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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Tue Jan 06, 2015 5:32 pm
by sprior
ORIGINAL: Apollo11
Hi all,
We all know that "Operation Sea Lion" was "pipe dream"... it was impossible to succeed... but it brought legacy that would heavily influence the Germans 4 years later... D-Day June 6 1944...
What I mean is that Germans tactical / strategic thought regarding possible Allied invasion was heavily influenced with their own "Operation Sea Lion"!
In other words German general plan (which was not at all that bad) was to fortify important harbors (i.e. make them "fortresses" and mine the harbor equipment) and try to defend the rest of open area with what they got plus reinforcements in the rear areas (this was done so much better after Rommel arrived and started to improve everything).
They simply never thought of artificial harbors (i.e. Mullberies) which were key to Allied victory in 1944 (because even in 1944 withheavy Allied supremacy in land / air / sea it took weeks to capture important harbors on French cost and more weeks to render them operational after deliberate destruction by Germans)!
Leo "Apollo11"
It also affected the placement of the beach defences. The German plans for Sealion involved the barges beaching on a falling tide so that they would dry out on the beaches (this also meant they could only be used twice a day and had to sit on the beach all day...). The allies actually landed on a rising tide so that the landing craft could float off and pick up another load almost immediately.
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Tue Jan 06, 2015 5:46 pm
by mind_messing
ORIGINAL: IronDuke
ORIGINAL: mind_messing
Damned forum ate my reply. That's the second time it's happened this week [:@]
Let's find something we can agree on.
1. The German plan was poor, and had several flaws.
2. The requirements for Sea Lion (namely Luftwaffe air superiority) could have been attained.
3. The German plan had only a small chance for success, but it's success was not an impossibility.
Sorry, but it's a fantasy.
I'm sure you would have said the same if I had said that France would only last a month and a half in 1940.
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Tue Jan 06, 2015 7:53 pm
by Apollo11
Hi all,
Although the "Sea Lion" was impossible I often thought that Luftwaffe might have done much much better with different/better leadership - that is some very interesting "What if?"...
Let me explain:
#1
We all know (and every man/woman/child in England knew) that there were just a few factories (with one main) that made Rolls Royce Merlin engines. The Germans didn't know (or didn't care) - this was intelligence blunder of prime magnitude.
#2
We all know (and every man/woman/child in England knew) that there was just a few factories that were making Spitfire and Hurricane fighters. Again the Germans didn't know (or didn't care) - this was another intelligence blunder of prime magnitude.
What Germans could have done is:
a)
Use the Kampfgruppe 100 to be a "pathfinder" striking force and then use all available other bombers to bomb at night the few British Rolls Royce engine factories and few Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft factories!
The Kampfgruppe 100 possessed both "X-Gerät" and "Knickebein" and was accurate to 100m (this was more than enough).
All other Luftwaffe bombers had "Knickebein" for basic navigation and could then use the initial marking attack of Kampfgruppe 100.
The RAF had NOTHING to stop Germans at night!
b)
During day use all other bombers and all fighters to continuously attack all airfields and all radar stations in England in range en masse!
c)
Never ever attack cities (this was totally unnecessary and counterproductive).
Leo "Apollo11"
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Tue Jan 06, 2015 11:37 pm
by wdolson
There are a few problems with this plan. Ford was building a large number of Merlins in a suburb of Manchester, which was out of range of many German bombers.
Additionally, the Germans didn't have the aircraft to do all the things you say here. If their bomber force was used for night bombing and then again for daytime attacks against radar and airfields, the planes would be crashing right and left because the poor pilots were falling asleep at the controls. Attacking airfields and radar stations are both very difficult to keep shut down. British airfields had grass runways which were even easier to repair than just about any other kind of runway and scoring hits on the radar stations proved to be very difficult without smart missiles. When the Germans did attack the British radar stations, they scored little damage and the stations were back online very quickly.
The Germans also didn't really understand the British radar infrastructure nor did they fully grasp the significant advantage it gave them. They did some early battle attacks on the radar stations and then left them alone the rest of the battle. The brass in charge of targeting figured dropping a few bombs on the stations early on would knock them out for the entire battle.
