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The USN refined refueling at sea during the late thirties. By 1941, they had finalized the techniques of alongside refueling at sea, but did not have sufficient fleet tankers (or the fleet train) to fully operate at operational distances from a port. All US BBs/CBs and CVs were equipped (or refitted) from 1939 on to provide alongside replenishment to escorts. This was not a common procedure till '44-'45. An interesting production alternative would be to convert extant "Esso/Cimarron" fleet tankers into "Sangamon" CVEs and merge the Kaiser CVEs with the fleet oilers to produce the "Commencement Bay" class CVEs. Both classes retained their fleet oiler capabilities, while operating more aircraft then the "Bogues" or "Casablancas".
The Japanese had also developed at sea replenishment, even designing and building fleet replenishment ships. The lack of sufficient fleet oilers, however, led to the use of tankers, which limited the refueling to over the stern techniques at slow speed and transfer rates. Eventually the loss of oilers and tankers forced the Japanese to base their main forces near the source, limiting their strategic and operational freedom.
Would not surprised if the "acts of desperation by madmen" did succeed. To many years of studying military history tell me it just sometimes happens. But the problem, like one Confederate regimental commander said on the third day of Gettysburg is"not getting there, but staying there". Everything I've read says that the Japanese just cannot sustain a garrison in Hawaii at what it would cost them. Of course, conventional wisdom says the same thing about a Japanese occupation of Midway.
As the elder Moltke supposedly said "Amateurs talk tactics, while professionals talk logistics"

Actually untill the creation of 3d/5th Fleet and its immense carrier strike aviation, the accepted doctrine was not to assault an enemy island/position outside your own land-based air cover, so your in good company with "Dugout Doug". The only caveat to this before 1944 would be the Kido Butai at full strength against a land target between Dec 41 and May 42 or if the US pulled together the Lexington, Saratoga, Yorktown, Enterprise, Wasp and Hornet into a single strike force early in the war when the IJNAF LBA was too dispersed to concentrate against them.

Originally posted by Mogami
Hi, For myself (only) I would not embark on any operation not dedicated to securing the SRA before such operations were in their final stages.

However. I bet right here and now. Some bright lad/lass in their very first PBEM game of WITP sends the units starting in the Home Islands straight for PH. The Japanese do have tankers and Oilers that on day one can begin sucking all the available fuel for use in this operation. What they use else where is not the issue.
I'll run concurrent tests. One for the No US DOW the other for the immediate assault on PH. I hope both fail. (because then I would have to conclude everyone on ether side in WW2 in the Pacific was wrong/blind/incompentant.

I recognize every Japanese player seeks to invent a war plan that can win the war.
However I don't think such plans are "attack as far as possible as soon as possible"
In my own planning I limit targets to those I have LBA cover. (meaning I have to capture and built a worthless Island before moving on to the important island. I'd never send a transport TF into area solely owned by enemy air. And I am not likely to send a TF into any area not under my control after the first month of the war.

There is always the suicide landing at Seattle.
far far away, no chance of reinforcement
no aircover
but you will get surprise

Actually, in Dec 41, you could probably put a IJN SLF or IJA RCT like the 144th through Puget Sound with freighters flying neutral flags or some such ruse de guerre and take and hold some part of Seattle (LA or SF or SD). The coastal defenses were still too strong for anything besides a major landing force (on the scale of Okinawa), but some ninja tactics could get you ashore and in position. You're right in that the US reaction would overwhelm the brave warriors from Nippon (eventually), but what a shock to the US public and it might have forced the retention of forces for continental defense better utilized elsewhere. But strategically, it would have been a pimple on a boil.

Originally posted by Mogami

Does it matter if PI or Malaya or NEI require a few extra weeks to secure if PH is captured?

In a word YES, If the historical reinforcment shedule is correclty modeled. A few extra weeks might have made all the difference in the world in the SRA. A few weeks means the Brit 18th Div has time to actually do something other than surrender. It means that the vetran 6th and 7th Australian Divs reach the NEIs. It means that the vetran Brit 7th Arm. Bgd. reaches Singapore. It means that TF Patch ( including 2 inf Regts, 1 combat eng. Regt, 1 med. Tank Bn., 3 arty Bns.) reaches Java. There were over 200 P-40 fighters in the pipeline to NEI of which only 36 actually made it in time. Some 80 B-17 and B-24s made it to Java historically, given another month that number would have more than doubled. In addition the Eastern Fleet arrives with 2 CVs, the Warspite and the 4 Rs BBs. Historically insignificant, but with the bulk of the IJN diddleing around PH who knows?

