Page 7 of 41
RE: RHS Design Theory: The Kamakaze Option (Scenario 102)
Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 8:02 am
by el cid again
See revised note below (about four panels down) for current status.
RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices
Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 8:13 am
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: dwg
Yet it remains the Germans did achieve things we didn't - in particular re jet aircraft.
Lots of proposals, a lot fewer actual achievements - which is pretty much my point. Finding papers relating to a proposal does not mean there was anything more to that proposal than those papers themselves.
USAF studis, at least, consider German achievements significant and worthy of imitation. In spite of mismanagement, the Germans managed to field operational jet aircraft in some numbers - and also ballistic missiles (although in the event only from improvised launchers - rendering them less accurate then designed - the fixed launchers having been overrun or bombed - these including radar course correction with the best radar in the entire world tracking the missile, so course corrections could be sent to it). USAF is less impressed with how the Luftwaffe organized for war - one paper has the sub title "Strategy for Defeat" Even so, some tactics were effective (see night fighter wild sow for example). It is just as well that Germany had problems with fuel supply, elected to bring the Russians into the war, and failed to organize pilot training on a sufficient scale.
RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices
Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 8:31 am
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: dwg
the ideas were impressive
The ideas were obvious, it's implementation that is impressive. If you develop a new power source, or any new technology, the first thing you do is look for places you can employ it to advantage (just look at the steam engine and the internal combustion engine). There are in fact two direct parallels to nuclear powered submarines that were investigated in WWII, High Test Peroxide based propulsion, and the Elektroboot. The first failed almost utterly, the second, which was a lucky spin-off from the first, might have been a war winner, if it was available in '42, but not only was it too late, Germany messed up the implementation, going for a massive mass-production scheme that might have made sense in 1942 or 42, but which was absurd a couple of years later. So there are parallels that actually went all the way to hardware, but we don't lose perspective over them the way that people do over nuclear power - and the difference is because we have the information to understand them in context and see the weaknesses, not just the possible strengths.
I think you are quibbling here. We do not really disagree about the nature of mistakes made. If we disagree, it is that the Germans had a broad range of technical successes we did not - enough so it took many years to catch up in all fields. Yet that was also a failing - too few resources spread too thin in the context of projects that needed more time than was available to be useful in wartime. But we were anything but informed about many of these lines of work. To go with your case on submarine propulsion, see USNI's US Submarines Since 1945. We developed steam power plants (closed cycle - these led to a destroyer plant when we decided we wanted nuclear steam instead); the closed cycle Walter engine you refer to (with Peroxide as the oxidizer), something RN also actually tried to deploy for a while; and a closed cycle diesel engine system, in addition to nuclear propulsion. We got farther than the Germans did eventually - and might have fielded practical boats using them - but nothing could compare with nuclear power in terms of sustained underwater range - so we abandoned the others. Only the Walter boat might not be perfectable - the Russians and British had terrible fires - and we never dared actually deploy any because of the fire risk. The other line of development was rechargable fuel cells - and in fact the successful design now made for several navies was a c 1942 German development not implemented during the war. But an Electroboot using them to recharge would have been a formidable thing to engage. Heisenberg wasn't wrong when he said the only practical wartime application for nuclear power was probably for submarine propulsion. Yet he never seems to have designed one, or even a power plant for one. Japan did both, and there is circumstantial evidence (mainly from US Army reports) it might have got one operational in time to make a single trip to Germany. [We have the interrogation of several passengers who made the trip on a submarine in only two months - utterly impossible for a conventional submarine of that era - particularly since surfaced operations in the Atlantic near Europe were suicide. We also have an Army patrol report of a midget found on the beach in Panama - a "recon" midget never reported in reference books. This vessel spent some years at the US Army Aviation Museum on Oahu, before being returned to Japan as a war relic. None of the conventional Japanese submarines were operating in the Eastern Pacific in 1945. The tale of the Army report can be found in Advance Force Pearl Harbor. Its author is the curator of the Army Aviation Museum on Oahu and had custody of the sub personally until it was decided to give it back to Japan. This is the same book that printed a WWII era picture showing a midget and its torpedo hitting a battleship on the first day of the war - something that has stood the test of forensic examination over time. Just because it is esoteric and little known doesn't mean it isn't true.]
