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ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

No they hadn't. Force Z (Prince of Wales and Resolution) was British, and it merrily sailed out into Jap air superiority without air cover. Quickly sunk.

We have the historically expressed concerns about the effects of German air power...but never mind that.

We have the forces that had been set aside to intercept the invasion consisting solely of destroyers and light cruisers...but never mind that.

We have the explicit refusal of the Admiralty to risk its capital ships unless the German capital ships appeared (which, being damaged, they weren't going to do)...but never mind that.

Bob says the entire Royal Navy will sortie in broad daylight, sail down to within Stuka range, and let itself be sunk.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

You're speculating about all sort of things beyond that. That the invasion will be detected in advance, for one. Off hand, I can't think of a single historical one that was.

How about Seelowe? We were photographing the ports regularly.

You have to realise the Channel is not the Atlantic Ocean- and we have always been paranoid about people wanting to invade us. That the Germans time and again failed to predict the target of invasions which they knew would happen speaks volumes, not about the difficulty of predicting invasions, but of the lack of German experience with naval matters, and above all amphibious matters.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

...Most of that 60 hours would be sitting on the beach unloading supplies - that could be cut short, or some of the barges just grounded. And if the RN intends to get in, and get out, entirely under cover of night they will have a very short and very predictable combat window (if any - I'm not sure they could even pull that off at all)....

No. The sixty hour figure is from when the troops begin boarding in Continental ports until when they arrive off the British beaches. Far from 'most of that sixty hours' being for unloading, the figure doesn't include unloading time at all.

The British have a wide and generous span of time to intercept the convoys -- and by late September, plenty of hours of darkness to do it in.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
No. The sixty hour figure is from when the troops begin boarding in Continental ports until when they arrive off the British beaches. Far from 'most of that sixty hours' being for unloading, the figure doesn't include unloading time at all.

Yeah. These aren't modern, purpose-built landing craft- they're ad-hoc constructions and elderly river barges. Nor are they just nipping across the 22 miles from Calais to Dover- they're going via a series of circuitous routes from a dozen or so ports (bearing in mind that most of the major ports in the Pas-de-Calais had been given a good seeing to by one air force or another over the Summer). There is tremendous congestion, there is the bad Channel weather (this is NOT the Mediterranean) and there is a chronic shortage of experience German naval personnel to conduct the operation. Even if the Royal Navy declined to interfere at all, you wouldn't get everyone over.

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

You're speculating about all sort of things beyond that. That the invasion will be detected in advance, for one. Off hand, I can't think of a single historical one that was.

How about Seelowe? We were photographing the ports regularly.

You have to realise the Channel is not the Atlantic Ocean- and we have always been paranoid about people wanting to invade us. That the Germans time and again failed to predict the target of invasions which they knew would happen speaks volumes, not about the difficulty of predicting invasions, but of the lack of German experience with naval matters, and above all amphibious matters.

Yeah. The British were monitoring the collection and assembly of barges in considerable detail, and given their naval superiority in the Channel at night, it's virtually inconceivable the German invasion flotillas could have left port undetected. If the Germans had launched Seelowe, at a minimum the British would have collected photographs suggesting a great deal of troops were being loaded on S-2, and would have seen a lot of craft leaving port on S-1. Then on the night preceding S-Day itself, destroyers would have swept into the Channel and encountered the invasion flotillas themselves. (Bob doesn't seem to grasp just how long these columns were going to be and how narrow the Channel is. Not spotting them would be like not being able to find the cars at an auto dealership).

By about 10:00 pm on S-1 the presence of large numbers of towed barges in the Channel would have been confirmed. By 2:00 am at the latest, these would have been engaged by close to thirty British destroyers and cruisers.

Dawn might have caught some of these destroyers and cruisers fatally close to the German airfields. However, that wouldn't have done Seelowe much good. It would have suffered massive losses, complete disruption, and would long since have ceased to be an organized military expedition. One can assume many of the troops would have made it back to France. One can even assume a few might have pressed on to England. However, nothing resembling a serious invasion would have occurred -- the planned initial assault wave of sixty thousand or so troops would have been reduced to ten-twenty thousand men in disorganized parties scattered virtually at random along the Sussex and Kentish coasts. Mopping them up would be a fine training exercise for the British Army and the Germans would immediately cancel all sailings that hadn't yet left port.