Ultimately the German bomber force was trying to achieve a task that was beyond their capabilities. They didn't have enough planes, the planes didn't have enough payload, their fighter coverage was too short legged, and there were more targets that needed to be knocked out for success in the battle. As the Allies learned in the next few years, factories were a lot tougher to knock out by air than anybody thought before the war. The US and RAF bombing effort definitely put a dent in German production, but ultimately they were able to keep on building equipment despite the raids. In many cases factories were back in production in a week after a major raid.
Bill
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Wed Jan 07, 2015 2:43 am
by warspite1
ORIGINAL: mind_messing
ORIGINAL: IronDuke
ORIGINAL: mind_messing
Damned forum ate my reply. That's the second time it's happened this week [:@]
Let's find something we can agree on.
1. The German plan was poor, and had several flaws.
2. The requirements for Sea Lion (namely Luftwaffe air superiority) could have been attained.
3. The German plan had only a small chance for success, but it's success was not an impossibility.
Sorry, but it's a fantasy.
I'm sure you would have said the same if I had said that France would only last a month and a half in 1940.
Warspite1
Isn't this now splitting hairs?
You yourself have admitted that without air superiority (which, in September 1940, the Germans most definitely did not have) there would be a 1% chance of success. Even with it, you have suggested the chance of a successful outcome increases to just 5%.
For all intents and purposes therefore we are talking "pipe-dream or fantasy".
Unless you are Japan at the end of the war when you are down to sending Yamato on her final mission - and even the Japanese knew it was a one way trip - no commander is going to launch an attack with a 5% chance of success. When does a plan become a pipe-dream? 10%, 1%, 0%? Few people would have thought France would collapse in the timescale she did (although there was 1870) but the German General Staff at least believed victory was possible.
The head of the navy told Hitler in no uncertain terms that the Kriegsmarine could not do what was being asked of it. The Luftwaffe was being bled white. Read the plan of action for how the Barges were to operate once they got to the UK (those that did) and just how long those vessels would need to be at the
beachhead then hooking up with the tugs so they can try and make it back to France. All of this - and the countless reasons given in previous posts - adds up to an impossible mission - hell even Rafe MacCauley couldn't pull this one off.
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Wed Jan 07, 2015 12:38 pm
by Numdydar
I bet Ben could have done it [:D]
[Ducks for cover]
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Wed Jan 07, 2015 5:58 pm
by warspite1
ORIGINAL: Numdydar
I bet Ben could have done it [:D]
[Ducks for cover]
warspite1
Ben who? You mean Rafe.
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Wed Jan 07, 2015 6:55 pm
by rustysi
ORIGINAL: warspite1
ORIGINAL: Numdydar
I bet Ben could have done it [:D]
[Ducks for cover]
warspite1
Ben who? You mean Rafe.
Love it, love it. You guys are always good for a laugh, and on a gloomy day where I could use it.[:D]
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Thu Jan 08, 2015 9:21 am
by Apollo11
Hi all,
ORIGINAL: wdolson
There are a few problems with this plan. Ford was building a large number of Merlins in a suburb of Manchester, which was out of range of many German bombers.
Additionally, the Germans didn't have the aircraft to do all the things you say here. If their bomber force was used for night bombing and then again for daytime attacks against radar and airfields, the planes would be crashing right and left because the poor pilots were falling asleep at the controls. Attacking airfields and radar stations are both very difficult to keep shut down. British airfields had grass runways which were even easier to repair than just about any other kind of runway and scoring hits on the radar stations proved to be very difficult without smart missiles. When the Germans did attack the British radar stations, they scored little damage and the stations were back online very quickly.
The Germans also didn't really understand the British radar infrastructure nor did they fully grasp the significant advantage it gave them. They did some early battle attacks on the radar stations and then left them alone the rest of the battle. The brass in charge of targeting figured dropping a few bombs on the stations early on would knock them out for the entire battle.
