Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: Evoken

Every turn i am hopefull this time he will have some proper cover with an invasion force but doesnt seem to be the case. I did a lot of the mistakes he also did in my first PBEM (No fighter cover for miri , underescorted task force going for invasion that resulted with slaughter ) but i learned from my mistakes real quick and fixed them ASAP , so why does Scout still do the same mistakes over and over again ? [:(]

ORIGINAL: RADM.Yamaguchi

Well, i for one can't take it anymore. I'm just not able to read this anymore. if i ever watch a movie and there is some sort of torture scene i always walk right out.

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: RADM.Yamaguchi

Well, i for one can't take it anymore. I'm just not able to read this anymore. if i ever watch a movie and there is some sort of torture scene i always walk right out.

But look on the valuable lessons you can learn in how to avoid making basic errors.

Alfred

ORIGINAL: jdsrae

IJN 5th Fleet mustn’t have anything allocated to it...
At least one patrol or Nell/Betty unit on search and one division of old DDs may have been enough to counter this sort of thing.

ORIGINAL: offenseman

I am just happy the TF didn't evade superior forces, retreat toward Russian held Sakhalin and unload there...

Its a good lesson for IJ players that do not establish air search in Paramushiro-Jima early. That said I nave have left this back door wide open. Perhaps I am in the minority of players who never trusts that an Allied player will do something that never would have happened historically and throw away assets, however small, on a mission that will ultimately fail but will have results that are out of proportion to the actual results on the game board.

This small Allied victory is a disaster in my mind. Loss of fuel, resources dedicated to taking it back, an AO, and most importantly TIME.

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

ORIGINAL: offenseman

I am just happy the TF didn't evade superior forces, retreat toward Russian held Sakhalin and unload there...

Its a good lesson for IJ players that do not establish air search in Paramushiro-Jima early. That said I nave have left this back door wide open. Perhaps I am in the minority of players who never trusts that an Allied player will do something that never would have happened historically and throw away assets, however small, on a mission that will ultimately fail but will have results that are out of proportion to the actual results on the game board.

This small Allied victory is a disaster in my mind. Loss of fuel, resources dedicated to taking it back, an AO, and most importantly TIME.

I see your winking smiley, but I still don't get your drift about unloading in Russia. The Allied player can never do anything about unloading in Russia before activation - no amphibs, no cargo, no air units - nada. After activation, a small construction unit is hardly a help to the Russians.
Your post only makes sense to me if the Japanese player unloaded there accidentally, but this is an Allied AAR. Am I missing your intention here?

ORIGINAL: offenseman

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

ORIGINAL: offenseman

I am just happy the TF didn't evade superior forces, retreat toward Russian held Sakhalin and unload there...

Its a good lesson for IJ players that do not establish air search in Paramushiro-Jima early. That said I nave have left this back door wide open. Perhaps I am in the minority of players who never trusts that an Allied player will do something that never would have happened historically and throw away assets, however small, on a mission that will ultimately fail but will have results that are out of proportion to the actual results on the game board.

This small Allied victory is a disaster in my mind. Loss of fuel, resources dedicated to taking it back, an AO, and most importantly TIME.

I see your winking smiley, but I still don't get your drift about unloading in Russia. The Allied player can never do anything about unloading in Russia before activation - no amphibs, no cargo, no air units - nada. After activation, a small construction unit is hardly a help to the Russians.
Your post only makes sense to me if the Japanese player unloaded there accidentally, but this is an Allied AAR. Am I missing your intention here?

It was a reference to a prior game where some supplies (IIRC) were unloaded by Japan accidentally somewhere in that part of the world and it activated the Soviets. Of course, I may be remembering that unload incident incorrectly...

ORIGINAL: offenseman

I am just happy the TF didn't evade superior forces, retreat toward Russian held Sakhalin and unload there...

Its a good lesson for IJ players that do not establish air search in Paramushiro-Jima early. That said I nave have left this back door wide open. Perhaps I am in the minority of players who never trusts that an Allied player will do something that never would have happened historically and throw away assets, however small, on a mission that will ultimately fail but will have results that are out of proportion to the actual results on the game board.

