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But you skip by the fact that Japan can never be sure where the allies will strike. Your logic would make sense only if combat units could instant travel to where they were needed...

ORIGINAL: Alfred

They could be at 100% TOE with 99% experience and they would still be worthless.

The only reason why Japanese players would take comfort from them is that most Allied players talk about manoeuvre but really fail abjectly to do so.  Instead most Allied players just launch frontal after frontal operations.

Alfred

Lets not get carried away! Anything with 99% exp is pretty good in defense. [;)]

I think you're missing several very obvious uses for these troops, or neglecting to see their importance due to your greater understanding of combat firepower. Im not saying these depot divisions can stand up to late war Allied troops 1 to 1. But behind forts they can offer good sized units at a cheaper than usual price for deployment to islands that simply will not be a waste of units. The Bonins come to mind immediately. Or Hokkaido, which gets very few troops. Recon cannot tell whether there are strong or weak divisions in place in defense, and sigint is not all-seeing, so the Allied player may in fact not invade locations he would try to take were there smaller troops formations there. Or he may try and realize that even 'worthless' divisions can be very useful defending an atoll shock attack after landing in the face of pre-war fort CD gun emplacements.

I think you're more creative than you imply above, and while you might argue Japan could last longer by using it's resources to deploy better troops, the fact is there are just never enough free units or enough PPs to place decent units in all necessary positions. I'd rather have these than a similarly worthless brigade or garrison unit with almost no arty at all.

ORIGINAL: Alfred

Every Japanese combat unit which never fights is useless. Does not matter how well equipped they are.

If a game ends in July 1945, every single Manchukuo Army LCU, was absolutely useless. That is a minimum of 8000 AV rendered absolutely useless.

Alfred

That's just not true. Then again, sweeping and controversial statements on strategy seems to be your thing here.

The Depot divisions fill a gap in the Japanese line-up - the one right between brigade and a full-blown division. They're big enough to make any landing a drawn-out affair when behind forts, and are much more durable than mixed brigades. Even better, they don't have the large TOE of the better Japanese divisions, so losing them is not a complete disater.

They have plenty of worth. Strategically, they're perfect for the bases that can be developed to further an advance, but where enemy invasions may or may not take place. As Obvert said, the Kuriles, the Bonins, and Okinawa are the perfect places for the Depot divisions. The smaller islands in the Marianas and Carolines to a lesser extent.

If I exchange a dozen LCU's in return for the Allies ditching 1943-44 plans to invade somewhere with a great deal of value in the late game such as Okinawa, Formosa or the Kuriles, then those LCU's have been far from useless.

Or have I misunderstood your thinking?

ORIGINAL: obvert

He is certainly tough and precise. He's much more focused on the numbers than I am for sure, and that makes him ideally suited to the Japanese side.

I see your point on having to feed them for the duration starting now. As a Japanese player now, having been through the late war supply dearth I would still take the divisions. It would just mean I would make other sacrifices.

In my game I did make some critical mistakes that also tipped the balance to supply loss hell, but a lot of it was the ultra-organized and thorough destruction plan Jocke set up from the moment B-29s hit the map. He went for EVERY oil and industry point in reach, and got nearly all of them outside the Home Islands, plus a good amount in the large industrial centers of Honshu and Kyushu. To make this stick and have effect it should be your aim to then get a decent base in range of the Home Islands as early as possible to take out that industry as well as hitting the other stuff in the DEI and China as soon as you can.

So the trouble is you've helped him get troops to defend the places you need to take to make the supply drain hurt the most. You can still do it, but you might have to be sneaky. [:)]

I watched Jocke and he did adjust pretty well to the B-29's dilemmas. I urged him to use the other 4Es more aggressively, but he didn't have the same success.

I have used my 1942 4Es as well as I could to hit supply. Chengtu is missing about 85 LI and some HI. As I said Loka has taken Chungking out--Resources are down to 8 points, but to do that he burned out 200 HI and over 100 LI. Once the base falls I want NW China to pull on Shanghai as much as is possible. I've bombed the 'K' bases south of Paoshan. Light damage. When Magwe falls I'll bomb that as soon as I can.

I also still have PBang and the fighting there has been long and violent with a lot of attacks and bombardments. I'm hoping for a good roll there when it goes. He just took Djambi (late IMO) so it's a matter of time. Oil was getting into PBang through one last open hexside.

Overall as soon as a base can take 4Es at even reduced range I'll strat bomb from it. I do Port attacks if there are a lot of ships docked, but endless AF bombing with 4Es I don't do much. I'd rather cut the head off the snake than dodge the venom (supply.)