RE: RHS Design Theory: Test Series Six Status and Threads
Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 6:41 pm
by el cid again
The Tag Team (Test 6A) AAR thread has been posted by Big Red - and he is in final
preparation of Japanese Turn One - over which he has operational control. I have
posted the definitions of the three Allied Chairs playing this game.
I am preparing Turn One with the same economic foundation but different operational
orders for tests 6B and 6C. These will be a standard game vs an Allied player and
vs a prototype Japanese script which may be reduced to AI commands in future.
[A script is a written set of rules defining what to do in various situations. Each time
a new situation arises, a new script to govern that will be written to apply to all future
similar cases.] These (identical) start turns may complete for Japan today.
All these games are open and players on the RHS mailing list will get the turns, passwords,
reports and replays. I do not at this time intend to use the Tracker on them (but it
probably will be used in Test 6A). To join the mailing list, contact Mifune, Big Red, or
myself.
These tests are based on RHS mod 4.15 - which when revised aircraft art is available -
will be frozen into the RHS installer - probably technically version 4.20 at that point.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Kamakaze Update: Scenario 106
Posted: Sat Jul 07, 2012 12:18 am
by el cid again
After investigating how kamakaze units are in stock, and discovering the
same unit in scenario 1 doesn't have the box checked but it does in the
downfall scenario, I decided to implement Kamakaze units (at least at first)
in the RHS 1945 Downfall Scenario 106 vice 102. 106 is based on 102 and
in many respects is similar - but its later date makes testing of these units
more feasible sometime soon. There also is some air art related to dedicated
kamakaze planes we can implement for it. Since this scenario is just starting
development, it will be some time before it properly configured. Once it is,
depending on how these units behave, we may be able to put the option into
other scenarios as well. For the present, 102 will not be reissued to include
these units. Kamakaze is both a scenario setting and an air group setting,
and apparently both are required to make the code work. Also, a plane
used in this role has a different loadout (and range) than with its normal load.
This should be properly defined, case by case.
RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices
Posted: Sat Jul 07, 2012 12:21 am
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: BigDuke66
In that light I wonder why the player is provided with a chance to use the "thin theory" of an Japanese atomic bomb but is denied to use kamikaze(doesn't matter if they make sense or not).
in the game
See above. After investigation, we are modeling a scenario to use them on the stock Downfall scenario which also uses them.
Stock scnario 1 (on which RHS is based) does NOT have this option - as apparently most others do not as well. If we can make it
work in Scenario 106 we may backfit it into other scenarios - depending on what we learn about how it works? Both Mifune and I -
the mod developers - are not particularly interested in the concept - but at least two players on the RHS mailing list want it. RHS
is open to even minority interests - which is one reason we have multiple scenarios with different options.
RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Start of Game Rules (CRITICAL)
Posted: Mon Jul 16, 2012 6:33 am
by el cid again
There is a common practice among Matrix players to severely restrict Allied movement BEYOND
what code does on the first turn, especially at Pearl Harbor. RHS does NOT do that. The reasoning
follows here:
Game Start: Matrix Options and RHS Mod Elections:
1) Option one, REJECTED: Force the historical start of the war. Base RHS on stock scenario six. This freezes the game results for turn one, defining them from history. No die rolls, no variables, you start with what survived the opening battles. There is considerable historical merit to such a start. Also some practical merit - stock is so broken re aircraft durability that Mifune found it almost tolerable to start this way - at least the Allies lost the right number of planes on the first day! But he found it better to use RHS concepts for plane durability, and AAA values, so the results are closer to right for the whole game.
2) Option two, REJECTED: Start the game without Dec 7 Surprise. This means both sides start even, like any other day. No special effects at all. Clearly events on the first day were NOT like any other. The raid on Clark was the most effective bombing raid of the entire war. Never mind the bombers came in above the heavy AAA - at about 24,000 feet - they hit better than low level bombers did on either side on any other day - due to intensive rehearsal. Allied AAA was uniformly dismal - and when it did shoot - more dangerous to Allied planes than to the enemy! We believe the special effects in the Dec 7 Surprise option are, if unpleasant for the Allies, both reasonable and fair.
