Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: Bogo Mil

I didn't say they were completely unable to do indirect fire, but most units were very badly trained at it.
Pre-planned bombardement against well known enemy positions was possible - this is the "easiest" way of indirect fire. But in a moving battlefield, when the batteries have to calculate their aiming themselves and time is an issue, they were usually not able to do it fast and accurate enough. Thus they usually relied on direct fire during the first year of the Great Patriotic War.

The Warsaw Pact was still relying heavily on direct fire support in the 1970s and 1980s. In analyses, we generally carried WP DF artillery as having about 3 times the firepower of indirect artillery of the same calibre (ceteris paribus). There were two downsides: ammunition supply and flexibility.

In these analyses, we considered the difference between general support and direct support as well. On a scale of 1-20, a light direct-fire howitzer in direct support was about 10 in that mission, with the lighter the calibre the higher the firepower. Guns, howitzers, and mortars of the same calibre and at the same rate of fire were 1:2:3 in relative firepower based on lethal area, so a 75 mm gun in direct fire was about the same effectiveness as the light howitzer--the howitzer was better in indirect fire. The light howitzer in direct support indirect-fire was 3. Medium caliber howitzers were 2, and heavy howitzers were 1, mostly due to less lethal area per minute. On the other hand, for general support missions, where shell explosive charge was more important than lethal area (which was based on fragmentation), for example against fortifications, artillery emplacements, armour or dug-in positions, the corresponding ratings were 1 for a light weapon, 2 for a medium weapon, and 3 for a heavy weapon.

Interesting, heres a tidbit for you, while I was assigned to the 1/26 Inf 1st Inf Foreward, our batallion was expected to have roughly 50% losses in transit just to get to our assembly area in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany. This from Red Army rocket, artillery and airstrikes. At the time I was a track driver, M113A1. Being that this vehicle is made out of alluminum (its also colder inside this vehicle as a result then it was outside in below zero temps, if anyone here served as a track driver in Germany back then and drove a M113 tell me your secret on how you stayed warm, and ill tell you mine ;}) I didnt have very much confidence in my survival. And thankfully I never had to experience war.

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Bogo Mil

I didn't say they were completely unable to do indirect fire, but most units were very badly trained at it.
Pre-planned bombardement against well known enemy positions was possible - this is the "easiest" way of indirect fire. But in a moving battlefield, when the batteries have to calculate their aiming themselves and time is an issue, they were usually not able to do it fast and accurate enough. Thus they usually relied on direct fire during the first year of the Great Patriotic War.

The Warsaw Pact was still relying heavily on direct fire support in the 1970s and 1980s. In analyses, we generally carried WP DF artillery as having about 3 times the firepower of indirect artillery of the same calibre (ceteris paribus). There were two downsides: ammunition supply and flexibility.

In these analyses, we considered the difference between general support and direct support as well. On a scale of 1-20, a light direct-fire howitzer in direct support was about 10 in that mission, with the lighter the calibre the higher the firepower. Guns, howitzers, and mortars of the same calibre and at the same rate of fire were 1:2:3 in relative firepower based on lethal area, so a 75 mm gun in direct fire was about the same effectiveness as the light howitzer--the howitzer was better in indirect fire. The light howitzer in direct support indirect-fire was 3. Medium caliber howitzers were 2, and heavy howitzers were 1, mostly due to less lethal area per minute. On the other hand, for general support missions, where shell explosive charge was more important than lethal area (which was based on fragmentation), for example against fortifications, artillery emplacements, armour or dug-in positions, the corresponding ratings were 1 for a light weapon, 2 for a medium weapon, and 3 for a heavy weapon.

ORIGINAL: Sheytan

Interesting, heres a tidbit for you, while I was assigned to the 1/26 Inf 1st Inf Foreward, our batallion was expected to have roughly 50% losses in transit just to get to our assembly area in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany. This from Red Army rocket, artillery and airstrikes. At the time I was a track driver, M113A1. Being that this vehicle is made out of alluminum (its also colder inside this vehicle as a result then it was outside in below zero temps, if anyone here served as a track driver in Germany back then and drove a M113 tell me your secret on how you stayed warm, and ill tell you mine ;}) I didnt have very much confidence in my survival. And thankfully I never had to experience war.

50% losses in transit to the assembly area? [X(] Was there really someone in the Nato that thought they could stop the Warsaw pact forces?

ORIGINAL: castor troy

ORIGINAL: Sheytan

Interesting, heres a tidbit for you, while I was assigned to the 1/26 Inf 1st Inf Foreward, our batallion was expected to have roughly 50% losses in transit just to get to our assembly area in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany. This from Red Army rocket, artillery and airstrikes. At the time I was a track driver, M113A1. Being that this vehicle is made out of alluminum (its also colder inside this vehicle as a result then it was outside in below zero temps, if anyone here served as a track driver in Germany back then and drove a M113 tell me your secret on how you stayed warm, and ill tell you mine ;}) I didnt have very much confidence in my survival. And thankfully I never had to experience war.