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: Alfred

Every Japanese combat unit which never fights is useless. Does not matter how well equipped they are.

If a game ends in July 1945, every single Manchukuo Army LCU, was absolutely useless. That is a minimum of 8000 AV rendered absolutely useless.

Alfred

That's just not true. Then again, sweeping and controversial statements on strategy seems to be your thing here.

The Depot divisions fill a gap in the Japanese line-up - the one right between brigade and a full-blown division. They're big enough to make any landing a drawn-out affair when behind forts, and are much more durable than mixed brigades. Even better, they don't have the large TOE of the better Japanese divisions, so losing them is not a complete disater.

They have plenty of worth. Strategically, they're perfect for the bases that can be developed to further an advance, but where enemy invasions may or may not take place. As Obvert said, the Kuriles, the Bonins, and Okinawa are the perfect places for the Depot divisions. The smaller islands in the Marianas and Carolines to a lesser extent.

If I exchange a dozen LCU's in return for the Allies ditching 1943-44 plans to invade somewhere with a great deal of value in the late game such as Okinawa, Formosa or the Kuriles, then those LCU's have been far from useless.

Or have I misunderstood your thinking?

You are describing a poor Allied player.

By 1944 a competent Allied player should have the initiative. The side with the initiative determines the battlefield. Initiative, manoeuvre, materiel, all will make a mockery of a static defence.

As to my so called sweeping statements. Firstly, I always back them up in considerable detail; detail which is rarely matched by other commentators. Secondly, Japanese players who have heeded them have done very well; Allied players who have not heeded them have done poorly.

Alfred

ORIGINAL: obvert

ORIGINAL: Alfred

They could be at 100% TOE with 99% experience and they would still be worthless.

The only reason why Japanese players would take comfort from them is that most Allied players talk about manoeuvre but really fail abjectly to do so.  Instead most Allied players just launch frontal after frontal operations.

Alfred

Lets not get carried away! Anything with 99% exp is pretty good in defense. [;)]

I think you're missing several very obvious uses for these troops, or neglecting to see their importance due to your greater understanding of combat firepower. Im not saying these depot divisions can stand up to late war Allied troops 1 to 1. But behind forts they can offer good sized units at a cheaper than usual price for deployment to islands that simply will not be a waste of units. The Bonins come to mind immediately. Or Hokkaido, which gets very few troops. Recon cannot tell whether there are strong or weak divisions in place in defense, and sigint is not all-seeing, so the Allied player may in fact not invade locations he would try to take were there smaller troops formations there. Or he may try and realize that even 'worthless' divisions can be very useful defending an atoll shock attack after landing in the face of pre-war fort CD gun emplacements.

I think you're more creative than you imply above, and while you might argue Japan could last longer by using it's resources to deploy better troops, the fact is there are just never enough free units or enough PPs to place decent units in all necessary positions. I'd rather have these than a similarly worthless brigade or garrison unit with almost no arty at all.

I am not getting carried away.

Every unit in the game, be it land/sea/air has a cost just doing nothing. To assist one's war effort, the objective is to generate a positive ROI on each unit. Any unit can "do" something but if the ROI is negative, that unit is useless. The ROI of every Manchukuo Army LCU is negative. Every Japanese LCU which spends the war on an atoll and never meets an Allied invasion is generating a negative ROI.

I've previously listed the specific negatives attached to trying to make these depot units useful. They possess very few positive attributes themselves. The negative ROI of these units is minimised if they are left at home. A good Allied player can force a decisive victory without landing on the Home Islands. A good Japanese player can deny an Allied decisive victory without these depot units.

AE reflects the nature of war in the PTO. Too many Allied players forget that the PTO was a naval operation. Bullwinkle is fully cognisant of that and his strategy always reflects that. The nature of naval operations is mobility, mobility, and more mobility. Plonking third rate, underpowered depot units on pieces of rock does zilch for Japanese mobility, although I suppose the men could wave at the 3rd/5th Fleet as it sails past them to a worthwhile target.

Alfred

ORIGINAL: Alfred

I am not getting carried away.

Every unit in the game, be it land/sea/air has a cost just doing nothing. To assist one's war effort, the objective is to generate a positive ROI on each unit. Any unit can "do" something but if the ROI is negative, that unit is useless. The ROI of every Manchukuo Army LCU is negative. Every Japanese LCU which spends the war on an atoll and never meets an Allied invasion is generating a negative ROI.

