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150 Years Ago Today:

U. S. Grant knew that the Confederates facing his army at Petersburg and Richmond had to be spread thin. Robert E. Lee had requested over a division to be returned to him from the Shenandoah Valley, but after the two resounding defeats there the march had been halted while Lee decided whether they were more desperately needed back in the Valley or to defend the capital. The Northerners decided to take advantage of the hesitation.

Aided by Benjamin Butler, Grant came up with a plan to strike two points of the long trench lines almost at the same time. Butler's Army of the James would would march northwards and strike near Richmond, targeting New Market Heights and perhaps the strongest Rebel fort in the lines, Fort Harrison. Meanwhile, the V Corps under Gouverneur Warren would strike towards the south, at a place called Peebles' Farm. If there was a breakthrough at that point, the vital Boydton Plank Road would be blocked, and Petersburg and Richmond would no longer be able to receive sufficient supplies.

For the only time in the war, Benjamin Butler's plan was reasonably successful. There was heavy fighting at New Market Heights, but the Yankees finally seized the ground. At Fort Harrison, the attack fared even better at first:

[font="Times New Roman"] The enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. Stannard's division of the 18th corps with General Burnham's brigade leading, tried an assault against Fort Harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and a good many prisoners. Burnham was killed in the assault. Colonel Stevens who succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the same way. Some works to the right and left were also carried with the guns in them--six in number--and a few more prisoners. Birney's troops to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line.

[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]

As Grant observed, now the Northerners were not in condition to advance further. Too many leaders had been lost, and in addition there were Confederate gunboats on the James River adding their firepower to the Southern artillery. The Federals turned their efforts to strengthening Fort Harrison against the counter-attack which was sure to come the next day. They also re-named it Fort Burnham in honor of their fallen general.

150 Years Ago Today:

At Peebles' Farm in Virginia, Robert E. Lee had removed a number of defenders for his counter-attack near the James River. The Union V Corps mounted its planned assault, but even against the thinned Rebel troops, the Yankees made only slight progress. They captured a redoubt and a line of trenches, but the Southerners were able to scrape up reinforcements, including a division which Lee had intended for the attack further north.

The Union IX Corps moved up to reinforce the first Federal wave, but a Confederate flank attack in the afternoon routed many of its units, including the capturing of a brigade. The bright side for the Northerners was that the attempt on the fort they had seized the day before was easily repelled.

Although Lee had failed to regain Fort Harrison/Burnham, the position was back to stalemate for the time being. Confederate troops and engineers had hastily thrown up another line of defenses, blocking any further Yankee advance. Union losses for the two days around the fort were 391 killed, 2,317 wounded, and 649 missing or captured, while the Confederates lost 250 killed, 1,250 wounded, and 500 missing or captured. Nonetheless, the Northerners considered it a victory. The lines had been extended a little further, and the Federals now controlled a little more of the James River. Unlike the trench warfare of WWI, the Southerners could not afford to extend their lines for hundreds of miles, and also could not afford to retreat much further.

150 Years Ago Today:

Around Petersburg, Virginia, the Battle of Peebles' Farm (or Poplar Springs Church) wound down. After halting the Confederate counter-attack the day before, the Northerners launched a counter-counter-attack, which seized another redoubt called Fort McCrae. The advance was stopped before it could cut the Boydton Plank road, however, and the total losses for the three days of fighting were about 1,200 for the Confederates and almost 2,900 for the Union. (Largely because of an entire brigade that had been surrounded and captured.)

Still, new recruits were flowing into the Union ranks (though they would need a few months' training to truly make good the casualties). The South, on the other hand, was only getting a trickle of new men. Robert E. Lee now faced the difficult choice of whether to abandon the Shenandoah Valley and its desperately wanted food supplies, or drain his Petersburg and Richmond defenses still further and try to push Philip Sheridan's army back to the north end of the valley. Grant believed that his opponent could not take the chance of losing Richmond. He should have known from the colossal gambles Lee had taken earlier in the war.


In Georgia, Sherman was also having trouble predicting his opponent John Bell Hood's next move. Though badly outnumbered, the Rebels were now free from the need to defend Atlanta, and could move to strike almost anywhere on the long rail line providing the Federals with their supplies. It was now the Southerners' turn to make "neckties" of the iron rails after ripping them up. The Northerners could salvage the rails by shipping them back to the foundries and running them through the mills, but it was easier simply to have new ones sent down. It took time, however, and in the meanwhile the Yankees chased after the Confederates -- but in vain. They were better equipped than their opponents, but that also meant they could not travel as lightly.

150 Years Ago Today:

President Davis and General Hood had announced what they planned to do: destroy Sherman's supply lines and force the Northern army to retreat all the way back to Tennessee. And so far, Hood's Army of Tennessee had begun to do just that. On this date, they attacked the Union positions at at Acworth and Moon's Station, destroying the blockhouses. Sherman read his map and grew alarmed, for the Rebels were closing in on the depot at Allatoona Pass, the main storage place for his army's supplies of bread. Roughly a million rations' worth had been concentrated there, enough to revitalize the hungry Confederate soldiers and conversely make the Union troops feel the pinch.



Sherman quickly sent out telegraphic orders to Brigadier General John M. Corse to reinforce the Allatoona garrison. But Corse did not have enough rail cars to move his entire command in one operation. He managed to bring in roughly half his brigade before the advancing Southerners blocked the line. The morrow would show whether the Yankees could hold their bread stores with what they had.

In the meantime, Sherman reluctantly decided that he would have to send nearly his entire army in pursuit of the Rebel forces. He had suggested to General Halleck in Washington that it would be better if he could continue south, to Savannah or even Charleston, rather than remain on the defensive indefinitely. But to Halleck and the War Department, it was too big a gamble with the election just five weeks away. Sherman's force would have to go north for the time being, back over the ground they had taken with such effort during the summer.

Let's put this back ahead of the prolific spam bot.

150 Years Ago Today:

[font="Times New Roman"]AROUND ALLATOONA, October 5, 1884.
Commanding Officer, United States Forces, Allatoona:

I have placed the forces under my command in such positions that you are surrounded, and to avoid a needless effusion of blood I call on you to surrender your forces at once, and unconditionally.
Five minutes will be allowed you to decide. Should you accede to this, you will be treated in the most honorable manner as prisoners of war.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully yours,
S. G. FRENCH,
Major-General, Commanding forces Confederate States.[/font]


Five minutes was plenty, for the Northern commander was already resolved:


[font="Times New Roman"]HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH CORPS
ALLATOONA, GEORGIA, October 5, 1864.

