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Von Rom, I'm not using Porch as a 'referee', all I'm doing is pointing out that Patton is controversial figure who invokes passionate debate. If you don't want to read/see/hear opinions which question Patton's reputation as a 'great' general that is entirely your right but it doesn't make for reasoned debate.

Many German units that fought in the Battle of the Bulge included some of the very best troops Germany had to offer.

Don't try and patronise me sonny, I'm well aware of what troops fought in Wacht Am Rhein. The 6th SS Panzerarmee, which was made up of the best troops with the best equipment, fought in the north. Manteuffels 5th Panzerarmee took the south. 7th Army were intended to secure the southern shoulder which was where Patton attacked. 7th army had only four divisions and were badly stretched in attempting to perform the task expected of them even without Pattons strike towards Bastogne. The 3rd Army did not encounter the best of the Wehrmacht here as they didn't throughout the campaign in Western Europe. Patton's reputation is largely built on his accomplishments in fighting second-rate Italian or German formations. He was never tested against the best and neither was he ever placed in a position whereby he had to stage a 'fighting retreat', the true test of a commander.

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

Von Rom, I'm not using Porch as a 'referee', all I'm doing is pointing out that Patton is controversial figure who invokes passionate debate. If you don't want to read/see/hear opinions which question Patton's reputation as a 'great' general that is entirely your right but it doesn't make for reasoned debate.

The last thing I want to read when finding out about someone, is to read a book that only throws praise on that person. On the other hand, if I dislike a person, I also don't want to read a book that obviously throws vindictive on the person. In other words, I search for fairly balanced books that detail not only the good and bad about a person or an event, but is fair-minded about it. I am looking for even-handed treatment that presents all the evidence.

Here is more of Porch's "insightful" understanding of Patton:

"Despite his World War II reputation as the U.S. Army's primary practitioner of armored warfare à la Rommel, Patton was in fact an eleventh-hour convert to tanks, preaching right up to the 1939 fall of Poland the virtues of the horse and the benefits of arming cavalrymen with a straight saber of his own design."

Not only is Porch in gross error in these statements, but even if Porch had done even a light reading into Patton's background, he would have clearly seen that Patton formed the US's first Tank Corps, commanded it, and wrote all the tactical and training manuals for it long before WW2.

His erroneous comments above indicate to me that he not only has failed to even do the slightest background study into Patton, but his writing contains all of the misconceptions that people, who have not read about Patton, contain.

I have read a lot about Patton. And after reading some of Porch's work on that webiste, I realize, reading him is a complete waste of time. It is a waste of time not only because his writing contains numerous errors, but he has also indicated very blatantly his crude approach to dealing with Patton.

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

Many German units that fought in the Battle of the Bulge included some of the very best troops Germany had to offer.

Don't try and patronise me sonny, I'm well aware of what troops fought in Wacht Am Rhein. The 6th SS Panzerarmee, which was made up of the best troops with the best equipment, fought in the north. Manteuffels 5th Panzerarmee took the south. 7th Army were intended to secure the southern shoulder which was where Patton attacked. 7th army had only four divisions and were badly stretched in attempting to perform the task expected of them even without Pattons strike towards Bastogne. The 3rd Army did not encounter the best of the Wehrmacht here as they didn't throughout the campaign in Western Europe. Patton's reputation is largely built on his accomplishments in fighting second-rate Italian or German formations. He was never tested against the best and neither was he ever placed in a position whereby he had to stage a 'fighting retreat', the true test of a commander.

You calling me sonny?

That truly is a compliment. . .

Heheh

Here again, is the battle history of the 352nd VolksGrenadier Division:

Contrary to your assertion, the German 352nd VolksGrenadier Division was NOT made up of old men or poor elements of the "Home Guard". It was in fact comprised of veteran infantry soldiers who were drawn from a variety of other infantry divisons.

Here is the battle history of this unit:

The 352nd VGD was first created in December, 1940 as the 352nd Infantry Division.