Ultimately the German bomber force was trying to achieve a task that was beyond their capabilities. They didn't have enough planes, the planes didn't have enough payload, their fighter coverage was too short legged, and there were more targets that needed to be knocked out for success in the battle. As the Allies learned in the next few years, factories were a lot tougher to knock out by air than anybody thought before the war. The US and RAF bombing effort definitely put a dent in German production, but ultimately they were able to keep on building equipment despite the raids. In many cases factories were back in production in a week after a major raid.
Bill
Bill, German medium bombers (He-111 and Ju-88A) had sufficient range to bomb almost all UK without any issues (they bombed Northern Ireland for example) so the Manchester was no problem at all (and it was heavily bomber during "Blitz")!
The "Kampfgruppe 100" was operational and very very capable.
All german bombers were trained for night bombing and had adequate equipemnet.
The concentrated night attacks against few selected aircraft / airframe factories would, therefore, be no problem at all!!!
Also the daily raids would be done by fighters (which would, of course, not be involved in night operations) and remaining bombers (i.e. not used for bombing raids so no overusing existing force at all). The attacks should be done the way Allies attacked German airfields in 1944 (i.e. patrolling over the bases and waiting for the opportunity to strike when enemy is landing / taking off - the attacks on grassy meadows serving as landing strips was 100% inefficient and useless.
This is, IMHO, quite feasible and achievable possible usage of German air strength (Germans had the strength - they lacked strategic vision and proper tactical usage of force)!
Leo "Apollo11"
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Thu Jan 08, 2015 11:07 am
by warspite1
ORIGINAL: Apollo11
Hi all,
ORIGINAL: wdolson
There are a few problems with this plan. Ford was building a large number of Merlins in a suburb of Manchester, which was out of range of many German bombers.
Additionally, the Germans didn't have the aircraft to do all the things you say here. If their bomber force was used for night bombing and then again for daytime attacks against radar and airfields, the planes would be crashing right and left because the poor pilots were falling asleep at the controls. Attacking airfields and radar stations are both very difficult to keep shut down. British airfields had grass runways which were even easier to repair than just about any other kind of runway and scoring hits on the radar stations proved to be very difficult without smart missiles. When the Germans did attack the British radar stations, they scored little damage and the stations were back online very quickly.
The Germans also didn't really understand the British radar infrastructure nor did they fully grasp the significant advantage it gave them. They did some early battle attacks on the radar stations and then left them alone the rest of the battle. The brass in charge of targeting figured dropping a few bombs on the stations early on would knock them out for the entire battle.
Ultimately the German bomber force was trying to achieve a task that was beyond their capabilities. They didn't have enough planes, the planes didn't have enough payload, their fighter coverage was too short legged, and there were more targets that needed to be knocked out for success in the battle. As the Allies learned in the next few years, factories were a lot tougher to knock out by air than anybody thought before the war. The US and RAF bombing effort definitely put a dent in German production, but ultimately they were able to keep on building equipment despite the raids. In many cases factories were back in production in a week after a major raid.
Bill
Bill, German medium bombers (He-111 and Ju-88A) had sufficient range to bomb almost all UK without any issues (they bombed Northern Ireland for example) so the Manchester was no problem at all (and it was heavily bomber during "Blitz")!
The "Kampfgruppe 100" was operational and very very capable.
All german bombers were trained for night bombing and had adequate equipemnet.
The concentrated night attacks against few selected aircraft / airframe factories would, therefore, be no problem at all!!!
Also the daily raids would be done by fighters (which would, of course, not be involved in night operations) and remaining bombers (i.e. not used for bombing raids so no overusing existing force at all). The attacks should be done the way Allies attacked German airfields in 1944 (i.e. patrolling over the bases and waiting for the opportunity to strike when enemy is landing / taking off - the attacks on grassy meadows serving as landing strips was 100% inefficient and useless.
This is, IMHO, quite feasible and achievable possible usage of German air strength (Germans had the strength - they lacked strategic vision and proper tactical usage of force)!
Leo "Apollo11"
warspite1
Leo I think the concept is sound but how successful any attack would be is the big doubt here.
The Germans did get wise to attacking the British aircraft industry in September – after wasting two months through a lack of strategic vision and tactical nous as you identify.