Major-General S. G. FRENCH, Confederate States, etc:

Your communication demanding surrender of my command I acknowledge receipt of, and respectfully reply that we are prepared for the "needless effusion of blood" whenever it is agreeable to you.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Jno. M. Corse
Brigadier General, Commanding U.S. Forces.[/font]


Though he was indeed surrounded and outnumbered, Corse's reply was not simply bravado. In addition to his fortifications, he had another advantage: a new repeating rifle. The Henry rifle had been submitted to the U. S. Army, but had only been issued to a few cavalry units to see if it could replace the Spencer carbine. It was found unsatisfactory, for the mechanism was liable to accidentally fire when being bounced on horseback at full gallop. The Army decided not to purchase the weapon in quantity, but a number of infantrymen saw a tremendous advantage: its tube magazine could hold a remarkable 16 rounds. The men bought the Henrys themselves using the substantial re-enlistment bonuses being offered by the Lincoln administration.


The Southerners, however, had the advantage in artillery. Twelve "Napoleon" smooth-bore cannon, which could fire shell, solid shot, or canister as the gun crews chose, were by now well emplaced around the Yankee fortifications. The order to open fire was given promptly. After a suitable bombardment, the Confederate commander ordered a two-pronged infantry assault, and the fighting became intense.

[font="Times New Roman"]Reaching Kenesaw Mountain about 8 a.m. of October 5th (a beautiful day), I had a superb view of the vast panorama to the north and west. To the southwest, about Dallas, could be seen the smoke of camp-fires, indicating the presence of a large force of the enemy, and the whole line of railroad from Big Shanty up to Allatoona (full fifteen miles) was marked by the fires of the burning railroad. We could plainly see the smoke of battle about, Allatoona, and hear the faint reverberation of the cannon.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

Sherman promptly ordered a large force to march to the rescue of the Federal garrison, but the distance was great enough that it would take most of the day to cover. Meanwhile, the Rebel attacks were checked, but both sides suffered. Union commander Corse himself took a bullet that scored one side of his face and removed part of his ear, but insisted on staying to direct the defense.

At the loss rate being sustained, the Northerners would not have enough men standing by the end of the day to hold the depot against the more numerous Confederates. But a little after noon, Southern commander French received a report of Sherman's reinforcements on the move. That part of the report was accurate, but it also said that the Yankee column was considerably closer than it actually was. French decided he could not risk staying longer, and ordered his force to pull out.

[font="Times New Roman"]I watched with painful suspense the indications of the battle raging there, and was dreadfully impatient at the slow progress of the relieving column, whose advance was marked by the smokes which were made according to orders, but about 2 p.m. I noticed with satisfaction that the smoke of battle about Allatoona grew less and less, and ceased altogether about 4 p.m.

[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center][/font]

Although the battle had not lasted an entire day, casualties on both sides had been high. The Union lost 142 killed, 352 wounded, and 212 missing, while the Confederates lost at least 122 killed, 443 wounded, and 234 missing. (One report puts the total Southern losses at 200 men higher.) A third of the Northern garrison was on the casualty list, but they had saved the depot and the million rations of bread.

150 Years Ago Today:

The CSS Alabama was gone, but she was not the only British-built commerce raider to wreak havoc on Union merchantmen. Built in Liverpool under the name of Oreto, another such ship had been sailed to the Bahamas in 1863 and converted into the armed cruiser CSS Florida. She had taken 22 Northern ships, and then done what even Alabama had not been able to do: receive a refit at Brest, France. Going back to sea in February 1864, she had taken eleven more prizes. On this date, she had docked in the neutral harbor of Bahia, Brazil.

Her skipper, Charles Morris, and many of the crew were enjoying shore leave, thinking themselves safe. But rules of international law were not a priority for the captain of the USS Wachusett, Napoleon Collins (below). He decided to attack and sink the Southern raider. The Wachusett entered the harbor after dark, and was not spotted by either the Brazilian harbor forts or the Florida until they were within musket range.


The Confederate cannon were not loaded, since she was in a neutral harbor, so the Florida's men opened up with small arms. The Wachusett answered with her own muskets and pistols, followed by a main gun broadside, then demanded surrender. The call was not answered, so Captain Collins ordered the Wachusett to ram the Rebel ship. His order was promptly executed.

Though Wachusett was the larger ship, it was immediately apparent that the damage was not serious. Captain Collins quickly decided on another approach: he ordered his men to board and capture the Florida. This they did without much trouble, for there was less than half the Confederate crew left on the ship. No story could cover such an act in a neutral port, so, taking their prize under tow, the Yankees headed back out to sea. The outraged Brazilian coast guard gave chase, but even pulling another ship, the Wachusett managed to out-run the pursuit.

This was, of course, a serious international incident. At this point in history, Brazil was officially an empire, had not yet abolished slavery, and so was already not sympathetic to the Union. The government would strongly protest the Union action, and formally demand redress. Captain Morris would also protest, but he was now "on the beach", and would have to serve as a Confederate agent abroad for the rest of the war.


In the Shenandoah Valley, Philip Sheridan's forces had completed their work of destroying the southernmost part of the valley's food supplies. Now the troops were on a "retrograde movement" back towards the north, burning as they went. On this date, Sheridan reported to U. S. Grant "I have destroyed over 2,000 barns, filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements, over 70 mills, filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4,000 head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than 3,000 sheep. . . tomorrow I will continue the destruction of wheat, forage, &c., down to Fisher’s hill. When this is complete the Valley, from Winchester up to Staunton, ninety-two miles, will have but little in it for man or beast.”

It was no idle boast; a year later, an English traveler to the area would describe it as "standing empty as a moor." But while the destruction lasted, the Confederates were determined to stop it. Already the infantry under Jubal Early had come out of its fortified positions in the Blue Ridge Mountains, and more infantry plus cavalry was on the way from Lee's army.

150 Years Ago Today:

In Georgia, Sherman and his forces were still in pursuit of the Confederates, and not having much luck. John Bell Hood's army was smaller but faster. Worse, Nathan Bedford Forrest was raiding further north, and seemed unstoppable. Sherman managed to find a telegraph line the Rebels had not cut, and used it to argue with Grant for the idea of turning to go south of Atlanta. He included a memorable phrase: "It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood, Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils, are turned loose without home or habitation. I think Hood's movements indicate a diversion to the end of the Selma & Talladega road . . . I propose that we break up the railroad from Chattanooga forward, and that we strike out with our wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah. Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless for us to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people, will cripple their military resources. By attempting to hold the roads, we will lose a thousand men each month, and will gain no result. I can make this march, and make Georgia howl!"