Originally known as the 352 Infantry Division, it suffered heavy losses in Russia, and was reorganized in November, 1943 at St Lô by including the 321st , 389th and 356th Infantry Divisions into it.

This newly reorganized division was again strongly reduced further during D-Day and more specifically during the battles of July, 1944.

In September, it was recreated in Germany by incorporating into it the survivors of the 581st Infantry Division.

It then became known as the 352nd VGD. But it comprised veteran infantry soldiers from various other infantry units.

After a training period on the western front, it participated in the Battle of the Bulge under Erich Otto Schmidt's command, fighting along side of the German veteran 5th Parachute Division.


I am always amazed how Patton's accomplishments rankle some people to no end. . .

Heheh

He is attacked on the basis of his character and/or because he supposedly faced poor opposition. . .

Heheh

No matter how much Patton is maligned; no matter how much the facts are distorted and twisted; no matter how much he is wrongly attacked; his critics simply can't undo what he accomplished. . .

heheh

Have a nice day [:)]

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames
He was never tested against the best and neither was he ever placed in a position whereby he had to stage a 'fighting retreat', the true test of a commander.

Heheh

Patton didn't believe in retreating; only attacking.

The true test of a commander is in winning battles - not retreating - something Patton did in spades. He never lost a campaign.

Are you suggesting that German surprise attacks upon poor Poland, neutral Belgium, little Norway, France, and the poorly-led rabble of Soviet troops during the opening phase of Barbarossa, was facing the Allies' best? It is interesting that once the Allies re-covered their balance, Germany was then on the defense and retreating . . .

Note how the appearance of the veteran Soviet Siberian troops pushed the Germans back before the gates of Moscow in late 1941/early 1942.

Cheers!

Von Rom,
I think your strategy is to post as much as you can in order to prevent people from arguing back [;)], I haven't got the time to take each post apart, however, I'll have to challenge some of it because I think you are way off. I should have more time rtomorrow [:)]. I'd like to respond as I was annoyed by the quote

Some of it is complete and utter nonsense. . .

So I am taking the time to post more information and views on Patton and Third Army for the more thoughtful reader.

You never seem to challenge anything I say or debate any of the issues I raise, merely post more details on the same thing. You're yet to tell me where my description of PAtton's actions are wrong, we just get more Pro-Patton opinions given as if they are some even handed and balanced opinion.

What disappointed me were your criticisms of Porch as unbalanced., only days after quoting extensively from the George S Patton fansite. With respect, I think you are guilty as we are of everything you criticise us for. We all seek works to justify our arguments, you included.

I also think some of your research is very faulty (with respect). Your remarks about the 352nd VG in particular seem to be trying to suggest it was a good combat formation.

The 352nd VGD was created at first under various names in December, 1940.

Originally known as the 352 Infantry Division, it suffered heavy losses in Russia, and was reorganized in November, 1943 at St Lô by including the 321st , 389th and 356th Infantry Divisions into it.

This newly reorganized division was again strongly reduced further during D-Day and more specifically during the battles of July, 1944.

In September, it was recreated in Germany by incorporating into it the survivors of the 581st Infantry Division.

A few problems here. The 352 that fought in Normandy was so badly mauled it's survivors were absorbed by the 2nd Panzer in august. The division was essentially destroyed. The rebuilt 352 was actually the renumbered 581 (as you mention) but there would have been few if any of the 352 Combat veterans from Normandy in the ranks. You call the 581 an infantry division, but it was in fact a Volksgrenadier division of the 32nd wave. Therefore, the 352nd was a Volksgrenadier division like any other, and not anything above that mediocre standard. Your comment:

It then became known as the 352nd VGD. But it comprised veteran infantry soldiers from various other infantry units.

is nonsense. Not only were the division's personnel largely drawn from the forming Volksgrenadiers of 581, but a large number of surplus naval and luftwaffe personnel were drafted in to make it up to the eventual strength of 13000. This division was the complete opposite of the one you describe.

