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If you are going to allow the Japanese player ahistorical unconstrained access to all resources, then you have to do the same for the Allied player.

1. The IJN's war against the US and the drive for the SRA were not the IJA's priority. Priority for the IJA was: 1) maintaining the strength of their forces in Manchuria for a future war with the USSR or to take advantage of further German successes in European Russia, 2) maintain and extend Japan's position in China and on the Chungking regime (ROC) to come to terms with the Japanese. The Central and SW Pacific came in a very far last even behind Malaya, Burma and the NEI. This is why the total IJA involvement in the SW Pacific in Dec 41 and early 42 was a RCT, the 144th and a only total of 11 div equivalents were released in Dec 41 for ops to secure the SRA.
2. There was no unified management of Japanese sealift before 1944 (or for the US at this time either). The IJN, the IJA and the civilian government all had there own transport fleets. The IJA, IJN and the civilians would not share hulls or even schedules, so that IJA transports delivering troops to Rangoon came back only partially filled with raw materiels and captured equipment destined for the IJA's programs. This is what so severely constrained the ability of the Japanese to execute large ops and to sustain the successes of the first phase ops. This is why there is not enough transport to carry five Army divs to Hawaii or Australia and sustain them there. This why Japanese ops in subsidiary areas like the SW Pacific were sequential in nature, since the same limited assets had to used over and over to execute landing operations.
3. The historic question that the Japanese player has to solve is how to achieve his strategic objectives of securing the SRA and defending it till a favorable peace was achieved with the limited resources available to him. This is why such strategic decisions as PH, no PH or a by-pass strategy have such an impact, because each option uses those limited resources differently, creating different event sequences and presenting the Allied player with different problems and opportunities. If you de-constrain the Japanese player, allowing him to use transport capacity ahistorically however he wishes and access air and land forces in China, Manchuria and the Home Islands that were not historical available, then you have produced a unbalanced game historically and reduced the challenge to the Japanese player to find the solution that eluded his historical counterparts. You must then allow the Allied player the same freedom to make strategic decisions and de-constrain his access to resources, such as using both the USN and US Army transport fleets interchangably, reducing or eliminating garrisions in Alaska, Panama or the US or to access industrial output and forces originally dedicated to North Africa and Europe.

Hey buddy, did you forget Yamato?
Remember that the Kongos would probably be supporting the Kido Butai and the heavy cruiser/destroyer torpedo strike forces.
So 7 vs. 7. But then there's Yamato. The fire control systems are even (Type 94 vs. Mk.20 or Mk.31 w/Mk.3 FCR), so the question is who has aerial supremacy and air spotting. If the Japanese have control of the air over the battleline, then they have a minimum 3,000yd advantage in effective range (14", 16.1" at 7,000 yds and 18.1" at 9,000 yds.) The IJN battleline would have a three knot speed advantage allowing it to better position itself at its optimum engagement range. If the four Kongos show up, then the Japanese BBs can engage and hold the US battleline, while the Kongos cap the "T" with a 3,000yd range advantage and the lead US ships are forced to choose between splitting their forward turrets between two groups of targets. With a three knot deficit, the US battleline would find it difficult to disengage. If the Kongos are there, it will be even harder to break off. And the battleline fight isn't the only game. The clash of the carriers and light forces would setup the clash of the Battlelines. Basically I wouldn't want to be the US commander at this fight.

LTCMTS-
I agree the IJN is superior on paper to the US Fleet, but your scenario assumes an awful lot. Bad weather, luck, allied damage control all could play a part in such a battleline encounter. US Intel also cant be discounted... Speaking of which, any word from the testers on how Ultra is going to be handled?

