Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Sid,

and you cannot really kill a rubber plantation with bombers

Incendiaries +/- biowarfare via the release of pests which attack rubber trees and vectors of said pests.

REPLY: I have material on Japans BW programs: Unit 731, Factories of Death and some general histories of BW along with some reports. Japan had the most extensive BW program in history to that time - and was the first nation ever to achieve a technical overkill capability. [It had enough anthrax to kill every person on the planet - if it could be delivered uniformly and internally - which it could not. 16 tons.] It did have research on bw to attack animals as well as humans - and it used a thousand prisoners from Bataan to insure there was no immunity of Caucasions to their agents (and even tried to make diseases that ONLY attacked Caucasions - but failed in that). Nevertheless, while post war Soviet and American (and British) BW programs engaged in extensive plant agent research, Japan seems not to have done that. Aside from the fact BW is not in the game, it was not an option for IJA IRL - so you should not assume it would be ordered - on the basis of your "it ain't physically possible" rule.

nevertheless you are right that significant inefficiencies could be achieved

And in WiTP we CANNOT stop all supplies being produced... Aden is a massive source of free supply which we can do nothing about.

REPLY: Nor should we be able to. Aden represents a stream of things from places we cannot reach. There are smaller points of this sort. In this area there is Rawalpindi (I think) - by Afghanistan. It produces a few points that are not from resource centers - representing off map sources. Farther North - a major supply source is Krasnyarsk - representing Western Siberia. These are map edge sources - and the heart of the game is that they feed Allied units - no matter what happens on the map. We should not be upset about that. It is a good model - and the normal one.


As to the practicalities. Once one selects a city attack one gets a readout of ALL of the resource centres within range. We know what resource levels they start with and can measure how much we've destroyed. I can even keep an eye on repair efforts in-game. So, it will be easy to calculate the total resource level and then calculate what 1/3rd of that level is. Once I've damaged the difference I will stop the bombing of resources.



If you signify agreement with this I will post the proposal to the Allied side.

REPLY: I am confused slightly - but not in disagreement. What proposal to the Allied side? I thought you said above you did not want any more house rules - and this was just between us.



Also, am awaiting feedback on the SAA situation....

REPLY: SAA? What is an SAA?

I posit that they are army troops and thus their disposition - after the invasion of the Phillipines is up to the IJA in-game...

REPLY: Uh - I thought I was doing the Philippines. AND DEI except Sumatra. Now IRL the troops that did PI went on to DEI. In fact - so did the troops that did Malaya - Java was hit on both ends by both forces. I didn't think you would want to send those troops to my area - from Malaya - particularly as you have other adventures in mind to the West - but I hardly thought you would want the troops I used? It seems obvious that they must garrison PI and DEI - and over time a good deal more will be required. IRL IJA was way too unwilling to commit troops early - and ended up committing them anyway - at a time they ended up getting badly hurt. We cannot take this vast area - and contest it effectively - if we then transfer the troops somewhere else.


Obviously I'm happy to leave you a significant number of divisions but if we have 2 or 3 divisions earmarked for Hawaii and another 5 for the Phillipines you could end up with more of the SAA than the IJA. I would not have allowed this in real life.

REPLY: There are 3 divisions allocated for the Philippines initially - 2 as such and two technical brigades -
plus another some follow on troops. The Navy has only companies (special NLFs), demi-battalions (NLFs), battalions (SNLFs) and dual battalions (CSNLFs) - plus a tiny number of light tank companies. [3 of the SNLFs are airborne - witn no more to come]. Just as you must have some naval assets in your areas - I must have some troops. Thinking in terms of "these are IJA, so they are really mine" is not consistent with "each controls operations in his area." I do not think in terms of keeping ships out of your hands - and even when you don't ask for them I won't allow you to have less than what I regard as minimum in EACH area you control. Similarly for certain critical and scarce air assets. Need them for the vast Pacific I may - grossly inadequate the total number may be - you are going to have patrol assets - and to the extent and degree you don't have them in JAAF - also naval fighters and bombers. Even captial ships and submarines. You ask for two BB - and I insist on sending four. That is my attitude.