Net results.

British losses. Say five destroyers and one cruiser sunk. Twice that number damaged. Perhaps a hundred aircraft lost in the fighting along the coast on S-Day. Maybe five thosuand casualties among the ground troops. I think these are generous figures.

German losses. Probably two-three destroyers sunk and as many damaged. Perhaps a hundred aircraft lost as well. Total losses of about thirty thousand men, including a great deal of Germany's available trained naval personnel.

Political fall-out. A thumping British victory. No doubt about her being able to stay the course now. Germans question the war. Russia turns more aggressive. France gets restive.

ORIGINAL: golden delicious


...You have to realise the Channel is not the Atlantic Ocean- and we have always been paranoid about people wanting to invade us. That the Germans time and again failed to predict the target of invasions which they knew would happen speaks volumes, not about the difficulty of predicting invasions, but of the lack of German experience with naval matters, and above all amphibious matters.

Well, it also speaks volumes about the inability of the Germans to conduct aerial reconnaissance in the face of Allied air supremacy, and the advantages conferred by Allied naval supremacy and amphibious capability. The Allies could indeed go where they pleased and strike where they pleased. The Germans of 1940 couldn't.

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
No. The sixty hour figure is from when the troops begin boarding in Continental ports until when they arrive off the British beaches. Far from 'most of that sixty hours' being for unloading, the figure doesn't include unloading time at all.

Yeah. These aren't modern, purpose-built landing craft- they're ad-hoc constructions and elderly river barges. Nor are they just nipping across the 22 miles from Calais to Dover- they're going via a series of circuitous routes from a dozen or so ports (bearing in mind that most of the major ports in the Pas-de-Calais had been given a good seeing to by one air force or another over the Summer). There is tremendous congestion, there is the bad Channel weather (this is NOT the Mediterranean) and there is a chronic shortage of experience German naval personnel to conduct the operation. Even if the Royal Navy declined to interfere at all, you wouldn't get everyone over.

That was more or less the picture. The Germans were bidding fair to possibly be able to manage to be able to mount a respectable landing -- if there was no British opposition at all. What with damaged mounting ports, untrained civilian crews, unseaworthy river craft, long, unwieldy tows, strong tides, and large numbers of craft at sea all at once, it was going to be quite a challenge as it was. The thought of the results if the British interfered isn't pleasant.

In the words of one participant, 'we should try this just to see if it works.' He was referring to just doing it as an exercise in peacetime -- that was going to be problematical enough.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

You're speculating about all sort of things beyond that. That the invasion will be detected in advance, for one. Off hand, I can't think of a single historical one that was.

Actually, when I think about that, I realize the above statement doesn't hold much water.

We knew the Japanese were planning to invade somewhere in December 1941. We even knew where the convoys were. The Germans had spotted the convoys for Torch. The Japanese fully expected American landings in 1944.

Etc. What generally wasn't known was exactly where the enemy would strike -- because the same naval supremacy that made the landings possible at all also conferred a wide range of possible targets.

Now let's look at invasions carried out absent naval supremacy. Funnily enough, these are few and far between. Generally -- the Armada and Napoleon's invasion come to mind -- they're cancelled. When they're tried anyway, they've generally been anticipated and destroyed. See Germany's attempted seaborne invasion of Crete and whatever the Japanese were up to when they were caught and destroyed in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Contrary to Bob, invasions are generally anticipated, and if the tools are at hand, foiled.

In fact, the only invasion I can think of that was both unanticipated and launched absent naval supremacy was Weserubung -- the German descent on Norway. Of course, that also relied on no significant opposition ashore -- hardly something the Germans contemplating invading Britain in 1940 could have counted on.

In 1940, the British had spotted the German landing craft. They had pretty definite ideas about where and in what force the Germans could land. They had ample naval force standing by, ready to interfere. This was not a recipe for success from the German point of view.