3) Option three: ACCEPTED: Start the game WITH Dec 7 Surprise. This means Japanese Task Forces get a movement bonus. At the same time, Allied Task Forces are penalized by losing one of two movement impulses. They are simply slow to form up - and in effect lose 12 hours steaming time. Much of that is reasonable simply because boilers need time to warm up, and crews need time to be recalled. JAPAN knows the war is going to start for sure long before it does - THEIR ships are at sea or ready for sea in a fundamentally different sense than the Allies are. There are also other penalties to die rolls of all kinds, making Japanese attacks more effective, and Allied attacks less so. Again, we think that is reasonable and a fair simulation of history.
4) Standard House Rule option: REJECTED: Most gamers using stock or other mods have a player agreement or "house rule" forcing the Allies to stay in port on the first turn. Often universally. Some even go farther, and forbid other kinds of orders. RHS delegates the decision from the design level to he player level: we PERMIT a player to ELECT to give no orders IF AND WHERE he believes the historical commander would certainly do that. But as designers we do NOT force this on players. Our design intent is to create uncertainty, a wider range of outcomes, and a more interesting campaign. We believe that there is inherently too much knowledge on the first day to begin with, and that players have too much 20-20 hindsight. So we deliberately give SOME power to the players in this matter. Option three bounds it - a hard code Matrix designed set of penalties for the Allies and bonuses for the Japanese. WITHIN that - we further restrict the player with our Primary RHS House Rule:
A player is NEVER to give an order he believes, personally, is not one an operational commander would give. Special case: a player is not allowed to give an order he knows is not physically possible. [For example, it is forbidden to order a RR unit to move not along a rail line - although if it retreated off one - it can move directly back to one] This is considered a real restriction, but also one with uncertainty inherent in it: you never know for sure the opinion of the other player what is "realistic" in every case. So you are forced to consider there are at least possibilities. We think that is more like real life than hard rules are. Be prepared.
IRL Kiddo Butai had five different attack contingencies it was prepared for:
1) All ships, including carriers, are at sea and operating in tactical cooperation, with air cover and supporting land air strikes
2) All ships, including carriers, are in port, and surprise is NOT achieved - so there is CAP and manned AAA at the target
3) All ships, including carriers, are in port, and surprise IS achieved - so there is NO CAP or manned AAA at the target
4) Only the main fleet, sans carriers, are in port, and surprise is NOT achieved - so there is CAP and manned AAA at the target
5) Only the main fleet, sans carriers, are in port, and surprise IS achieved - so there is NO CAP or manned AAA at the target [historical case]
There had been no recon or reports in several days - since the last liner left with two Kempetai officers from the Navy section -
so it was possible ships had left port. In the event both Carrier TFs had done so.
RE: RHS Design Theory: New Aircraft and a Axis Ship Withdrawal Rule
Posted: Wed Aug 01, 2012 1:28 am
by el cid again
On 22 June, 1944, Thai forces staged a coup removing Phibun from power. RTA land and air
units, and Marines all disappear (in RHS). RTN ships need to be "interned" in port. This is
to be achieved by a house rule: on or after that date, Thai ships in port may not form into
a task force or leave port. They can be sunk in port or lost if the port falls, but that is not a
reason to move them. If a ship is at sea on that date, it must head to the nearest Axis port
and auto-disband. It may not be in a TF with any non-Thai ship.
On 7 May, 1945, German naval units in theater are considered to be taken over by the Japanese.
Submarines will be assigned I or Ro numbers - at least for new game starts.
RHS is now using the standard air art for Allied planes from stock, dababes and reluctant admiral.
About eight new Allied plane sub types were added. As well, some additional planes on both sides
now point at art that existed, or now exists, but which was not being used. All the documentation
about plane slots and bitmaps above is now being updated to the new data. Some new art,
added by Mifune, does not yet have tops. The filmstrips will continue to add art until everything
needed is done - and filmstrip updates can occur during a game or test game.
RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Plane CAF Section (REVISED)
Posted: Wed Aug 01, 2012 1:34 am
by el cid again
This material reposted after significant updating at the end of the thread.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Installer
Posted: Wed Aug 01, 2012 1:41 am
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: kevin_hx
btw,When does the RHS mod formally issue?
