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ORIGINAL: pipewrench

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conscripti ... is_of_1944

Canada's manpower in world war 2 . (excerpts)

In June 1940 the government adopted conscription for home service in the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA), which allowed the government to register men and women and move them into jobs considered necessary for wartime production, but did not allow them to be conscripted for overseas service.
By the late summer of 1944, the numbers of new recruits were insufficient to replace war casualties in Europe, particularly among the infantry.
Few conscripts saw combat in Europe: only 2463 men reached units on the front lines. Out of these, 79 lost their lives.

the conscription crisis of 1944 was more of a political crisis, the manpower problem in 1944 was mostly one of allocation, not an absolute lack of men.

In 1944, the Canadian Army numbered around 550,000. 450,000 were volunteers who had signed up to serve anywhere and 100,000 were draftees who could only serve in Canada.

In June 44, 3 divisions were slated for normandy. Between them, they had around 16-18,000 combat infantrymen. At that time, the Canadian replacement system was a cross between the US and British system. There was a central replacement pool, but an effort was made to allocate replacements to individual regiments and to have the replacements integrated into and trained with the regiment before being thrown into combat. There were around 8-12,000 trained infantry replacements in the pool in june. This was thought to be enough for the whole campaign. This was not the total number of replacements, since there were also replacements for the other branches.

As it turned out, the allied planners were totally off on their infantry casualty projections and the Army had gone through all the infantry replacements by september. This precipated a crisis back home which was fueled by many factors: resentment that draftees were safe back home while volunteers were risking their lives, the endless english-french tensions and media hysteria. This caused the decision to send draftees to Europe.

Meanwhile the Army solved its problem by reallocating personnel: soldiers and replacements in other branches were they were not needed were transferred to the infantry. Since Canada had a democratic volunteer army, the Army first proceeded by asking for volunteers and it turned out there were more than enough to solve the problem. These soldiers then had to be retrained as infantrymen. This process took several weeks/months. However, in the front lines, the infantry shortage was never severe enough to seriously affect the combat units. By the time the draftees showed up in the front lines in 1945, the crisis was already over.

These describe the problems with creating and maintaining the US Army during WWII, and addressing the replacement shortages:

http://www.history.army.mil/books/agf/AGF004/index.htm

http://www.history.army.mil/books/agf/AGF007/index.htm

ORIGINAL: Brad Hunter

These describe the problems with creating and maintaining the US Army during WWII, and addressing the replacement shortages:

http://www.history.army.mil/books/agf/AGF004/index.htm

http://www.history.army.mil/books/agf/AGF007/index.htm

Well, after carefully reading both studies I believe I can summarize the contents as follows

1. There wasn't really a problem
2. Well, there was a problem but we were not given the responsibility we should have had and that's why it happened
3. Except that when we were responsible it really wasn't our fault and we couldn't fix it anyway because everybody else didn't do their jobs
4. There wasn't really a problem, at least on our watch.
5. Next time we will do it better (365 days anyone?)

Overall I get the impression that the replacement process wasn't Rocket Science but the people responsible of creating, implementing and operating the process certainly were not up to the Rocket Science level either.

totally with you Captain,

that is why it was called the zombie draft. Legions from what I hear were not too impressed with certain individuals after the war but that is another story in itself.

ORIGINAL: pompack
Well, after carefully reading both studies I believe I can summarize the contents as follows

1. There wasn't really a problem
2. Well, there was a problem but we were not given the responsibility we should have had and that's why it happened
3. Except that when we were responsible it really wasn't our fault and we couldn't fix it anyway because everybody else didn't do their jobs
4. There wasn't really a problem, at least on our watch.
5. Next time we will do it better (365 days anyone?)

Sounds like a summary of my history thesis...

The issue the Americans had was fixing the number of Divisions they intended to field to 90. That essentially meant that Divisions didn't get rotated out of the line often enough. The Divisions hit initally in the bulge were there resting and absorbing replacements because sufficient units didn't exist to replace them in the line and give them a complete break.

On top of that, the US sent most of the better quality Officers into the Logistics and USAAF. This fit the western european method which saw war as managed rather than just fought, and provided an upside of a logistical effort the Germans could only dream of..

They capped it all off with a replacement system that fed inadequately trained individuals right into battle amongst people and units they had never met before.

In addition, the Army was seemingly gripped by pyschological issues that far exceeded those suffered by the Germans despite the fact the recruitment system screened individuals extensively before admitting them.

That said, they got the job done. War is, ultimately, a results game.

Regards,
ID

US v. UK
I think the USA was clearly better on offense in France after the first few weeks (after the divisions like the 90th and 79th went through their shakedowns) - I think it was largely a consciousness of the manpower problem the Brits had together with their officer corps hangover from the horrific wastage of men on the Western Front of WWI.
But I don't think there is any reason to think the US was the superior on defense at all, at least if you exclude the paratroops.

