ORIGINAL: IronDuke
ORIGINAL: Von Rom
ORIGINAL: IronDuke
This post (IMHO) illustrates one of the reasons you get into the arguments you do. Firstly, I asked several questions in my post, which if you wanted to debate with me, you could have answered. However, you seem to have completely ignored all my difficult questions:
Instead, you've gone back a page or two and pulled out this, or rather the sentiment, not the quote (or context) which you didn't reproduce.
The phrase "It would have looked a bit like Kursk" was comparing the shape of the battlefield. My point was that without an attack from the north, any success Patton had in the south would have been like Kursk where (if you are familiar with this battle) the SS Panzer Corps penetrated in the south as far as Prokhorovka, but Model's troops in the north made no ground, leaving the southern pincer (as Patton's would have been) dangling in the air. This entire piece from you, therefore, seems like a straw man. You seem to have deliberately taken the wrong context for my words, and then argued against something I never said in order to hide the fact you don't want to answer the real points in my post.
This is what frustrates forum users, because you've avoided my valid points, and instead made up an argument about Kursk to insult me with. My real points are above, if you want to continue this debate.
I took the morning of the 22.12.1944 as day one (let me know if you dispute the dates I'm using). A tenuous link (but a link non-the-less) was established to Bastogne around 17.00 on 26.12.1944. This was day five of the offensive if 22.12.1944 was day one. It's a moot point, but the actual time for the offensive was around 4 and a half days. I suppose it depends on whether you round up or down.
In addition to the questions above, I have another. How can you be mobile and be low on fuel? Doesn't having no fuel somewhat restrict the mobility of mechanised forces? In addition, can you tell us which of the forces that faced Patton's drive on Bastogne were mobile (whether with or without fuel?)
Makes you wonder why it took four or five days to break through, then.
[&:] Are you suggesting here, that wintery weather meant all German vehicles had to be on the roads, but that Patton's vehicles (his trucks for example) could go cross country quite happily in the weather prevalent at that time? Some of the heavier (and in terms of deployment, statistically small) German tanks (Tiger II for eg) didn't like the Ardennes very much at all. However, all vehicles seems a little harsh. Would Patton have been better off on the roads in these conditions? If so, wouldn't his attack have come across the same problems of bottlenecks that the German attacks did?
Very tenuous, since my Kursk argument seems to have been manufactured to avoid the following, which I'll ask again:
IronDuke
What are you trying to say ID?
Soviet defenses at Kursk were mostly STATIC. In the Bulge, the German forces were all mobile, with the main muscle of the Germans being north with 6th SS Panzer and Peiper pushing for the Meuse.
You prsent NO valid argument.
Hence, Patton's plan to cut-off the Germans at the salient was the CORRECT one.
Ike was too timid at the Bulge, just as he was at Falaise.
The Allied High Command was the best friend the German army had in Europe.
Which translates as I'd rather keep up this Kursk straw man rather than answer your real points, because I have no answers to your real points. Fair enough, I should have known better after the Dietrich thread, but never mind. I present lots of valid arguments (and questions) you just find it easier to say I have no argument, because then you don't have to answer it.
PLEASE look and quote my comparison with Kursk (I dare you), as others have pointed out (yet another forum poster seems to have joined my side, I get a new friend every week arguing with you, yet no one seems to take your side...strange, that) I never went on about specifics, I merely said that Pattons strike would have looked like Mansteins, one arm of a pincer stretching northwards with nothing to link with, I never talked about fixed defences, mobile units (you no longer seem to mention the low on fuel comment, you seem to have dropped it rather than answer it) or anything specific. As I said, Forum posters should be in no doubt that this straw man is a tactic designed to hide the fact you have no answer sto my real questions. Your subsequent detour on to Dietrich again, is another attempt to hide this. This topic was locked, why drag it all up again and upset the moderator?
I repeat:
Can I ask for the following facts/opinions/evidence.
Do you think encircling two Panzer Armees and an Infantry Armee was on with the three Divisions Patton wheeled northwards in 48 hours? If so, please explain reasoning. Where would they have attacked, for example, what do you think the german response would have been?
Do you think Patton could have achieved this pincer without a companion pincer being launched from the northern shoulder of the Bulge. If not, please outline which formations you feel would have been capable of launching this.
If you think he could have done it, please give a little more detail on how. How flanks would have been covered given the troop numbers he employed; how the German counterattacks across his lines of communication from east and west would have been handled etc. Some information on where he would have made the assault (near what town, how wide a frontage etc)and what objectives he would have set along the way would also be helpful to us in visualising this masterstroke
For you to reply to very detailed questions like this with the superficiality of this is astounding.
What are you trying to say ID?
Soviet defenses at Kursk were mostly STATIC. In the Bulge, the German forces were all mobile, with the main muscle of the Germans being north with 6th SS Panzer and Peiper pushing for the Meuse.
You prsent NO valid argument.
Hence, Patton's plan to cut-off the Germans at the salient was the CORRECT one.
Ike was too timid at the Bulge, just as he was at Falaise.
The Allied High Command was the best friend the German army had in Europe.
Your comments about Kursk indicate one thing.
1. You're hiding from my real points.
You can keep going on about the Kursk straw man if you wish, but ultimately we both know you concentrate on this because you have nowhere else to go. It is very sad.
Ironduke
Well, you continue to defend your Kursk and Bulge analogy. [8|]
So it's you and one other person. Two whole people?

anyway