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ORIGINAL: el cid again

[
[Ignoring the explative] This is a basic principle. Evidence is evidence. Testimony is an important category of evidence. While Tsuji mostly was a staff officer - he was a very unusual one - at the front in landings in Thailand - with the point advancing into Malaya - personally flying recon in a Ki-46 before the war - and even a commander on Guadalcanal.

He is a direct participant. What he says is a fact in the primary data sense of the term. I speak and think technically and you are not listening technically.

NOTHING I have said implies Tsuji - Mac - or anyone else is 100% correct about anything. It is rather the opposite:

we may not safely assume something a person with direct knowledge says is 100% false - it requires compelling evidence on a case by case basis to reach that conclusion. There is an attitude out there - very popular in the US in particular - to wholly discount Tsuji as a source.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

In general, most CD guns cover only a certain sector. But some of the guns ranged the islands - and diagrams of this are in the Osprey book. Regretfully - many of them are post 1941 batteries - the heavy ex battleship turrets only came almost on line when the war ended (one fired proof shots, the other didn't, and neither was ever operational). But the M1919s were able to range the island BEFORE the war began - decades before.

You seem to seriously doubt anything and everything I say.

Why don't you read the Alaska Statehood Act - which is unique. Eisenhauer refused to accept statehood for Alaska without PEACETIME Presidential authority NOT to defend the vast majority of it. It is a strategic fact of life. We have 75% of US coastline - but not one navy base (an ex Navy base serves USCG at Kodiak, and another at Adak was turned over to Aleuts who have not figured out what to do with it).
We have had as one brigade nominally stationed here - on 20% of US territory - and while now there are nominally two - it is SOP to have 2/3 deployed operationally - and the other 1/3 not fit for operations. We are the only state that mobilizes not only elements of the NG but the State Defense Force every year - and we have as many fires, floods, volcanic eruptions, and sometimes other disasters (e.g. oil spills) as the rest of the country combined - but almost no infrastructure to deal with them (not enough for a single 747 crash unless we mobilize). We dare not run our airport police too many hours - we fly our food in - so we have to be creative about what to do in a problem situation.

Historically - when the commander, Alaska Command, called for reinforcements - the Canadians sent more than the US did - and sometimes the US sent nothing at all! See The Thousand Mile War for details.

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

A lovely nugget which has what to do with the subject of invading Hawaii or claiming that the US would tend to not defend its own territory? Its nice to know though that the airport police arn't overworked.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

[What is tripping you up is a difference in assumptions. You are assuming casualties are possible which, bluntly, were not short of the Japanese pulling their own seacocks. You are missing the operational point - ANY unit that is significantly damaged need not press on - and most of them will be saved if withdrawn. BECAUSE you don't have to take Oahu - just threaten it - to win - to establish CONTROL over the central Pacific area - you are NEVER required to risk truly heavy losses. You wait until those big guns are out - and if they never go out - you don't really have to go. Taking out two guns ought to be possible - and probably a list of secondary things as well. I am assuming competent leadership would NOT risk severe losses - period - and that isolating Oahu serves almost as well as occupation does. Ultimately - time is not on the side of the defense: like Versingetorex at Alecia Short likely will surrender - to save the women and children from starvation - if things are not resolved by military events sooner than that becomes a necessity.

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Well according to a study entitled "Guarding the United States and Its Outposts" and conducted for the Center for Military History, U.S. Army, the northwestern shore was the most likely place for a landing.

"The principal Army unit was the Hawaiian Division, activated in 1921; and its station at Schofield covered the Pearl Harbor base against an enemy landing on the northwest coast. It was only along this coast that the Army believed a hostile landing in force even remotely feasible."