50% losses in transit to the assembly area? [X(] Was there really someone in the Nato that thought they could stop the Warsaw pact forces?

I fink NATO relied on airstrike to stop the supply flow, and on town combat to cripple the armor power of Warsaw pact forces: that mean no real hopes in open land....SO in fact it was just aiming for a stalemate, not on real victory.

NATO hope to have at least some warning prior to a Warsaw Pact attack.  Even 12 hours would be enough to get a large number of of troops to thier General Defense Plan positions.  I think (and worked as a intel analyst during the cold war) that NATO would have a 48-72 hr period of mobilization prior to an attack.
 
The scary scenario was an attack by the Soviets straight out of the barracks with GSFG, with no reinorcement from the other GOF's or the Western Military Districts.

When I served during the cold war, I was stationed in Berlin, Germany (before the wall came down). For those that don't know, Berlin was located about 120 miles inside of East Germany and there was a wall completely around West Berlin. West Berlin was home to French, British and US forces. The wall was there to keep East Germans from defecting to West Berlin.

While stationed there, the main consensus was that if the Warsaw Pact attacked, we would effectively become POWs, since our "prison" wall was already in place.[X(]

ORIGINAL: castor troy

ORIGINAL: Sheytan

Interesting, heres a tidbit for you, while I was assigned to the 1/26 Inf 1st Inf Foreward, our batallion was expected to have roughly 50% losses in transit just to get to our assembly area in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany. This from Red Army rocket, artillery and airstrikes. At the time I was a track driver, M113A1. Being that this vehicle is made out of alluminum (its also colder inside this vehicle as a result then it was outside in below zero temps, if anyone here served as a track driver in Germany back then and drove a M113 tell me your secret on how you stayed warm, and ill tell you mine ;}) I didnt have very much confidence in my survival. And thankfully I never had to experience war.

50% losses in transit to the assembly area? [X(] Was there really someone in the Nato that thought they could stop the Warsaw pact forces?

The only way they could maintain the operational tempo they wanted was by not stopping to fight. There was no way they could win in a conventional war--it was going to be a target-rich environment and we could shoot them down as fast as they came into view, even after taking 50% casualties moving to the assembly areas. We expected the war to go chemical/nuclear out of the box. I was really glad to see 1992.

In the 2nd Amored Cavalry stationed in Bamburg, WG we were told that we (the regiment) would cease to exist a a fighting force after 7 days combat against the Warsaw Pact. 7 out of 10 would be dead, missing or wounded. Of course, we would start the fight at the border and trade lives for time until the Russians hit the MLR about 60 miles behind us. Lucky for me, the wall fell and then we went and beat up on the Iraqi's.

mother often said- amongst other words of wisdom, pot to pee in window to toss it out, was I born yesterday, etc.- is that even a bind Squirrel can find a nut.  I take that to mean if you bring enough ordnance to the table you will overcome your enemy.  

ORIGINAL: 2ndACR

In the 2nd Amored Cavalry stationed in Bamburg, WG we were told that we (the regiment) would cease to exist a a fighting force after 7 days combat against the Warsaw Pact. 7 out of 10 would be dead, missing or wounded. Of course, we would start the fight at the border and trade lives for time until the Russians hit the MLR about 60 miles behind us. Lucky for me, the wall fell and then we went and beat up on the Iraqi's.

I agree with your sentiment. The point is that the Warsaw Pact forces would have been burnt out more quickly. Your ACR could reasonably expect to ruin a couple of divisions and perhaps a corps in those seven days. Mission accomplished.

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: 2ndACR

In the 2nd Amored Cavalry stationed in Bamburg, WG we were told that we (the regiment) would cease to exist a a fighting force after 7 days combat against the Warsaw Pact. 7 out of 10 would be dead, missing or wounded. Of course, we would start the fight at the border and trade lives for time until the Russians hit the MLR about 60 miles behind us. Lucky for me, the wall fell and then we went and beat up on the Iraqi's.

I agree with your sentiment. The point is that the Warsaw Pact forces would have been burnt out more quickly. Your ACR could reasonably expect to ruin a couple of divisions and perhaps a corps in those seven days. Mission accomplished.

a couple of divisions? What does acr stand for? Armored cavalry rgt? How big is a rgt in the US forces when they could expect to wreck a couple of Soviet divisions. And why should the Warsaw pact divisions so much worse?