Lots of nice chat about Sealion......
 
I wonder if Matrix could do an upgrade of SSI's Panzer Commander. Failing that, since I have the original program, does any one know how to run it on Windows XP?

Someone may already have dealt with this one - but I'd love to see a "revisionist" France 1940 - that is to say, one along the lines of the Don Alexander, Julian Jackson, Ernest May, Jeffrey Gunsburg school of thought, that basically just interprets the debacle in terms of operational dislocation more than moral and material deficiency.

If the current France 40 scenario(s) already have accurate OOBs and TO&Es, then it might just be a matter of modifying readiness values etc; or of redeploying units that were very badly located historically, like Giraud's Seventh Army or the excessive Maginot interval troops.

EDIT: Depending, of course, on what one wanted. If one accepts that it was dislocation of the good French armies rather than an overall question of quality, than would one attempt to replicate the defeat, using shock events? Or to simulate counterfactuals? Or make it a question of either/or, with theatre events?

I might someday putter at this myself, as the topic interests me greatly, but depending on how historically accurate the OOB/TO&Es are it could be a monstrous task.

I want to see a better France '40. I would like to see at least 2 of them actually. One a sort of "what if" that we could have some time to move forces around on both sides. Something on the scale of DNO for example. I would also like to see a more historical one a few days after the start of hostilities at a shorter hex scale.

I would like to see a fantasy scenario (or maybe "what if" I guess) where the allies take a stand at Munich and there is war with the Czechs.

ORIGINAL: jtownsend2k

Someone may already have dealt with this one - but I'd love to see a "revisionist" France 1940 - that is to say, one along the lines of the Don Alexander, Julian Jackson, Ernest May, Jeffrey Gunsburg school of thought, that basically just interprets the debacle in terms of operational dislocation more than moral and material deficiency.

If the current France 40 scenario(s) already have accurate OOBs and TO&Es, then it might just be a matter of modifying readiness values etc; or of redeploying units that were very badly located historically, like Giraud's Seventh Army or the excessive Maginot interval troops.

EDIT: Depending, of course, on what one wanted. If one accepts that it was dislocation of the good French armies rather than an overall question of quality, than would one attempt to replicate the defeat, using shock events? Or to simulate counterfactuals? Or make it a question of either/or, with theatre events?

I might someday putter at this myself, as the topic interests me greatly, but depending on how historically accurate the OOB/TO&Es are it could be a monstrous task.

I'd suggest starting from scratch, but I don't think building the OOB will be very difficult because there are a lot of good sources for this. One could do the vast majority of the work using just Niehorster's site and the French and Dutch pages he links to.

The problem is in getting the scenario to play right. I discussed exactly this problem in my BA dissertation, which you can read here;
http://www.tdg.nu/articles/historical%2 ... france.htm

The trouble is that the French army couldn't act off-the-cuff in the manner that a TOAW army can. This presents huge problems. There are a number of tools available to the discerning designer which can encourage fairly realistic behaviour from the French player, but it's an uphill struggle.

Another nagging detail for me is France '40 being division units; I've always had the gut feeling TOAW was a better game with the scale kept to regiments tops. I wonder if perhaps a new map just representing the rectangle Abbeville-Marne-North end of Maginot line-Antwerp or something to that effect might take the scale down low enough to make that possible? It could be that even if the hex scale is right the unit density would hurt gameplay.

I agree that the TOAW ability - and the ability in lots of other wargames - to just have whole army corps spin round and maneuver in any of 360-degrees at the drop of a hat is a realism problem, but that's true of more scenarios than this and more armies than just the French. But what can one do? Consider Ugoigo, for that matter. Fun, but awfully 'abstracted.'

EDIT: Interesting dissertation. Expands amply on what May wrote about simulations of '40. I'm writing an MA term paper on the defeat and its historiography, or rather, I'm instead posting on gaming messageboards because I'm an idiot. Back to work

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

The problem is in getting the scenario to play right. I discussed exactly this problem in my BA dissertation, which you can read here;
http://www.tdg.nu/articles/historical%2 ... france.htm

The trouble is that the French army couldn't act off-the-cuff in the manner that a TOAW army can. This presents huge problems. There are a number of tools available to the discerning designer which can encourage fairly realistic behaviour from the French player, but it's an uphill struggle.