Chez

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: el cid again

[What is tripping you up is a difference in assumptions. You are assuming casualties are possible which, bluntly, were not short of the Japanese pulling their own seacocks. You are missing the operational point - ANY unit that is significantly damaged need not press on - and most of them will be saved if withdrawn. BECAUSE you don't have to take Oahu - just threaten it - to win - to establish CONTROL over the central Pacific area - you are NEVER required to risk truly heavy losses. You wait until those big guns are out - and if they never go out - you don't really have to go. Taking out two guns ought to be possible - and probably a list of secondary things as well. I am assuming competent leadership would NOT risk severe losses - period - and that isolating Oahu serves almost as well as occupation does. Ultimately - time is not on the side of the defense: like Versingetorex at Alecia Short likely will surrender - to save the women and children from starvation - if things are not resolved by military events sooner than that becomes a necessity.

<shrug> As i've previously said, the Japanese do have to take Oahu. "Threatening" it gives them nothing and isn't worth the cost and risk of the operation, much less the expense. Midway threatened Hawaii....as did the original Pearl Harbor raid. Both situations proved transitory and even the disablement of the battlefleet might have helped the US more than it hindered them in hindsight. It did not gain Japan anything dipolmatically nor did it much alter the time line of US recovery and advance. Time is almost always against the invader, esp where amphibious ops are concerned. The Japanese also needed Oahu/Hawaii secured to as to be used as a bargaining chip to secure a peace with the US that leaves Japan in a suitible post-war position. I'd say its you thats missing the opeational point. The hypothetical Hawaii operation was not some kind of grand demonstration.

Fort Ruger was West of the entrance of Pearl Harbor.

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

Fort Ruger was West of the entrance of Pearl Harbor.

Actually it's at Diamond Head.
Chez

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

<shrug> As i've previously said, the Japanese do have to take Oahu. "Threatening" it gives them nothing and isn't worth the cost and risk of the operation, much less the expense. Midway threatened Hawaii....as did the original Pearl Harbor raid. Both situations proved transitory and even the disablement of the battlefleet might have helped the US more than it hindered them in hindsight. It did not gain Japan anything dipolmatically nor did it much alter the time line of US recovery and advance. Time is almost always against the invader, esp where amphibious ops are concerned. The Japanese also needed Oahu/Hawaii secured to as to be used as a bargaining chip to secure a peace with the US that leaves Japan in a suitible post-war position. I'd say its you thats missing the opeational point. The hypothetical Hawaii operation was not some kind of grand demonstration.

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Well, Sid apparently doubts it...[8|]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Dili

Supposing a succefull invasion what were the facilities in Pearl Harbour that could support KidoButai instead of having it return to mainland?

It depends on what you mean. But AFTER a successful invasion, you do have a significant repair shipyard - with a substantially ethnic Japanese workforce - at Pearl Harbor. IJN also had moblile repair units - and these could even build/complete ships - and did at Hong Kong, Soerabaja, and other places. After some period of repair and reorganization - the real question is "how much repair capacity would Japan want to have at Oahu?" rather than how much was possible? Because surely the inherant capacity of the place exceeded anything they would have attempted to fully exploit. Useful - surely.

But BEFORE a "successful invasion" - and even if there NEVER was one - Japan would still have significant repair facilities and capabilities forward. These begin at established bases - in particular at Kwajalein and Saipan - and also at unestablished bases (Eneweitok, captured Midway and Johnston) - which could achieve minimal capability by moving in repair ships and "mobile repairs sections." On the islands themselves, there are three good ports, one moderate port, and a number of very minor ports. Moving in repairs ships and or repairs sections would be useful - as a ship damaged off Oahu would not need long to reach them. The ships then hop - in good weather - first to Johnston - then Kwajalein - then Eneweitok - than Saipan - finally Japan itself - until they reach truly major shipyards - if required.

Kwajalein

Largest atoll in the world. Roi was covered by an airfield (4300, 2x2700 feet), while Namur was brush-covered. One significant pier, about 450 feet long. Kwaj itself was about 2.5x0.5 miles. Two 300-foot wharves at the air stripe and a 1500 foot long pier on the north (naval base) side. 5000-foot air strip in the island's central area. Ebeye had a seaplane ramp. HQ for the eastern mandates.


REPLY: Correct - but more ships would be there if it was to support a forward operation like invading Hawaii. For details of this and other islands, see University of Hawaii Press Nanyo - the Japanese word for the area.

Eniwetok

Anchorage for up to 2000 ships. No military facilities prewar.