The installer may release about 1 August
RE: RHS Design Theory: Revised Axis Air Art Pointers
Posted: Sun Aug 05, 2012 8:58 am
by el cid again
Mifune added some new air art and I have revised what planes point at which art.
Because we have the art, 3 more types were added. Still more art is added for
use with his scenario 100 - and even unused art is at least listed under bitmaps
so modders can point at it if they wish. [This is also true of the Allied sections]
Supporting lists are revised (Slot Order List, Axis Bitmap List, JNAF and JAAF
Slot Order Lists)
RE: RHS Design Theory: Arming offensive airstrikes
Posted: Thu Aug 09, 2012 5:19 pm
by elcid
First of all, the idea to include torpedo ordnance at land bases was long proposed by Mifune. He observed that land based air units armed with torpedoes often flew with bombs - even when instructed to use torpedoes. This turns out to be related to how code allocates torpedoes. I finally looked at the matter - because I didn't want to have to change the installer.
When finally I examined the matter, I determined the problem is more general. It also applies to bombs. The number of bomb armed planes is limited by several factors, but not just the number of planes which can fly.
I had major concernes that devices not squads might be treated differently from proper squads. In at least some ways, that seems not to be the case. The system often treats a device for one purpose in one place but as a squad in another place. [For example, a weapon may be a 'squad' when assigned to a land unit, but not when it is on a naval unit.] But when a device is in a land unit, it is listed as a squad, it is tallied in the support requirement, and it increases the supply cost. This has the MAJOR benefit of increasing logistical cost for air units - which is a big problem in AE as some threads have noted. Planes fly almost free. Literally. And the load carried is NOT related to the logistical cost. NOW we can make the base forces which are more likely to arm major air strikes, and those associated with torpedo strikes and bomber attacks cost more. This is similar to adding vehicles which RHS did a while ago - but even more functional - although somewhat abstractly. It makes a base force more likely to arm the planes as desired - but increases the cost of the base force that can do that all the time. It is also now possible to distinguish between Navy and Air Force base forces, base forces of different nations, upper echelon support units, and training support units. And different kinds of small detachments - a recon support element is different from a forward offensive base even if small. For example, a HQ unit with air support repairs planes, or 'fuels them' for a flight - exactly as all units in AE always have done. There are no additional aircraft ordnance or torpedo ordnance elements. A standard base force is the opposite. It has aircraft ordnance up to its aircraft support squad number (or often slightly less than that). Navy Base Forces also get torpedo ordnance - typically at a lower number - variable by nation according to their torpedo usage. Thus - if you only might fly patrol flying boats in a torpedo attack - a typical value might be 12. But if you might support a bomber unit entirely of torpedo bombers, the value might be a major fraction of aircraft ordnance. Dedicated OTU base forces, on the other hand, only get about 1/3 of the aircraft support squads as their aircraft ordnance value. They can arm planes - and better than an air HQ can - but nothing like as efficiently as a combat support base force can. There are many variations on this - and each has proportional logistical impacts. Adding these elements also increases the support requirement, so a combat base force now costs more to move and feed in general, but an air HQ doesn't. Also, those able to arm torpedo attacks more often cost more than those that don't.
RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Installer Issued
Posted: Wed Aug 15, 2012 11:19 am
by el cid again
The RHS installer has been assembled and distributed to the RHS user list.
It contains 8 scenarios - 5 issued and 3 works in progress -
92 May 42 WORK IN PROGRESS by Mifune
100 Greater Asian Prosperity WORK IN PROGRESS (very Japan enhansed) by Mifune
101 CVO (Carrier Oriented, historical, active Russians)
102 AIO (AI Oriented, simplified historical, passive Russians)
103 RPO (Russian Passive Option of 101)
104 RAO (Russian Active Option of 102)
105 EOS (Empire of the Sun - slightly Japan enhansed)
106 DFS (Downfall Scenario) WORK IN PROGRESS and 1945 device/plane testbed
In addition to the single compressed file installer available to anyone on the RHS distribution list,
Scenarios 101 to 105 files, and RHS art files, are separately available on the following site
http://alternatewars.com/Mods/WITP_AE/R ... nario.html
RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Installer Issued
Posted: Sun Aug 19, 2012 11:28 pm
by kevin_hx
ORIGINAL: el cid again
The RHS installer has been assembled and distributed to the RHS user list.