I've previously listed the specific negatives attached to trying to make these depot units useful. They possess very few positive attributes themselves. The negative ROI of these units is minimised if they are left at home. A good Allied player can force a decisive victory without landing on the Home Islands. A good Japanese player can deny an Allied decisive victory without these depot units.

AE reflects the nature of war in the PTO. Too many Allied players forget that the PTO was a naval operation. Bullwinkle is fully cognisant of that and his strategy always reflects that. The nature of naval operations is mobility, mobility, and more mobility. Plonking third rate, underpowered depot units on pieces of rock does zilch for Japanese mobility, although I suppose the men could wave at the 3rd/5th Fleet as it sails past them to a worthwhile target.

Alfred

So Alfred. What does a good Japanese player do then? Don't keep us all in the dark.

Should he disband every other 'useless' unit that is not 'doing anything?' How does he prepare a defense if all units 'doing nothing' sitting in a defensive position are 'useless?'

Without stacking limits even very experienced, quality Japanese divisions will fold in the face of 4-5k AV of later war Allied troops, bombardments and air power. On an island or a land mass. Good territory is key, fortification is key, and yes flexibility is key to strategically retreat and move troops to slow or stifle Allied moves. The Allied player still has to take something to get in range of the HI to bomb it. All of those inner targets by definition will be static defensive positions. Are you saying it's useless to have a division on Iwo-Jima?

Without providing an alternative strategy to static defense for important island targets I really struggle to see your point. What would you do as a Japanese player with no moveable divisions arriving before 44 if you felt the Marianas and even the Bonins might be threatened by Allied amphibious invasions? What troops would you use and how would you justify placing them there is static defense is by definition 'useless?'

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: obvert

ORIGINAL: Alfred

They could be at 100% TOE with 99% experience and they would still be worthless.

The only reason why Japanese players would take comfort from them is that most Allied players talk about manoeuvre but really fail abjectly to do so.  Instead most Allied players just launch frontal after frontal operations.

Alfred

Lets not get carried away! Anything with 99% exp is pretty good in defense. [;)]

I think you're missing several very obvious uses for these troops, or neglecting to see their importance due to your greater understanding of combat firepower. Im not saying these depot divisions can stand up to late war Allied troops 1 to 1. But behind forts they can offer good sized units at a cheaper than usual price for deployment to islands that simply will not be a waste of units. The Bonins come to mind immediately. Or Hokkaido, which gets very few troops. Recon cannot tell whether there are strong or weak divisions in place in defense, and sigint is not all-seeing, so the Allied player may in fact not invade locations he would try to take were there smaller troops formations there. Or he may try and realize that even 'worthless' divisions can be very useful defending an atoll shock attack after landing in the face of pre-war fort CD gun emplacements.

I think you're more creative than you imply above, and while you might argue Japan could last longer by using it's resources to deploy better troops, the fact is there are just never enough free units or enough PPs to place decent units in all necessary positions. I'd rather have these than a similarly worthless brigade or garrison unit with almost no arty at all.

AE reflects the nature of war in the PTO. Too many Allied players forget that the PTO was a naval operation. Bullwinkle is fully cognisant of that and his strategy always reflects that. The nature of naval operations is mobility, mobility, and more mobility. Plonking third rate, underpowered depot units on pieces of rock does zilch for Japanese mobility, although I suppose the men could wave at the 3rd/5th Fleet as it sails past them to a worthwhile target.

Alfred

Japanese mobility dies in 1943-44 with the arrival of overwhelming Allied reinforcements. Even assuming that the IJN makes a net gain in terms of ships throughout 1941-44(which is unlikely!), it will still be vastly outnumbered, and as the war progresses, outdone in quality as well.

The only real alternative for Japan is to exchange troops and space for time. That's where the depot divisions come in. They deny a big SPS base to the Allies, and make them invade, exposing amphib shipping and warships to Japanese air and sea power.

At the end of the day, Japan has far more infantry divisions that it does capital ships.

What would you do Alfred?

Alfred's comments imply he does not attach any value to deterrence. I think we must be misunderstanding him, because the idea that a unit which never sees combat cannot influence the outcome of the game seems naive to me.

Japanese mobility does not necessarily die in 1943-44.
 
I should be paid a spotters fee for every time I direct people to Cribtop's concluded AAR for an excellent demonstration of how to conduct an active defence.  That AAR has extensive commentary on strategy and tactical implementation.
 