REPLY: Not exactly correct, but there were no military UNITS prewar. Again - ships would be sent if this was to be an emergency support facility. Whoever did WITP gave it a port rating of 3 and an airfield rating of 1 - and in all forms of WITP there are (correctly) stocks of fuel and supplies there. Remember - this is a former German territory - it has its own civil infrastructure and economy - and even a native population - and most of the islands have NON military facilities - and Japanese militia - which isn't in the game.

Midway

Coral sand islands. Lagoon is mostly foul ground. Sand Island is 11400x6000 feet. Seaplane base and submarine base. Naval air station on Eastern Island (6600x3900 feet, triangular). Three runways (3250, 4500, 5300 feet). Garrison in June 1942 was two battalions, a USMC air group, and a provisional USAF bombing force (crammed in there). Eventually the runways were increased by about 50% in length and a major submarine base was built.

REPLY: This is misleading insofar as in invasion in 1941 will not face the forces or facilities of the time of the Battle of Midway. It is an amazingly small place - the runways dominate the island - but there was apparently only a Marine Defense Battalion - some contractors working on facilities - and the Pan Am "base" for the clipper in 1941.

Johnston

3000x600 feet, coral topped with guano. No anchorage. Used as a seaplane base, with a single 4000 foot runway added later. One USMC company garrisoned it.


REPLY: Rather incorrect, there was a significant contractor presence. See Advance Force Pearl Harbor for details. There were also similar activities on many islands - and enough had been developed that B-17s could transit the entire Pacific to the Philippines using them.

Battle damage had to get back to the mandates for temporary repair.

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: el cid again
The rationale for Germany first is "it is the more dangerous enemy because it is bigger economically and more advanced technically." I do not see how that would be changed.

My assumption is that the more successful Japan is, or the bigger a threat it poses to the USA, the more likely that the USA would be willing to increase the proportion of its effort to fighting in the Pacific, even to the point of suspending "Germany First" if the threat from Japan is serious enough.

Politically, does anyone doubt that the Congress would allow this state of affairs to continue? Forget Torch, if the Japanese invaded the Hawaiian Islands, and had American citizens under their guns, we would have to put whatever we could into the basket; sufficient to insure that the Japanese invasion force would cease to exist. Anybody doubt this?

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: el cid again

But you have not yet come to an understanding of the Japanese operational concept. It specifically DID involve forward bases. Staging out of Kwajelien, Eneweitok and Saipan, all of them given extra "infrastructure" in the form of repair ships, they planned to sieze Midway, Johnston, and one or two of the lower islands in the first phase. Moving assets forward to these, they would occupy the rest of the lower islands and the islands Northeast of Oahu in phase two. They would sieze good ports and airfields and put support assets onto them. By the end of stage three - when air and support units were moved in strength onto the lower islands - the land based air (an entire Air Brigade) would be able to dominate the skies even in the absence of the KB - which is then free to leave - or divide - as appropriate due to battle damage or other requirements - or the need to rebuild air groups. There is no particular time limit on this phase either - they can pound for days - weeks - months - as required - until intel on the ground - and photographs - indicate landing is feasible. Japan started with outstanding intel on Oahu and this was an important key to its successful offensives everywhere: Malaya, the Philippines, the NEI, the attack on Oahu itself.

I think my understanding of Japanese operational capabilities is sufficient enough to know that the forward bases you allude too are not capable of sustaining the level of operations required for the fleet to operate continuously near Oahu. The Japanese had no equivilent of later war fleet and logistical train that allowed the USN to operate effectively hundreds, even thousands of miles from long established logistical hubs. The swift capture of minor bases like Midway or Johnston are not going to fill the bill and "repair" ships can only do so much. They would provide way points for Japanese Datais to transfer to Hawaii however. I still have my doubts about how effectively the Japanese are going to establish their land based airpower on the chain.

The Japanese have no need for a fleet train on the scale the US had later. And they did have a fleet train of some significance - more appropriate to the size of their forces. The USN fielded over 60,000 vessels - and the US Army over 80,000 - by the later years of the war. An operation in 1941 does not require anything like the forces we needed to take on Japan in 1944 or 1945.