It contains 8 scenarios - 5 issued and 3 works in progress -
92 May 42 WORK IN PROGRESS by Mifune
100 Greater Asian Prosperity WORK IN PROGRESS (very Japan enhansed) by Mifune
101 CVO (Carrier Oriented, historical, active Russians)
102 AIO (AI Oriented, simplified historical, passive Russians)
103 RPO (Russian Passive Option of 101)
104 RAO (Russian Active Option of 102)
105 EOS (Empire of the Sun - slightly Japan enhansed)
106 DFS (Downfall Scenario) WORK IN PROGRESS and 1945 device/plane testbed
In addition to the single compressed file installer available to anyone on the RHS distribution list,
Scenarios 101 to 105 files, and RHS art files, are separately available on the following site
http://alternatewars.com/Mods/WITP_AE/R ... nario.html
When I click the pictures download link, it says "404 Error File Not Found"...
What happens?
RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Installer Issued
Posted: Mon Aug 20, 2012 9:19 pm
by Mifune
Something did go wonky with that web page. Layout also got a bit messy too. I am not on the right computer at the moment. I will fix as soon as possible.
RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS pwhex: Seasonal Construction
Posted: Wed Aug 22, 2012 3:53 pm
by el cid again
Spring 1942
Reactivation of minor RR on New Caledonia (1 hex NW from Noumea)
Monsoon 1942
Fall 1942
Winter 1942
Completion of Iranian National RR spur (2 hexes E from Abadan/Khorramshahr)
Completion of ALCAN highway as pioneer road (segments of 10 trail hexes, 8 trail hexes, and upgrading of 4 winter tail hexes to year around trail in 3 segments between existing road and rail lines in Canada and Alaska)
Spring 1943
Upgrading of Whitehorse & Yukon RR to main line completed (2 hexes NW from Skagway)
Monsoon 1943
Road along Burma-Siam RR line completed (5 hexes SE from Ye)
Winter 1943
Completion of Burma-Siam RR (5 hexes SE from Ye)
Completion of ALCAN highway as secondary road (segments of 10, 8 & 4 trail hexes upgraded to minor road)
Spring 1944
Upgrading of Bengal & Assam RR to main line completed (15 hexes from existing line near Jessore to Ledo including major river bridging; 8 hex spur to Chittagong)
Monsoon 1944
Ledo Road completed to Myitkyina (upgrading 4 trail hexes to minor road)
Winter 1944
Ledo Road completed to existing Burma Road near Lashio (upgrading 3 more trail hexes between Myitkyina and Lashio)
Fall 1945
Completion of Sumatra RR (aka 'the second death railway')
Winter 1945 and Spring 1946 and Summer 1946 (OPTIONAL)
Completion of Burma-Yunnan RR (8 minor RR hexes IF construction not suspended as IRL)
Upgrading ALCAN to primary road (25 minor road hexes upgraded IF construction not suspended as IRL)
Special Case: The Copper River RR is present in ALL versions of the pwhex files. It runs from Cordova, Alaska to Kennicot, a wholly undeveloped dot location. This RR was abandoned in 1938 when the copper mines were closed due to low copper prices. Other copper mines were reopened in WWII (for example in Michigan and in Montana). This copper mine can be reopened IF an Allied player moves engineer to the dot location along with lots of supplies – in which case the RR will function. The Million Dollar Bridge remained in tact until the 1964 earthquake. This location and RR may be ignore by any player who does not want to use them – and NOTHING will move along it – since there will be no production unless the damaged resources are repaired.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Plane additions and revisions
Posted: Sat Aug 25, 2012 11:45 am
by el cid again
Reviewing the Allied turn in test 6A I found in tne NEI that a light
trainer that doubled as a transport - the KNIL L-212 - had the wrong
data. It was still in the old format, not the one we have determined works
best with AE code.
For the sake of clarity - let me break out the unique RHS method of rating
transport ranges. We consider operational range to be the most important.