In the Shenandoah Valley, the Confederate cavalry reinforcements had quickly made their presence known to the Northerners. A division led by Thomas Rosser had been harassing the rear-guard of the Union army as it marched back towards Winchester, continuing its work of destruction:

[font="Times New Roman"]The cavalry as it retired was stretched across the country from the Blue Ridge to the eastern slope of the Alleghanies, with orders to drive off all stock and destroy all supplies as it moved northward. The infantry preceded the cavalry, passing down the Valley pike, and as we marched along the many columns of smoke from burning stacks, and mills filled with grain, indicated that the adjacent country was fast losing the features which hitherto had made it a great magazine of stores for the Confederate armies. During the 6th and 7th of October, the enemy's horse followed us up, though at a respectful distance. This cavalry was now under command of General T. W. Rosser, who on October 5 had joined Early with an additional brigade from Richmond. As we proceeded the Confederates gained confidence, probably on account of the reputation with which its new commander had been heralded, and on the third day's march had the temerity to annoy my rear guard considerably. Tired of these annoyances, I concluded to open the enemy's eyes in earnest, so that night I told Torbert I expected him either to give Rosser a drubbing next morning or get whipped himself, and that the infantry would be halted until the affair was over; I also informed him that I proposed to ride out to Round Top Mountain to see the fight.

[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

(Brevet Major General Alfred Torbert was the commander of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Shenandoah. Torbert decided to use nearly his entire force, including the division led by George Armstong Custer.)

[font="Times New Roman"]About 7 in the morning, Custer's division encountered Rosser himself with three brigades, and while the stirring sounds of the resulting artillery duel were reverberating through the valley Merritt moved briskly to the front and fell upon Generals Lomax and Johnson on the Valley pike. Merritt, by extending his right, quickly established connection with Custer, and the two divisions moved forward together under Torbert's direction, with a determination to inflict on the enemy the sharp and summary punishment his rashness had invited. The engagement soon became general across the valley, both sides fighting mainly mounted. For about two hours the contending lines struggled with each other along Tom's Brook, the charges and counter charges at many points being plainly visible from the summit of Round Top, where I had my headquarters for the time. The open country permitting a sabre fight, both sides seemed bent on using that arm. In the centre the Confederates maintained their position with much stubbornness, and for a time seemed to have recovered their former spirit, but at last they began to give way on both flanks, and as these receded, Merritt and Custer went at the wavering ranks in a charge along the whole front. The result was a general smash-up of the entire Confederate line, the retreat quickly degenerating into a rout the like of which was never before seen. For twenty-six miles this wild stampede kept up, with our troopers close at the enemy's heels; and the ludicrous incidents of the chase never ceased to be amusing topics around the camp-fires of Merritt and Custer. In the fight and pursuit Torbert took eleven pieces of artillery, with their caissons, all the wagons and ambulances the enemy had on the ground, and three hundred prisoners.

[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

A more formal count of the casualties was, Confederates 20 killed, 50 wounded, 280 missing or captured; Union, only 10 killed and 47 wounded. The "Woodstock Races" was yet another debacle for the South in the Shenandoah Valley, which had produced so many victories in years before. Besides the loss of the troopers, the Rebels could not easily replace the dozens of cannon that the Yankees had captured since Sheridan had begun his campaign. But Jubal Early was still determined to get revenge for his defeats.

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

150 Years Ago Today:

Sterling Price's Missouri expedition was not going well. His scouts informed him that Jefferson City was too well defended for his force, which was nearly all cavalry and irregulars. He skirted around to the west, and seized the town of Boonville instead. There, his under-equipped troops proceeded to loot the town, turning the initially pro-southern population against him. A Union brigade attempted to take the town back, but was easily beaten back by the Rebels. This action is noteworthy because it was the fourth battle fought over the luckless town during the Civil War. It also gave the Federals in Missouri time to bring larger forces against Price.

At about the same time, "Bloody Bill" Anderson and his troop of guerrillas arrived in Boonville to join up with Price's army. Anderson and others in his group had Union scalps dangling from their mounts. Price ordered Anderson to remove the grisly trophies, refusing to speak to him until it was done. Anderson obeyed, but Price seems to have decided he could not use the "bushwackers" as part of his regular force. Instead, he ordered them to ride north and break up the North Missouri Railroad.

Other pro-southern partisans in Missouri were joining up with Price's scratch army, but not in the numbers he had hoped for and needed. It is estimated that Price picked up about 6,000 extra men, bringing his total to 18,000. With militia, the Northerners would be able to field almost twice that number.

150 Years Ago Today:

In Washington, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, author of the shameful "Dred Scott" decision, died of old age at 87. He was born in Maryland, and had supported the institution of slavery all his life, though he had freed his own slaves and stayed loyal to the Union. The war years had not been kind to him; his estate in Maryland had been devastated, his authority had been largely ignored under war-time powers, and his health had declined. Modern scholars hold that he was a competent administrator; he had been Secretary of the Treasury, Attorney General, and briefly Acting Secretary of War before going to the Supreme Court. His record there would have been one of the finer Justices -- if not for the appalling decision that had done much to bring on the Civil War.

Only a few months before, President Lincoln had mentioned that deposed Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase would make a good Chief Justice. Now the question could be put to the test.


The reports that Ulysses S. Grant was receiving at his headquarters tallied with what Philip Sheridan was discovering in the Shenandoah Valley: in spite of the drubbing given to the Confederate cavalry at Tom's Brook, the Southerners were sending more troops to beat Sheridan's Army of the Shenandoah and win the valley back. Since the southern part of the valley had already been devastated, Grant saw no reason to shed more of his soldiers' blood on the attack, and wired instructions to Sheridan to hold himself on the defensive around the mid-point of the valley. However, Henry Halleck and the War Department had other ideas. As Grant later wrote;

"But this order had to go through Washington where it was intercepted; and when Sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what I wanted him to do it was something entirely different."

[font="Times New Roman"] [right]WASHINGTON, October 12, 1864, 12 P.M.[/right]

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN: Lieutenant-General Grant wishes a position taken far enough south to serve as a base for further operations upon Gordonsville and Charlottesville. It must be strongly fortified and provisioned. Some point in the vicinity of Manassas Gap would seem best suited for all purposes. Colonel Alexander, of the Engineers, will be sent to consult with you as soon as you connect with General Augur.

[right]H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.[/right][/font]

In Grant's words, "Sheridan objected to this most decidedly". Grant would have to try to straighten matters out himself.


In Georgia, John Bell Hood's force was speedily marching north, visiting many of the same places that had been fought over on Sherman's way south just a few months before. On this date, the Confederates arrived at Resaca.