Who said anything about "operate continuously near Oahu?" The idea - explicitly divided into phases - was to move forward - sieze ground - and move back; replenish, reorganize and recieve additional echelons on ships arriving from Japan; then move forward again, reinforce the islands formerly taken and take some more; repeat the process - three times - at which point the fleet does not have to be present "near Oahu" at all - except when operationally convient - until such time as the decision is made to go for the landing on Oahu itself. Unless the defenses (meaning air units and coast defense positions) were reduced sufficiently, this does not happen. This isn't a plan based on the idea of a "continuous presence of ships at sea near a major enemy base for months on end." As I posted above, ships are unable to operate more than about six weeks without significant repair issues wholly unrelated to combat. If you want to sustain a presence and control an area - you occupy land bases - and exploit them so you do NOT attempt to stay at sea for long periods.

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

You also do not seem to understand that an operation of this sort is inherantly managable: you push as long as you can, and when and if the cost becomes excessive - you can stop pushing. Then you can either push again later - after a phase of repair / build up - or you can make a partial withdrawall - and contest the area as you see fit. Because you do NOT need the area - you have lots of options.

The goal is to get the US to focus on the Eastern/Central Pacific - and leave Japan free in the Western Pacific. Also to delay - probably until 1944 or later - any offensive into the Western Pacific. And that is worth much more than the likely cost - however well or poorly the op goes.

<shurg> You don't seem to understand how inherantly unmanageable this type of operation can be. If it was that managable then the Allies would have conducted Overlord in 42 instead of 44. Japan can't afford to push, then "push later" as you allude. Time is against them and the Imperial fleet cannot operate in Hawaiian waters indefinately, nor can they base operations out of fringe bases for long either. They don't "need" the area.......yes....they need to capture Oahu and they need to do it reletively quickly.

How is Japan "Free" in the Western Pacific if the bulk of her assets are pursuing this host of options you keep alluding too? Japan isn't delaying squat if she gets bogged down or thwarted. The opposite in fact. Only if they win quickly might there be such a delay and they must win completely and then fortify their position (if they can) The focusing of US efforts along a single track might serve to accelerate their advance across the Pacific anyway. Again you claim how well the op goes doesn't matter. Yet it mattered in all the other operations and it mattered in Japanese thinking. Japan's strength was finite and couldn't be frittered away in costly operations without a substantial return for the investment. Hence the obsession with the Decisive Battle.

Well - you have the obsession with Decisive Battle right, anyway. And that is WHY Yamamoto wanted it. This is the best way to get the USN to commit too early - before it is strong enough to win - and to get them to be so predictable about doing it they don't wait until Japan is weaker. Jim Dunnigan points out that a military machine at war is essentially wearing itself out - by wearing out its machines - and by attrition. Except to the extent that is compensated for by new machines being built and new units being trained, the original force - the veteran force with experience - is getting weaker - and probably also getting discouraged. Nagumo was told by a staff officer - the morning of Dec 7 - "the men are in high spirits" - to which he replied "Of course they are. They don't know the taste of battle." You want to discourage a military force - let it fight on a scale big enough to take losses for weeks on end. I promise - it will work. Anyway - major battle early sees the IJN at its very strongest moment - relatively speaking. The longer the war, the less chance IJN can win a decisive battle. Indeed, Japan must have a short war or lose - even in the view of its optimists.
Taking the White House is not an option: taking Oahu is - and the mere attempt probably forces the decisive battle early - which is the only time Japan is likely to win it desicively. The better (US) strategy is to AVOID a decisive battle early - in which case Japan gets Oahu as a position and a bargaining chip - and the US SLOC starts on the West Coast instead of mid - ocean. This is a win win situation: EITHER you get the Decisive Battle at the one time you can win it OR you get Oahu and the American ability to project power is diminished - and its first projection will be at a predictable place - instead of somewhere that might be in bomber range of things Japan cares about. Yamamoto was a strategic naval thinker - and he was not wrong.