Just like being green isn't easy for Kermit, so playing Japan isn't easy.  But Japanese players do have certain factors which they can use to their benefit.
 
1.  Japan has the interior lines.  Allied players who essentially just adopt a frontal approach on a single axis will not be in a position in 1943-44 to interdict all the Japanese interior LOCs.
 
2.  Controlling production when combined with PDU ON often sees Japanese airpower remaining very competitive in 1943-44.  That can severely infringe upon Allied mobility with the flipside being less pressure on Japanese mobility.
 
3.  Unlike the historical situation, there are several means available to Japanese players to counteract the historical debilitating effects of the Allied blockade.  This means production can be maintained and pressure maintained on the Allied position.
 
 
A key concept to keep in mind is the ROI is referred to in another post in this thread.  Japan would do a lot better if instead of receiving 10 understrength and underpowered depot divisions, it received 10 Base Forces or 10 engineering units.  The later are much easier to get a positive ROI, starting immediately upon their on map arrival.  Logistics; it always comes down to logistics if one wants to conduct an effective war effort.
 
Alfred

ORIGINAL: Amoral

Alfred's comments imply he does not attach any value to deterrence. I think we must be misunderstanding him, because the idea that a unit which never sees combat cannot influence the outcome of the game seems naive to me.

Deterrence has a value. But what people are positing here is not deterrence.

This game is an abstraction. If all that a unit is providing is "deterrence", in a situation where it is guarding a non critical rock which can be overlooked by the Allied player because better alternative targets exist, then you are generating a very low positive return to be offset against the built in negative costs of that unit merely existing on map.

Alfred

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Japanese mobility dies in 1943-44 with the arrival of overwhelming Allied reinforcements. Even assuming that the IJN makes a net gain in terms of ships throughout 1941-44(which is unlikely!), it will still be vastly outnumbered, and as the war progresses, outdone in quality as well.

The only real alternative for Japan is to exchange troops and space for time. That's where the depot divisions come in. They deny a big SPS base to the Allies, and make them invade, exposing amphib shipping and warships to Japanese air and sea power.

At the end of the day, Japan has far more infantry divisions that it does capital ships.

What would you do Alfred?

Have to disagree with most of this.

J. mobility doesn't "die", certainly not in 1943. Just as Allied players sometimes make 1942 Japan twelve feet tall so the same with the Allies in 1943. Things are better; they aren't great yet in numbers or capabilities. Playing the Allies one may have more naval assets, but little to no extra intel of what's going on in that deep blue well behind the front ocean lines. The KB with 8-hex strike is in there somewhere. Very rarely does the Allied player know where beyond a datum 2-3 days old.

Exchanging troops and space for time: this I agree with, but would add ships and planes to the trading pile. Time, time, time. I never get tired of saying that. In a for-VP, auto-vic game it's the most important thing there is. (In a "for the journey" game, it's not.) The Japan player KNOWS exactly, to the day, how long he has to hold out to win. RL Japan didn't. If the game went to the end of 1946 and into 1947 even pretty bad Allied players could wipe every single Japanese unit off the map and take every single Japanese hex. I've done it against the AI in 1946 just to see. Almost no players ever see what the Soviets can do. I've seen.

But the game doesn't go to 1947. So trading is what it's all about. All Alfred is saying is that a core part of the trading dynamic is getting "work"--ROI--from your units. The subject of deterrence has come up in this thread. As an Allied player I am not deterred, not an iota, by the Manchurian garrison. Similarly, in my play style, I am not deterred at all by Japan taking Baker Island, to pick one. Doesn't matter except it makes me a little glad that assets have been expended to take something that I don't care about. The ROI of Baker in a PBEM game with me is negative. I don't care. I don't travel that way.

Denying a big SPS base. Japan can do that, for a time, but will lose any base if the Allies really want it. The issue is there are far too many big SPS bases for Japan to cover, and Allied engineering is too good in the 1944-45 timeframe. You can't squat on enough of them to deny all of them. Particularly true in the PI and DEI, but also in China. Here we come again to Alfred's point about mobility. It IS a naval game, although probably half or more players see it as Airplanes in the Pacific. To some extent GG saw it that way; just look at where he put the detail development hours. But it's a naval game, and I've said many times here that it's a truism, first told to me in my first week at OCS, that navies exist ONLY to influence events ashore. Mobility is key to that. The WWII USN was built for it. Witness the vast investment in mobile infrastructure--the logistic ships, the quick-load amphibs, the tenders, the Seabees. Underway replenishment, the best force multiplier in naval history. And the USMC, an arm of the mobility doctrine. Japan had none of that, or that in pygmy form.