Sure, but it was the IJN that trained at night and in bad weather, advantage IJN. (The Mk.3 (FC) FCR had problems with heavy rain)
Intel? The USN had not broken JN-25 sufficiently to read operationally. That wouldn't happen till April. So Kimmel/Pye/Nimitz is limited to B-17s, PBYs and SBDs. With a 3 or 4 to 6 CV disadvantage.
Luck? Luck usually washes both ways.
Damage control? At this point in the war, USN damage control was not significantly superior to the IJN's.
Conditions, at 6 to 3 or 4 in CVs, I have a feeling the US battleline will be fighting off the Vals and Kates, while dodging the "Long Lances" even before the surface engagement. Some of the USN BBs might not enter the climactic engagement in the best of shape.
And the subs will be basically a wash, with the US problems with skippers and torpedoes and the US ASW superiority over the big "I" boats.

There's no compelling evidence that Japanese night training gave them any advantage in gun accuracy and lots of anecdotal evidence to indicate that despite the training and allegedly better spotting systems their shooting was relatively poor compared to Allied gunnery.

What a night engagement does:

1. Obviate IJN speed advantage.
2. Obviate Yamato class' range advantage.
3. Put the Type 93a torpedo in play.

Originally posted by mdiehl
There's no compelling evidence that Japanese night training gave them any advantage in gun accuracy and lots of anecdotal evidence to indicate that despite the training and allegedly better spotting systems their shooting was relatively poor compared to Allied gunnery.

What a night engagement does:

1. Obviate IJN speed advantage.
2. Obviate Yamato class' range advantage.
3. Put the Type 93a torpedo in play.

Regardless of Mdiehl's naysaying almost all authors I have read
credit the Jap training with some measure of usefullness.

The fact is that in the Solomon Islands the Jap lookouts
several time spotted USN task forces at night, before USN Radar.

Originally posted by LTCMTS
Hey buddy, did you forget Yamato?
Remember that the Kongos would probably be supporting the Kido Butai and the heavy cruiser/destroyer torpedo strike forces.
So 7 vs. 7. But then there's Yamato. The fire control systems are even (Type 94 vs. Mk.20 or Mk.31 w/Mk.3 FCR), so the question is who has aerial supremacy and air spotting. If the Japanese have control of the air over the battleline, then they have a minimum 3,000yd advantage in effective range (14", 16.1" at 7,000 yds and 18.1" at 9,000 yds.) The IJN battleline would have a three knot speed advantage allowing it to better position itself at its optimum engagement range. If the four Kongos show up, then the Japanese BBs can engage and hold the US battleline, while the Kongos cap the "T" with a 3,000yd range advantage and the lead US ships are forced to choose between splitting their forward turrets between two groups of targets. With a three knot deficit, the US battleline would find it difficult to disengage. If the Kongos are there, it will be even harder to break off. And the battleline fight isn't the only game. The clash of the carriers and light forces would setup the clash of the Battlelines. Basically I wouldn't want to be the US commander at this fight.

Nope, I was talking specifically about the effects of the PH losses on operations in the first few months of the war. If I recall, the Yamato was still running trials until late spring 42. Even when she joined the Fleet, Yamamoto considered her gunnery proficiency well below par. But if you are going to prematurely add the Yamato to the mix in early 42 then you should also add the North Carolina which was also going thru her shakedown cruise in the Caribean.

Yes the battleline fight isnt the only game, but none of the CAs or CVs were sunk or damaged in the PH attack while only 3 CLs and 3 DDs were damaged. I dont think these minor temporary losses can be said to have somehow delayed a USN counter offensive. Which is my point. It is comonly stated that the US was put on the defensive BECAUSE of the losses of PH. When in fact the USN did exactly what was stipulated in Rainbow-5, not withstanding Kimmels audacious WP46, which stretched his mandate to "Raid" to the extreme.

I agree that the PH losses prevented WP46, but that can be said to be a positive to the USN and a negative to the IJN. It can be said that implementation of WP46 would have served the IJN better than PH.

In any case. The salient point is that what time did the PH attack buy the Japanese? If WP46 was inacted the IJN certainly wouldnt have to take up Kimmels challenged unless they wanted to. It isnt as though the Pac Fleet was going to sail to rescue the PI. If they did they would be doing exactly what the IJN wanted them to. The Pac Fleet wasnt goint to sail to the NEI either.