Very good and I would agree with just about everything you discuss there, especially as applies to war gaming in general. The frustration that I feel with wargames in general with respect to the lack of good C3 highlights why all the France '40 scenarios never get it right without special rules. That is also why I wanted a second, more historical scenario starting a bit later as I mentioned above, because I want to make sure that the northern section of the campaign is already committed to the low countries.

My problem with that notion is that to simulate the actual campaign you have to padlock the French, which isn't a great deal of fun for the French player. That's why it seems to me you could have theatre options to undo, above all, the deployment errors.

Then the second question is - if you undo the deployment errors, shouldn't you obviate the need to simulate command paralysis at the Army/Army Group commander level? If you put Giraud's forces into a reserve corps - which I think was originally supposed to be partly fixed on Reims - suddenly you don't have to necessarily start wondering how the hell you disentangle the French First Army and the BEF, because it'd be strategic reserve forces that would immediately be going for the Meuse spearhead.

And of course, if you have the Seventh Army mostly back in reserve, that presumably means the Dyle-Breda plan is out the window, and your line is going either up the Escaut or along the French frontier, which is quite a different ball-game; the French frontier would also be better fortified (not well, but better) than the defensive fronts the Seventh, BEF and First armies fell back from in May. Which means further yet that the Meuse line itself could be different; I mean, if you want to get way into monday morning quarterbacking, if they had decided to screw over the Belgians, they could have systematically blocked French roads in the Ardennes sector, something that was eshewed so that the Ardennes cavalry screen could maneuver forward.

I guess at the end of the day, I'm interested in having at least the option of sitting on a frontier defensive position with the Seventh Army and part of the Ardennes interval troops in reserve, and seeing if I can't have myself a nice bataille conduite. But that may because I'm a bit peculiar. If you made a lot of theatre options you could have the same scenario be able to do both that, AND an historical outcome. Ideally.

Different challenges here:

1. PBEM historical outcome - seems like a painful experience for the poor bastard playing France
2. PBEM hypothetical outcomes of various levels of hypotheticality
3. French player vs. German PO historical - I dunno why you'd want to do this. Maybe play while drunk?
4. German player vs. French PO historical - I can see how people would find this amusing.
5. French player vs. German PO hypothetical - not quite as fun as 2, but hey
6. German player vs. French PO hypothetical - could be interesting.

ramble ramble ramble. Back to paper.

ORIGINAL: jtownsend2k

Another nagging detail for me is France '40 being division units; I've always had the gut feeling TOAW was a better game with the scale kept to regiments tops.

I'd say it works OK at division. But for France I would work at regiment scale, 5km/hex.

I wonder if perhaps a new map just representing the rectangle Abbeville-Marne-North end of Maginot line-Antwerp or something to that effect might take the scale down low enough to make that possible?

I'd be inclined to incorporate the map down to the Swiss frontier. As it was, once the French had completed stripped the Maginot Line, the Germans were able to pierce it. This needs to be an option.

EDIT: Interesting dissertation. Expands amply on what May wrote about simulations of '40. I'm writing an MA term paper on the defeat and its historiography, or rather, I'm instead posting on gaming messageboards because I'm an idiot. Back to work

Nonsense. Reading this thread is important research.

ORIGINAL: Graymane

Very good and I would agree with just about everything you discuss there, especially as applies to war gaming in general. The frustration that I feel with wargames in general with respect to the lack of good C3 highlights why all the France '40 scenarios never get it right without special rules. That is also why I wanted a second, more historical scenario starting a bit later as I mentioned above, because I want to make sure that the northern section of the campaign is already committed to the low countries.

That's one way to approach it. However it's difficult to go far enough so that the French can't play in an unrealistic way without going so far that the campaign is a foregone conclusion.

