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Which in all the smoke, has been my point. Did the Germans use massive amounts of airlift? No. Could they have? Yes, provided that they would have dedicated the resources to do so, which was what this game was supposed to simulate. That was why players were allowed to devote production to anything that was historically available. If a player wants to dedicate his bomber forces to airlifting supplies instead of supporting ground forces, fine. If the Soviet player does nothing to stop it, then he deserves to lose. As long as it is within a historically correct framework, I'm all for it. But instead, the opinion has become that anything that was not historically done should be banned from the game. Unfortunately, I see that this same opinion has become prevelant on the Pacific War forum. Players are now debating whether or not Japan should be allowed to invade India since Japan did not do it in real life. I think it's a sad state of affairs when avid wargamers begin to lose the ability to think outside of the box.

Originally posted by Nikademus:
Have the supply rules via air transport been modified much?

I recall reading about air transport back when the game was new, and called "Second Front"

The impression i got examining the formula and rules explanation in the manuel was that a massive amount of air transport would be needed just to raise an corp a few % points in readiness.

It would seem that now one can do considerably more than this.

This leads to another question as well. People are saying "its possible" but if it were (and no, i still dont believe it is) it would require a very large commitment on the Luftwaffe's part. This would take away from their normal responsibilities of ground attack and support. How would they be able to acomplish both in real life? Bombers cant be in two places at once. Either they are supporting the main army or they are carrying supplies (continuously) to that pz corp operating in the enemy's rear.

Originally posted by Don Shafer:
Which in all the smoke, has been my point. Did the Germans use massive amounts of airlift? No. Could they have? Yes, provided that they would have dedicated the resources to do so, which was what this game was supposed to simulate. That was why players were allowed to devote production to anything that was historically available. If a player wants to dedicate his bomber forces to airlifting supplies instead of supporting ground forces, fine. If the Soviet player does nothing to stop it, then he deserves to lose. As long as it is within a historically correct framework, I'm all for it. But instead, the opinion has become that anything that was not historically done should be banned from the game. Unfortunately, I see that this same opinion has become prevelant on the Pacific War forum. Players are now debating whether or not Japan should be allowed to invade India since Japan did not do it in real life. I think it's a sad state of affairs when avid wargamers begin to lose the ability to think outside of the box.

Don

I agree, my earlier post on this was based on what the germans had available. If the german player wants to build 1000's of transports then he can do just that.(and do what he wants with them).
The several hundred planes they had were as i mentioned just borderline for minimal supply of one Pz Div only. (in my opinion)

Nick

Using the planning model that is used by US operational planners, I have "planned" the airlift needs for our resupply mission given the following inputs:

1. Mission: Sustainment supply by airdrop of a full strength panzer division operating outside the effect of ground supply capabilities.

2. The panzer division has the June 22, 1941 complement of armor that existed for the most armor equipped panzer division at the time.

3. The supply needs as determined by means of our research, always choosing the most generous of options, is 2,216 tons per week plus 84,062 litres of fuel per week. This supply need includes everything except replacement equipment.

4. Our airlift fleet is primarily composed of the JU-52. The He 111 and He 177 bombers experienced limited "transport" use historically and the Do bombers were built as transport platform. Without evidence suggesting a airdrop capability for the JU-88s and other bombers, they will not be given consideration for this mission. The "usable" bombers will be considered our "auxillary fleet" and noted seperately throughout.

I. The most simple formula is:
Number of Cargo Missions Required
= requirement/average payload

Where,
requirement=2216 tons(x) + 84062 litres(y)
Ju-52 "normal payload"
(A)= 1.653 tons + 400 litres
or (B)= 1.9285 tons + 300 litres
or (C)= 2.204 tons + 200 litres
or (D)= 2.4795 tons + 100 litres
or (E)= 2.755 tons

# Missions = A(1.653x+400y)+B(1.9285x+300y)+C(2.204x+200y)+D(2.4795x+100y)+E(2.755x+0y)

# Missions = 421 (C) airdrop missions and 570 (E) airdrop missions

Using this simple formula, one can determine that 991 Ju-52 airdrop missions per week (already using "normal" payload rather than maximum)
would suffice the supply needs of the panzer division.