The problems were:
1. As the Allies found, the ability to stop production (or at least slow down production) temporarily was possible – it was keeping it that way that was the issue and Lord Beaverbrook simply ordered dispersal of production to satellite factories. The Germans would need to not only find those factories but keep hitting them.
2. As I mentioned in a previous post another major advantage the British held over the Germans was in the repairing of damaged aircraft and their engines. Quite simply the Germans never got to grips with this aspect. The Civilian Repair Organisation was headed by Beaverbrook (who replaced the ineffectual Lord Nuffield). A unit – No.50 Maintenance Unit - was responsible for getting damaged aircraft to the appropriate places (based on 6 categories of damage) and from there the workshops went to work. As an example, in the last two weeks of June 1940 no less than 250 aircraft were repaired and returned either to front-line squadrons or to training units*. In relation to the number of aircraft being built and involved in the battle this is a significant number. What it also meant though was that when production was temporarily suspended or slowed down – as when the Germans finally started hitting the factories - there were always plenty of “spares” at the Maintenance Units to ensure that the loss was minimised.
*Wikipedia states almost 5,000 aircraft (no doubt not all fighters) were repaired and put back into service by the end of December 1940. Based on the 250 number for two weeks in June alone, that does not sound out of line and is a very significant number of aircraft.
Plus of course, there is always the possibility that the British do things differently too! How about Dowding was listened to and an effective method of night-fighting was developed two months earlier [:)]
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Thu Jan 08, 2015 12:25 pm
by Apollo11
Hi all,
BTW, Robert, my favourite book about WWII "Battle of Briatin" is:
Fighter: The True Story of the Battle of Britain
by Len Deighton
[:)]
http://www.amazon.com/Fighter-True-Stor ... 0785812083
Leo "Apollo11"
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Thu Jan 08, 2015 12:43 pm
by Mundy
I never got to that book, though it's sitting on my shelf.
Blood, Tears and Folly has been a long time favorite of mine, with several re-readings.
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Thu Jan 08, 2015 1:09 pm
by warspite1
warspite1
I read this many, many years ago - I should re-read this but there are sooo many great books out there I am loathe to re-read when there are a lot waiting for reading first time around...[:(]
It's strange as I am a "Navy man" but I have found the few books I have read about the air war to be incredibly interesting and great reads, namely:
The Battle of Britain - James Holland
The Most Dangerous Enemy - Stephen Bungay
The Air War 1939-1945 - Richard Overy
The Hardest Day - Alfred Price
Fighter - Len Deighton
I would recommend any of these [:)]
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Thu Jan 08, 2015 6:38 pm
by Orm
ORIGINAL: warspite1
ORIGINAL: Numdydar
I bet Ben could have done it [:D]
[Ducks for cover]
warspite1
Ben who? You mean Rafe.
No, no. It is obviously that he referred to Ben-Hur. He was, after all, a important member of a fleet that could do it better than the German fleet could.
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Thu Jan 08, 2015 6:53 pm
by warspite1
ORIGINAL: Orm
ORIGINAL: warspite1
ORIGINAL: Numdydar
I bet Ben could have done it [:D]
[Ducks for cover]
warspite1
Ben who? You mean Rafe.
No, no. It is obviously that he referred to Ben-Hur. He was, after all, a important member of a fleet that could do it better than the German fleet could.
Warspite1
[:)]
I'll tell you what mate - those barges look a damn sight more sea worthy than the ones the Germans were proposing to use - faster too [:D]
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Thu Jan 08, 2015 7:27 pm
by Orm
ORIGINAL: warspite1
ORIGINAL: Orm
ORIGINAL: warspite1
warspite1
Ben who? You mean Rafe.
No, no. It is obviously that he referred to Ben-Hur. He was, after all, a important member of a fleet that could do it better than the German fleet could.