[font="Times New Roman"][right]HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE IN THE FIELD, October 12, 1861.
To the officer commanding the United States Forces at Resaca, Georgia.[/right]

SIR: I demand the immediate and unconditional surrender of the post and garrison under your command, and, should this be acceded to, all white officers and soldiers will be parolled in a few days. If the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. HOOD, General.[/font]

The Union commander was a Colonel named Clark R. Weaver. Though he had only a brigade against an army, Weaver was much of the frame of mind as John Corse, who had led the successful defense of Allatoona a week before:

[font="Times New Roman"][right]HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION, FIFTEENTH CORPS
RESACA, GEORGIA, October 12, 1884.[/right]

To General J. B. HOOD:

Your communication of this date just received. In reply, I have to state that I am somewhat surprised at the concluding paragraph, to the effect that, 'if the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken'. In my opinion I can hold this post. If you want it, come and take it.

I am, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
CLARK R. WEAVER, Commanding Officer.[/font]

With Sherman's army hot on his trail, Hood decided he could not afford the casualties, and even more, the time required to take Resaca. His army moved on to Dalton, which would not fare so happily.

150 Years Ago Today:

One day after the death of Maryland-born Roger Taney, the state abolished slavery in a new constitution.


The depot at Dalton, Georgia, was held by 751 Northern troops, about 600 of them the regiment of the 44th U. S. Colored Troops. It had been the site of the first clash of Sherman's drive on Atlanta, so there was some prestige for John Bell Hood in recapturing it:

[font="Times New Roman"]When we arrived at Dalton, we had a desire to see how the old place looked; not that we cared anything about it, but we just wanted to take a last farewell look at the old place. We saw the United States flag flying from the ramparts, and thought that Yank would probably be asleep or catching lice, or maybe engaged in a game of seven-up.
[...]
The place was guarded by negro troops. We marched the black rascals out. They were mighty glad to see us, and we were kindly disposed to them. We said, "Now, boys, we don't want the Yankees to get mad at you, and to blame you; so, just let's get out here on the railroad track, and tear it up, and pile up the crossties, and then pile the iron on top of them, and we'll set the thing a-fire...

[center]--Sam R. Watkins, "Co. Aytch" Maury Grays, First Tennessee Regiment[/center][/font]

But other reports give a much darker story. As at Reseca, Hood sent a demand for unconditional surrender, threatening to take no prisoners if he had to storm the place. There is reason to believe he was not bluffing, for as the Rebel infantry was forming up, the word was passed for no quarter. Union commander Colonel Lewis Johnson tried to get an agreement to have his colored troops treated as regular prisoners of war, but Hood replied that "all slaves belonging to persons in the Confederacy", being property, would be returned to their former owners. Faced with overwhelming numbers and Rebel artillery posted on higher ground, Lewis surrendered.

The blacks were indeed set to work destroying the railroad, after being stripped of their valuable shoes first. Six of them were unwilling or unable, and were shot. Afterwards, while the white prisoners were paroled, the blacks were taken with the Confederate army as it marched west into Alabama. A few managed to escape, but many of the others simply disappeared from the historical record. It can be guessed that some were returned to their former owners, or those who claimed to be, and others died of malnutrition, disease, and exhaustion along the way.

150 Years Ago Today:

In Missouri, Sterling Price had previously not been able to capture the supplies and equipment he wanted for his campaign. On this date, he decided to double his chances by splitting his forces and attacking the two towns of Glasgow and Sedalia. He sent forces of about 1,500 men to each place.

At Glasgow, Confederate commander John B. Clark, Jr. (below) mounted the attack expertly. An early morning artillery bombardment on the Union positions was followed by a determined infantry advance. The Northerners blew up their town hall, where they had stored much of their gunpowder, before retreating to their main fortification on a nearby hill. Nonetheless, the defense became more and more discouraged under relentless fire from Rebel artillery and infantry. General Clark offered generous terms, and the Union commander accepted and surrendered in the early afternoon.


Although the Confederates failed to capture much ammunition, what they did take more than made up for it. 1,200 muskets, roughly the same number of overcoats, and 150 horses did much to replenish their stocks.


At Sedalia, Confederate General M. Jeff Thompson (below) had an easier and quicker task at first. The town was defended only by state militia, who were shortly overrun. But then Thompson was dismayed to see his men start to loot the town. This was not what he wanted from soldiers under his command, and he ordered it stopped. Surprisingly, the men obeyed, and confined themselves to taking arms, military equipment, and of course, horses. The Northern prisoners were given parole -- for one day, the war in Missouri was being fought under less savage terms.


Between the two successes, Sterling Price's raiding force finally had enough weapons and supplies to take a major target. Price selected Kansas City, but it would take about three days to re-unite his army.

150 Years Ago Today:

President Jefferson Davis strongly disliked General P.G.T Beauregard, and had hoped that assigning him to the defenses south of Richmond would effectively get him out of the way. But the two-pronged Union advance had put Beauregard in the middle of the action again, where he had won additional fame. Now, however, it was a good idea for Robert E. Lee to assume command of all the forces in the Richmond-Petersburg area. Davis seized the opportunity by creating the Confederate Department of the West and assigning it to Beauregard. In theory, this was a sound move, for it allowed John Bell Hood to focus on commanding the Army of Tennessee and drive Sherman out of Atlanta, without the distractions of being a theater commander. In practice, Beauregard had almost no authority. His first official act after formally assuming the command on this date was to issue an appeal for volunteers:

[font="Times New Roman"]HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST
October 17, 1864

In assuming command, at this critical juncture, of the Military Division of the West, I appeal to my countrymen, of all classes and sections, for their generous support...

The army of Sherman still defiantly holds Atlanta. He can and must be driven from it. It is only for the good people of Georgia and surrounding states to speak the word, and the work is done, we have abundant provisions. There are men enough in the country, liable to and able for service, to accomplish the result...

My countrymen, respond to this call as you have done in days that are past, and, with the blessing of a kind and overruling Providence, the enemy shall be driven from your soil. The security of your wives and daughters from the insults and outrages of a brutal foe shall be established soon, and be followed by a permanent and honorable peace. The claims of home and country, wife and children, uniting with the demands of honor and patriotism, summon us to the field. We cannot, dare not, will not fail to respond. Full of hope and confidence, I come to join you in your struggles, sharing your privations, and, with your brave and true men, to strike the blow that shall bring success to our arms, triumph to our cause, and peace to our country! . . .

P. G. T. BEAUREGARD, General.[/font]

The practical results were small. Many Southerners had decided that this was "a rich man's war but a poor man's fight", and painfully learned that once in the Confederate army there was almost no way out.


Meanwhile, although the bulk of Sherman's forces were chasing Hood's Army of Tennessee, the Yankees still held Atlanta. Hood had hoped that the last Union corps in the city would be compelled to leave when the railroads were cut. But under Colonel W. W. Wright, the Northerners were performing miracles. In order to repair one major break, the estimate called for 35,000 new ties, six miles of new rails, and 10,000 workers. It was completed in just seven days. As Sherman would write, "it was by such acts of extraordinary energy that we discouraged our adversaries, for the rebel soldiers felt that it was a waste of labor for them to march hurriedly on wide circuits, day and night, to burn a bridge and tear up a mile or so of track, when they knew we could lay it back so quickly."