Regardless of Mdiehl's naysaying almost all authors I have read credit the Jap training with some measure of usefullness.

The fact is that in the Solomon Islands the Jap lookouts
several time spotted USN task forces at night, before USN Radar.

Both statements demonstrate that a biased observer sees or counts only the things to which their prejudices dispose them. The "facts" include that in some Solomons engagements USN lookouts spotted IJN ships before either the US radar or Japanese spotting scopes registered an opponent.

Originally posted by mdiehl
Both statements demonstrate that a biased observer sees or counts only the things to which their prejudices dispose them. The "facts" include that in some Solomons engagements USN lookouts spotted IJN ships before either the US radar or Japanese spotting scopes registered an opponent.

Does not in any way impact the validity of the original assertion.
The assertion remains true.

I'll bite the bullet, what does SRA stand for?

Originally posted by MemoryLeak
I'll bite the bullet, what does SRA stand for?

Southern Resource Area

Japan's name for Dutch and British possestions

Thank you for the quick reply. I read all of the posts on this site and UV's site. Very interesting.

Originally posted by MemoryLeak
I'll bite the bullet, what does SRA stand for?

Southern Resource Area (SRA), i.e. the Dutch East Indies (DEI) & Malaysia.

The Northern Resource Area (NRA) refers in general to the area north of the Korean and Manchurian/Manchukwo borders, i.e. Siberia.

That didn't hurt a bit now, did it

-g

mdiehl-
The IJN's superiority in night fighting is fairly well documented. Of course there are always exceptions, but it was a fact that the optics on Japanese spotting and targeting scopes were far superior to those on the US ships at the time. This alone provides a huge advantage at night.

ltcmts-
I still don't buy that the US fleet will get taken to the cleaners in a climactic battle, but I guess thats one for the modders to deal with once this game comes out...

The IJN's superiority in night fighting is fairly well documented. Of course there are always exceptions, but it was a fact that the optics on Japanese spotting and targeting scopes were far superior to those on the US ships at the time. This alone provides a huge advantage at night.

The IJN's "superiority in night fighting" is a self propagating myth. Using the phrase "in night fighting" instantly washes away all the details that make fighting fighting. The myth works something like this:

The Japanese trained hard at fighting in adverse conditions.
They had superior spotting binoculars.
They won several engagements.
Therefore it follows that they were superior at night fighting.

The FACTS are that:

Despite all the intensive night training, Japanese night gunnery accuracy varied from "really great, when the enemy was surprised and backlit by float plane flares" (as at Savo) to "abysmally crappy" (in the final sortie of Houston and Perth) and "markedly inferior to optically ranged Allied gunfire accuracy" in 1942 at 1st and 2nd Guadalcanal, for example.

Japanese optical spotting allowed them to spot the Allies first about half the time in 1942. No advantage there IN FACT despite the observation that their optical spotting equipment was better than Allied optical spotting equipment.

The Japanese had a huge advantage in one weapon (the Type 93a) which, when all other elements worked in their favor (spotting, weather, relative amounts of fatigue on Allied vs. Japanese ships) became potentially significant.

At some point an elegant theory ("Japanese superiority in night fighting") collapses under the weight of DATA (Japanese won about as many engagements in 1942 as they lost measured either in numbers ships sonk or aggregate tonnage or displacement) and details of analysis. The only advantage that the IJN possessed in night fighting was a better torpedo and a doctrine at the CRUISER level that emphasized the weapon. USN DDs had teh same doctrine, but largely weren't allowed to imlpement it when subordinated to a CRUISER admiral.

Originally posted by mdiehl
The IJN's "superiority in night fighting" is a self propagating myth. Using the phrase "in night fighting" instantly washes away all the details that make fighting fighting. The myth works something like this:

The Japanese trained hard at fighting in adverse conditions.
They had superior spotting binoculars.
They won several engagements.
Therefore it follows that they were superior at night fighting.

