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Erich von Manstein

For the most part, Manstein achieved most of his successes against inferior troop quality in the west and in Russia:

Successes:

* in 1938, took part in the German take-over of the Sudetenland as the Chief of Staff to General von Leeb

* On February 1st of 1940, he received the command of 38th Infantry Corps to invade France

* June 22nd to 26th, von Manstein advanced over 320km, while capturing bridges across Duna River yet failed to capture the city of Leningrad.

* he secured the Crimea and eventually took Sevastopol


********************************

However, Manstein's failures were of a greater consequence to Germany's strategic position:

FAILURES:

* August of 1942, von Manstein was once again in charge of forces attacking the city of Leningrad and FAILED to capture it.

* In November, 1942 Erich von Manstein received the command of newly formed Army Group Don, which was made up of Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, Paulus's 6th Army (entirely trapped in Stalingrad) and 3rd Romanian Army. He was ordered to relieve the 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army trapped in the city of Stalingrad. Von Manstein started his attack on December 12th and by 24th was within 50km from "Fortress Stalingrad", when his advance was halted and he was forced into 200km long retreat, which continued until February of 1943. He FAILED again.

* von Manstein's Army Group South FAILED in its attack at Kursk in 1943.

* After the unsuccessful outcome of the Operation "Citadel" (July/August of 1943), Erich von Manstein was driven into a long RETREAT by the Russian counteroffensive.

* In late January, 1944 Manstein was forced to RETREAT further westwards by the new Soviet offensive.

* On March 30th of 1944, Erich von Manstein was dismissed by Adolf Hitler.

Different commanders, different theatres, each with their own set of problems. 'Jungle' could be equally as varied as the 'open plains of Western Europe'. Patton never had to deal with the Monsoon, crumbling (or non-existent) roads, relying on air transport for much of his logistical support. Additionally, I think describing Slim as 'an infantry commander' is about as accurate as calling Patton 'A Tank Commander'.

Von Rom,I note you avoided to mention Mansteins brilliant victory at Kharkov and the reason he was sacked by Hitler (disagreeing with the little corporals 'military genius' once too often[:)]). Balance please[:)]

Back to Slim momentarily, head over to http://198.231.69.12/papers/amsc1/040.html for a good analysis of Slim's generalship in India and Burma in WW2. It's a scholastic work and is well researched and annotated.

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Different commanders, different theatres, each with their own set of problems. 'Jungle' could be equally as varied as the 'open plains of Western Europe'. Patton never had to deal with the Monsoon, crumbling (or non-existent) roads, relying on air transport for much of his logistical support. Additionally, I think describing Slim as 'an infantry commander' is about as accurate as calling Patton 'A Tank Commander'.

Slim was essentially an infantry commander - look at the OoB of 14th army.

He fought in ONE theatre with jungle terrain.

Patton dealt with desert, heat, and winter in a variety of terrain, from severe rains and flooding in Lorraine to severe winter storms in the Bulge.

Plus before the Lorraine Campaign, Patton lost half of Third Army, lost half his airforce, had few supplies and little gas. . .

Patton commanded a wide variety of green armies, while Slim had only the 14th.

Slim retreated and lost battles. Patton NEVER retreated and never lost a campaign.

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Von Rom,I note you avoided to mention Mansteins brilliant victory at Kharkov and the reason he was sacked by Hitler (disagreeing with the little corporals 'military genius' once too often[:)]). Balance please[:)]

Kharkov:

Both Hausser and von Manstein knew that the Russians were not able to expend more effort at this time, and that their lines of supply were now dangerously outstretched. The Russian men were exhausted from months of relentless fighting. Von Manstein asked and received 12 tank divisions - the largest concentration of Panzerdivisionen so far - for an armoured counterassault against the Russian salient that had formed at Kharkov. He envisaged an assault from three sides, and the SS-Panzerkorps would be the head of the pincer that would destroy the Russian divisons around Kharkov.

Yes, Manstein achieved his victory against an exhausted and spent Russian army that was at the end of its supply lines, and that eventaully surrendered in droves.

It was also a costly German victory.

OK, ONE major victory for Manstein after 1942 - yet ALL of his other battles were FAILURES.

So, I agree - more balance is needed when looking at Manstein [;)]

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Back to Slim momentarily, head over to http://198.231.69.12/papers/amsc1/040.html for a good analysis of Slim's generalship in India and Burma in WW2. It's a scholastic work and is well researched and annotated.