Warspite1
[:)]
I'll tell you what mate - those barges look a damn sight more sea worthy than the ones the Germans were proposing to use - faster too [:D]
Yep. Better than those barges so I am rather pleased with it. [8D]
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Thu Jan 08, 2015 7:30 pm
by Orm
ORIGINAL: warspite1
warspite1
I read this many, many years ago - I should re-read this but there are sooo many great books out there I am loathe to re-read when there are a lot waiting for reading first time around...[:(]
It's strange as I am a "Navy man" but I have found the few books I have read about the air war to be incredibly interesting and great reads, namely:
The Battle of Britain - James Holland
The Most Dangerous Enemy - Stephen Bungay
The Air War 1939-1945 - Richard Overy
The Hardest Day - Alfred Price
Fighter - Len Deighton
I would recommend any of these [:)]
Thank you for the suggestions. [:)]
I added a couple of them to my "to buy" list.
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Thu Jan 08, 2015 7:36 pm
by warspite1
ORIGINAL: Orm
ORIGINAL: warspite1
warspite1
I read this many, many years ago - I should re-read this but there are sooo many great books out there I am loathe to re-read when there are a lot waiting for reading first time around...[:(]
It's strange as I am a "Navy man" but I have found the few books I have read about the air war to be incredibly interesting and great reads, namely:
The Battle of Britain - James Holland
The Most Dangerous Enemy - Stephen Bungay
The Air War 1939-1945 - Richard Overy
The Hardest Day - Alfred Price
Fighter - Len Deighton
I would recommend any of these [:)]
Thank you for the suggestions. [:)]
I added a couple of them to my "to buy" list.
Warspite1
You're welcome - I'd put The Most Dangerous Enemy at the top of that list personally.
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Thu Jan 08, 2015 10:32 pm
by wdolson
ORIGINAL: Apollo11
Hi all,
Bill, German medium bombers (He-111 and Ju-88A) had sufficient range to bomb almost all UK without any issues (they bombed Northern Ireland for example) so the Manchester was no problem at all (and it was heavily bomber during "Blitz")!
The "Kampfgruppe 100" was operational and very very capable.
All german bombers were trained for night bombing and had adequate equipemnet.
The concentrated night attacks against few selected aircraft / airframe factories would, therefore, be no problem at all!!!
Also the daily raids would be done by fighters (which would, of course, not be involved in night operations) and remaining bombers (i.e. not used for bombing raids so no overusing existing force at all). The attacks should be done the way Allies attacked German airfields in 1944 (i.e. patrolling over the bases and waiting for the opportunity to strike when enemy is landing / taking off - the attacks on grassy meadows serving as landing strips was 100% inefficient and useless.
This is, IMHO, quite feasible and achievable possible usage of German air strength (Germans had the strength - they lacked strategic vision and proper tactical usage of force)!
Leo "Apollo11"
RAF Bomber Command found that night bombing was terribly inaccurate. They gave up trying to hit individual buildings at night fairly early in the bombing campaign and switched to area bombing entire cities. By 1944, Bomber Command was the best at night bombing of any air force in history to that date, and they still couldn't hit individual buildings at night. That technology wasn't really perfected until the 1980s.
I just don't see how the Germans could have had any hope of hitting a factory building in Manchester at night in 1940 when night bombing was still in its infancy when RAF Bomber Command would be hard pressed to do it 4 years later with vast advancements in technology.
German fighters didn't have the loiter time to patrol over British airfields and wait for opportunities. Even Mustangs rarely loiter over German airfields waiting for planes to take off and land. If fighters were loitering over airfields, planes landing would usually be diverted to other fields, planes on the ground wouldn't take off, and fighters from somewhere else would be vectored in to deal with the loitering fighters.
The only place where I've read Allied fighters did loiter were over the Me-262 fields. The Me-262 couldn't be diverted to many other fields and the goal was to keep them on the ground even if it did tie down a lot of Allied fighters to achieve that.
American fighters were cut loose to sweep targets of opportunity returning from escort missions and many times they would sweep over a German airfield while planes were taking off or landing and scored some easy kills.
The German bomber force at the Battle of Britain was much smaller than what the Allies had even by mid-1943, bomber payloads were on average smaller than later war Allied bombers, their fighters had shorter range than the P-47, night bombing was in its infancy and all the predictions of accuracy from all the experts was way over what was achievable by the end of the war, and their bomber force had to serve as both tactical and strategic bombers.
