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Interesting discussion still.
 
But I go for PH for a couple of reasons:
 
- You can hit Manila with other means than the KB.
- As repeated often enough the benefit of PH is strategic freedom for half a year, sometimes longer.
- You can hit AC
- You are in a position that allows for more guesswork on whats your next KB destination
- The subs you might kill at Manila only affect the game after 1st Jan´43 and a careful allied player will have huge numbers of subs anyway by then.
- The rest you can hit there is crap
- You have higher chances to kill an allied CV if lucky and go for PH
 
My conclusion would be: Hit the battlewagons at PH. Manila is a nice target but the advantages to hit there are outweighted by the disadvantages
not to hit PH.
 

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

Interesting discussion still.

But I go for PH for a couple of reasons:

- You can hit Manila with other means than the KB.
- As repeated often enough the benefit of PH is strategic freedom for half a year, sometimes longer.
- You can hit AC
- You are in a position that allows for more guesswork on whats your next KB destination
- The subs you might kill at Manila only affect the game after 1st Jan´43 and a careful allied player will have huge numbers of subs anyway by then.
- The rest you can hit there is crap
- You have higher chances to kill an allied CV if lucky and go for PH

My conclusion would be: Hit the battlewagons at PH. Manila is a nice target but the advantages to hit there are outweighted by the disadvantages
not to hit PH.

We have modified victory conditions if the Japanese avoid Hawaii, Alaska, and the continental US:

If the Allied player has a sea line of communications (a continuous path with air superiority) between North America and a fleet base in the Philippines and from there to a forward base in the Ryukyus, Korea, or Japan by 31 January 1944, he wins a decisive victory. If this requirement is met by 30 April 1944, this is a regular Allied victory. By 31 July 1944, a marginal victory, by 31 October 1944, a draw, by 31 January 1945, a Japanese marginal victory, by 30 April 1945, a Japanese regular victory, and by 31 July 1945 or later, a decisive Japanese victory.

If at any time, the Japanese player attacks a hex in Alaska, Hawaii (excluding Midway), or continental North America, the Allied player has an additional two years (just so) to meet his requirements for a victory.

The purpose of this scenario is to explore the Pacific campaign as both sides expected it to take place.

Ah ok.
 
Very interesting VC conditions!
Please dis....eh ignore my comments. [8D]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

Ah ok.

Very interesting VC conditions!
Please dis....eh ignore my comments. [8D]

Both Japan and America did their pre-war planning assuming something like those victory conditions. Japan intended to hold out for American war weariness, and the US Navy planned a rapid campaign for the same reason. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor changed the rules of the game, toggling it from a limited to a total war. Oops. See Totaler Krieg for a game where the German side has that option.

It is worth noting that in Real Life the Pacific Fleet anchored in Pearl was ineffectual at most - looked good, but in reality was a bit toothless. Admiral Kimmel realised this very quickly, as did his predecessor (who I think was replaced for complaining too loudly about it to Washington)
Basically despite its size there were insufficient facilities in Pearl for the battleships - morale was low, and there were also insufficient support craft (especially tankers) to back them up for any kind of even limited offensive operations westward. Also destroyers were in short supply to protect them from subs.
The plan was, as admitted by Kimmel that he had few other options, if war was declared between the US and the Japanese Empire, for the fleet to return to the West Coast, change a large portion of the crews and await sufficient screening (destroyers) adn support craft (tankers!) before it could even contemplate a return to the central Pacific

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

It is worth noting that in Real Life the Pacific Fleet anchored in Pearl was ineffectual at most - looked good, but in reality was a bit toothless. Admiral Kimmel realised this very quickly, as did his predecessor (who I think was replaced for complaining too loudly about it to Washington)
Basically despite its size there were insufficient facilities in Pearl for the battleships - morale was low, and there were also insufficient support craft (especially tankers) to back them up for any kind of even limited offensive operations westward. Also destroyers were in short supply to protect them from subs.
The plan was, as admitted by Kimmel that he had few other options, if war was declared between the US and the Japanese Empire, for the fleet to return to the West Coast, change a large portion of the crews and await sufficient screening (destroyers) adn support craft (tankers!) before it could even contemplate a return to the central Pacific

Read War Plan Orange by Edward S. Miller--it covers the pre-war planning. In the absence of the KB, the 1941 plan goes very smoothly.

ORIGINAL: herwin
Hi, JWE,

Blitzk and I are just starting again. We're using a modified version of Scenario 1 with the KB move replotted. The Allied first turn is unmodified. I've been following the pre-war plan for the US Fleet. It works well if the Japanese player focusses too much on operations in the SRA.