I am not disagreeing that Slim was a good commander.

However, to compare him to Patton is like comparing apples and oranges.

More on von Manstein and the War in the East

The Nazis deliberately used famine as a political weapon in the East, and it soon became the largest single killer.

As the German invasion of the USSR began, General (later Field Marshal) Erich von Manstein told the Wehrmacht that the Soviet population *had to be* starved and that nothing:

"...may, out of a sense of mistaken humaneness, be distributed to prisoners or to the population - unless they are in the service of the German Wehrmacht."


Other features of military regulations promulgated by von Manstein on the eve of the war include orders for the immediate liquidation of all captured Soviet political officers or leaders, summary executions for civilians who 'participate or want to participate' in resistance to German troops, and "collective measures of force", which soon came to mean murder of entire populations of villages, including children-to punish hamlets in which 'malicious attacks [against the Wehrmacht] of any kind whatsoever' had taken place.

German soldiers who had committed what would otherwise be crimes under Germany's own military code were not to be prosecuted if their acts had taken place "out of bitterness against . . . carriers of the Jewish-Bolshevik [sic] system."

Manstein later claimed at his trial for war crimes that the starvation order had escaped his memory entirely. He was convicted by a British tribunal and sentenced to eighteen years in prison, but he obtained release in 1952 after serving fewer than three years of his term. The former field marshal eventually became an adviser to the West German Defense Ministry.


[Source: Simpson, Christopher. 1988. Blowback: America's recruitment of Nazis and its effects on the Cold War. New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. (pp.14 and 15)]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Different commanders, different theatres, each with their own set of problems. 'Jungle' could be equally as varied as the 'open plains of Western Europe'. Patton never had to deal with the Monsoon, crumbling (or non-existent) roads, relying on air transport for much of his logistical support. Additionally, I think describing Slim as 'an infantry commander' is about as accurate as calling Patton 'A Tank Commander'.

Slim was essentially an infantry commander - look at the OoB of 14th army.

He fought in ONE theatre with jungle terrain.

Patton dealt with desert, heat, and winter in a variety of terrain, from severe rains and flooding in Lorraine to severe winter storms in the Bulge.

Plus before the Lorraine Campaign, Patton lost half of Third Army, lost half his airforce, had few supplies and little gas. . .

Patton commanded a wide variety of green armies, while Slim had only the 14th.

Slim retreated and lost battles. Patton NEVER retreated and never lost a campaign.

As has been pointed out, India and Burma are not just jungle! 14th Army was a heterogenuous collection of units from various nations, many of them of dubious quality and reliability - Slim had to weld them together into an effective fighting force. Slim never had the benefit of overwhelming air superiority nor access to the latest equipment. Patton NEVER faced the kind of adverse conditions Slim did.

The comparison you make between Patton and Slim over retreating and losing battles is not a good one. As is well known, Hannibal is everywhere regarded as one of the great commanders of all time as well as being Pattons military hero. Yet Hannibal failed in his campaign against the Romans in Italy and was decisively defeated at Zama before ignominiously ending his own life on the run from Roman justice.

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Erich von Manstein

For the most part, Manstein achieved most of his successes against inferior troop quality in the west and in Russia:

Bit like Patton in Western Europe then[;)]

I'm not going to get involved in a major discussion on Patton again (please, I have a life[:D]).

On Manstein, I'm going to 'crib' this summary of his military career from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_von_Manstein - it reflects the problems he faced in many of the battles he commanded in, especially when considerably outnumbered on the Eastern Front and regularly hamstrung by Hitlers interference and intransigence. I'd like to go into more depth but I'm away for a few days so hopefully another can take up the cudgels[;)]

"During the Operation Fall Weiss, the German invasion of Poland, he served as chief of staff to the Army Group South under Gerd von Rundstedt. He was first to strike into Warsaw's suburbs, and when the remainder of the Polish army moved east he closed off the encirclement and was the main force in the total destruction of the encirclement. This was considered his first mark of genius.

In 1940 Manstein worked with Blumentritt and von Tresckow to develop the plan to invade France. He suggested that the tank troops should decisively attack through the wooded hills of the Ardennes, where no one would expect them, seize bridges on the Meuse River before striking eastwards, thus outflanking the Maginot Line and cutting off strong French and Allied Armies in the Belgium and Flanders from the French mainland.