I don't see where what you propose was even remotely possible for the Germans in 1940. I may be missing something, but the US Strategic Bombing Survey, done just after the war, lays out pretty clearly what was and wasn't achievable by Allied bombers with 1945 capability. Even daylight bombers were found sorely lacking in accuracy. Night bombers were lucky to just be able to hit the right city.
Bill
RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940
Posted: Fri Jan 09, 2015 5:14 am
by Apollo11
Hi all,
ORIGINAL: wdolson
RAF Bomber Command found that night bombing was terribly inaccurate. They gave up trying to hit individual buildings at night fairly early in the bombing campaign and switched to area bombing entire cities. By 1944, Bomber Command was the best at night bombing of any air force in history to that date, and they still couldn't hit individual buildings at night. That technology wasn't really perfected until the 1980s.
I just don't see how the Germans could have had any hope of hitting a factory building in Manchester at night in 1940 when night bombing was still in its infancy when RAF Bomber Command would be hard pressed to do it 4 years later with vast advancements in technology.
German fighters didn't have the loiter time to patrol over British airfields and wait for opportunities. Even Mustangs rarely loiter over German airfields waiting for planes to take off and land. If fighters were loitering over airfields, planes landing would usually be diverted to other fields, planes on the ground wouldn't take off, and fighters from somewhere else would be vectored in to deal with the loitering fighters.
The only place where I've read Allied fighters did loiter were over the Me-262 fields. The Me-262 couldn't be diverted to many other fields and the goal was to keep them on the ground even if it did tie down a lot of Allied fighters to achieve that.
American fighters were cut loose to sweep targets of opportunity returning from escort missions and many times they would sweep over a German airfield while planes were taking off or landing and scored some easy kills.
The German bomber force at the Battle of Britain was much smaller than what the Allies had even by mid-1943, bomber payloads were on average smaller than later war Allied bombers, their fighters had shorter range than the P-47, night bombing was in its infancy and all the predictions of accuracy from all the experts was way over what was achievable by the end of the war, and their bomber force had to serve as both tactical and strategic bombers.
I don't see where what you propose was even remotely possible for the Germans in 1940. I may be missing something, but the US Strategic Bombing Survey, done just after the war, lays out pretty clearly what was and wasn't achievable by Allied bombers with 1945 capability. Even daylight bombers were found sorely lacking in accuracy. Night bombers were lucky to just be able to hit the right city.
All you are saying is 100% correct But - but (there is always but [;)]) it is about RAF and not Luftwaffe...
Here is interesting infor abour RAF bombing capability:
Len Deighton
Blood, tears and Folly
ISBN: 0785811141
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/de ... 65-1301546
#1
In 1941 (June and July) there was big inquiry about RAF Bomber Command capabilities at night.
During that time all 100 different RAF Bomber Command night raids were examined (using mission debriefs and 633 post attack reconnaissance photos) by D.M. Butt of cabinet secretariat.
He reported that:
"Of the two-thirds of crews who claimed to have hit the targets only one-third had come within 5 miles of the aiming point. Against the Ruhr targets this proportion fell to one-tenth. Moonlight was indispensable to the crews of Bomber Command - two crews in five came within 5 miles of their targets on full moon night while this ratio fell to one in fifteen on moonless one."
#2
Also on 9 July 1941 the deputy chief of Air Staff reported about inability of RAF crews to find their targets unless there is full moon:
"For approximately three quarters of each month it is only possible to obtain satisfactory results by heavy, concentrated and continuous attacks on large working-class and industrial areas in carefully selected towns."
This is all because the RAF, at the time, still depended on star navigation (and moon light)!
The Luftwaffe had (yep even in 1940) some excellent electronic devices which RAF didn't have for years (but when they finally got it later in the war - for example the "Oboe" and H2S radar - it was, of course, far superior to German 1940 technology):
a) All German bombers had this and all crews were trained to use it
"Knickebein"
b) KG100 had this one:
"X-Gerät"
Leo "Apollo11"