ORIGINAL: castor troy

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: 2ndACR

In the 2nd Amored Cavalry stationed in Bamburg, WG we were told that we (the regiment) would cease to exist a a fighting force after 7 days combat against the Warsaw Pact. 7 out of 10 would be dead, missing or wounded. Of course, we would start the fight at the border and trade lives for time until the Russians hit the MLR about 60 miles behind us. Lucky for me, the wall fell and then we went and beat up on the Iraqi's.

I agree with your sentiment. The point is that the Warsaw Pact forces would have been burnt out more quickly. Your ACR could reasonably expect to ruin a couple of divisions and perhaps a corps in those seven days. Mission accomplished.

a couple of divisions? What does acr stand for? Armored cavalry rgt? How big is a rgt in the US forces when they could expect to wreck a couple of Soviet divisions. And why should the Warsaw pact divisions so much worse?

ACR = Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Precision munitions, esp. wire guided AT missiles operated from concealed positions against enemy trying to move forward were why a small force could be expected to hurt any attackers so much.

Of course, this theory was never tested, so it remains a moot point whether or not it would have worked.

The NATO force would have going for them well prepared positions (years in preparation), pre-spotted artillery, the defender has the espirit de corps of an all volunteer force (in the case of the Americans), the fact the defender has a built in advantage, and better overall equipment quality.  The Soviets need to breakthrough the NATO line.  The NATO guys win if they prevent breakthrough.

I don't know if Soviet divisions were the same size in the 70s as during WW II, but they tended to be smaller than most other countries during that war.

Up to the end of the USSR, most Soviet NCOs were draftees.  They had very few career enlisted personnel.  The only volunteers were the officers.  The US, with an all volunteer force and NCOs who had been in the service for multiple enlistments had a significant advantage in morale and unit cohesiveness.

I could see one regiment mauling a division or two in that situation.

Bill

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: castor troy

ORIGINAL: herwin




I agree with your sentiment. The point is that the Warsaw Pact forces would have been burnt out more quickly. Your ACR could reasonably expect to ruin a couple of divisions and perhaps a corps in those seven days. Mission accomplished.

a couple of divisions? What does acr stand for? Armored cavalry rgt? How big is a rgt in the US forces when they could expect to wreck a couple of Soviet divisions. And why should the Warsaw pact divisions so much worse?

ACR = Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Precision munitions, esp. wire guided AT missiles operated from concealed positions against enemy trying to move forward were why a small force could be expected to hurt any attackers so much.

Of course, this theory was never tested, so it remains a moot point whether or not it would have worked.

Iraq definitely reset the indicator lights of a lot of people who had bought into Soviet military doctrine. The Active Defense doctrine was actually more effective than the Air-Land Battle doctrine at blocking a Soviet offensive, but it was much less effective during the counterattack phase. Soviet tanks were designed for offensive operations along well-developed transportation routes. They couldn't fight from hull-down positions, and they lacked high cross-country mobility. Their small crews (and the lack of accompanying infantry on the ground) meant that their target acquisition was slow, so that a target an American tank would handle alone required a Soviet tank platoon or more. To make the advance rates their doctrine required, they had to be in column with perhaps a platoon deployed in lead. Basically if you could acquire and kill them at least as fast as they closed, you would win.

The Abrams also had better long range fire control, so they could hit the Iraqi tanks before the Iraqi tanks could have any hope of hitting the Abrams.

Necessity breeds innovation.  The western allies knew they could not compete with the Soviets in equal numbers, so they developed the best systems they could.  Western armies and air forces also trust their soldiers to do their jobs.  A high degee of independence on the battle field is given to tank crews and aircraft crews.  Soviet doctrine had their troops hamstrung and controlled centrally. 

The western allies did not completely appreciate what a limitation this was until after the Soviet Union fell.  I read an article about Germany's Soviet fighters they inherited from East Germany during unification.  They kept them on strength but in secondary roles.  Aerodynamically, they were advanced airplanes, but they were built for a much more limited doctrine than western fighters and they were of limited use to the Germans, who were using West German doctrine.

Back in 1986, a Russian MiG-25 pilot defected by flying his plane to Japan.  I read his biography in college.  The Americans treated him quite well and his belief in the differences between the Soviet system and the American system came slowly.  His initial position was that he was just seeing what the elites had.  When they were taking him to a safe house in some American city, they stopped at a market to get supplies.  Suddenly his agents realized he was gone and went on a frantic search.  They found him staring at the meat case in disbelief.  All that meat and it wasn't rotting.  That was the first indication to him that things were different in the US.

What finally convinced him that the US was completely different was when he was taken aboard a US carrier and watched flight ops.  He said afterwards that the Soviets would never be able to operate a fleet carrier.  Everybody on that flight deck needs to trust everyone else.  The person in charge of the deck is an enlisted man.  For some things, the NCO in charge of the deck trumps the captain of the ship.  No NCO in the USSR would have ever been given that level of authority.  Few officers would have.  Fighter pilots were under complete ground control every minute they were in the air.  They didn't do anything without control from the ground.