The best Japan can do IMO is pick the best defense points to cover the most possible routes into the core of the Empire. They can't cover all of them, or even most of them. But if they can cover enough of them for enough TIME, they win. If not, mobility wins.

As for what Alfred would do he'll speak to that. But I will posit that whatever it is it would look highly "weird" to most players. And it would work.

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: Amoral

Alfred's comments imply he does not attach any value to deterrence. I think we must be misunderstanding him, because the idea that a unit which never sees combat cannot influence the outcome of the game seems naive to me.

Deterrence has a value. But what people are positing here is not deterrence.

This game is an abstraction. If all that a unit is providing is "deterrence", in a situation where it is guarding a non critical rock which can be overlooked by the Allied player because better alternative targets exist, then you are generating a very low positive return to be offset against the built in negative costs of that unit merely existing on map.

Alfred

How about a critical rock? What cannot be overlooked by the Allied player?

Placing these units in a rear position, which in this particular game the Bull has just shown he is wiling to strike at early (the best part of this move IMHO), frees the better divisions to do just what you describe and players like Cribtop and PzB have shown several times and Greyjoy and Mr Kane more recently. I don't put myself in that category because I'm not that adept with mobile defensive forces, which is one reason I'm really making an effort to understand what you're advocating.

All of the talk about the Manchurian garrison is irrelevant because that is by definition of the game rules a deterrent to the Soviets becoming involved, and therefore that 8k AV is pretty useful (but also quite necessary).

Shouldn't the Japanese always have a garrison on critical islands near the Home Islands, especially against a risk taker like Bullwinkle? Wouldn't these depot divisions make any move to the Bonins, Hokkaido, the Marianas or Sakhalin have to be a big nasty sigint blip instead of a stealthy operation? isn't that worth quite a lot to make sure your best troops can be mobile?

ORIGINAL: obvert

Shouldn't the Japanese always have a garrison on critical islands near the Home Islands, especially against a risk taker like Bullwinkle? Wouldn't these depot divisions make any move to the Bonins, Hokkaido, the Marianas or Sakhalin have to be a big nasty sigint blip instead of a stealthy operation? isn't that worth quite a lot to make sure your best troops can be mobile?

As you get into the center of the onion, yes, garrisons matter. They're core to the "defend enough" process I spoke to above. Garrisoning ones that can straddle a lot of approaches is obvious. But that isn't Baker, or Marcus, or Tulagi.

Look at your own game. Of the bases you mention here and in your previous post--Hokkaido, Bonins, Marianas, Sakhalin, Okinawa, Formosa, Ryukus (did I miss any) had you had these ten depot divs to plunk down on them, would they have stopped Jocke from standing in Korea at the end of the game? He didn't land on any of them except the Marianas and Okinawa. On the former you held him up a lot, due IMO by his lack of commitment to the op at first; at the latter he found a speed-bump. The others he used mobility to go around or ignored. You held half the Aleutians on the last turn. So what? Bad ROI. Had you still possessed all of the supply and fuel you used to take, develop, and hold the Aleutians you would have been better off in 1945 with the really good air force you still had.

Lokasenna can plunk these guys down, after he spends PPs on them and invests ships and fuel to move them. If he put all ten of them on Saipan though, guess where I'm not landing? And he's feeding them today, tomorrow, and next year. Next three years. It cost me about 250 VPs.

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: obvert

Shouldn't the Japanese always have a garrison on critical islands near the Home Islands, especially against a risk taker like Bullwinkle? Wouldn't these depot divisions make any move to the Bonins, Hokkaido, the Marianas or Sakhalin have to be a big nasty sigint blip instead of a stealthy operation? isn't that worth quite a lot to make sure your best troops can be mobile?

As you get into the center of the onion, yes, garrisons matter. They're core to the "defend enough" process I spoke to above. Garrisoning ones that can straddle a lot of approaches is obvious. But that isn't Baker, or Marcus, or Tulagi.

Look at your own game. Of the bases you mention here and in your previous post--Hokkaido, Bonins, Marianas, Sakhalin, Okinawa, Formosa, Ryukus (did I miss any) had you had these ten depot divs to plunk down on them, would they have stopped Jocke from standing in Korea at the end of the game?

The very problem I'm talking about comes from my experience in the game you mention. Due to the ability of the Allies to be mobile with a crapload of units, able to land 5kAV in one base in about a day, these depot divisions would have been priceless! Korea didn't end that game, strat bombing did, so anything earlier that could have slowed Allied progress would have prolonged the game.

