With ammunition running low, he prepared to retreat to a new line of defenses.


16. Aftermath.

German records after the war showed the loss of 128 men in the battle, along with 5 tanks, 2 armored cars, and 10 halftracks. Wadsworth had lost 2 armored cars and 21 men from his own command, while Mazurowski lost 3 vehicles and 7 men.

Technically, the battle was a draw. Wadsworth had slowed the Germans for a little while, but the losses made such a small dent in the German war machine that it would largely go unnoticed in the weeks to come.

Perhaps the most important result of this battle was the effect that it had on morale back in England. Chamberland was more than pleased to announce that the British and German soldiers had met on the field of battle, and the British had left victorious.

The captain who, "...seemed keenly adept at identifying exactly the worst thing he could do, and executing it flawlessly," managed to win the first battle that really mattered.