After a training period on the western front,

Which would have been very short since the division did not begin to form until 21 September, and fought in the Eiffel before getting involved in the Bulge.

The best account of the Bulge probably remains MacDonald's account (he is a US Army historian). In his OOB at the end of the book he describes the 352 as "Poorly trained and lacked experienced officers."

This division was made up of ex sailors and airplane ground crew together with the usual VG fare of men previously considered too old or unfit for combat together with teenagers. It had few combat veterans, and when formed would have had only a few weeks to train and prepare for what was to come. To suggest Patton met combat veterans when he ran into them is nonsense.

Regards,
IronDuke

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

'Duke, were you getting tired when you wrote this or was it me not being clear[&:]. Either way, we agree[:)]

Top generals, like top politicians, are rarely blessed with the gift of humility. The 'drive' required to get to the top of the greasy pole tends to negate such qualities. Rather thsn admit to errors they prefer to blame others (Sosabowski at Arnhem) or retrospectively twist facts (Caen, as you mention above) - I only choose these examples as Montgomery is immediate in my mind. Wellington is one of the few in history who made it to the top of both greasy poles yet emerged with his dignity and reputation relatively untarnished by unnecessary self-mythologysing (can you say that? did I spell it correctly? [:D]). One of the reasons I like Slim is that his account of the campaign in India and Burma (Defeat Into Victory - a fine book!) is refreshingly honest with him being candid regarding his own shortcomings and the mistakes he made.

I was tired, It's a war of attrition against a thousand dodgy websites, and I need all the Allies I can get, so my apologies [:)]. Interesting remarks about Slim, I have his autobiography but haven't got around to reading it, yet. I will bear your recommendation in mind.
Regards,
IronDuke

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Von Rom,
I think your strategy is to post as much as you can in order to prevent people from arguing back [;)], I haven't got the time to take each post apart, however, I'll have to challenge some of it because I think you are way off. I should have more time rtomorrow [:)].

Regards,
IronDuke

My strategy??? [&:]

With all due respect, that is a blatantly false accusation.

There is so much misinformation and basically incorrect information in this thread, that I balanced it out with info about Patton and Third Army. This information is for the interested reader.

As I stated at the beginning of my post, I have posted information that roughly corresponds to the known facts surrounding many incidents about Patton. Many historians agree with these assessments.

I have used the information from "The Unknown Patton" because based on my extensive reading about Patton, most of the info is essentially correct. This just saves me a great deal of typing.

As to the 352 VGD:

GuitarJames made it appear that this division was made up of old men and home guard units.

I have clearly shown that when it fought in the Bulge, it was made of veteran soldiers from several other disbanded infantry divisions. It was then given time to train together as a unit.

It also fought beside the veteran German 5th Parachute Division.

These were only two of several units Third Army engaged.

I have no doubt that when it surrendered it was a beaten and demoralized unit, as most fighting units would be, which had fought in the freezing cold and then had to surrender.

How is any of this incorrect?? [8|][&:]

Besides, no one (not the Germans or Allies) expected Patton to be able to attack from the south, since Third Army was heavily engaged fighting the German First Army.

Any army is vulnerable on its flanks. The Germans were at the Bulge, just as the Allies were in France in 1940, and Soviet troops were in 1941 Russia.

The miracle is the Patton was able to disengage Third Army from fighting, and while he had to protect himself from the German First Army, he turned Third Army 90 degrees north in freezing winter weather, and attacked the Germans in the flanks, surprising them.

Everyone, including all Allied Commanders, and most historians, as well as many top German officers, considered what Patton did was brilliant.

General Omar N. Bradley, who had no love for Patton, called his actions in the Bulge "one of the most astonishing feats of generalship of our campaign in the west".