II. Fleet Capability on June 22, 1941

Fleet Capability = (average payload x # of aircraft x USE rate) / RoundTripFlyingTime (RTFT)

Where historical USE rate = .78
and RTFT (includes ground time and legs) = 48 hours,

= ((1.653 to 2.755 tons) + (400 to 0 litres)) x 800 Ju-52 x .78 / 48 hours

~ 1,888 tons + 68,800 litres x .78 / 48 hours

= 1,472 tons + 53,664 litres / 48 hours

= 736 tons + 26,832 litres per day

= 5,152 tons + 187,824 litres per week (game turn) Ju-52 Fleet Capability airlifting at less than 7% Productivity.

Conclusions:

Having used generously high estimates for a panzer division's needs while mobile and assuming constant heavy engagement, the "normal" airdrop capabilities of the Ju-52 and extremely liberal time alotments for ground and cycle time, these conclusions are reached under conditions that are very favorable to the belief that it was historically impossible for a German armored unit to be sustained behind Soviet lines by airlift.

1. With inefficiencies and multiple legs accounted for, the Germans could have airlift supplied a full strength panzer division operating out of ground supply to 100% Readiness (by measure of the supply component) with a dedicated fleet of 400 Ju-52s alone. Since we are only expecting the unit to cover 40 miles per week, it seems fair to suggest that significantly less supply and air missions would have been required to sustain the unit at the readiness levels as discussed in this thread.

2. This couldn't have been accomplished ad hoc, as it would have required a conscience decision to plan such an operation and distribute the supplies and delivery chutes in the quantities needed to the operational airfields once determined.

3. The mystery of why the Germans didn't try such a maneuver could be as simple as they weren't so ready as we gamers are to send so many men and equipment on a what could best be described as a hail mary suicide mission. The amount of information that we have regarding the Soviet defense capabilities and priorities is also very different from what was known to the Germans.

It could be that the Germans simply didn't think of it or that they thought it might be impossible. Considering the limitations of what was known about the abilities of airlift, let alone airpower, it is no surprise that we are more proficient at using both after the experiences of 60 years since Barbarosa. This is no different than the reason for the horrendous casualties on the mid 19th century and WWI battlefields (why did it take so long for the military leaders to adjust tactics for the minie ball, rifling and the machine gun?) This is no different than why the Allies were caught unprepared to follow up on the breakthroughs by the first tank actions of WWI.

When the Germans airlifted into Crete, they parachuted with pistols and machine pistols and it was felt that the airfield must be taken before they could rendezvous with the rest of their equipment. The German's Crete experience was a lesson that US airborne forces learned from and one that Hitler misinterpreted. The technology was available, but it's application was still being learned.

4. As stated in the WIR manual:
(WIR manual's explanation of Supply Airlift)
"Airlift operations may be mounted to raise the readiness of units in a hex. It is useful for any units who are in a low Supply Level hex, have been cut off by enemy units, or have outrun their supply lines in the advance. Larger units will receive less readiness increase. Only transport and level bomber type aircraft can airlift supplies. Units will receive more readiness as the number of participating aircraft increases."

The use of airlifting supplies to units who have outrun their supply lines is explicitly stated as an intent of this capability in the game. The 21 hex range of the Ju-52 in the game is accurate to the loaded range of the aircraft.

5. The success in reality and in WIR of such an airlift operation would have been and would be affected by the net use of combat airpower by the Soviets and Germans. The game accounts for fighter interception and the Germans have the ability to provide fighter escort. Germany's losses of transport aircraft was in the thousands during the war and air parity in airlift operation in WIR will likewise be reflected in transport losses.

In my opinion, changing the game so that the air supply capability of transport aircraft is reduced or reducing the mobility to less than the already present restriction of 2 hexes (40 miles per week) would not be an action taken for the sake of historical accuracy. Such a change would be redefining the scope of control by the players. If such a change is made, then the programmers may as well hard code all production and restrict units to the fronts (as defined by hex ranges) that they were actually employed. Additionally, access to HQ assets should also be removed from the player and allocation should be hardcoded. Changing the air supply effects in the game would be reflecting a preference for a game without the influence of players' ideas. The East front was a strategic front, wherein massive armies battled in several operational areas simultaneously.

I do however believe that since we had no control of resources prior to June 22, 1941, it would take a few weeks before we could plan and implement Lorenzo's move and have the neccessary logistical support in place.

