RE: 'stuffing' the border
Posted: Tue Oct 20, 2009 5:10 pm
The 'stuff' is commonly discussed in terms of whether it prevents the Germans from declaring war on May/Jun 1941. I think analysis needs to go beyond that point...the stuff will not permanently keep the Germans from declaring the war. The question is, on which turn will the teeter-totter tip the German way? True, maybe they are shut down in May/Jun. But what happens if they draw two '4' chits that turn, the Russians draw a '1', and two new German MECH and a half-dozen INF arrive as Jul/Aug reinforcements? Did the stuff still work then?
Also, building air is cost-effective, for the Russians at least, in that they can build a 2 BP pilot and put it in each of their antique planes they start with for a 2 BP garrison point. Not the most cost-effective use of pre-war Russian BP to be sure, but if you can get your opponent to surrender in 1941 via a successful stuff...
The stuff prevents what is an extremely powerful Axis strategy that they did not try in real life, but is a common posit of history analyses...what if the Germans completely ignored the Mediterranean and instead hired the Italians as another ally to invade Russia with, but on a much more massive scale than real life? This is the type of Operation Barbarossa where people bemoan Russia's doomed fate. This is not a historical Barbarossa, where a lot of German resources were in the Med (Luftwaffe strength in the Med was at 2000 air-frames during several critical phases of Barbarossa) and fighting the Battle of the Atlantic. If the Axis build on a single-minded goal of invading Russia and even evacuate Libya rather than reinforcing it, of course they should do much better in Russia than historically.
Also, building air is cost-effective, for the Russians at least, in that they can build a 2 BP pilot and put it in each of their antique planes they start with for a 2 BP garrison point. Not the most cost-effective use of pre-war Russian BP to be sure, but if you can get your opponent to surrender in 1941 via a successful stuff...
The stuff prevents what is an extremely powerful Axis strategy that they did not try in real life, but is a common posit of history analyses...what if the Germans completely ignored the Mediterranean and instead hired the Italians as another ally to invade Russia with, but on a much more massive scale than real life? This is the type of Operation Barbarossa where people bemoan Russia's doomed fate. This is not a historical Barbarossa, where a lot of German resources were in the Med (Luftwaffe strength in the Med was at 2000 air-frames during several critical phases of Barbarossa) and fighting the Battle of the Atlantic. If the Axis build on a single-minded goal of invading Russia and even evacuate Libya rather than reinforcing it, of course they should do much better in Russia than historically.