Hi Harry,

Only thing we do different is we have a moderator/umpire. He gets both side's initial op plans and then sends out intelligence. A lot of it is misdirection, a lot is plain nonsense, some of it is valid. One must sift through the dross and guess intelligently. So the team leaders get a certain amount of indications, and both sides get to adjust their initial move on that basis. Allows for some very interesting variations in the opening moves.

I can't really make a point that hasn't already been made, but I am firmly in the PH camp. The surviving US subs will mostly sink your transports; big deal. There is nothing else in Manila harbor worth sinking other than the subs, and at any rate a few SAGs can clean alot of those surface ships up when they attempt to leave.

BBs are important in AE, moreso than IRL. In my PBEM as Japan, I am in a better position because of the 4 sunk BBs, and the other 4 damaged ones (none of which I have seen yet), giving me much greater surface superiority and freedom of action.

The only arguments I can see are post-attack positioning, but even there, the USN CVs are in position to wreck havoc on a Wake landing or Solomons if KB is in the DEI. Meanwhile, having KB in the DEI providing ground support is a waste of a strategic asset. And Ryujo/Zuiho is enough to cover invasions, or keep the Allies honest, at least for the first month.

Anyway, I just don't see the benefit to a Manila attack personally

I could give a detailed analysis of why Pearl Harbor is the only game in town, but I will instead be quite succinct and limit myself to a one word analysis.

Clausewitz

He was right in 1812. He still remains right in 2010. His analysis equally applies to maritime warfare. In the Pacific conflict, maritime power IS the military means of defeating the enemy.

Alfred

Read War Plan Orange by Edward S. Miller--it covers the pre-war planning. In the absence of the KB, the 1941 plan goes very smoothly.

The problem is that the US War Dept had been working on War Plan Orange since 1913, where it had been the source of long and bitter/acrimonious disputes about the defensibility of the Phillipines (which seemed to completely dominate all of its plans and thinking).
Even in late '41, the US still seemed to have a pre-WWI mentality where heavy battlewagons would dominate the battlefield. Naval Air Power, or the ability to project it to undreamed of areas, hardly featured in any such planning and thinking. Everyone was still obsessed with the Mahan-ideal of two BB-dominated battlefleets slugging it out a la Jutland and all carriers were good for were knocking out other carriers and thus depriving the enemy battlefleet of its eyes and advanced reconissance.
Altohugh the commanders of the air-groups on board the Lady Lex, Saucy-Striped Sara and Big 'E' might beg to differ, the idea of naval planes totally knocking out an enemy battlefleet just did not enter the picture in Washington. Thus before PH the US had never ever considered the fast carrier strike group, nor trained for operating more than one carrier together in the same task force.
Contrast this with the IJN, who despite its share of 'big gun theorists' had actually designed its Car Divisions to operate in pairs, and had extensive training of linking up into even bigger task forces should the situation so demand - the Hawaiian Operations was certainly not the first time the IJ had ever operated all six big carriers together, as they had done so on exercises earlier on in '41 even though S & Z were relatively inexperienced and new to the fleet.

ORIGINAL: Alfred

I could give a detailed analysis of why Pearl Harbor is the only game in town, but I will instead be quite succinct and limit myself to a one word analysis.

Clausewitz

He was right in 1812. He still remains right in 2010. His analysis equally applies to maritime warfare. In the Pacific conflict, maritime power IS the military means of defeating the enemy.

Alfred

In the Pacific Theater of Operations, airpower was the military means of defeating the enemy. In particular, a naval base that lacked control of the air was untenable.

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Read War Plan Orange by Edward S. Miller--it covers the pre-war planning. In the absence of the KB, the 1941 plan goes very smoothly.

Thus before PH the US had never ever considered the fast carrier strike group, nor trained for operating more than one carrier together in the same task force.

This question had been subject to heated debate within the US Navy before the war. The single-CV TF was probably optimal for the 1941-42 period, while offence dominated defence. (After Eastern Solomons, it was claimed that the 10-15 nm separation between the two carriers preserved the Saratoga unhurt while the Enterprise was hit hard.) On the other hand, at Coral Sea, the US carriers initially operated in a single formation.

The fast CVTF was a pre-war development, designed for scouting, raiding, and anti-raider operations. It consisted theoretically of a carrier, two to four escorting heavy cruisers, a CLAA serving as DD squadron leader, and a destroyer squadron. Interestingly, a modern CVTF has much the same organisation, with the heavy cruisers replaced with SSNs. An Essex class CVTF was to consist of a carrier, several large cruisers, a CLAA serving as DD squadron leader, and a destroyer squadron, although I doubt they ever operated that way. The heavy/large cruisers were in the mix to provide protection from SAGs during restricted flying conditions and could keep up with the carrier if the TF did a fast operational redeployment--leaving behind the destroyers.