[ July 29, 2001: Message edited by: JustAGame ]

I think players should try things. I also think Lorenzo's comprimise suggestion is a good one.
The use of such a tactic in the 1941 scenario or a continuation of it is to me acceptable as the Soviets have enough units and strength to counter act it.
The use of such a tactic in the 1942 scenario to me makes an incredibily difficult scenario impossible as with only 29 tank divisions to start with instead of 54, and the Germans able to attack towards Leningrad, Moscow, Tula, Stalingrad or the Caucasus makes that scenario for a stretched Soviet defender impossible as almost all the soviet tank divisions are already commited to bolstering defence lines on the front, there are very limited tank divisions spare (the only units capable of stopping a panzer division, even a weak supplied one) and if more than one similtaneous attack is launched it is impossible to defend.
Alternative solution - allow the air lift if players want to try it. Perhaps it was envisioned in the rules.
But. And this is the important but, rewrite the force layout of the Soviet forces in 1942 so that they have 42, or better still the full complement of 54 tank divisions so they can counter this devastating tactic.
I am sure this is historically credible as the Soviets were as strong in 1942 as the weakened Axis forces but Stalin's refusal to allow reserves to be redeployed to the South from Moscow meant that the Caucaus and Stalingrad nearly fell.
A stronger 1942 Russian player would make that scenario balanced.
As it is, with a player playing someone's of Lorenzo's talents it is impossible as Russian to properly defend which historically was not the case.
They had at least a 70% chance of winning by that stage. It was only overextending the winter offensive with the massive casualties that involved that weakened them so much plus a refusal by Stalin to react quickly.
To be playable, the Soviets must have a better force and more tank units at the outset of the 1942 scenario.

Matt Buttsworth

Originally posted by Don Shafer: I agree Ed, 7 months out of supply for a panzer army is extreme. So how do you propose to fix this problem without effecting units that are cut off for a short period of time?

My out-of-supply rules suggested earlier (an older version of this is in the issues list):


===========================================
5) Rules for losses by out-of-supply (OOS) units:

Something like below would make a hell of a lot more sense than the current rules. The idea is to prevent a unit from living off airlift supply indefinitely behind enemy lines. (OOS = out of supply):

Readiness losses:

When readiness of all division units in an OOS corps drop below %10, the unit becomes IMMOBILIZED.

Readiness losses for the movement of OOS units should be increased (a readiness penalty added to the readiness cost of the terrain being moved into). The penalty for motorized/armor units should be higher than infantry units. Let's say +15 for mechanized OOS units, and +8 for unmechanzied units. The penalty should be just strong enough that
an OOS unit, after about 6-8 phases of movement (less than 2 full turns of mechanized movement), becomes immobilized
if it tries to move any more.(1) However, a stationary unit could "survive" on airlift supply until ground supply reaches it. A unit that stops moving could begin to regain readiness via air-supply, but the recovery should be slow.

Equipment losses:

if OOS unit moves: 50% equipment losses, (2) if OOS unit is attacked: 25% losses minus 5% for every entrench level
(3) if OOS unit remains stationary:
if enemy adjacent: 10% losses minus 5% for every entrench level
if enemy not adjacent: 0% losses.

(1) Note that there is no arbitary restriction of number of squares to move per turn. A panzer corps can move 5 squares in the first turn after losing supply, but will become immobilized 2-3 more phases later in the next turn if it keeps trying to move.

(2) No matter the destination square. If square occupied by enemy unit,
the 50% losses are taken BEFORE combat.

(3) Losses should be taken after combat.
===========================================


This isn't a quick simple fix, its complicated and replaces all current rules, that's why I kinda understand why Arnaud doesn't want to do this, but the current OOS rules are so screwed up, he's gonna have to deal with this eventually.

Let's not turn this into a flame war, and I am reading you're posts, I just don't agree with you're conclusion that anything that was not done historically should not be allowed when it comes to tactics and strategy.

This isn't a flame war yet. When I reach for my flamethrower, you'll know its a flamewar fairly quick.

You keep misinterpreting what I say. Hitler didn't go after Leningrad the way the Barbarossa plans spoke of, so if the player choses to do so, that is something that didn't happen historically, but it is well within the ability of this game to support such an ahistorical event. You and a few others keep claiming this is a "strategy" or a "tactic". It isn't. Its a design flaw.

I am very confident the numbers are on my side on this, and the logistical problem of operating temporary air fields while the unit is moving is something that can't be ignored. The numbers presented so far pretty much make the idea of an active panzer corps moving and fighting indefinitely behind enemy lines supplied only by air-supply an impossibility, and I contend it was so impossible then that no one even considered trying it.