It might be that there isn't much of a game at all in the wider campaign. In the early going the French were paralysed by their command system and caught by surprise, whilst already by late May there is an air of trying to salvage French honour without losing too many lives. Perhaps a vs. PO campaign for a German player, or some of the battles (in particular the evacuation of the BEF) might make for better gaming.

Thanks to both of you for your kind words on my dissertation, btw.

ORIGINAL: jtownsend2k

If you put Giraud's forces into a reserve corps - which I think was originally supposed to be partly fixed on Reims - suddenly you don't have to necessarily start wondering how the hell you disentangle the French First Army and the BEF, because it'd be strategic reserve forces that would immediately be going for the Meuse spearhead.

I'm not convinced the French could react quickly enough. As it is, Gamelin decided it would be best to let matters "develop". There was considerable infantry in GHQ reserve and masses of stuff behind the Maginot line yet this was not thrown into the path of the German offensive; it was merely deployed to form a new line behind the Somme. The French did not want for troops. They wanted for the wit to use them.

And of course, if you have the Seventh Army mostly back in reserve, that presumably means the Dyle-Breda plan is out the window,

Again, I'm not convinced. The thrust into Holland was a last minute addition. The Allies will still move to the Dyle.

if they had decided to screw over the Belgians,

You need to look into why they didn't do so, though. In addition to political concerns, abandoning Belgium gives the Germans, besides Belgium's own industry, a clear shot at Lille and the Pas de Calais- and with it the majority of French coal and a good deal of other raw materials and heavy industry. This is what the Dyle Plan was all about; providing enough depth to secure precisely those areas which were lost to France's detriment in the last war. Since the Allies knew they had to outbuild Germany to win, this was an essential objective

Really one wants to set up a scenario where the threshold for French victory is set very high; they need to hold on to their frontiers without taking severe losses. Moreover the scenario lasts until the Autumn of 1940. This forces them to face the same considerations as their historical counterparts. This may lead them to overstretching and being crushed. Not exactly balanced but there it is.

Well, Don W. Alexander, Mr. Breda Variant himself (You know, I'm pretty sure he never got a job in academia, kind of funny since he's the go-to guy on an historiographical revolution) supported the Dyle plan of November 1939; that's saying something. And yeah, it's a shorter line, better defence, gets Antwerp, protects Britain, welds alliance together, has the chance of getting the (3x BEF) Belgian Army into line - it's definately got its bright spots.

But it definitely -could- have been an encounter battle; if the Germans had gone to Gembloux as expected the initial clash would have favoured the Germans, who could always safely concentrate their corps d'elite of air and armour more because they knew they were the only ones out to win the war in a few months. That is, I think the battle the Dyle plan expected - a one on one clash of the hard-edges of the opposing armies - might have led to a decisive battle the Allies would have lost. A more conservative deployment would have allowed for the safest possible reaction to the expected Gembloux onslaught, while also being somewhat better than the Dyle plan (or much better than Dyle Breda) at reacting to disasters between Namur and the Maginot line.

Unquestionably, the Escaut plan is a longer, worse line, closer to (or driven into) Northern France, it endangers French industry - but it is also possible to build fieldworks there, and most importantly of all, the motorized forces don't have to be put in a 'liason' role to save anyone ass; that is, if you imagine the Breda Variant being the ultimate in throwing your best forces after dubious aims, I think that actually any extra-frontier manuever may be a subset of the same thing.

So, if I'm Gamelin in November 1939, I'd either go with the Escaut or the Franco-Belgian Frontier, and suck up all of the (considerable) disadvantages; because at no time would I be obliged to throw any of my reserves into anything, and the entire bulk of the low countries would screen any incoming German advance in such a way as to make it easy to relocate reserves as needed.

