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RE: New morale rule has screwed 41.
Posted: Mon May 13, 2013 7:05 pm
by Michael T
Yes, this exactly what I said. I wish they would do it. Why bother with a NM less than 50 with these rules. It non sensical and to defend it is laughable [:D][:D][:D]
RE: New morale rule has screwed 41.
Posted: Mon May 13, 2013 8:11 pm
by rmonical
Why bother with a NM less than 50 with these rules. It non sensical and to defend it is laughable
Axis allies also benefit from these rules. The rapid recovery of Romanian morale after the blizzard surprised me. Especially for units I pulled way back.
I think the special role of 50 is defensible. Using a sports analogy, it is far easier to train a team up to be competitive in intramural sport than it is to be competitive in intercollegiate sport. Considerations include the quality of the manpower pool, the quality of the leadership pool and doctrine.
Right now, if there is a problem, IMHO it is the notion that morale so outweighs experience in the game calculation.
RE: New morale rule has screwed 41.
Posted: Mon May 13, 2013 9:04 pm
by Michael T
Experience has no direct bearing on rout probablity. And it is routs that facilitate breakthru's.
RE: New morale rule has screwed 41.
Posted: Tue May 14, 2013 9:46 am
by swkuh
Michael, is that the way the code has been done, or, is that the way it should be? Think that "experience" is a factor in "routs" in real situations.
RE: New morale rule has screwed 41.
Posted: Tue May 14, 2013 7:01 pm
by Michael T
Units only break due to morale check failure. A lack of experience will increase the chances of losing the battle, which triggers the morale check. So experience matters, but it doesn't make any difference on the morale check itself.
RE: New morale rule has screwed 41.
Posted: Sun May 19, 2013 8:08 am
by Mehring
Didn't trawl through all the above, but has anyone mentioned casualties?
Low morale/experience Russians can attack and win battles but they pay a terrible price, as they should. Up morale and experience and they're winning battles without these losses. This means the same units can attack repeatedly with little or no break. An Russian offensive, then, causing more losses to the Germans than to the Russians, will have an entirely different set of consequences than before.
The attack doctrine becomes a feature with no downside for the Russians. If it was always a substitute for a genuinely seperate Russian attack system that reflects their doctrines and abilities, in the context of high Russian morale, it's no longer viable at all.