I don't think we should shoestring the players into doing what was actually done in history strategy wise.

Don, this has NOTHING to do with strategy, its design flaw. It couldn't have happened then for the same reason I know elephants can't fly. Even the pachoderms are smart enough to know they can't fly, which is why they've never tried either.

You feel the Finns should not be allowed to coordinate with the Germans, then let's remove the Finn army and Finland from the map and be done with them, since they will no longer serve any purpose.

That might actually make sense, all the action that far north was a sideshow anyway.

I suppose we could do the same thing with the West and Italian Fronts also and use their slots for something else since they have no impact on the Russian operations.

Yes they do, they are an incomplete attempt to represent the other theatres of the war without making this something that the player has to spend more time on than the fighting in the east. This allows the player to chose different priorities if he wishes, by altering the distribution of forces. They also can lead to the end of the game, so their strength is very important to the Germans trying to defeat the USSR before Britian can find some friends and start threatening Germany from the west.

JustAGame
Using the planning model that is used by US operational planners

A modern planning model applied to a military operation 60 years ago?

1. Mission: Sustainment supply by airdrop of a full strength panzer division operating outside the effect of ground supply capabilities.

I was referring to a full strength panzer CORPS. A single division wouldn't be strong enough to succeed in most situations. It's likely a single division could be stopped or delayed by an entrenched infantry division.

Having used generously high estimates for a panzer division's needs

How many Ju-52s get shot down? You need to factor in the Soviet Air Force into your formula.

I don't believe a single division can hold a large enough area on the ground to keep Soviet forces from seriously interfering with air operations. A full size corps probably could hold pocket large enough for air drops to occur deep enough in the pocket to keep Soviet artillery from bombing the air strips. It'll have to be air strips too, not just air drops, since if air drops are as efficient as an airfield, they wouldn't have used airfields in the Stalingrad pocket, they just would have dropped it all in.

2. This couldn't have been accomplished ad hoc, as it would have required a conscience decision to plan such an operation and distribute the supplies and delivery chutes in the quantities needed to the operational airfields once determined.

The planning to keep a moving division supplied by airfields which need to be close by (as they were in Stalingrad), and adjust every flight to a new destination (because the unit is moving) and somehow dodge all the enemy fighters in the area (because they know the route your transports are taking) land on something like a dirt airstrip while under artillery bombardment, offload supplies before being blown up, get back into the air and dodge enemy fighters on the way back, then figure out the next location since the unit is moving and has already moved too far to use the last airstrip, will be more like nightmare than a plan.

3. The mystery of why the Germans didn't try such a maneuver could be as simple as they weren't so ready as we gamers are to send so many men and equipment on a what could best be described as a hail mary suicide mission.

This may be true, not just about what happens after the force has reached its destination and taken it, but about the whole process to get that unit to its destination. The deeper the unit moves into Soviet territory, the more likely the air lift operation will come unglued. The efficiency of airlift supply into the Stalingrad pocket decayed as time went on, instead of getting better. Besides, a single division is probably a suicide mission, which is why I've been referring to an armored CORPS all along.

The use of airlifting supplies to units who have outrun their supply lines is explicitly stated as an intent of this capability in the game.

Come now, we all know the intent behind this statement was for supplying units by air until ground supply reached them, not to spend 6 weeks behind enemy lines, as an active moving and fighting force. Had they meant something as radical as a moving/fighting corps to live soley on air supply behind enemy lines something along those lines would have been mentioned. I contend they didn't explicitly refer to it because they didn't realize the flaw that they left in the game which would allow what should be an understood impossibility as something possible in the game.

The 21 hex range of the Ju-52 in the game is accurate to the loaded range of the aircraft.

10 hexes max because without fighter cover all your transports will be shot down in a couple of weeks at the most.

In my opinion, changing the game so that the air supply capability of transport aircraft is reduced or reducing the mobility to less than the already present restriction of 2 hexes (40 miles per week) would not be an action taken for the sake of historical accuracy.

I think it would. Wir is a corps level game. I've been talking about a corps sized force. Leaving this in just because you can theoretically "prove" a single division could survive (without speaking to the problems I mentioned above, and why it was never tried, or even discussed) indefinitely does not cover the issue of a corps sized force.