Agree that the military position of the Brits and Dutch would be better. The US forces would probably, however, have gone on to the Philippines, since the IJN would be to busy elsewhere to make an effective blockade. And with the costs of sustaining the Hawaii occupation force, the Japanese would have less resources to attack SEA and NEI, unless they reduce their forces in China and Manchuria to (them) unacceptable levels. Actually, another strategic rumination, the Japanese were terribly short sighted at the geopolitical level. As Napoleon once said, focus on the main effort, once that's resolved, the subsidiary matters will resolve themselves. The focal point of resistence to Japanese policy in China was the US and the USSR. When the Japanese attacked the US to resolve the "China Issue", they needed to put every available resource into the fight, yet throughout the war, massive ground and significant air forces were committed to holding and extending Japanese occupied areas in China. A more rational strategy would have been to withdraw to the coast and north and encourage the Communists and Kuominting to get on with their civil war. If the war with the US is resolved in Japan's favor in the Pacific, then China will fall back into Japan's grasp. If Japan loses its war with the US, what happens in China won't matter anymore. Yet the IJA and by extension the Japanese government could never get past their myoptic vision of victory in China through occupying more ground.

Seems to me that enough disruption would (have been)/be done with a smaller force that rampages around Oahu even for a short time before surrendering or being wiped out.

...been a while since I posted ... Good thread, all.

Originally posted by LTCMTS
Agree that the military position of the Brits and Dutch would be better. The US forces would probably, however, have gone on to the Philippines, since the IJN would be to busy elsewhere to make an effective blockade. And with the costs of sustaining the Hawaii occupation force, the Japanese would have less resources to attack SEA and NEI, unless they reduce their forces in China and Manchuria to (them) unacceptable levels.

Agreed, many of the fighters would have gone to the PI but due to the vulnerability of Clark the bombers would probably be based in the NEI with Delmonte Mindanao, acting as an advance stageing base. Regardless any major effort directed at Hawaii should if the game is modeled correctly, put the conquest of the SRA in jeopardy. A Japanese player choosing such a gambit, stands a good chance of losing the war before it begins. For what? A remote outpost that they can not possibley keep garrisoned or supplied.

Originally posted by Mogami

I'll run concurrent tests. One for the No US DOW the other for the immediate assault on PH. I hope both fail. (because then I would have to conclude everyone on ether side in WW2 in the Pacific was wrong/blind/incompentant.

Not everyone Mogami, Adm. Nagano Chief Staff Imperial Navy and his faction, along with many on the IJA Staff, argued unsuccessfully for the by-pass US strategy. They were pretty much overuled by a clique of younger hothead/reactionary officers of the combined fleet staff. Who after nearly 40years of preparing for a war against the US simply could not comprehend anything else.

I do agree with you, and hope that the PH assault fails because if the IJA can secure both Hawaii and the SRA simuataneously at the start, then something is seriously wrong with the game.

Hi, After much study. I have came to the following conclusions.

There is no reason to avoid war with US from start. Nothing is gained for Japan. While the PH strike did not and will not yield decisive results it is better then nothing. (In game terms it scores several hundred victory points. The Japanese will never again have the opportunity to bomb so many ships in such favorable conditions.)

The South Pacific operation is STILL possible. Admittedly with smaller forces. But this also cuts down the logistical support needed there.

The Japanese rather then ignoring the US should seek to speed up operations against them. Guam/Wake can be had on Dec 7th. PI can be captured in less time then historic. The ultimate goal should be securing all the actual historic targets in less time. (I think I can knock off at least a month)

I need U2 or Snigbert to run allied side. It's just not possible to plan if I run both sides. (I don't like to become too familiar with the side I am not going to play. I don't want to plan operations as Japan knowing a potential target is or is not going to be defended in advance.

As Japan the mission is not only to occupy the bases and destroy as much allied material as possible. The Japanese have to win the battles without loss. Every ship, aircraft, and man are important.

I've divided the target area into 3 'layers' layer 1 sees Japanese landings on Dec 7th. layer one target bases will also be the ones that provide air cover/support for layer 2 targets. In the Philippines the object is only to secure the large airfields and Manila rapidly. It does not matter so much if US/PI forces remain as long as they are not blocking supply/support for layer (or phase) 2.