It appears that only you, IronDuke, consider what Patton did was not very good. I guess you must be privy to information and insight that no other high level Allied or German officer or reputable historian has had access to. [&:]

Besides, the American troops that the Germans attacked in the Ardennes were themselves green and resting. So by your estimation, of what value was the German victory over them? Plus, many troops in Patton's Third Army were themselves relatively inexperienced when they attacked north into the German flanks.

Frankly, I just can't see what it is you are trying to argue or prove. . .[&:]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Besides, no one (not the Germans or Allies) expected Patton to be able to attack from the south, since Third Army was heavily engaged fighting the German First Army.

The miracle is the Patton was able to disengage Third Army from fighting, and while he had to protect himself from the German First Army, he turned Third Army 90 degrees north in freezing winter weather, and attacked the Germans in the flanks, surprising them.

'Heavily engaged' doing what exactly? Since the First Army was not on the offensive then we must assume that it was the US Third Army which was itself attacking. Therefore Patton switched his axis of offensive through ninety degrees, a clever move but not in itself dangerous to his position.

More Praises for General Patton:

1) HASSO VON MANTEUFFEL (1897 - 1978) - von Manteuffel became the Commander-in-Chief of 5th Panzer Army and received the rank of General of the Panzer Troops. In December of 1944, Hasso Von Manteuffel was the commander of 5th Panzer Army, which was ordered to drive across the Meuse to Brussels and Antwerp, protecting the flank of 6th Panzer Army. During the Battle of the Bulge, 5th Panzer Army won tremendous victories and almost succeeded in breaking the Allied lines of defence. On December 16, 1970 Manteuffel praised his old adversary, Gen. George S. Patton. In part: "...General Patton was a master of lightning warfare and the best commander in this reference. Evidence of his excellent command and control of an army are the campaign in Sicily, the break-out in Brittany 1944 and during the Battle of the Bulge Dec. 1944..."

2) In his book Crusade in Europe, Eisenhower praises Patton’s mobility in Sicily: "Speed requires training, fitness, confidence, morale, suitable transport, and skillful leadership. Patton employed these tactics relentlessly, and thus not only minimized casualties but shook the whole Italian Government so forcibly that Mussolini toppled from his position in late July."

3) Also in a letter to Marshall, Eisenhower praised Patton’s "native shrewdness about logistics…and as a truly aggressive commander with brains."

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Besides, no one (not the Germans or Allies) expected Patton to be able to attack from the south, since Third Army was heavily engaged fighting the German First Army.

The miracle is the Patton was able to disengage Third Army from fighting, and while he had to protect himself from the German First Army, he turned Third Army 90 degrees north in freezing winter weather, and attacked the Germans in the flanks, surprising them.

'Heavily engaged' doing what exactly? Since the First Army was not on the offensive then we must assume that it was the US Third Army which was itself attacking. Therefore Patton switched his axis of offensive through ninety degrees, a clever move but not in itself dangerous to his position.

Not dangerous to Third Army's position?? [&:]

Please consult any reputable historian, Allied Leader or German General for the answer to this highly questionable statement.

It seems you are truly grasping at straws. . . Still trying to find a hole in the dike?[8|]

[

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames
He was never tested against the best and neither was he ever placed in a position whereby he had to stage a 'fighting retreat', the true test of a commander.

Heheh

Patton didn't believe in retreating; only attacking.

The true test of a commander is in winning battles - not retreating - something Patton did in spades. He never lost a campaign.

Cheers!

It's a reflection of Patton's one dimensional view of warfare and something that was shared by Hitler incidentally. The true master commander knows when to retreat (the old doggeral 'he who fights and runs away lives to fight another day'[:)]), to conserve his forces. He/She sees the battle being fought as part of a greater strategic whole and is aware that 'retreat' does not necessarily equal 'defeat'. The British retreated from Dunkirk in 1940 and returned to France in 1944 to defeat Nazi Germany in concert with their Allies. Thankfully they didn't have a 'Patton' commanding the BEF, otherwise they'd all have been speaking German [:-]

I'm really beginning to despair. Your unquestioning acceptance of material favourable to your cause makes debate difficult. This piece is so strewn with historical errors large and small (not just in interpretation but in fact) that it would require hours to put right. Are you saying this was actually written by a historian? How can you say most historians accept this nonsense?