150 Years Ago Today:

In the east, James Longstreet was re-instated at the head of his corps in the Army of Northern Virginia. He had not fully recovered from his "friendly-fire" wound at the Wilderness, for his right arm was still paralyzed, and he was learning how to write with his left hand. In this condition, he feared that he would be more of an impediment than an asset. But Robert E. Lee was very pleased to have his "old war horse" back, for none of his current corps commanders was performing very well at this point, and as a result he was having to do much of the administrative work for the entire army himself.

(After the war, Longstreet would regain the use of his right hand by practising an early form of physical therapy, helping his right arm to move using his left, until it grew strong enough to move on its own.)


Longstreet's return had been advertised even before the fact, in one of the more unusual intelligence gambits of the war. A false message had been sent to a place in the Shenandoah Valley where the Southerners knew it would be intercepted:

[font="Times New Roman"]"To LIEUTENANT-GENERAL EARLY: Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan. LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General." The message from Longstreet had been taken down as it was being flagged from the Confederate signal-station on Three Top Mountain, and afterward translated by our signal officers, who knew the Confederate signal code. I first thought it a ruse, and hardly worth attention, but on reflection deemed it best to be on the safe side...

[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

It was a ruse, but only in part. Neither Longstreet nor any of his corps were being sent against Sheridan. But Jubal Early had managed to increase his strength back up to about 21,000 men, and now he was ready to move against the Northern army. Although still badly outnumbered, he had a secret weapon: map-maker Jedediah Hotchkiss, who knew the valley well. Hotchkiss had discovered a trail by which the Confederates could march a force around the otherwise imposing Union entrenchments and deliver a flank attack. The route was long, and so the march would have to be done at night, for surprise was vital. Early and his subordinates went over the maps and the plan carefully. Knowing where the Union commander's headquarters was, they even assigned a force of cavalry to:

[font="Times New Roman"]. . . endeavor to capture Sheridan himself. Rosser was ordered to move before day, in time to attack at five o'clock next morning, and to endeavor to surprise the enemy's cavalry in camp. Kershaw and Wharton were ordered to move, at one o'clock in the morning, towards Strasburg under my personal superintendence, and the artillery was ordered to concentrate where the Pike passed through the lines at Fisher's Hill, and, at the hour appointed for the attack, to move at a gallop to Hupp's Hill--the movement of the artillery being thus delayed for fear of attracting the attention of the enemy by the rumbling of the wheels over the macadamized road.
Swords and canteens were directed to be left in camp, so as to make as little noise as possible.
The division commanders were particularly admonished as to the necessity for promptness and energy in all their movements, and they were instructed to press the enemy with vigor after he was encountered, and to allow him no time to form, but to continue the pursuit until his forces should be completely routed. They were also admonished of the danger to be apprehended from a disposition to plunder the enemy's camps by their men, and they were enjoined to take every possible precaution against it.
[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center][/font]

The Confederates actually had no chance of bagging Sheridan. Partly because of the false message about Longstreet, Sheridan had gone to Washington to consult with the War Department. On this date he was on his way back, but he stopped for the night at Winchester. The good news for the Rebels: the Northerners were temporarily without their leader.

150 Years Ago Today:

Possibly inspired by John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry, a group of twenty-one Confederates had assembled in Canada for a strike at the town of St. Albans in Vermont. On this date, having come over the border in small groups, they gathered in the main square of the town shortly after noon, threw off their overcoats to reveal Confederate uniforms, and announced to the townspeople that they had taken over the town in the name of the Confederacy.

Many of the locals simply didn't believe them at first, but when the Southerners started robbing the three main banks, matters were taken seriously. Some of the townsmen grabbed their weapons and started shooting, but the Rebels gave better than they got, killing one man and wounding a second. (The northernmost land fatality of the Civil War.) After over $200,000 had been taken, the Confederates tried to set fire to a number of buildings with the hope of engulfing the entire town. This part did not work, however; the "Greek fire" they had brought was a failure and the buildings were still wet from a rain the day before.

The raiders mounted their horses and managed to escape the posse assembled to catch them. By nightfall they were back over the border into Canada. There, a number of them would be arrested, but eventually released because they had been wearing uniforms and so were considered soldiers instead of bandits. (The Canadians did return about $80,000 of the bank money.)


Near Cedar Creek in the Shenandoah Valley, Jubal Early's plan went into motion:

[font="Times New Roman"]At one o'clock on the morning of the 19th, Kershaw and Wharton moved, and I accompanied them. At Strasburg Kershaw moved to the right on the road to Bowman's Mill, and Wharton moved along the Pike to Hupp's Hill, with instructions not to display his forces but avoid the enemy's notice until the attack began, when he was to move forward, support the artillery when it came up, and send a force to get possession of the bridge on the Pike over the creek. I accompanied Kershaw's division, and we got in sight of the enemy's fires at halfpast three o'clock. The moon was now shining and we could see the camps. The division was halted under cover to await the arrival of the proper time, and I pointed out to Kershaw, and the commander of his leading brigade, the enemy's position and described the nature of the ground, and directed them how the attack was to be made and followed up. Kershaw was directed to cross his division over the creek as quietly as possible, and to form it into column of brigades, as he did so, and advance in that manner against the enemy's left breastwork, extending to the right or left as might be necessary.
At half-past four he was ordered forward, and, a very short time after he started, the firing from Rosser, on our left, and the picket firing at the ford at which Gordon was crossing were heard. Kershaw crossed the creek without molestation and formed his division as directed, and precisely at five o'clock his leading brigade, with little opposition, swept over the enemy's left work, capturing seven guns, which were at once turned on the enemy. As soon as this attack was made, I rode as rapidly as possible to the position on Hupp's Hill to which Wharton and the artillery had been ordered. I found the artillery just arriving, and a very heavy fire of musketry was now heard in the enemy's rear from Gordon's column. Wharton had advanced his skirmishers to the creek, capturing some prisoners, but the enemy still held the works on our left of the Pike, commanding that road and the bridge, and opened with his artillery on us. Our artillery was immediately brought into action and opened on the enemy, but he soon evacuated his works, and our men from the other columns rushed into them.
Just then the sun rose, and Wharton's division, and the artillery were ordered immediately forward. I rode in advance of them across the creek, and met General Gordon on the opposite hill. Kershaw's division had swept along the enemy's works on the right of the Pike, which were occupied by Crook's corps, and he and Gordon had united at the Pike, and their divisions had pushed across it in pursuit of the enemy. . .
[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center][/font]