So we allow transfer range to be wrong. In game terms, extended range is
half (sometimes fuzzy) of transfer range. Further, you define them as the SAME
distance in miles - we use nautical miles and knots since hexes are defined in
nautical miles - but one could use statute miles if one assumed every hex was 46
sm vice 40 nm. USUALLY - if you define them the same - the extended range
in hexes is half the transfer range. If it isn't - increase the transfer range to 1 more than the next increment of 20 - and it will be. To get the actual extended range
right, on average, we define transfer range and extended range as 88% of actual
transfer range. If there is a mismatch, we increase the transfer range a bit, but not the extended range - and that works out every time. The normal range is 80% of the extended range.
OK - so the L-212 was not defined that way. So it needs to be. And if we change it - the data will filter into existing games too. Good.
But when I find a problem, I check all the cousins. I reviewed every transport plane on both sides. I found two actual data issues - with the C-74 and something so obscure I forget its name. I also decided to treat flying boat transports in the same way as land transports unless armed (as the Empire Flying boats with bombs) - in which case they are defined as patrol planes which AE does allow to transport. But defining a transport as a patrol plane produces the weird effect that it can do armed missions - and even without bombs defined will 'hit' targets on patrol!
While I was at it, I realized that a plane I wanted to add - 22 served in the war IRL and the war in RHS can go on another year - can be added - that we had the art in disguised form (as a bomber variant of the plane). So I added the C-69 Constellation, a fairly fabulous transport - with naturally more priority in Scenario 105 responding to the greater Japanese threat in 105. The art was in the 'standard' Allied art we use - for the B-30. Competition for the B-29, it was started way to late to have a shot - and I don't see why the art was put in. But the transport version DID make production in the war - so I wanted it for flavor.
Then I realized - if we can use turretless bomber art for a transport - why not do the variant of the B-29 - known as the C-97? We can use some of the Silverplate art - silver plate is the atomic bombers - without turrets - or the B-39 - which is a conventional bomber also without turrets. So I added that as well. Because the plane could have been in service in an extended war, it is also in all scenarios.
Working that up, I realized there was also art for the C-99. This is a transport version of the B-36, and it was so low in priority only one was ever made - the biggest landplane in the world - second only to the Hughes Flying Boat in size. It was hampered by low priority, but in 105 we allow the B-36 higher priority - and so its transport also can have that. But this monster is really too big - only the Martin Mars in RHS is anything comparable - and only 5 of these were built IRL. So 'production' is only one a month - and only briefly in 1946. Yet there are one and two plane detachments that can have it if a player wants - if they survive until 1946. And it carries more than whole squadrons of normal planes - so much in fact I had to mis state the cargo - there is a code limit of 64 k - it carries 65,500 pounds in game terms - although its max load is - if just troops - 88,000 and if cargo - 100,000 (it broke that once to set a record). It does that transoceanic - vastly greater than even the other 'giant' transports. Since we have the art - why not put it in?
Looking at the art list for the standard set, I noted a plane I do not know. The P-50A.
What is that? It is an F5F-1 - stripped of carrier gear for USAAF. It was dropped in favor of the P-65 which ultimately lost out to the later P-38s. But it is a rather neat two engine, land based interceptor with 2 20mm cannon and 2 .50 cals. It is actually better than early P-38s - which are not impressive - and it could have been produced early. In the face of the increased onslaught in 105, I allowed a limited run - at the expense of Grumman F4Fs for a short while - eventually that gets made up. Once in production at 12 a month, it stays until the P-38L comes along - the first clearly superior option. That happens in the month that drop tanks are allowed to USAAF fighters (air force politics) - so it never did get the range it would have if it could have drop tanks. But it is a rather nice plane in 1942 and 1943 - and it really looks different - and we have the art.
The lists that changed in this thread are not updated. These include List 1 - Slot Order. List 2 - Allied bitmap order. And the USAAF section of List 1.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Plane additions and revisions
Posted: Mon Aug 27, 2012 6:23 pm
by Enforcer
El Cid When do you think the mod will be released?
It sound very interesting and I have not played WITP:AE for a year so This may be fun to do again!