The FACTS are that:

Despite all the intensive night training, Japanese night gunnery accuracy varied from "really great, when the enemy was surprised and backlit by float plane flares" (as at Savo) to "abysmally crappy" (in the final sortie of Houston and Perth) and "markedly inferior to optically ranged Allied gunfire accuracy" in 1942 at 1st and 2nd Guadalcanal, for example.

Japanese optical spotting allowed them to spot the Allies first about half the time in 1942. No advantage there IN FACT despite the observation that their optical spotting equipment was better than Allied optical spotting equipment.

The Japanese had a huge advantage in one weapon (the Type 93a) which, when all other elements worked in their favor (spotting, weather, relative amounts of fatigue on Allied vs. Japanese ships) became potentially significant.

At some point an elegant theory ("Japanese superiority in night fighting") collapses under the weight of DATA (Japanese won about as many engagements in 1942 as they lost measured either in numbers ships sonk or aggregate tonnage or displacement) and details of analysis. The only advantage that the IJN possessed in night fighting was a better torpedo and a doctrine at the CRUISER level that emphasized the weapon. USN DDs had teh same doctrine, but largely weren't allowed to imlpement it when subordinated to a CRUISER admiral.

So what your saying Mdiehl, is that you agree with Matrix.
Since matrix suppresses the true role played by the Jap torpedoe,
they have no advantage in surface combat.

Actually your wrong.

If you read 'Destroyer Captain' By Hara, you will find that
the Jap torpedoe doctrine had a MUCH higher chance of actually hitting, and he explains WHY.

At Tassaforanga...Tanaka was SURPRISED totally by Wright.

As I am sure you know, the 'theorhetical' kludge that Matrix has
added, ONLY works if the JAPS get surprised.

There is NO mechanism that allows Tassaforanga to be duplicated.

So you are actually supporting my existing complaints about the surface combat model.

If you read 'Destroyer Captain' By Hara, you will find that
the Jap torpedoe doctrine had a MUCH higher chance of actually hitting, and he explains WHY.

And yet, the hit rate (proportion of torpedoes fired in surface engagements to hits) was comparable between the Allied forces and the Japanese ones. This is what I mean when I say that "at some point a theory, however elegant, must fall in the face of DATA." You can fixate on strategy, tactics, training, doctrine and weapon systems theory all you want. The FACT is that the mean IJN hit rate was about 3%. At night, around 7%. In their best engagements, around 12%. And that's about the rate that Allied forces achieved under comparable circumstances. So all of that presumedly superior training and doctrine bought was parity.

I do not have a problem with the AARs comments about the frequency with which IJN torp attacks provide decisive outcomes. UV does not give, from what I've read, ANY option for a torpedo-only night surface attack to Allied vessels, despite the fact that the Allies did it FIRST (in January 1942) and did it better throughout 1943.

Originally posted by mdiehl
And yet, the hit rate (proportion of torpedoes fired in surface engagements to hits) was comparable between the Allied forces and the Japanese ones. This is what I mean when I say that "at some point a theory, however elegant, must fall in the face of DATA." You can fixate on strategy, tactics, training, doctrine and weapon systems theory all you want. The FACT is that the mean IJN hit rate was about 3%. At night, around 7%. In their best engagements, around 12%. And that's about the rate that Allied forces achieved under comparable circumstances. So all of that presumedly superior training and doctrine bought was parity.

I do not have a problem with the AARs comments about the frequency with which IJN torp attacks provide decisive outcomes. UV does not give, from what I've read, ANY option for a torpedo-only night surface attack to Allied vessels, despite the fact that the Allies did it FIRST (in January 1942) and did it better throughout 1943.

That is the problem with making an evaluation on statistics,
rather than actual outcome.

Whatever. Stats are facts. Interpretations are interpretations. Interpretations that are not supported by the stats are worth nuthin.

Originally posted by mdiehl
Whatever. Stats are facts. Interpretations are interpretations. Interpretations that are not supported by the stats are worth nuthin.

Statistics that dont reflect reality are worth nothing.
Using YOUR stats, Tassaforonga never happened.

Men make their own odds in war.