Thus far the attack had been a brilliant success. The surprised Union soldiers abandoned their positions, and in running for the rear, spread panic. The whooping Rebels rolled up their foes by regiments, then brigades, then divisions. Shortly only one Northern corps out of three was still standing. And it appeared that Early had partly redeemed the number of cannon he had lost to the Yankees during previous battles, for eighteen guns were taken. But then what Early had feared began to happen. It was too much to ask that hungry, poorly clothed soldiers who had marched nearly the whole night could resist the temptation of the helping themselves to the food, clothing, and other useful things to be found in the hastily abandoned Union camps:

[font="Times New Roman"]As I passed across Cedar Creek after the enemy was driven from it, I had discovered a number of men in the enemy's camps plundering, and one of Wharton's battalions was ordered to clear the camps, and drive the men to their commands.
It was reported to me, subsequently, that a great number were at the same work, and I sent all my staff officers who could be spared, to stop it if possible, and orders were sent to the division commanders to send for their men.
[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center][/font]

In the meantime, Philip Sheridan had the first inklings of the Union debacle. Even in the days before radio, news could spread surprisingly quickly:

[font="Times New Roman"]Toward 6 o'clock the morning of the 19th, the officer on picket duty at Winchester came to my room, I being yet in bed, and reported artillery firing from the direction of Cedar Creek. I asked him if the firing was continuous or only desultory, to which he replied that it was not a sustained fire, but rather irregular and fitful. I remarked: "It's all right; Grover has gone out this morning to make a reconnoissance, and he is merely feeling the enemy." I tried to go to sleep again, but grew so restless that I could not, and soon got up and dressed myself.
[...]
We mounted our horses between half-past 8 and 9, and as we were proceeding up the street which leads directly through Winchester . . . I noticed that there were many women at the windows and doors of the houses, who kept shaking their skirts at us and who were otherwise markedly insolent in their demeanor, but supposing this conduct to be instigated by their well-known and perhaps natural prejudices, I ascribed to it no unusual significance. On reaching the edge of the town I halted a moment, and there heard quite distinctly the sound of artillery firing in an unceasing roar. Concluding from this that a battle was in progress, I now felt confident that the women along the street had received intelligence from the battle, field by the "grape-vine telegraph," and were in raptures over some good news...
[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

A short distance out of town, Sheridan discovered how good the news was for the pro-Southerners:

[font="Times New Roman"]...just as we made the crest of the rise beyond the stream, there burst upon our view the appalling spectacle of a panic-stricken army--hundreds of slightly wounded men, throngs of others unhurt but utterly demoralized, and baggage-wagons by the score, all pressing to the rear in hopeless confusion, telling only too plainly that a disaster had occurred at the front. On accosting some of the fugitives, they assured me that the army was broken up, in full retreat, and that all was lost; all this with a manner true to that peculiar indifference that takes possession of panic-stricken men. I was greatly disturbed by the sight, but at once sent word to Colonel Edwards commanding the brigade in Winchester, to stretch his troops across the valley, near Mill Creek, and stop all fugitives, directing also that the transportation be passed through and parked on the north side of the town. As I continued at a walk a few hundred yards farther, thinking all the time of Longstreet's telegram to Early, "Be ready when I join you, and we will crush Sheridan," I was fixing in my mind what I should do. My first thought was to stop the army in the suburbs of Winchester as it came back, form a new line, and fight there; but as the situation was more maturely considered a better conception prevailed.
[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

At Cedar Creek, there was still on corps of Union infantry in good order, plus a number of Union cavalry. These formed a defensive line to rear of the original Union position. Jubal Early and his subordinates wanted to make their victory complete, but they no longer had surprise on their side.

[font="Times New Roman"]I found Ramseur and Kershaw in line with Pegram, but Gordon had not come up. In a short time, however, I found him coming up from the rear, and I ordered him to take position on Kershaw's left, and advance for the purpose of driving the enemy from his new position--Kershaw and Ramseur being ordered to advance at the same time. As the enemy's cavalry on our left was very strong, and had the benefit of an open country to the rear of that flank, a repulse at this time would have been disastrous, and I therefore directed General Gordon, if he found the enemy's line too strong to attack with success, not to make the assault. The advance was made for some distance, when Gordon's skirmishers came back, reporting a line of battle in front behind breastworks, and Gordon did not make the attack.
It was now apparent that it would not do to press my troops further. They had been up all night and were much jaded. In passing over rough ground to attack the enemy in the early morning, their own ranks had been much disordered, and the men scattered, and it had required time to re-form them. Their ranks, moreover, were much thinned by the advance of the men engaged in plundering the enemy's camps. The delay which had unavoidably occurred had enabled the enemy to rally a portion of his routed troops, and his immense force of cavalry, which remained intact, was threatening both of our flanks in an open country, which of itself rendered an advance extremely hazardous.
I determined, therefore, to try and hold what had been gained, and orders were given for carrying off the captured and abandoned artillery, small arms and wagons.
[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center][/font]

The word spread that Sheridan had returned. To borrow Grant's words, "His presence soon restored confidence. Finding themselves worse frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. " Some had retreated as far as 10 miles (16 km), but went to the scene of action again. Sheridan arrived at the front before noon, but waited until enough of his troops had both returned and been deployed in an organized fashion to give him the clear advantage.

[font="Times New Roman"]Between half-past and 4 o'clock, I was ready to assail, and decided to do so by advancing my infantry line in a swinging movement, so as to gain the Valley pike with my right between Middletown and the Belle Grove House; and when the order was passed along, the men pushed steadily forward with enthusiasm and confidence.
[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

Although the Confederates had been holding their ground for several hours, they had not bothered to dig in. Both sides had reason to be tired; the Rebels had marched most of the night before their pre-dawn assault, while many of the Yankees had run for miles in the morning, and then had to march nearly the same distance in the early afternoon back to the front lines. But there was a difference between men who had been on scanty rations for months, and those who had been well-fed.

[font="Times New Roman"]Late in the afternoon, the enemy's infantry advanced against Ramseur's, Kershaw's and Gordon's lines, and the attack on Ramseur's and Kershaw's fronts was handsomely repulsed in my view, and I hoped that the day was finally ours, but a portion of the enemy had penetrated an interval which was between Evans' brigade, on the extreme left, and the rest of the line, when that brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades soon followed. General Gordon made every possible effort to rally his men, and lead them back against the enemy, but without avail. The information of this affair, with exaggerations, passed rapidly along Kershaw's and Ramseur's lines, and their men, under the apprehension of being flanked, commenced falling back in disorder, though no enemy was pressing them, and this gave me the first intimation of Gordon's condition.
At the same time the enemy's cavalry, observing the disorder in our ranks, made another charge on our right, but was repulsed. Every effort was made to stop and rally Kershaw's and Ramseur's men, but the mass of them resisted all appeals, and continued to go to the rear without waiting for any effort to retrieve the partial disorder.
[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center][/font]

The disorder rapidly went from "partial" to "total", and the Southerners' retreat deteriorated into an all-out debacle. Many of the equipment wagons were left behind, as were all of the eighteen Union guns captured in the morning, and twenty-three Confederate guns besides.

