MDIEHL One point. All of your observations on Allied Pilots/Planes seems to be based on the US Navy Experiance---but the US Navy had very little involvement in the first 3 months of the war.
If the simulation posited that the RAF/RAAF/USAAFFE pilots suffered a kind of excessive willingness to engage in turning combats with A6Ms I'd (1) wonder about the veracity of the assumption, and (b) probably not object if the effect was both weak and brief.
WitPs problem is that IJN pilots are credited with being both more experienced and having a "special death ray" (in the zero bonus) that under no circumstances is warranted historically.
So were there a "special death ray" bonus it should not apply to engagements between any IJN pilots and USN pilots. Moreover, USN pilots should have the same EXP levels on average than the IJN ones, because EXP abstracts air time, experience, and also doctrine, tactics, and training in important skills like deflection shooting.
I'd doubt the validity of the Zero bonus even against army pilots though, because so much of the "edge" gleaned in the Burma/Malaya/Borneo theater seems a product of factors like the initial japanese logistical advantage, lack of allied preparation, replacement parts &c.
Don't get me wrong. Allied pilots were impressed with the Zeke. But they weren't particularly in fear of it. And after Pearl Harbor no one doubted their ability to do the job.
I'm accused on this forum of being an "Allied Fan-Boy", but I can still see justification for some sort of Japanese "bonus" in the opening phases of the campaign. That it's effects can be made more accurate I wouldn't argue with you, but the "shock" of the Japanese actually being competant is also well documented.
Outside of Malaya I don't see in histories that are really detailed all the shock that is supposed to be attributed to the allies. In Indonesia one P-40 group was winning, until they were bounced in their landing pattern. I read that action a while ago. Wish I could recall the source. And then... no more P-40s for Indonesia. Its hard to get a P-40 to last long without spare parts. So if you're flying a crate that needs repair you're already in a bad position. Much worse to be in a beater and in your landing circle when the Zekes arrive. Which they could do, without warning, easily enough because the Zekes could strike a long ways and because in most of the MBI theater radar was nonexistent.
In most of the other brief skirmishes culminating in the last retreat to Australia you see the Allies in shock of Japanese logistical preparation and the suddeness of their advance everywhere. But not in shock or awe of Japanese pilots. Instead you see a bunch of Allied fighters trying to slow the Japanese advance even when at times it had overtaken them, with front lines so fluid that Allied logistics went from shoestring to nonexistent in many places overnight.
In short it had less to do with Japanese pilots or Allied fear or shock or awe than it did good Japanese operational planning, good logistics, and the success of bliztkrieg war (keeping the Allies reeling so that they could not organize a defense until they'd fallen back to Australia in the south and Burma in the northwest).
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?