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Alfred

I could give a detailed analysis of why Pearl Harbor is the only game in town, but I will instead be quite succinct and limit myself to a one word analysis.

Clausewitz

He was right in 1812. He still remains right in 2010. His analysis equally applies to maritime warfare. In the Pacific conflict, maritime power IS the military means of defeating the enemy.

Alfred

In the Pacific Theater of Operations, airpower was the military means of defeating the enemy. In particular, a naval base that lacked control of the air was untenable.

Disagree.

1. You can't import the necessary raw materials using aircraft transport planes. You can't maintain the land forces, who after all are ultimately needed to hold terrain, unless you operate SLOCs.

2. Airpower in the Pacific was impossible unless you captured/maintained airfields. For that you needed boots on the ground, and how did those boots capture/maintain the base. Answer by having maritime power.

3. Most of the mobile offensive airpower was provided by carrier airpower. Again, no maritime power, no significant air projection. The PTO was not the ETO. The great distances over water limited the usefulness of air power in comparison to continental combat.

4. Air power by itself did not tactically guarantee a blockade. To say that a naval base would be untenable merely reinforces the point that maintenance of SLOC is the key. The enemy air will not be able to maintain a blockade if it itself could not be logistically maintained.

War is a combined arms operation where all three elements are required. In the PTO Clausewitz's observations apply to the maritime as that was the primus inter pares of the military forces to get the job done taking into account the geopolitical.

Alfred

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball
I can't really make a point that hasn't already been made, but I am firmly in the PH camp. The surviving US subs will mostly sink your transports; big deal. There is nothing else in Manila harbor worth sinking other than the subs, and at any rate a few SAGs can clean alot of those surface ships up when they attempt to leave.

BBs are important in AE, moreso than IRL. In my PBEM as Japan, I am in a better position because of the 4 sunk BBs, and the other 4 damaged ones (none of which I have seen yet), giving me much greater surface superiority and freedom of action.

The only arguments I can see are post-attack positioning, but even there, the USN CVs are in position to wreck havoc on a Wake landing or Solomons if KB is in the DEI. Meanwhile, having KB in the DEI providing ground support is a waste of a strategic asset. And Ryujo/Zuiho is enough to cover invasions, or keep the Allies honest, at least for the first month.

Anyway, I just don't see the benefit to a Manila attack personally

It all depends on the initial conditions. Judged in a vacuum, a PH strike appears to have the more beneficial result. But Harry and Bliztk are playing a classic, traditional CPXercise, so the initial conditions are different. In their case, the cost of a PH strike is to add two years to the Allied victory timing, so the cost/benefit analysis is different. Under those conditions, I would fo-sho think hard about Southern deployment options.

I might even bifurcate the KB and look at a Kuantan/Palembang operation; forget the knees, cut the swine off at the neck. In one sense, it does seem beneficial to out-deploy the KB elements; give them their mission at the outer edge of the op (the most important and also the most risky), and then reel them back to a central position, supporting the peripheral ops on the way.

Personally, I'm a fan of the Southern option. Have got some really nice results with it. But, like Harry and Bliztk's scenario, my initial conditions are different. I have an umpire that says what troops/ships I can use, and who wants to see my o-plan. Maybe little bits and pieces of it will show up in intelligence to the other side, so I am never confident as to potential responses.

That's the wonderful thing about this game. If played right, all sorts of options can be explored. That is why I say the PH v Manila strike is a question in a vacuum. The game provides historical tools, and a judicious and intelligent application of those tools will give countless hours of stress. Rather than modding 'what ifs', our group is more concerned with developing scenarios with specific 'initial conditions' and going from there. Given the fabulous editor, this is a simple task.

Would suggest that a-historical options not be judged by books or hindsight, but by their immediate, actual capability. Well developed opening day scenario alternatives will provide a garden of flowers, of all sorts of colors.

The altered victory conditions does change things. I was thinking a stock game. Have at it on Manila!

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Alfred

I could give a detailed analysis of why Pearl Harbor is the only game in town, but I will instead be quite succinct and limit myself to a one word analysis.

Clausewitz

He was right in 1812. He still remains right in 2010. His analysis equally applies to maritime warfare. In the Pacific conflict, maritime power IS the military means of defeating the enemy.

Alfred

In the Pacific Theater of Operations, airpower was the military means of defeating the enemy. In particular, a naval base that lacked control of the air was untenable.