Frankly, this whole thing is somewhat pointless since out of supply infantry divisions can move at only 2 hexes too, so the player is more likely to sacrifice infantry divisions instead of a panzer division, depending on the enemy force believed to be at the destination. And in the real world, commanders wouldn't risk a corps sized force on something which clearly ends in the total destruction of that force, unless the payoff is huge (an end to the war) and the possibility of initial sucess is strong.

This is my last post on this subject. I feel like I've kept repeating myself because what I said earlier was just ignored. I've also been told I am acting "desperate" in this debate, which could mean different things, but none of them good. So, before my desperation becomes embarrassingly obvious, I will gracefully bow out. You have the last word gentlemen.

You guys really need to move on!

Regards, Rundstedt

Ed, my words about you acting disperate did not mean anything bad about you. I've just meant that you are not heard and repeat and repeat the same arguements in different ways without being exactly responded.
That's your right to leave the disccussion. You've done what you could here. That's a pitty that I've not had neithter time nor ablitity to explain myself as good as native english speaker. I just can to make some additions to your arguements.
1. as far as I've noticed noone had ever mentioned(prooved) Luftwaffe capabilities to airlift supplies to the moving force of korps size. we need at least comparison with airlift to stationary korps.
2. no mention yet to actual fuel requirements for an average tank which participates in battle order movememt.
3. no mention about actual amount of supplies of spare parts needed by vehicles of panzer korps.
4. No mention yet how shock strength of surrouned force is reduced because it is fighting all around and has no actual rear.

that's it for now. I'd like to also give you all the reference to Manstein.
I was rereading Manstein's memories about the times when he was commanding by 56th panzer korps. They were actualy surrounded during 3 days in July. That were the days when Luftwaffe ruled the skies unarguably.
Nevertheless, he decided to withdraw 8th panzer division and 3rd motorized division from dangerous positions in face of serious danger of surrounding.
Certanly, infantry division is a bit different subject. But it needs point 1 and 4 (see above) to be fullfilled.
Writing this, I feel that I am proving something to myself. But I am also currious, do anyone realy believes that panzer(well ok, infantry) corps could advance during more than 1-2 week while only being supplied by air in real war conditions?

Originally posted by Rundstedt:
You guys really need to move on!

Do you know how rare a 6 page thread is in this forum? You should be urging the argument to continue for at least another page. 7 pages would be a clear record for this forum, one which would be very hard to beat.

Thank you Ed, in one post you finally saw the light in the point I was trying to get across. You see, maybe I'm not as far out in left field as you think I am. (My apologies to anyone that resides in countries that do not follow my baseball analogy )

Originally posted by Ed Cogburn:


I think it would. Wir is a corps level game. I've been talking about a corps sized force. Leaving this in just because you can theoretically "prove" a single division could survive (without speaking to the problems I mentioned above, and why it was never tried, or even discussed) indefinitely does not cover the issue of a corps sized force.

Frankly, this whole thing is somewhat pointless since out of supply infantry divisions can move at only 2 hexes too, so the player is more likely to sacrifice infantry divisions instead of a panzer division, depending on the enemy force believed to be at the destination. And in the real world, commanders wouldn't risk a corps sized force on something which clearly ends in the total destruction of that force, unless the payoff is huge (an end to the war) and the possibility of initial sucess is strong.

This is my last post on this subject. I feel like I've kept repeating myself because what I said earlier was just ignored. I've also been told I am acting "desperate" in this debate, which could mean different things, but none of them good. So, before my desperation becomes embarrassingly obvious, I will gracefully bow out. You have the last word gentlemen.

Originally posted by Don Shafer:
Thank you Ed, in one post you finally saw the light in the point I was trying to get across.

Ahha, you *are* mixing up threads. You're just taking advantage of the fact that I promised not to post here again.

Go to the "unlimited Pz divisions" thread and enlighten me on what point of yours I've agreed to, as I can't for the life of me figure out what that is.

Gooooo Yankees!!

Regards, Rundstedt

For those who are interested in the accuracy of information:

"According to Major General Arthur Schmidt, the chief of staff of the 6th Army, that army required a minimum of 750 tons of supplies (all categories) per day as of early November 1942. As I recall, Army Group Center in the winter of 1941/42 consisted of the 3rd Panzer, 4th, 4th Panzer, 9th, 2nd Panzer and 2nd Armies--6 armies in all. In Nov 1942, however, 6th Army was somewhat larger than the average Army Group Center army in the winter of 1941/42, so I would estimate that Army Group Center would have required 650 to 700 tons per army per day, or 3,900 to 4,200 tons per day total."