On June 6th, 1944, the Allied Forces launched "Overlord". The invasion of Normandy. This force, consisting of the First Army (American) and the Second Army (British) was commanded by General Montgomery.

On August 1st, 1944, D-Day+55, Patton's Third Army became officially operational.

Between July 5th, when Third Army had actually landed on French soil, and July 31, Third Army had advanced inland to the town of Avranches. The advance was a total of about 50 miles in 26 days.

In a comparison, Montgomery and his Second British Army had, since D-Day, advanced to the town of Caen, about 10 miles inland. A total of ten miles in 55 days. Montgomery's explanation for his slowness was that he was "re-grouping" in order to pivot at Caen and attack the Germans in force. . .

This is the sort of stuff which gives history a bad name. Montgomery launched several separate Corp sized offensives to take Caen (Charnwood, Epsom, Goodwood) etc. They had also launched these offensives into the teeth of just about every Panzer Division deployed by the Germans into Normandy, including the SS formations that were generally perceived to be the best they had.

To compare the drive on and eventually past Caen to the attacks by Patton's third army is nonsense. One was against the best the Germans had, the other was through a hole made by 1st US Army into an area largely only defended now by German MPs and the kitchen units. How can you compare these offensives without seeing the context? Raw statisticss mean nothing unless understood and assessed in context.

By August 11, D-Day+66, Patton and his Third Army had broken completely out of the Cherbourg peninsula. He had advanced south, west, east, and north. Third Army had ripped a hole through the German Seventh Army and had roared "hell for leather" through the towns of Avranches, Mortain, Fougeres, Vitre, Mayenne, and Laval. They had made a sharp 90 degree turn at Le Mans and attacked north to the town of Alecon. They had gone a total of 200 miles in 10 days. . . .

This is palpably untrue. 3rd Army did not rip a hole in German 7th Army, the hole was already there. This makes it sound as if Patton fought some sort of breakout battle. Also look at the map. Once through the german front line Patton turned west into Brittany in the complete opposite direction to where the Falaise pocket and the German Field Army in Normandy was. How can you hold this up as some sort of Strategic brilliance????? You also seem obsessed (both in Sicily and Normandy and France) with how many miles Patton covered. It seems to escape you that if there is no one standing in front of you, only the maximum speed of your vehicles and the size of your petrol tanks limits how far you can advance and how quickly. I appeal to you, tell me where in any of these advances, Patton did any serious fighting? Name any battles fought along the way that we can discuss, please don't keep on quoting Patton fanboys who make their points by lifting his actions out of context. Lets talk specifics.

By August 15th, D-Day+70, Third Army units (the Second French Armored Division and the 90th American Infantry Division) had reached Argentan, a town about 12 miles from Falaise. Canadian troops under Montgomery had reached the outskirts of Falaise. August 17th, D-Day+72, saw Patton's 90th Division and Second French Division joined by the 80th Infantry Division at Argentan. Montgomery's Second Army was still about 10 miles from Falaise.

At this point, there was a gap of 12 miles between Falaise to Argentan through which the German Seventh Army was escaping. Patton and his Third Army had moved 250 miles in 17 days. They had completely encircled the German Seventh Army, and were now ready to advance directly to Falaise. Blocking their escape and destroying them would be like shooting fish in a barrel. . . .

Third Army was poised and ready for one of the swiftest, greatest victories in all of history. Closing the gap between the two towns was a matter of hours. The 15th Corps had the tanks and troops necessary to put up a solid wall of men and armor. The Germans were completely confused and running for their lives. Then, the order arrived from SHAEF. HALT!