[font="Times New Roman"]All our troops were now moving on the retreating Confederates, and as I rode to the front Colonel Gibbs, who succeeded Lowell, made ready for another mounted charge, but I checked him from pressing the enemy's right, in the hope that the swinging attack from my right would throw most of the Confederates to the east of the Valley pike, and hence off their line of retreat through Strasburg to Fisher's Hill. The eagerness of the men soon frustrated this anticipation, however, the left insisting on keeping pace with the centre and right, and all pushing ahead till we regained our old camps at Cedar Creek. Beyond Cedar Creek, at Strasburg, the pike makes a sharp turn to the west toward Fisher's Hill, and here Merritt uniting with Custer, they together fell on the flank of the retreating columns, taking many prisoners, wagons, and guns, among the prisoners being Major-General Ramseur, who, mortally wounded, died the next day.
[center]--Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army[/center][/font]

Total losses for the North were 569 killed, 3,425 wounded, and 1,770 missing or captured, and for the South 320 killed, 1,540 wounded, and 1,050 missing or captured. In terms of casualties, the Union had actually had the worst of the battle. But the Confederate army had been scattered, and lost many guns and other equipment. Early would mange to pull his force back together in time, but without enough cavalry or artillery, it would never again be a threat to the Northern army. The Shenandoah Valley was, for practical purposes, lost to the Confederacy. And the dramatic tale of Sheridan's ride, "snatching victory from the jaws of defeat", was an immense boost for the Republicans. Lincoln's re-election, which had seemed a lost cause only two months before, was now a virtual certainty.

Maps by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

150 Years Ago Today:

In Missouri, the scattered Union forces were starting to come together against the Rebel army under Sterling Price. The Southerners had by now marched to the western edge of the state, looking for supplies and recruits. But what they were finding was militia hastily gathered from neighboring Kansas, and Federal cavalry. On this date, there was considerable fighting around Byram's Ford and the town of Independence. The results were mostly in the Southerners' favor, for they managed to cross the ford and take most of the town. (For once, there is a better record of Confederate casualties, about 140 in all, than for the Union.) But the reports showed that the total number of Yankees in the area was over double the number of men under Price's command. Price decided to fall back to the town of Westport, and then turn on his opponents, hoping to defeat them in detail before they could truly link up.


In Georgia, Grant had sent his friend Sherman a gift: a talented cavalry general named James H. Wilson, who Grant believed would greatly increase the effectiveness of Sherman's troopers. When Wilson reported to the Western headquarters, his new commander made some interesting remarks: "I am a damned sight smarter man than Grant. I know more about military history, strategy, and grand tactics than he does. I know more about supply, administration, and everything else than he does. I'll tell you where he beats me, though, and where he beats the world. He doesn't give a damn about what the enemy does out of his sight, but it scares me like hell."

The interview does not seem to have gone as happily as could have been hoped. Sherman decided to send Wilson north to Tennessee to help defend the state from John Bell Hood's army and Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry, and keep Judson "Kill-Cavalry" Kilpatrick as the head of the cavalry he would take with him on his famous march south. It would eventually prove to be a wise decision, however, for Wilson was what the Union had been desperately searching for: the commander who could beat Nathan Bedford Forrest.

150 Years Ago Today:

Near Westport, Missouri, both Northerners and Southerners were in a mood to attack. The Northerners under Samuel Curtis had more than a two-to-one advantage and knew it, although many of their troops were militia. The Southerners under Sterling Price had more experienced men, and knew that a large body of Federal cavalry was blocked at Byram's Ford from the day before. Thus the action started early in the morning, or more accurately developed from the skirmishing the day before.

The two bodies of infantry charged and counter-charged, with first one side and then the other seeming to have the advantage. At one point the Yankees were driven back nearly to the streets of Westport, but reinforcements turned the tide. Then, for once, it was the Union side that benefitted from a little-known road. A local farmer annoyed at the Rebel invasion showed the Northerners a route through a gully, where they could move unseen to the Confederate flank. The Federals even managed to march a battery of cannon to the new position, and began an enfilading fire.

In the meantime, though it had taken three hours, at 11:00 a.m. the Northern cavalry finally gained control of Byram's Ford. The Southerners now faced a force in their rear fully as large as their entire army, as well as being outnumbered and outmanuvered by the force in their front. It was time to retire and accept defeat.

Westport has been called "The Gettysburg of the West", which is a great exaggeration, but it did spell the end of Price's expedition into Missouri. Both sides had lost about 1,500 men, which the Confederates couold not afford, but the Union could. Faced with now-insurmountable odds, Sterling Price could no longer accomplish anything useful. His army began the withdrawal back to Arkansas, closely pursued by the victorious Northerners.

150 Years Ago Today:

Sterling Price's defeated army was retreating roughly along the border between Missouri and Arkansas. As generally happened in the Civil War, the Confederates were able to out-march the pursuing Union infantry. The cavalry was another matter; on this date there were skirmishes at Marais des Cygnes and Marmiton River, and a disaster for the Southerners at Mine Creek. Price had detached part of his force to attempt to capture Fort Scott and seize some badly-needed arms and supplies. The rest were helping the supply wagons to ford Mine Creek when about 2,600 Federal horsemen caught up with them.

Although the Confederates had about 7,000 men on scene, they were armed with single-shot muskets or, for some men, no firearms at all. The Northerners had repeating carbines and revolvers. One of their commanders was Frederick Benteen, who would later be criticized for his tardiness in helping Custer's force at Little Big Horn. On this date, however, Benteen was not slow, leading his troopers at the Southern center while another Union column struck at the left flank. After a few minutes, the Rebel line broke into confusion, aided by the fact that some of the poorly-equipped Confederates were wearing captured Union uniforms.

A few Southerners fought sturdily, but most of the force went into hurried retreat. The Federals took a number of the wagons, two cannon, and nearly a thousand prisoners, including Major-General John Marmaduke. Total Confederate losses were about 1,200 against only 100 men on the Union side. The attempt on Fort Scott was called off; the Rebel army was no longer in condition to assault any major fort.

150 Years Ago Today:

The Confederate cause was faring poorly in Missouri. Sterling Price had called most of the pro-Southern guerrillas and irregulars of the state into his army, which was now fleeing from the much larger Union forces. This gave the pro-Northern partisans a distinct advantage in the lawless violence which had plagued the state almost from the beginning of the war.