1. They would have allowed me to better garrison the Burma and Thai coast, likely preventing the easy capture of Tavoy and the eventual encirclement of the Burma Army. (I could easily have avoided it anyway by taking the Pisanoluke road but simply miscalculated movement). (3 depot divisions)

2. They would have provided welcome reserves for the front lines and likely slowed Jocke at Sarmi, in the Moluccas and on Mindanao. (3 depot divisions)

3. They would have given me a few extra units to bulk up Formosa defenses and released some better divisions to go to Okinawa, slowing the fall of that base dramatically, and thus directly delaying the invasion of Korea. (2 depot divisions)

4. They wold have given me a few more units for the Marianas defenses that could easily have slowed the fall of those bases, thus postponing the strat bombing of the HI industry. (2 depot divisions)

All of these things would have helped prevent a landing in Korea when it happened and they would have also saved me supply by delaying strat bombing in several locations as the progress of the Allies slowed.

ORIGINAL: offenseman

You can prep anywhere and at any time. You gain one prep point per day so 100 days to 100% prep.

Manual, p187, 8.2.1.4 states "number will increase 1 or 2 points per turn".

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: offenseman

What glorious fun! Bravo Moose for giving it a shot- Cadillac plan even. [&o]

Thank you. One more trick up the Moose's sleeve, then we go back to getting our butarkis kicked. Be a few days.

Didn't the Moose always say, "nothing up my sleeve".[:D]

ORIGINAL: rustysi

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: offenseman

What glorious fun! Bravo Moose for giving it a shot- Cadillac plan even. [&o]

Thank you. One more trick up the Moose's sleeve, then we go back to getting our butarkis kicked. Be a few days.

Didn't the Moose always say, "nothing up my sleeve".[:D]

Yeah, then "presto". Ripped up a lot of sleeves in my childhood. [:)]

ORIGINAL: obvert

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: obvert

Shouldn't the Japanese always have a garrison on critical islands near the Home Islands, especially against a risk taker like Bullwinkle? Wouldn't these depot divisions make any move to the Bonins, Hokkaido, the Marianas or Sakhalin have to be a big nasty sigint blip instead of a stealthy operation? isn't that worth quite a lot to make sure your best troops can be mobile?

As you get into the center of the onion, yes, garrisons matter. They're core to the "defend enough" process I spoke to above. Garrisoning ones that can straddle a lot of approaches is obvious. But that isn't Baker, or Marcus, or Tulagi.

Look at your own game. Of the bases you mention here and in your previous post--Hokkaido, Bonins, Marianas, Sakhalin, Okinawa, Formosa, Ryukus (did I miss any) had you had these ten depot divs to plunk down on them, would they have stopped Jocke from standing in Korea at the end of the game?

The very problem I'm talking about comes from my experience in the game you mention. Due to the ability of the Allies to be mobile with a crapload of units, able to land 5kAV in one base in about a day, these depot divisions would have been priceless! Korea didn't end that game, strat bombing did, so anything earlier that could have slowed Allied progress would have prolonged the game.

1. They would have allowed me to better garrison the Burma and Thai coast, likely preventing the easy capture of Tavoy and the eventual encirclement of the Burma Army. (I could easily have avoided it anyway by taking the Pisanoluke road but simply miscalculated movement). (3 depot divisions)

2. They would have provided welcome reserves for the front lines and likely slowed Jocke at Sarmi, in the Moluccas and on Mindanao. (3 depot divisions)

3. They would have given me a few extra units to bulk up Formosa defenses and released some better divisions to go to Okinawa, slowing the fall of that base dramatically, and thus directly delaying the invasion of Korea. (2 depot divisions)

4. They wold have given me a few more units for the Marianas defenses that could easily have slowed the fall of those bases, thus postponing the strat bombing of the HI industry. (2 depot divisions)

All of these things would have helped prevent a landing in Korea when it happened and they would have also saved me supply by delaying strat bombing in several locations as the progress of the Allies slowed.

I don't get your point.

ORIGINAL: rustysi

ORIGINAL: offenseman

You can prep anywhere and at any time. You gain one prep point per day so 100 days to 100% prep.

Manual, p187, 8.2.1.4 states "number will increase 1 or 2 points per turn".

I see 2 pts/day frequently. Not sure what influences this, but it definitely happens. I plan ~65 days to "fully" prep a unit.