Who on earth writes this? Firstly, we've already seen the quotes in this thread from Bradley's autobiography stating that he rang Patton and told him to stop. Bradley did not belong to SHAEF. SHAEF was Eisenhower's HQ. Tactical command of the ground units in Normandy rested with 21st Army Group (commanded by Montgomery) although in practice, since Bradley had activated 3rd Army, handed over command to Hodges of 1st Army, and assumed command of US 12th Army Group, he was largely free to do what he liked as Montgomery at this stage did not feel able to control the US forces that now matched his own in size. Bradley was not independent, but he was no longer Monty's strict subordinate. It was 12th Army Group that gave Patton's third army the order. A proper historian should know this, so why such the basic error???

Secondly, 90th Infantry division had number of problems during the Normandy campaign. It was not one of the better performing divisions, certainly at that stage. It is not true to say it would have been like shooting fish in a barrel. Bradley realised that the units would have been attacked persistently by German forces looking to break through. The list of units who would have attempted it reads like a who's who of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS in 1944. Bradley knew the units in and around Falaise were being bombarded by artillery and from the air. Most German casualties were not caused by Allied ground units, but by air and artillery. They were already fish in the barrel, and Bradley felt (rightly or wrongly) giving them Americans to shoot back at was not wise in the circumstances.

Patton and his Third Army were ordered NOT to seize Falaise.

What the Germans were powerless to do, SHAEF did for them.

More of this SHAEF business. What does this say about this researcher's abilities?

There were later two explanations given for the order to stop Patton. First, SHAEF claimed that the British had "heavily sewn the Falaise area with time bombs." Secondly, Bradley claimed that he not only feared a head on collision of the British and Americans, he also was worried that the fleeing Germans might "trample" the Third Army in it's rush to escape.

The first claim was an outright lie to cover political chicanery.

The second claim by Bradley made no sense at all. They were noises made by a subordinate to obfuscate and condone an error by his superiors. Had the proper order been issued, the British could have held their position and there would have been no possibility of a "collision" of British and American forces.

Regarding Bradley's anxiety about Third Army being "trampled", it is incredible and difficult to imagine two Infantry Divisions and an Armored Division being "trampled" by a thoroughly routed enemy. Evidently, the thought never occurred to Bradley that the enemy might consider surrendering.

The real reason behind the halting of Third Army was Montgomery. He insisted, or rather, demanded that he be allowed to close the gap. He did not want Patton to spring the trap that Third Army had set. Monty wanted the glory and the credit for the "ripe plum" situation which was created by Patton's brilliant leadership and Third Army's speed and daring execution. He received neither. He did not close the gap in time, and he allowed a great number of Germans to live to fight another day.

This is paranoid fantasy. The author has at least now decided that Bradley played a part in this, not just SHAEF. The evidence overwhelmingly shows (as Hastings in "Overlord" and D'Este in "Decision in Normandy" clearly demonstrate to all but those who refuse to see) that Bradley alone decided that Haislip's Corp should halt at Argentan and not close the gap. Bradley himself stated this, that the decision to halt was his and his alone. As I have stated, the 90th Infantry was not the best formation in the US OOB, and the Germans in the pocket were thought to number tens of thousands. Some American units had already fought fierce breakout batles with the Germans, and Bradley feared the division would be mauled. Eisenhower concurred with the decision. Once ordered to halt, Patton actually requested permission to send one of his Corps off towards the Seine (the so called long hook) in an attempt to seize bridgeheads, and cut off further German forces. PAtton (and his fans) may have seen the gap as an attempt for glory, but Bradley was more concerned with lives. The German army was being destroyed as it stumbled out of the gap. Why put American lives on the line when Artillery and air strikes were already doing the job.

Montgomery failed to reach Falaise until the 19th of August, D-Day+74. During that time, with Patton halted at Argentan, the great bulk of the German Army managed to escape through the 12 mile gap. What would have been one of the great and memorable victories of all time was lost due to one of SHAEF's oleaginous political schemes.