William "Bloody Bill" Anderson was still at large, however, and leading a band of "bushwackers" against various places. By this time they were not particular about whether their victims had Union sympathies or not. They left a trail of looting and murder as they went, and Anderson even committed one of the few recorded rapes in the Missouri conflict. Outraged about this and the Centralia massacres, the Union generals in the area assigned a force against Anderson's band. But this time it was of 150 experienced troopers under a Lieutenant Colonel Samuel P. Cox. Nor were the Federal commanders the only ones angered; Cox and his men received tips from the locals on where Anderson was headed.

On this date, the Northerners caught up with Anderson and his men near what is now Orrick, Missouri. The Rebels charged, firing their revolvers and hitting five or six of their opponents. But the Union cavalrymen returned a heavy fire, killing four of the guerrillas and sending all the others in retreat except two. One of them was Anderson, and at the next volley he was struck in the head and killed.


The body of "Bloody Bill" was paraded through the streets of a nearby town, ironically named Richmond, to the happiness of nearly everyone in Missouri. The Union soldiers who searched the corpse reported that they found a string on which Anderson had tied a knot for each person he had killed. There were fifty-three.


Although Lincoln's re-election was now assured, the Republicans wanted their majority as large as possible, both for general political prestige and also to pass the 13th amendment. (At this point the amendment was still blocked in the House of Representatives.) With this view, efforts now turned to admitting Nevada as a new state to the Union. An American state, however, requires a state constitution. The Nevada constitution had not been approved by the voters until early September. Previous attempts to send it to Washington by conventional transport of the day had failed. Therefore, in one of history's first transmissions of an official document by electronic means, the Nevada constitution was sent by telegraph beginning on this date. The first key operator would labor for seven hours to transmit, and his line only reached as far as Salt lake City. From there it would go next to Chicago.

150 Years Ago Today:

On the Roanoke River in North Carolina, the Northerners were still blocked by the presence of the Confederate ironclad Albemarle. An enterprising naval lieutenant named William B. Cushing came up with an idea. Since no large ships dare to tangle with the Southern vessel, Cushing proposed to use a small steam-powered launch and equip it with a "spar torpedo" (a large explosive charge at the end of a pole), and attack the Albemarle at night. The plan was approved by the Union admiral, and Cushing and a small crew of volunteers set off after nightfall on this date.



The first part went well. The Yankees managed to sneak past a Confederate schooner on picket duty undetected. Cushing was even thinking of rushing his men on board the Albemarle and capturing her. But just as they approached the docks where the ironclad was moored, they were spotted, and what had been a quiet night got very noisy very quickly:

[font="Times New Roman"]A heavy fire was at once opened upon us, not only from the ship, but from men stationed on the shore. This did not disable us and we neared them rapidly. A large fire now blazed , upon the bank, and by its light I discovered the unfortunate fact that there was a circle of logs around the Albemarle, boomed well out from her side, with the very intention of preventing the action of torpedoes. To examine them more closely, I ran alongside until amidships, received the enemy's fire, and sheered off for the purpose of turning, a hundred yards away, and going at the booms squarely, at right angles, trusting to their having been long enough in the water to have become slimy -- in which case my boat, under full headway, would bump up against them and slip over into the pen with the ram. This was my only chance of success, and once over the obstruction my boat would never get out again. As I turned, the whole back of my coat was torn out by buckshot and the sole of my shoe was carried away. The fire was very severe.

In a lull of the firing, the captain demanding what boat it was. All my men gave comical answers, and mine was a dose of canister from the howitzer. In another instant we had struck the logs and were over, with headway nearly gone, slowly forging up under the enemy's quarter-port. Ten feet from us the muzzle of a rifle gun looked into our faces, and every word of command on board was distinctly heard.

My clothing was perforated with bullets as I stood in the bow, the heel-jigger in my right hand and the exploding-line in the left. We were near enough then, and I ordered the boom lowered until the forward motion of the launch carried the torpedo under the ram's overhang. A strong pull of the detaching-line, a moment's waiting for the torpedo to rise under the hull and, I hauled in the left hand, just cut by a bullet. The explosion took place at the same instant that 100 pounds of grape, at 10 feet range, crashed among us, and the dense mass of water thrown out by the torpedo came down with choking weight upon us.

Twice refusing to surrender; I commanded the men to save themselves; and, throwing off sword, revolver, shoes, and coat, struck out from my disabled and sinking boat into the river.

[center]--William B. Cushing, Destruction of CSS Albemarle[/center][/font]



Cushing and just one other man managed to escape back to Union lines; the rest of his men were either picked up by the Confederates or drowned in the cold water of the river. But they had accomplished their mission. The spar torpedo had blown a gaping hole into the Albemarle, and she settled on the bottom, just deep enough to put her out of action. The Roanoke River was now open to the Union navy.


Along the Richmond-Petersburg lines, U. S. Grant made one more attempt to break the Confederate supply line. He ordered an attack on the south side against the Boydton Plank road, and a diversion on the north side under Benjamin Butler. Given Butler's dismal record as a field commander, it was not surprising that the northern advance went nowhere. The column failed to march around the Confederate entrenchments, instead going straight towards them, but then wisely stopping when the men realized the situation.

To the south, the assault was made by the II Corps under Winfield Hancock and a division of V Corps under one Samuel Crawford. This also suffered from bad navigation; a gap opened up between Crawford's force and the remainder of the Union troops, and continued to get wider. More, it was discovered that Confederate fortifications which were reported to be still in progress were in fact complete, and would exact a heavy price to any attempt to overrun them. After some reconaissance by Grant in person, it was determined to hold Hancock's II Corps where it was until the reinforcing division could arrive.

It never happened. Instead, the Confederates realized that II Corps was now exposed, and launched a counter-attack. For a time it looked as if Hancock's Northerners were facing an even worse disaster than at Ream's Station: they were confronted on three sides with no good route on the fourth side. But this time there was no panic on the Union side. Hancock ordered a counter-counter-attack that broke through in a key area, and in turn isolated a Confederate division. Union cavalry was also able to get the better of the Rebel troopers, and soon reinforcements opened a path to the Northern main line. Grant gave Hancock the choice of holding the position or falling back. Since the missing division under Crawford had never shown up, Hancock decided that his force was still too exposed. They were still some distance from the Boydton Plank road, so the ground was of little use to the Federals. Hancock retreated back to his original lines during the night.

The day's fighting would be the last serious action in the area for 1864, and had cost the Union 1,758 casualties and the Confederacy about 1,300. By the grim mathematics of the war, this was a Northern victory, for they could replace their losses more easily now that the war was clearly going in their favor, and re-enlistments and new recruits were inspired to come forward.