OKW originally rejected the proposal, but Hitler, looking for a innovative new methods of waging war, approved of a modified version, Fall Gelb, that later became known as the Manstein Plan. Manstein was then sent back to Silesia and did not take part in the operation until the final stages when he served under Günther von Kluge. The plan was so successful that Manstein was awarded the Knight's Cross for planning it and made into a General.

In February 1941, Manstein was appointed commander of the 56th Panzer Corps. He was involved in Operation Barbarossa where he served under General Erich Hoepner. Attacking on 22nd June 1941, Manstein advanced more than 100 miles in only two days and was able to seize the important bridges at Dvinsk. The following month he captured Demyansk and Torzhok.

Manstein was appointed commander of Eleventh Army in September 1941, and was given the task of conquering the Crimea. The Red Army defended Sevastopol and this important Black Sea naval base was not taken until late June 1942. Promoted to Field Marshal on July 1, Manstein was sent to the Leningrad front. This led to a series of bitter battles where Manstein's inferior forces managed to outmaneuver superior Soviet forces, and the loss of over 60,000 men over the next few months.

In November 1942, during the Battle of Stalingrad, Adolf Hitler appointed Manstein the commander of the Army Group Don (Heeresgruppe Don) and ordered him to rescue the Sixth Army of Friedrich Paulus that was encircled inside the city. Placed in charge of a hastily assembled group of tired men and machines, he got his three panzer divisions to within 35 miles of the city, at this point Manstein pleaded that the 6th Army attempt a break out, but Hitler refused to issue such an order, and ordered the 6th Army to stay in the besieged city. A massive Red Army attack at another point on the line forced Manstein to divert his forces to help hard-pressed Army Group A in its retreat from the Caucasus to the Ukraine, thus avoiding the complete collapse of the entire front.

Manstein regrouped and the following year inflicted a heavy defeat on the Soviets at Krasnograd. An estimated 23,000 Soviet soldiers were killed and a further 9,000 were captured. Manstein now went on to recapture Kharkov and Belgorod with 2nd SS Panzer Corps. In recognition for this action, he received the Oak Leaves for the Knight's Cross in March 1943. Manstein then proposed a daring action for the summer to outflank the Red Army into the Sea of Azov at Rostov, but Hitler instead chose to back the more conventional Operation Citadel aimed at crushing the Kursk salient.

During the Citadel Manstein led the southern pincer, and despite immense losses he managed to complete most of his initial goals, but due the almost complete failure of the northern pincer, as well as the Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Italy, Hitler decided to call off the offensive. Manstein protested, asserting that the victory was almost at hand. After the failure of Citadel the Soviets launched a massive counterattack on the exhausted German forces.

In September he withdrew to the west bank of the Dnieper River, while inflicting heavy casualties on the Red Army. From October to mid January of 1944, von Manstein "stabilized" the situation but in late January was forced to retreat further westwards by the Soviet offensive. In mid-February of 1944, von Manstein disobeyed Hitler's order and ordered 11th and 42nd Corps (consisting of 56,000 men in six divisions) of Army Group South (Heeresegruppe Süd) to break out from the "Korsun Pocket", which occurred on February 16/17th. Eventually, Hitler accepted this action and ordered the breakout after it already took place.

Manstein continued to argue with Hitler about overall strategy and in March 1944 he was relieved of his command. On 2 April 1944 Colonel-General (later Field Marshal) Walther Model replaced him as commander of Southern Army Group. Nevertheless Manstein received the Swords for his Knight's Cross, the highest German military honour. After his dismissal he entered an eye clinic in Breslau, recuperated near Dresden, and then retired. Although he did not take part in the attempt to kill Hitler in July 1944, he was aware of it. In late January of 1945 he collected his family from their homes in Liegnitz and evacuated them to western Germany."

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Different commanders, different theatres, each with their own set of problems. 'Jungle' could be equally as varied as the 'open plains of Western Europe'. Patton never had to deal with the Monsoon, crumbling (or non-existent) roads, relying on air transport for much of his logistical support. Additionally, I think describing Slim as 'an infantry commander' is about as accurate as calling Patton 'A Tank Commander'.

Slim was essentially an infantry commander - look at the OoB of 14th army.

He fought in ONE theatre with jungle terrain.

Patton dealt with desert, heat, and winter in a variety of terrain, from severe rains and flooding in Lorraine to severe winter storms in the Bulge.

Plus before the Lorraine Campaign, Patton lost half of Third Army, lost half his airforce, had few supplies and little gas. . .