Bill

ORIGINAL: castor troy

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: 2ndACR

In the 2nd Amored Cavalry stationed in Bamburg, WG we were told that we (the regiment) would cease to exist a a fighting force after 7 days combat against the Warsaw Pact. 7 out of 10 would be dead, missing or wounded. Of course, we would start the fight at the border and trade lives for time until the Russians hit the MLR about 60 miles behind us. Lucky for me, the wall fell and then we went and beat up on the Iraqi's.

I agree with your sentiment. The point is that the Warsaw Pact forces would have been burnt out more quickly. Your ACR could reasonably expect to ruin a couple of divisions and perhaps a corps in those seven days. Mission accomplished.

a couple of divisions? What does acr stand for? Armored cavalry rgt? How big is a rgt in the US forces when they could expect to wreck a couple of Soviet divisions. And why should the Warsaw pact divisions so much worse?

Back then, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment could easily take on 3-1 odds and kick the stuffing out of it. An ACR has alot of teeth but short on tail. 2/3rds the combat power of an Armored Division with only 1/3 the manpower.

In 1989-1991 we had (deployed to Iraq) 160 M1a1 heavy armor, 160 M3 Bradleys, 24 M109a2 155mm howitzers, 24 Cobra's. With 4800 personnel in the regiment. We carry enough ammo and supplies for 7 days combat internally. We have 3 Cav Squadrons each with 3 Cav troops, 1 tank company, 1 how battery and a service company. Each Cav troop is equipped with 13 M3 Bradleys, 9 M1a1 HA, 2 120mm mortar tracks and a Fist track. The tank company has 14 M1a1 HA and 2 120mm mortar tracks, plus FIST. The you add in the CO, XO, S3 who all have M1a1 HA and I think they had 6 Bradleys.

Basically we have a tank Battalion and a mech Infantry Battalion worth of Bradleys (but not the infantrymen) all in one Squadron (Battalion). We are the ultimate in combined arms warriors. I still think the army should have nothing but ACR's for armored formations.

Once in theater (Saudi) we were assigned, the 214th arty brigade, an attack helcopter brigade, an engineer brigade and an MP battalion and also a combat support BN. Our full bird Colonel had under his command if my memory serves, 16,000 troops. So basically we became a division.

ORIGINAL: 2ndACR

ORIGINAL: castor troy

ORIGINAL: herwin




I agree with your sentiment. The point is that the Warsaw Pact forces would have been burnt out more quickly. Your ACR could reasonably expect to ruin a couple of divisions and perhaps a corps in those seven days. Mission accomplished.

a couple of divisions? What does acr stand for? Armored cavalry rgt? How big is a rgt in the US forces when they could expect to wreck a couple of Soviet divisions. And why should the Warsaw pact divisions so much worse?

Back then, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment could easily take on 3-1 odds and kick the stuffing out of it. An ACR has alot of teeth but short on tail. 2/3rds the combat power of an Armored Division with only 1/3 the manpower.

In 1989-1991 we had (deployed to Iraq) 160 M1a1 heavy armor, 160 M3 Bradleys, 24 M109a2 155mm howitzers, 24 Cobra's. With 4800 personnel in the regiment. We carry enough ammo and supplies for 7 days combat internally. We have 3 Cav Squadrons each with 3 Cav troops, 1 tank company, 1 how battery and a service company. Each Cav troop is equipped with 13 M3 Bradleys, 9 M1a1 HA, 2 120mm mortar tracks and a Fist track. The tank company has 14 M1a1 HA and 2 120mm mortar tracks, plus FIST. The you add in the CO, XO, S3 who all have M1a1 HA and I think they had 6 Bradleys.

Basically we have a tank Battalion and a mech Infantry Battalion worth of Bradleys (but not the infantrymen) all in one Squadron (Battalion). We are the ultimate in combined arms warriors. I still think the army should have nothing but ACR's for armored formations.

Once in theater (Saudi) we were assigned, the 214th arty brigade, an attack helcopter brigade, an engineer brigade and an MP battalion and also a combat support BN. Our full bird Colonel had under his command if my memory serves, 16,000 troops. So basically we became a division.

I see, thx for the info. Now I know that an ACR has more firepower than the whole Austrian Army! [X(]

ORIGINAL: castor troy

I see, thx for the info. Now I know that an ACR has more firepower than the whole Austrian Army! [X(]

At one point in my professional career, I put together an OB for all the troops on both sides in Central Europe, including their peacetime garrison locations. I believe at that time, an ACR did have more firepower than the whole Austrian Army. It was certainly comparable.