15th Army is not impacted by ignoring or attacking USA.
25th Army is not impacted by ignoring or attacking USA
16th Army is not impacted by ignoring or attacking USA

only 14th Army is impacted. But by delaying the attack what ever HQ is assigned the mission will have a more difficult time then 14th Army will experience if it goes on Dec 7th.

The South Pacific operation can be pushed forward with units from Southern Area Army and 1 of the divisions in the Home Islands at start. (21st is the one I am considering at present)

15th Army can go light at start (it is still 3 divisions counting the IG transfered from 25th) It's ultimate target is Rangoon and it should be able to reach there before enemy can move anything to prevent.

25th Army. Can still have 3 divisions landing on Dec 7th. 38th Division (16th Army)
moves and captures Hong Kong by Dec 9th. Transports after landing 14th Army 48th Div on PI move to Hong Kong and pick up 38th Div and transport to Khota Bharu. (replacing IG div still ahead of time IG div could have marched to 25th army)

16th Army still attacks Kendari and Balikpapan.

I don't see any reduction in securing SRA while at same time knocking out PI and Central Pacific bases. (This also allows rapid movement through Gilberts toward Canton Island. ) The SRA area does not require a large IJN commitment after the enemy forces at Singapore/Manila/Java accounted for. These forces have to commit to battle or flight early. (before Japanese LBA moves south).

What again were the benifits of ignoring USA on Dec 7th?

I cannot see how any force commitment to the PI above historical levels does not affect other operations. An Allied player with better sense than McArthur showed at the start of the Japanese invasion of the PI should be able to delay capture of the airfields somewhat, but should be able to deny the Japanese use (not occupation, Manilla was useless without Bataan/Corregidor cleared) even longer than the US/PA did historical, at least till Jun/Jul 42 with the additional supplies and his PA divisions unshredded by the fight at the beaches and the long retreat to Bataan. In fact, historically, this would have put the US/PA in position to launch a counteroffensive when Homma is left with only 65th Bde and 16th Div, with army troops in support after the withdrawl of 48th Div and over half the air assets for ops in NEI.
By by-passing the PI and securing the SEA and NEI first, this would release a larger force for the invasion and occupation of the PI later, with better positions to prevent the use of the Solomons as a stepping stone back to the PI, limiting the US to the Central Pacific route..
After checking my references, I see Southern Army w/21st Div and a bde, 14th Army (16th, 48th Div, 65th Bde), 15th Army (33d, 55th Div), 16th Army (2d Div) and 25th Army (IG, 5th, 18th and 56th Div, 1 Bde). These were the assets released from IGHQ for the Southern ops along with the SS Det (144th RCT). The other forces were committed to other theaters. Are you executing a non-historical OOB?
Of course, you're probably right, in that if Homma realizes he doesn't have the forces to execute his mission in the PI, then once SEA and NEI are secured, those forces can be released for duty in the PI, except what forces can be released from pursuing the Brits through Burma and garrisoning the SRA. The PI just falls much later, perhaps as late as Aug 42.

Of course, if the game gets produced and there's a scenario editor than I can quit wasting your time and work the alternate scenarios myself. As it is I'm killing time till HArpoon4 and Duke Nukem show up (ha.ha!!)

Originally posted by LTCMTS
Of course, if the game gets produced and there's a scenario editor than I can quit wasting your time and work the alternate scenarios myself. As it is I'm killing time till HArpoon4 and Duke Nukem show up (ha.ha!!)

As I understand it there is a scenario editor planned for the game. I don't know if it's going to do everything the one with the Alpha does but if so you could set the Nimitz off Pearl Harbor on Dec 6th and wait!

Originally posted by Mogami

What again were the benifits of ignoring USA on Dec 7th?

How about avoiding a un-winnable war with the world's most powerful nation for starters.

However since this possibility will not be modeled in the game, then how about a secured NEI by January vs. historical March. How about a secured SWPAC in March vs. a historical never. How about that for everyday the US is not in the war, the more time youhave to prepare your defense perimeter. How about the capture of Ceylon, sealing off the Indian ocean. How about invading Banglegesh, depriving China from even the "Hump" air supply line.

Now, what again were the benifits of NOT ignoring the USA on Dec.7? In particular what exactly was historically gained by the PH attack?

Originally posted by TIMJOT
How about avoiding a un-winnable war with the world's most powerful nation for starters.