Patton commanded a wide variety of green armies, while Slim had only the 14th.

Slim retreated and lost battles. Patton NEVER retreated and never lost a campaign.

As has been pointed out, India and Burma are not just jungle! 14th Army was a heterogenuous collection of units from various nations, many of them of dubious quality and reliability - Slim had to weld them together into an effective fighting force. Slim never had the benefit of overwhelming air superiority nor access to the latest equipment. Patton NEVER faced the kind of adverse conditions Slim did.

The comparison you make between Patton and Slim over retreating and losing battles is not a good one. As is well known, Hannibal is everywhere regarded as one of the great commanders of all time as well as being Pattons military hero. Yet Hannibal failed in his campaign against the Romans in Italy and was decisively defeated at Zama before ignominiously ending his own life on the run from Roman justice.

As has been pointed out, India and Burma are not just jungle! 14th Army was a heterogenuous collection of units from various nations, many of them of dubious quality and reliability - Slim had to weld them together into an effective fighting force. Slim never had the benefit of overwhelming air superiority nor access to the latest equipment. Patton NEVER faced the kind of adverse conditions Slim did.

14th Army was essentially an INFANTRY army.

Slim lost his early battles and was driven back into India.

He fought essentially INFANTRY-type battles.

Patton never faced adverse conditons? [8|]

Please examine the Lorraine Campaign more closely (bad weather and terrible flooding) meant NO air support. He also lost HALF his army and airforce before the campaign even began. He was also low on ammo and artillery shells.

Please do more readng on the Bulge - he did what NO other Allied or German commander thought was possible: he moved three divisions 150 miles in 48 hours in the worst winter storms to hit the Ardennes in decades, and ALL without air support.

Most of the time he had to work with green troops and was always running low on supplies and fuel (Lorraine).

The comparison you make between Patton and Slim over retreating and losing battles is not a good one. As is well known, Hannibal is everywhere regarded as one of the great commanders of all time as well as being Pattons military hero. Yet Hannibal failed in his campaign against the Romans in Italy and was decisively defeated at Zama before ignominiously ending his own life on the run from Roman justice

What's your point?

Patton NEVER lost - Slim did.

Slim was a relatively good commander fighting in a limited theatre (Burma) with essentially an infantry army.

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Erich von Manstein

For the most part, Manstein achieved most of his successes against inferior troop quality in the west and in Russia:

Bit like Patton in Western Europe then[;)]

No.

The Germans were fighting do - or - die battles, and were man for man still better than the Polish, Flemish and French forces in 1940.

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

[clipped for space]

On Manstein, I'm going to 'crib' this summary of his military career from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_von_Manstein - it reflects the problems he faced in many of the battles he commanded in, especially when considerably outnumbered on the Eastern Front and regularly hamstrung by Hitlers interference and intransigence. I'd like to go into more depth but I'm away for a few days so hopefully another can take up the cudgels[;)]

As I mentioned before:

Manstein, as many German Generals did, achieved his early blitzkrieg victories against inferior forces in Poland, Belgium, Denmark, France and in Barbarossa (against ill equipped and poorly trained Russian troops).

Manstein failed to take Leningrad (twice); failed to relieve Stalingrad; failed at Kursk; and failed to stem the Soviet advances.

He did achieve a temporary victory at Kharkov - but even this was against exhausted and worn out Soviet troops, who surrendered in droves. But he failed to stop their advances.

Manstein had a policy of starving the Soviet populace; he did not join the conspirators to kill Hitler as Rommel, Stauffenberg, etc did; and he was sentenced to 18 years in prison for war crimes.

VR,
Your posts about Mainstein in regards to his crimes are noted, he was a bad person in that he did little to feed an enemy populace. I consider him an above average example of the german officer corp, do you really think with aduquit supplies and manpower levels he would have "failed"?

vonRom
Just a short question: Is there any commander from any other country participating in ww2 that is Pattons equal or better in your opinion?

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

As I mentioned before:

Manstein, as many German Generals did, achieved his early blitzkrieg victories against inferior forces in Poland, Belgium, Denmark, France and in Barbarossa (against ill equipped and poorly trained Russian troops).

Manstein failed to take Leningrad (twice); failed to relieve Stalingrad; failed at Kursk; and failed to stem the Soviet advances.