Regarding the actual reserves used in the real May 10 - I do think the Breda Variant made a huge difference there. There's a quote I have here from Alexander - unfortunately I trimmed it for use in my paper so it's a bit truncated, but if you have JSTOR access it's on page 485 of Alexander's FHS paper on Breda:

"Had the Dyle plan of October 1939 been executed and Giraud’s forces not directed to Breda, his army – one DLM, two motorized divisions, and four infantry divisions – would have formed ample reserves for the Lowlands . . . with the Seventh Army detached to Holland Georges replaced this reserve with most of the remaining French reserve units . . . had Giraud’s forces not been directed to Breda, Georges could have retained his concentration of 3 DCRs around Chalons-sur-Marne intact, as well as the two infantry divisions . . . and other available units, including the Third Motorized Division."

In other words, it wasn't so much that Giraud could have saved the day if he'd been in reserve, but that there had been a domino effect; when Giraud was retasked to Breda in the 1940 version of the plan, the whole system of reserves moved north, with the best units going behind the Belgian plains where Giraud's original role was. Between having those units closer to hand, Giraud closer to hand, plus the units originally sent, I think there's the possibility that Army Group A's offensive might have been plausibly blunted.

Then there's the Maginot troops; I wish there was an article like Alexanders JUST on the subject of why the hell there was no existing staff work done to examine how they would redeploy North if necessary; a mindboggling oversight on the part of all responsible Allied authorities.

My own sense - dunno how you feel about this - is that the war was basically lost in the disposition; literally, so that on May 10, there was never going to be any force big enough or close enough to interpose itself effectively against Army Group A.

ORIGINAL: jtownsend2k

But it definitely -could- have been an encounter battle; if the Germans had gone to Gembloux as expected the initial clash would have favoured the Germans, who could always safely concentrate their corps d'elite of air and armour more because they knew they were the only ones out to win the war in a few months.

!!! Maybe Manstein and Hitler. OKH had no such expectations.

That is, I think the battle the Dyle plan expected - a one on one clash of the hard-edges of the opposing armies - might have led to a decisive battle the Allies would have lost.

Presuming this is the Germans going with their original plan- their Schlieffen mark II- I'd say one gets a very bloody melee from which the Germans emerge victorious. Victory, however, means driving the Allies back to either the French border or to the Somme, in the space of six or eight weeks, with the main strength of the Allied armies intact and German losses much more severe than they were historically.

German tactical and operational superiority were going to be enough to win whatever. However for a decisive battle they really need a large encirclement as the Allies are going to be able to put more men onto the field, and large encirclements are hard to come by in such a densely populated battlefield. Without such a decisive battle winning will take all year and half a million casualties.

This actually makes a decent scenario, but it's one which is going to disappoint any German player who is hoping to reach the Spanish frontier in six weeks. It also opens up all kinds of questions about what will happen in the course of several months, particularly with regard to popular feeling in France and Germany.

"Had the Dyle plan of October 1939 been executed and Giraud’s forces not directed to Breda, his army – one DLM, two motorized divisions, and four infantry divisions – would have formed ample reserves for the Lowlands . . . with the Seventh Army detached to Holland Georges replaced this reserve with most of the remaining French reserve units . . . had Giraud’s forces not been directed to Breda, Georges could have retained his concentration of 3 DCRs around Chalons-sur-Marne intact, as well as the two infantry divisions . . . and other available units, including the Third Motorized Division."

This is all very well, but the question of whether the French would or could put this reserve in the right place remains unanswered. They did not perceive the real threat until several days into the campaign, due to a very convincing German decoy offensive in the Low Countries

Then there's the Maginot troops; I wish there was an article like Alexanders JUST on the subject of why the hell there was no existing staff work done to examine how they would redeploy North if necessary; a mindboggling oversight on the part of all responsible Allied authorities.

Yeah. It is startling just how much of a reserve was placed behing the Maginot line. The whole rationale behind building the line was to save manpower for the more mobile battle on the plain of Flanders, and yet two whole Army Groups were deployed behind it.

My own sense - dunno how you feel about this - is that the war was basically lost in the disposition; literally, so that on May 10, there was never going to be any force big enough or close enough to interpose itself effectively against Army Group A.

I'd say the war was lost in the early and mid-30s with the French taking their army in the wrong direction, and the uncertain commitment of the nation to facing another First World War-style holocaust. The campaign- that was lost in the dispositions.