This small Allied victory is a disaster in my mind. Loss of fuel, resources dedicated to taking it back, an AO, and most importantly TIME.

ORIGINAL: offenseman

I was referring to fuel for ships moving around to take Shikuka back.

And yeah, AE version of Doolittle Raid. Nice way to think of it. Was telling my wife yesterday that the type of aircraft we saw flying around yesterday was a B-25, similar to the Doolittle Raid. Then I digressed into some of the finer points of the raid and I suspect she stopped listening when I said they flew off a CV...
Here is the aircraft a little off center and a tree branch in the corner.

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe



You should get some of her favorite snacks and then watch "30 seconds over Tokyo" with her. [:D]

ORIGINAL: offenseman

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe



You should get some of her favorite snacks and then watch "30 seconds over Tokyo" with her. [:D]

Great idea!! [:D]

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The initial sea trials started on Oct. 30 1963 and were conducted into a 40-knot wind: however the crew successfully performed 29 touch-and-go landings, 21 unarrested full-stop landings, and 21 unassisted takeoffs at gross weights of 85,000 pounds up to 121,000 pounds.

At 85,000 pounds, the KC-130F came to a complete stop within 267 feet, about twice the aircraft’s wing span as remarked by Dabney on his book.

The Navy discovered that even with a maximum payload, the plane used only 745 feet of flight deck for takeoff and 460 feet for landing. These achievements were confirmed by Lockheed’s Ted Limmer, who checked out fighter pilot Flatley in the C-130 and stayed on for some of the initial touch-and-go and full-stop landings. “The last landing I participated in, we touched down about 150 feet from the end, stopped in 270 feet more and launched from that position, using what was left of the deck. We still had a couple hundred feet left when we lifted off.”
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On Oct. 30, 1963, Flatley and his crew of four flew out to a spot five hundred miles off the coast from Boston, where the USS Forrestal was waiting. Conditions that day were far from ideal. The seas were moderately rough, and they were facing 40-knot winds. Flatley’s biggest concern, though, was that the aircraft would not manage the maximum nine foot-per-second sink rate. But the Hercules did fine. The secret, he later said, was the excellent coordination he had with Landing Signal Officer Jack Daugherty. When the aircraft was still three or four feet off the deck he got the “cut” signal from Daugherty to pull the throttles back to idle. A second later, the aircraft touched down and rolled to a halt at a spot exactly even with the captain’s bridge. The tip of the starboard wing was only fifteen feet away from the carrier’s island. The captain and the others stared at the aircraft, still totally amazed that it had put down on their deck without destroying everything around them.

Over the next couple of days, Flatley and his crew made twenty-nine touch-and-go landings, and twenty-one full-stop landings and unassisted takeoffs from the Forrestal’s deck. In most instances the aircraft would touch down about 150 feet from the end of the deck, roll for a little under 300 feet and then take off from the same position, using what was left of the deck, leaving a couple hundred feet to spare by the time they lifted off. The aircraft took off with loads of between 85,000 pounds to 121,000 pounds.
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When the order came to start measuring the C-130 Hercules in preparation for an aircraft carrier landing and launch test, engineers at the Naval Air Test Center thought someone must be joking. With a wingspan of 132-feet, few could imagine that the C-130 would be able to operate off of a flight deck only 1,017-feet long and approximately 250-feet wide. But the Department of the United States Navy needed to find out the feasibility of landing large planes on carriers for resource transportation. As U.S. carrier fleets were being deployed around the world to increasingly more remote locations, the existing supply logistics relying on the Grumman C-1 Trader were proving insufficient. Configured for carrier operations, the small twin-engine C-1 had comparatively limited range and payload capacity. To solve the problem, the Navy assembled a team of shocked pilots and engineers to figure out how to land a colossal C-130 on the supercarrier USS Forrestal. Given the considerable uncertainty around the experiment, plans were made to toss the aircraft overboard with a crane should it prove unable to take off again.