After this major blunder had been accomplished and became part of history, Patton wrote in his diary, "The 15th Corps could have easily entered the town of Falaise and completely closed the gap to Argentan. This halt was a great mistake as I was certain that we could have entered Falaise and I was not certain that the British would. As a matter of fact, we had reconnaissance parties near the town when we were ordered to pull back." Patton was correct, yet his advice went unheeded.

If the great bulk of the German Army were trapped in the pocket, how could one average American Corp have held it up? D'Este and Hastings both thought that on the basis of the information available, Bradley was right to give the halt order. Only those ignorant of military reality (and upset that George wasn't allowed to win the war on his own) would assume that having gotten there (which was never the issue), Patton would have been able to stay there. As it was, out of 6 panzer divisions, less than a hundred tanks escaped. The germans were all but destroyed. A great victory was won.

I'm presuming this stuff comes from Rohmer's Patton's Gap? D'Este had this to say about the book.

"He used an extract from de Pogue's notes of the Williams interview, which, by his own admission, he obtained over the telephone, as a basis for drawing a sweeping and highly innaccurate conclusion that Montgomery bore sole responsibility for failing to close the Falaise gap."

Hmmmm.....?

Furthermore, it seems Rohmer was largely driven by a dislike for Montgomery and that coupled with poor research created this fantasy which no other serious historian (contrary to your own sweeping statements) takes seriously.

Regards,
IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Besides, no one (not the Germans or Allies) expected Patton to be able to attack from the south, since Third Army was heavily engaged fighting the German First Army.

The miracle is the Patton was able to disengage Third Army from fighting, and while he had to protect himself from the German First Army, he turned Third Army 90 degrees north in freezing winter weather, and attacked the Germans in the flanks, surprising them.

'Heavily engaged' doing what exactly? Since the First Army was not on the offensive then we must assume that it was the US Third Army which was itself attacking. Therefore Patton switched his axis of offensive through ninety degrees, a clever move but not in itself dangerous to his position.

Not dangerous to Third Army's position?? [&:]

Please consult any reputable historian, Allied Leader or German General for the answer to this highly questionable statement.

It seems you are truly grasping at straws. . . [8|]

Nope, you've already said that the best of the German troops were engaged in the 'Bulge' offensive. In any case, Patton didn't attack with his whole army, he merely 'refused' the front facing east, switching the rest of his army to attack northwards.

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames
He was never tested against the best and neither was he ever placed in a position whereby he had to stage a 'fighting retreat', the true test of a commander.

Heheh

Patton didn't believe in retreating; only attacking.

The true test of a commander is in winning battles - not retreating - something Patton did in spades. He never lost a campaign.

Cheers!

It's a reflection of Patton's one dimensional view of warfare and something that was shared by Hitler incidentally. The true master commander knows when to retreat (the old doggeral 'he who fights and runs away lives to fight another day'[:)]), to conserve his forces. He/She sees the battle being fought as part of a greater strategic whole and is aware that 'retreat' does not necessarily equal 'defeat'. The British retreated from Dunkirk in 1940 and returned to France in 1944 to defeat Nazi Germany in concert with their Allies. Thankfully they didn't have a 'Patton' commanding the BEF, otherwise they'd all have been speaking German [:-]

Heheh

Patton would never have been caught as the Allies were in 1940 - now that is a brilliant commander.

He anticipated many of the German moves BEFORE they happened, especially in the Bugle. . .

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Von Rom,
I think your strategy is to post as much as you can in order to prevent people from arguing back [;)], I haven't got the time to take each post apart, however, I'll have to challenge some of it because I think you are way off. I should have more time rtomorrow [:)].

Regards,
IronDuke

My strategy??? [&:]

With all due respect, that is a blatantly false accusation.

There is so much misinformation and basically incorrect information in this thread, that I balanced it out with info about Patton and Third Army. This information is for the interested reader.