Disagree.

1. You can't import the necessary raw materials using aircraft transport planes. You can't maintain the land forces, who after all are ultimately needed to hold terrain, unless you operate SLOCs.

2. Airpower in the Pacific was impossible unless you captured/maintained airfields. For that you needed boots on the ground, and how did those boots capture/maintain the base. Answer by having maritime power.

3. Most of the mobile offensive airpower was provided by carrier airpower. Again, no maritime power, no significant air projection. The PTO was not the ETO. The great distances over water limited the usefulness of air power in comparison to continental combat.

4. Air power by itself did not tactically guarantee a blockade. To say that a naval base would be untenable merely reinforces the point that maintenance of SLOC is the key. The enemy air will not be able to maintain a blockade if it itself could not be logistically maintained.

War is a combined arms operation where all three elements are required. In the PTO Clausewitz's observations apply to the maritime as that was the primus inter pares of the military forces to get the job done taking into account the geopolitical.

Alfred

Hear me out.

There was no key terrain in the theatre--no locations you needed to hold as naval bases, population centres, or for their natural resources. (Most of the island airbases were fragile and easily suppressed.) The only reason you took a landmass was to base aircraft there. That meant you could bypass most occupied islands and put a minimum of troops into the islands you did land on. Almost all the airpower was land-based. Carriers gave you two things--mobility and mass--they could generate a surge of sorties for a few days and then get out of Dodge, but you needed the land-based air to maintain long-term operational superiority. That long-term operational superiority created a blockade no naval force could challenge. And no troops could cross the water unaided. Air dominated the Pacific.

If you don't believe me, note that only the Guadalcanal operation was launched outside the range of land-based air.

The limited war scenario (with Japan treating Hawaii, Alaska, and the lower 48 as off-limits, but always with the option of flipping the bit and going to total war) is very challenging for the Allies.

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: herwin




In the Pacific Theater of Operations, airpower was the military means of defeating the enemy. In particular, a naval base that lacked control of the air was untenable.

Disagree.

1. You can't import the necessary raw materials using aircraft transport planes. You can't maintain the land forces, who after all are ultimately needed to hold terrain, unless you operate SLOCs.

2. Airpower in the Pacific was impossible unless you captured/maintained airfields. For that you needed boots on the ground, and how did those boots capture/maintain the base. Answer by having maritime power.

3. Most of the mobile offensive airpower was provided by carrier airpower. Again, no maritime power, no significant air projection. The PTO was not the ETO. The great distances over water limited the usefulness of air power in comparison to continental combat.

4. Air power by itself did not tactically guarantee a blockade. To say that a naval base would be untenable merely reinforces the point that maintenance of SLOC is the key. The enemy air will not be able to maintain a blockade if it itself could not be logistically maintained.

War is a combined arms operation where all three elements are required. In the PTO Clausewitz's observations apply to the maritime as that was the primus inter pares of the military forces to get the job done taking into account the geopolitical.

Alfred

Hear me out.

There was no key terrain in the theatre--no locations you needed to hold as naval bases, population centres, or for their natural resources. (Most of the island airbases were fragile and easily suppressed.) The only reason you took a landmass was to base aircraft there. That meant you could bypass most occupied islands and put a minimum of troops into the islands you did land on. Almost all the airpower was land-based. Carriers gave you two things--mobility and mass--they could generate a surge of sorties for a few days and then get out of Dodge, but you needed the land-based air to maintain long-term operational superiority. That long-term operational superiority created a blockade no naval force could challenge. And no troops could cross the water unaided. Air dominated the Pacific.

If you don't believe me, note that only the Guadalcanal operation was launched outside the range of land-based air.

Gilberts? Marianas? Leyte? Okinawa? Some may have technically been w/i range of LBA, but certainly not effective range.

ORIGINAL: herwin
In the Pacific Theater of Operations, airpower was the military means of defeating the enemy. In particular, a naval base that lacked control of the air was untenable.

In RL, while airpower was dominant, surface combatants were quite important. They are even more important in AE, where setting up night naval bombardments that are 100% guaranteed to wreck the airfield (unless you run into some snarl that causes your SCTF to loiter in the danger zone) requires only trivial preparations (getting detection on a base to 9/10) and night intercepts within the range of enemy air, with following successful extrication of non-crippled ships, happen regularly. Surface combatants are not as important as carriers, but they are still vital.

What I like about the Pacific theatre is that it requires the optimum use of combined forces. While I will agree with the premise that it was primarily a maritime theatre of war, at no point during the Pacific war could any one of the primary arms of the military (land, sea, air) be ignored with the expectation of victory coming about without its use.