You're probably familiar with Patton's statement that inferior infantry need more artillery support and American infantry needed lots of artillery.

Speaking of this, I think the US doctrine on artillery was far superior to any of the major powers - the sophistication of the rapid aimed fire techniques - due to the pre-calculation of multiple tapes kept in file cabinets for different situations meant that aimed fire without pre-registration was rapidly possible, which the other countries couldn't match, combined with US time on target techniques. For American artillery, I think a morale of 85 might not be excessive.

Q-ball

The US Army was nothing special tactically; it was all about production and logistics, where the US was unmatched.

I would beg to differ. I think that US arty was something special tactically.

It's always been speculated that one of the main reasons for Market Garden was to make use of the huge airborne resource of highly motivated and trained men and equipment. Having invested so heavily in the concept it had to be used.

Where do you get that information? While the Canadian Army could have used some more Bert Hoffmeisters it performed quite well despite average leadership. The 3rd Can Div was the only Allied division that came close to completing all its D-Day objectives.

You know for a fact that Panzer meyer though very little of the canadians??? Did you speak to him yourself? I have read more than one account where it would seem he a a grudging respect for the Canadians fighting ability. After all, despite numerous attempts he was never able to break the Canadian line and was forced to withdrawl.

ORIGINAL: JocMeister

I´m not very well read on the subject but wasn´t the canadian performace a disaster during most of aftermath of D-Day? Mostly because of very poor leadership?

I know for a fact that atleast Panzer Meyer thought very little of the canadians.

ORIGINAL: J Boomer

Where do you get that information? While the Canadian Army could have used some more Bert Hoffmeisters it performed quite well despite average leadership. The 3rd Can Div was the only Allied division that came close to completing all its D-Day objectives.

You know for a fact that Panzer meyer though very little of the canadians??? Did you speak to him yourself? I have read more than one account where it would seem he a a grudging respect for the Canadians fighting ability. After all, despite numerous attempts he was never able to break the Canadian line and was forced to withdrawl.

ORIGINAL: JocMeister

I´m not very well read on the subject but wasn´t the canadian performace a disaster during most of aftermath of D-Day? Mostly because of very poor leadership?

I know for a fact that atleast Panzer Meyer thought very little of the canadians.

adians??? Did you speak to him yourself? I have read more than one account where it would seem he a a grudging respect for the Canadians fighting ability. After all, despite num

Yah, to summarise Kurt Meyer's views on Canadians expressed in his book "Grenadiers", which I read this year so hopefully can still more or less remember it:

1) Commanders: yah, he thought our leadership was garbage, maybe even worse than Soviet leaders I had the sense, on balance. Consistent failure to exploit obvious opportunities. Didn't understand combined arms warfare. By plodding along, either through lack of ability or aversion to losses, they ended up allowing Meyer to engage at times & places of his choosing, rather than forcing issues where & when he would've been screwed, and caused themselves more trouble, effort & losses by so doing. He mighta thought one guy was OK, forget who, maybe an Armoured Brigade commander, or possibly it was Lt Gen Simonds?

2) Troops: He thought Canadian morale was extremely high. Think he was referring especially to the Infantry. He may have said we weren't quite as wise tactically as his guys but I forget details.

3) Artillery: In particular, he thought our artillery kicked. Fast, accurate, overwhelming. I think the implication is he thought our FOO's (forward artillery observers) were very good & their communications with the guns must've been very good too.

4) Prison Population: he had a very low opinion of our criminals, having been incarcerated alongside the general population (in Halifax?), following conviction in the Canadian Army's only Nuremberg-style show trial, and was greatly relieved when his sentence was commuted & he could finally return to his family.

5) Post-war Canadian Forces: he maintained excellent relations with several Canadian officers, mostly field grade and veterans of the Western Front, throughout and following his imprisonment. Believe he actually volunteered to join the CF (and show us how combined arms warfare was actually _done_), to get out of prison, an interesting offer but this didn't go anywhere.

Panzermeyer was certainly extremely bright, articulate & most capable. I enjoyed the book, which covers his whole wartime career (Poland, France, Balkans, East Front, West Front) & would not hesitate to recommend it to you.

Stoat,

Spot on! I read it just a few weeks before I wrote that on the forum. I also found his book a very good read. Highly recommended!

Stoat

Thanks for the book title I will have to check it out, sounds like a good read. What you say seems to confirm what other sources I have looked at have said. When you take into the consideration of the lack of experience of the western units when compared to the Germans this could be taken as an overall good impression. Not a complete negative one. All the Western allies learned some hard lessons in Normandy.
Despite large numbers of tanks the Canadian Army was dominated by the Infantry which effected the thinking of its Generals. General Hoffmeister was probably the only real manouver warfare type and he was in Italy with 5th Armoured.

Does anyone have a high opinion of criminals? [:)]