As I stated at the beginning of my post, I have posted information that roughly corresponds to the known facts surrounding many incidents about Patton. Many historians agree with these assessments.

I have used the information from "The Unknown Patton" because based on my extensive reading about Patton, most of the info is essentially correct. This just saves me a great deal of typing.

As to the 352 VGD:

GuitarJames made it appear that this division was made up of old men and home guard units.

I have clearly shown that when it fought in the Bulge, it was made of veteran soldiers from several other disbanded infantry divisions. It was then given time to train together as a unit.

It also fought beside the veteran German 5th Parachute Division.

These were only two of several units Third Army engaged.

I have no doubt that when it surrendered it was a beaten and demoralized unit, as most fighting units would be, which had fought in the freezing cold and then had to surrender.

How is any of this incorrect?? [8|][&:]

Do you actually read anything that I write? You say time and time again that "most historians" agree with you. I then quote historians who don't. Which historians agree with you? Don't just say "they" agree, quote their conclusions that match yours. Just because you say something time and again, doesn't make it true. You have to prove it, something you seem unwilling to do. So far, you've cited the George S Patton website (really unbiased source) and possibly Rohmer, who D'este (a historian you've praised) severly criticised for poor method and innaccurate conclusions in "Patton's gap". How can you credit these sources? Don't tell us historians agree with you, name them so we can assess their credentials. Read my posts, I cram them with quotes and references from historians, please do the same.

Also,

I have clearly shown that when it fought in the Bulge, it was made of veteran soldiers from several other disbanded infantry divisions. It was then given time to train together as a unit.

This is the most astonishing statement. You didn't demonstrate it, please requote (to make me look stupid) where you proved it. You merely stated it. and have again repeated it. At no point have you proved it. Saying something is so doesn't make it true. My description of the 352 was based on works by Nafziger, Mitcham and MacDonald, all recognised historians with good reputations. PLEASE, PLEASE, PLEASE tell us where you got this information from that was not available to these men? Their works will require updating.

Regards,
IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Heheh

Patton would never have been caught as the Allies were in 1940 - now that is a brilliant commander.

He anticipated many of the German moves BEFORE they happened, especially in the Bugle. . .

Oh I give up! I had hoped that this would be a discussion based on facts, instead I'm faced with this subjective nonsense. Bye, bye Matrix.

IronDuke:

Your way of writing and arguing is very frustrating.

What you are arguing is inconsequential.

You simply cannot see the forest for the trees [8|]

I used that site for an overview of facts related to the Falaise Gap.

What is IMPORTANT is the failure to close the Falaise Gap. Can't you SEE that?

Patton was ORDERED NOT to close the Gap. Can't you grasp this bit of information?

Slight errors in who reported to who, or if a few dates are off, really doesn't matter. Can't you grasp the BIGGER picture?

Patton was ordered to stop and NOT close the Falasie Gap. By not closing the Gap, 75,000 German soldiers escaped.

Patton, in his own diaries, written at the time, also says so, as well as many historians.

Again, you write a great deal, but you do not deal with central issues!

It's like wanting to use bricks to build a house, but instead you focus on hammering a few nails into a board.. . .

YOU say Patton could not have closed the Gap.

But patton and others felt otherwise.


As to the 352 VGD:

Who cares?

What is the point of going on and on about the 352nd GVD?

Many troops in Patton's Third Army were inexperienced. So what?

He caught the German's napping and hit them in an exposed flank.

Can't you see the bigger picture of what EVERYONE ELSE can see in what Patton accomplished at the Bulge??

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Heheh

Patton would never have been caught as the Allies were in 1940 - now that is a brilliant commander.

He anticipated many of the German moves BEFORE they happened, especially in the Bugle. . .

Oh I give up! I had hoped that this would be a discussion based on facts, instead I'm faced with this subjective nonsense. Bye, bye Matrix.

Heheh

Facts?

That is all I have provided in this thread.

Sorry to see you go. . .