Yeah, that's one way to put it. [8|] One can also argue that Stalingrad was a failure because the 6th Army and 4th Panzer had their hands tied as they were not allowed to cross the Volga. Had they done that, Stalingrad could have been taken in a matter of weeks. It's not necessarily Manstein's fault that the rules of the game were changed - by his own superiors.

Also, it's true that he failed to relieve Stalingrad. But the fact that he was successful in closing the absolutely enormous hole left after the collapse of 6th Army says more. There were literally no units in the rear, yet the Soviet offensive after Operation Saturn was stopped.

He did achieve a temporary victory at Kharkov - but even this was against exhausted and worn out Soviet troops, who surrendered in droves. But he failed to stop their advances.

With arguments like this it's easy to belittle anything, the same could (I guess) be said about Operation Overlord. And the Wehrmacht, too, was exhausted and worn out.

Manstein had a policy of starving the Soviet populace; he did not join the conspirators to kill Hitler as Rommel, Stauffenberg, etc did; and he was sentenced to 18 years in prison for war crimes.

Nothing to debate there. Keep in mind though that Manstein was an aristocrat, and an officer raised with Prussian ideals. Treason was beyond his frame of imagination, albeit for a greater good.

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

FAILURES:
* von Manstein's Army Group South FAILED in its attack at Kursk in 1943.

* After the unsuccessful outcome of the Operation "Citadel" (July/August of 1943), Erich von Manstein was driven into a long RETREAT by the Russian counteroffensive.

hear, hear... so Manstein was ordered to do something where he adviced something else (he proposed a completely different operation and after that plea was dismissed he constantly pleaded to start citadel as early as possible b4 the soviet fortification events were finished). how is this different to your beloved Pattons "failure" to close the Falaise gap. obviously Patton - with the rules you apply to Manstein - is to be taken responsible for it.

you probably still believe the Prokhorovka battle was a large tank melee with heavy losses for both sides, but that´s completely wrong. in this battle the russian guards tank corps was almost anhiliated with only 40+ german tanks destroyed and damaged. that´s the reason why Manstein wanted to continue the attack (the 1st SS Panzerkorps hardly lost its strength), only the allied invasion of sicily and the advance (rather lack of) of the northern pincer forced the german high command to cancel this operation. for reference check the journal of military history, the data became available during the last few years.

I really ask you to read more than just Patton fanbooks.

About Kursk. In fact, South Army in Kursk, the one at Manstein´s command, achieved good victories. In fact, Prokorovka was a terrible defeat for USSR, and germans still were advancing after that day. Manstein asked Hitler to allow the use or armour reserves, because he rightly thought that he would destroy Russian armour reserves and, if not turning Zitadelle to a victory, that was impossible, maybe making great damage in Russian operational forces, and forcing them to halt and reagroup, leaving the germans a time to reinforce their defences. So, Kursk failure was not Manstein's failure, but Hitler.

About Kharkhov. Well, Hitler's initial idea was to counterttack inmediately, but Manstein convinced him that was better to reagroup german forces, especially armour, and let the Russian to advance beyond their suply posibilities. That make the counterstrike lethal. This is a demonstration of superb strategical evaluation.

Leningrad. German forces in North Front were weak. Many panzer regiment have to give tanks to support the advance in South front, so Germans haven't the weight to achieve a victory. In fact, they couldn´t take a serious offensive in two fronts, so atacking to Leningrad was a serious mistake, not from Manstein, but OKW.

Stalingrad. Manstein was making quite good progress, but he was attcking from Rostov. He knew, and Russians too, that if Russians made a counterstrike in italian and Hungarian sector Manstein's army was in serious danger to be trapped, and the 6th army condemned to death. So it was not Manstein's fault.

Of course you are right about Manstein and other officers responsibility in criminal treat of POW and civil population, but Manstein was not the exception, only a few officers did a decent job in that way.

ORIGINAL: freeboy

VR,
Your posts about Mainstein in regards to his crimes are noted, he was a bad person in that he did little to feed an enemy populace. I consider him an above average example of the german officer corp, do you really think with aduquit supplies and manpower levels he would have "failed"?

Hi [:)]

The question might be put this way:

Would any good commander have failed without the proper supplies and troops?

Rommel for example, did wonders with so little - one can only imagine what he might have done with just one extra panzer division.

But the war is fraught with examples of what-ifs, especially when it comes to interference from high command:

Example:

Hitlers' order to halt the panzers outside of Dunkirk.

Ike's and Bradley's oders to halt Patton from closing the Falaise Pocket.