The USN - in 1941 - and the USAAF - ignorant of the relative strengths and weaknesses of both sides - would probably not be wise enough to evacuate what it could - and would try to fight - losing the bulk of the United States Fleet - as it was called in the process. After that it would be catch up ball - and they might well be wise enough not to throw good money after bad - but that only means Oahu must fall and the come back will occur late in 1942 or sometime in 1943 (depending, critically, on wether or not the carriers in PTO survived - damaged or not they can be repaired - but sunk = you must wait for USS Essex and her first two sisters - the rest are too late to mattter - but 3 = 3 - so the Essex and her sisters can replace the 3 PTO carriers - at a cost in time - you have to wait for them to complete and work up.]

The operation is much more viable in 1941 - with the advantage of better intel in peacetime than ever could happen in wartime - the unpreparedness of an enemy still at peace - the things not yet delivered from the immense US production stream (the Two Ocean Navy was already building) - the lessons not yet learned and the doctrines not yet invented.
It does not have to be gigantic by later US standards - although it is gigantic by Japanese standards. The deal is classic: take the weak points - use them to isolate the strong point - then reduce it while it is isolated and unsupplied. It is more a military operation than a naval one - disguised by the fact it is in the center of the world's greatest ocean. And it permits Japan to exploit its one great military asset: its superior (size as well as quality meant here) military (ie army) forces. This battle requires joint operations of the sort we really saw in Malaya - and probably only a collaboration of Yamamoto and Yamashita were up to doing it. Yet Japan did have both - and it did have a generation of background planning as foundation for detail operational plans to work with.

Inherantly the very scale of the operation - and its timing - remove gigantic portions of the risk which existed IRL when it really was attempted - in 1942. It is not just that US forces were much stronger in 1942 - but Japanese intelligence was much worse - US intelligence was much better [the US could actually read significant portions of the JN25 code] - and Japan was not implementing the original plan - because the situation had changed so dramatically. Granted that Japan should not have lost the first trick (the Battle of Midway) - nevertheless the strategic conception was flawed except in this basic sense: the whole point was really to force the USN into battle - and it did succeed in doing that. This operation ultimately is the best way to get the Decisive Battle early - and it worked as well in June 1942 as it would have in December 1942 - the US Fleet did come out to fight. But in 1942, it came out to fight unexpectedly early, and it was competent in a sense it could not have been in 1941. Due to the relative size of the forces - and their relative readiness - it is far safer to attempt the full scale invasion in 1941 than just a raid. For a sense of this I suggest you game it - from both sides - several times. The wisest thing the Americans can do is go for attrition by bombers and submarines and try to pick off inevitable uncovered peripheral forces with momentary carrier air strikes from unexpected directions at unexpected times. Make em pay - keep the fleet in being - build up for a rapid return - and do not force a slow return by losing a lot. That is the BEST case scenario for the Americans - and notice that in NO case is there any possibility of keeping Hawaii as a viable fleet base early in the war. All you can do is hope to make em pay two or three times as much as they might pay if you are foolish and fight hard battles you must lose.

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

Politically, does anyone doubt that the Congress would allow this state of affairs to continue? Forget Torch, if the Japanese invaded the Hawaiian Islands, and had American citizens under their guns, we would have to put whatever we could into the basket; sufficient to insure that the Japanese invasion force would cease to exist. Anybody doubt this?

Actually, yes. As Hawaii was not yet a state and given the large percentage (43%) of people of Japanese descent living there, Congress may or may not have felt a compulsion to do anything immediately.

And given that large population of ethnic Japanese, I am sure there were elements who would cooperate with the invasion force to the fullest extent possible including sabotage. Add to the fact that most of the local defense forces were comprised of ethnic Japanese and you have a situation where "American" forces may actually turn on their continental brethern.

An invasion of Hawaii may have been operationally feasible for the Japanese, however it certainly wouldn't have been logistically feasible for sustaining their forces there. Their supply line would have been wide open to US submarines and certainly the Aleutians would have been built up as quick as possible for raids by US carrier and surface forces against that supply line. That long supply trail would be indefensible.

Chez