Matrix Games Forums

I am not sure this was explicitly stated as such anywhere, but

RHSEOS assumed that Gen Yamashita's historical plan to focus on armor was implemented.

He had visited the (German) Eastern Front in 1941, and wrote a report on his return, just before
the Pacific War began. His recommendations can be seen in RHS in general - by the creation of
4 armored brigades - all of them present when the game begins - but the newest ones are pretty
below strength. All 4 will grow to their mid 1942 strength (which uses a slightly different OB) a
bit too fast - if in supply. By summer 1942 four brigades RHS calls mechanized are formed -
these are everything else in the 4 historical tank divisions (other than the tank brigade proper).
That includes a motorized infantry regiment, a mech battalion, an SP arty unit, an engineer unit,
and a good deal of support.

Now for EOS we didn't end the program there (historically). We went on to form another (fifth)
tank division (that is, both a tank brigade and mech brigade) plus another independent mech brigade.
Beyond that we formed a few additional independent tank companies - these earlier so they are
available at start and because they need less time and put minimal strain on both the production and the
training institutions.

It would not have been possible to "convert" these companies to even tank "regiments" (i.e. battalions)
by the time the war began - much less brigades. IF they were to form up as regiments, it would have taken until the end of 1942 and if as brigades until mid-1943 (considering training alone). Feeding them with the many non-tank vehicles involved probably would have taken even longer. I found that it was difficult even for an expanded industry to support the added burden of the moderately larger tank force (5.5 divisions vs 4) - although that was in the context of having also added about 7 light tank companies and a number of tank units to brigades - which was the de facto equivilant of doubling the AFV requirements. Taking those companies (and the historical independent companies) out, AND ALSO removing the tank units from brigades and other formations which EOS has added, would have the effect of permitting about 7 or 8 tank divisions - but not before mid 1943 would it have been possible to both train them up and outfit them. At that point it depends on operations and the state of industrial production - but if operations are significant but not catistrophic - and if industry is 100% - you have a fair balance between what could have been produced and what this force would require. These are very optimistic assumptions, and involve putting in place a much better economic plan than occurred in history combined with not deciding tanks are not a war winning weapon (a decision which was reversed too late to matter). It appears that - not realizing that EOS had pretty much run AFV and support motor vehicle production up to such great levels that more would require reduction in aircraft industry (Japan had converted motor vehicle plants to aircraft production) and aircraft engine production - and similarly had taxed the training institutions (and the 88 German advisors) to the limits - it may be that too many formations were formed up too soon here? Unless - of course - actual limits are not a consideration.

AndyMac,

Well, I hunt down BBs with a vengeance. I devote recon and airplanes and CVs to the task until it is done. If I lose 100 planes but take down a BB then I'm happy. If takes 200 or 300 then so be it.

In any case I added the two Alaskas and then took 1 out so you get 1 Alaska BC and then those 6 or 7 CLs you wanted instead of the 2nd one. Those CLs will arrive throughout 44.

I do like that in this mod the Allies are wondering about having TOO MANY BBs . Fair enough there will be some shortages in airplanes etc but I like that the Allies feel they may have too many of the non-respawning ships. This was my intent all along. I don't want an Allied player feeling that the economic side of the game has screwed him over.


Sid,
With the Allies getting the Midway, 4 additional Essex, 3 additional CVEs, 1 additional CVL, 7 additional BBs, 12 additional CLs, 12 additional DDs and 5 entire additional divisions I think it is safe to say that production limits aren't a major issue in-game . Oh and just for fun we quadrupled the B17 replacement rate from 4 to 16... Should give the Allies a bit of punch in 42 they would otherwise lack.

The goal is to get a game we're both happy with, play it and then modify the scenario based on our experience. Aim of game = FUN, not realism. I'm a fan of realism in terms of modelling individual devices properly but once that's done I prefer to let the players make of it what they will. IOW, make sure the tools are right and then leave them to build whatever they want. I don't try to prescribe what they should do with the tools I give them.

And apparently the most significant strategic resource for both the USA and Japan - aside from oil -
is not a factor either. I refer, of course, to steel. The USN really did order many additional Essex class ships,
and three additional Midways (total = 6) - but could not produce them during the war because of shortages of steel and yard capacity.

OK - I get it. I took out Midway so the Allies could get Essex sooner - and found a similar thing applied to her sister (FDR). But here there is no need to find steel, yards not building other ships, anything. Understood. We can keep those two extra Essex, return Midway, and add still more Essex class - without accounting for their steel or construction sites/availability either. Sort of compensate for extra Japanese steel with extra Allied steel. And note a carrier is worth 1500 tanks - measured in steel.

The B-17 rate was much higher in stock and CHS - and generated a host of complaints because the plane was not used in numbers in theater. I happen to have the ability to track B-17s and B-24 by both manufacturer's number and by "tail number" (a service assignment) - and I determined that the numbers were even less than one would expect by applying allocations by area to production rates. This partly reflects many airframes associated with units not in the game (e.g. air sea rescue), operational training, and probably factors we cannot think of. I used a value of 40% of the base figure based on a realistic allocation figure (which is something like 26% - never mind the theory it is 15%). IF you wished to assume that ALL production was available to line units - and don't mind the things Gary told us about air sea rescue being built in for example - you could multiply my value by 2.5 (and increase 4 to 10). I assume this is not germane - that you prefer just to make it up - but just in case - FYI.

Welcome to the big world of people choosing a different path than you like.

It is pretty unusual for anyone to make my choices. And I never met anyone who would make all the same choices.
Not a new concept for me. What is a surprise for me is the idea someone could say they appreciate all the hard work trying to get RHS more historically correct - even to the extent of saying nothing else was worth considering - but then contradicting that by wholly ignoring the methodology used. But I expect that not being constrained by anything but imagination is a lot more fun for you.

LOL! No, I'm constrained by what a potential opponent would find acceptable also.

As to your insights into my soul... you are welcome to your opinions.


As always in the final reckoning I don't force anyone to play any mod so if you don't like it you are free to go on your way.