However since this possibility will not be modeled in the game, then how about a secured NEI by January vs. historical March. How about a secured SWPAC in March vs. a historical never. How about that for everyday the US is not in the war, the more time youhave to prepare your defense perimeter. How about the capture of Ceylon, sealing off the Indian ocean. How about invading Banglegesh, depriving China from even the "Hump" air supply line.

Now, what again were the benifits of NOT ignoring the USA on Dec.7? In particular what exactly was historically gained by the PH attack?

TIME...

Originally posted by Tanaka
TIME...

If you mean in respect to the PH attack I totally disagree. The sinking and damaging of those BBs contributed zilch in buying time. Rainbow 5 bought more time for the Japanese than PH. Rainbow 5 stipulated that in event of war the USN was to hold a defensive paremeter around the Eastern Pacific, on the line Alutians, Midway, Johnston, Samoa (roughly the Intl.Dateline). Then conduct nusance raids in the Japanese mandates. Under no circumstances was the USN to go on the offensive until which time the war in Europe was settled.

Now what happened after PH? The USN held a defensive paremeter in the eastern Pacific and within weeks were conducting Raids in the Mandates. Within a few months the USN was going beyond what Rainbow 5 perscibed by raiding the SWPAC and even Japan itself.

Now what about the PH losses? Well by Feburary 42 the USN had all but made up those losses in the Pacific, with 7 BBs ready for action. Including the Colorado, Maryland, Missassippi, Idaho, New Mexico, Tennassee, and Pennsylvania. Of those the Colorado, Maryland, and the 3 New Mexicos were superior to any of the BBs lost at PH except temporarily the West Virginia. If it wasnt for Rainbow 5 the BB Washington could also have been available. Thats 8 BBs against 6 true BBs. The Washington was superior to the Nagato's, the Colorado's were equal to the Nagotos. the New Mexico's were superior to the Hyuga's, the Arizona and Tennassee were superior to the Fuso's and they all were superior to the Kongos in every way except speed.

So I ask again, what exactly did the IJN gain by attacking PH?

Originally posted by TIMJOT
If you mean in respect to the PH attack I totally disagree. The sinking and damaging of those BBs contributed zilch in buying time. Rainbow 5 bought more time for the Japanese than PH. Rainbow 5 stipulated that in event of war the USN was to hold a defensive paremeter around the Eastern Pacific, on the line Alutians, Midway, Johnston, Samoa (roughly the Intl.Dateline). Then conduct nusance raids in the Japanese mandates. Under no circumstances was the USN to go on the offensive until which time the war in Europe was settled.

Now what happened after PH? The USN held a defensive paremeter in the eastern Pacific and within weeks were conducting Raids in the Mandates. Within a few months the USN was going beyond what Rainbow 5 perscibed by raiding the SWPAC and even Japan itself.

Now what about the PH losses? Well by Feburary 42 the USN had all but made up those losses in the Pacific, with 7 BBs ready for action. Including the Colorado, Maryland, Missassippi, Idaho, New Mexico, Tennassee, and Pennsylvania. Of those the Colorado, Maryland, and the 3 New Mexicos were superior to any of the BBs lost at PH except temporarily the West Virginia. If it wasnt for Rainbow 5 the BB Washington could also have been available. Thats 8 BBs against 6 true BBs. The Washington was superior to the Nagato's, the Colorado's were equal to the Nagotos. the New Mexico's were superior to the Hyuga's, the Arizona and Tennassee were superior to the Fuso's and they all were superior to the Kongos in every way except speed.

So I ask again, what exactly did the IJN gain by attacking PH?

I would say time also.

PH was more than simple BB strikes. It also had a profound psych
affect.

Quick question, do you know how GG figured the soft attack values for land weapons? I've compiled all the possible US and Japanese CD,static AA, mobile AA, infantry guns, mountain and pack artillery, ligh and medium, heavy and siege artillery, anti-tank weapons and tank/self-propelled guns for 1933-1945 but that's one value I haven't figured out yet.

Originally posted by Chiteng
I would say time also.

PH was more than simple BB strikes. It also had a profound psych
affect.

Time for what ? Give me a for instance. Yes it had a profound psych affect. An extremely positive and motivating one for the American people.

More pysch shock than losing a good part of the PacFleet at sea in Kimmel's projected ambush, or in a Battleline raid into the Mandates?