RE: RHS Design Theory: Scenario 105 Kiddo Butai Theory
Posted: Sat Sep 01, 2012 2:52 am
by el cid again
Scenario 105 Kiddo Butai Theory
The original concept for a pure carrier task force (rather than a carrier as an aircraft auxiliary that searched for and tried to damage the enemy fleet prior to the main engagement between the line of battle ships) was that of Vice Admiral Ozawa. Probably the best carrier theorist in the world in 1941, the Doro Nawa Unit (too late planning group) decided he should command the KB on its initial raid against the United States Fleet.
As most students of naval history know, a task force usually has several task groups, and these in turn usually have several task elements. In the case of a pure ship task force, task elements are ships. Naval operational organization differs from naval administrative organization, although sometimes an administrative unit is also an operational one. In administrative terms, KB included three carrier divisions, a division of battleships, a division of cruisers, and most of a destroyer squadron (which on paper would include a light cruiser and 12 destroyers - but the number 12 was always to included ships not available for actual operations - so operational numbers were always slightly less than that,) But in operational terms, another of admiral Ozawa's concepts was the formation of operational task groups which included carriers, heavy cruisers or fast battleships, and destroyer. As taught on paper, there could be three such task groups. In practice, when he commanded in a carrier battle later in the war, two were formed.
In scenario 105 two major task groups are formed named Kiddo Butai Div 1 and 2. Division 1 includes the older ships, some of them not able to make the modern fleet speed of 36 knots. That includes Akagi and Kaga, and both Kongos, as well as the original CL and the original Yugumo class destroyer assigned to the task force, and 4 Kageros. Division 2 includes the faster Shokaku and Zuikaku, both Tone class cruisers, a CL not historically asigned, the Yugumo herself, and the other four Kagero's originally assigned. Hiryu and Soryu are split - one to each division - not because they do not form a natural division which can be the foundation of a task force but because enough escorts could not be found to permit three task groups given all the other operations in the start of war plan. It also represents probably the ultimate of operational efficiency in the era. By midwar, the USN was operating groups of three carriers - typically two CV and a CVL. The time to assemble air strikes is less, and the loss of a carrier to battle damage is less catastrophic to the fate of the task group - making its ultimate success more likely. In the case of Scenario 105, these two task groups are together, with 2 assigned to follow 1. Division 2 is commanded by Rear Admiral Yamaguchi, possibly the second most able Japanese carrier commander.
In Scenario 105, there is also a Ni Butai - Ni meaning 2 or Second. In stock and most mods, this Task Force is called "IJN Cruisers" - although in fact it is a carrier task force with CVL Ryujo. Here we add the CVL Zuiho to the task group/force, add the fourth member of the CA division back, and add a CL as well. The assigned commander is Rear Admiral Fujita, one of the best carrier commanders - because the only better choice - Admiral Nugumo - is a Vice Admiral - too important for a mere glorified CVL division. The only 'real' CVE - Taiho - replaces Zuiho at Kure, where it joins Hosho - a nominal CVL classified as a CVE.
In Scenario 105, there also are differences in the assigned aircraft. Most significant of these is the inclusion of a recon variant of the Kate - precursor of a concept IJN later developed more widely. Prototype recon versions of Val were introduced at Midway, and later in the war the C6N1 was developed and intended for late war use on every large carrier. Here the two existing prototype C3N1s are joined by converted B5N1s (to the same standard) - in a lovely camo finish designed to make the planes hard to see. Both Hiryu and Soryu get a flight, and Akagi, with its larger capacity, gets an entire squadron (termed 'unit' by JNAF). In addition, both the CLs are assigned an D11A1 Laura night reconnaissance "floatplane" - so classified because it operates from small ships - it really is a tiny flying boat - like the Walrus. Designed to fly all night so it can land in daylight, painted entirely black, these represent a unique JNAF development. In this case, the planes included the special "night glasses" issued by IJN - something RHS also puts on major warships. "Night Glasses" is a device that is a fairly low probability of detection radar in software terms. The idea of these planes is to try to track all night an enemy force detected the previous day - permitting a dawn engagement without needing to search for it.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Scenario 105 Kiddo Butai Theory
Posted: Sat Sep 01, 2012 6:30 am
by moonraker65
Has the website been updated for getting hold of the RHS scenarios ? The one listed further back keeps giving a 404 error