After Hawaii and DEI are cleared up you will be able to aim the 2 to 3 divisions from Hawaii + whatever is left from DEI ( several Brigades) at Port Moresby and Noumea.


REPLY: While I intend to leave only 1 division and 1 brigade in Hawaii (on Oahu and the other island with major bases) - defending other bases with naval units - that probably only brings back a division or so. DEI isn't going to free up anything - ever. It is going to need more troops over time - as pressure builds. These forces will probably invest Northern Australia - and be fully engaged on that front. On the other hand, 1 plus divisions - and a few specialist units (I want every specialist company you can spare - and a few battalions - these matter a lot in the empty Pacific) - should be enough - and I will go for Noumea if no major problems develop. I intend to make it hard to transit the Pacific from US to Australia. They must either go way South - or go via the Indian Ocean.

That should come to about 5 division equivalents and be enough for your operations. I would like to keep most of the divisions from the Phillipines in order to speed up the capture of Burma and allow me to concentrate this whole force for my previously discussed plan for wrapping up China as quickly as possible and opening up that southern railroad ASAP.

REPLY: This is a misunderstanding of the situation: there are probably more than that involved in PH & DEI. Add 3 for Hawaii. And then figure a stream of garrison units and specialist units. The only mitigator is that IJN has about a division in true assault battalions, and gets another divison worth of them, plus a similar amount in horribly weak (no heavy weapons) garrison units. Well - also base forces have organic garrison in them - worth perhaps a division or more at start and another in 1942/3. If you plan on the basis of the above you are going to replay the historical situation - in which too small forces had to be backed up by major ones. These never arrived in time or in sufficient strength (losing most along the way) - and it turned the war right around. The clever thing is to send enough to begin with - and then use it well. By 1945 the IJA has 150 divisions - and an equal amount in other units (half was not in divisions but brigades). And you are figuring I get 5 divsions? IJA is at all times larger than the US Army - and starts about 150 division equivelants.

ORIGINAL: Kereguelen

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

nevertheless you are right that significant inefficiencies could be achieved

And in WiTP we CANNOT stop all supplies being produced... Aden is a massive source of free supply which we can do nothing about. We can, however, create such inefficiencies in TRANSPORT ( tieing down many dozens of AKs shipping it from Aden to Karachi and then even more inefficiency in transporting it by rail down to south-eastern India) that the bombing can have a major effect. I figure that about 50% of Allied supplies landed at Karachi will be "lost in transport" if it has to be transported overland to south-eastern India. This is a massive victory for us and will pay major dividends until such time as the Allies are able to take Ceylon and close the airfields which prevent the shipping of supply directly to south-eastern India.

You'll probably loose lots of supplies and shipping enroute to Ceylon yourself if you take it and the Allied side still holds the rest of India (the approaches to Ceylon are a perfect hunting ground for US S-Class subs with their limited range). And you'll have to commit a sizeable part of your airforce to prevent your airfields on Ceylon from being bombed to dust from India (Bangalore and Hyderabad are inland, thus no naval bombardment is possible to suppress their airfields). If your opponents manage to ship some 100,000 supplies from Aden to Bombay/Karachi before you're able to threaten the sealane from Aden, spoilage on the Indian roads should not matter much for them.

 I am confused slightly - but not in disagreement. What proposal to the Allied side? I thought you said above you did not want any more house rules - and this was just between us. 

 What is an SAA?

They will raise much more than that right in India - every month.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

 I am confused slightly - but not in disagreement. What proposal to the Allied side? I thought you said above you did not want any more house rules - and this was just between us. 

Hell no. If the Allies don't agree to limit themselves in the exact same way you want us to limit ourselves then 100% resource bombing is back on the table for BOTH sides. I'll post it to them andif they agree then I will abie by that agreement. If they don't then they can bomb everything we have and I can bomb everything they have. Simple.


UNDERSTOOD and CONCUR

Japan CAN win a war of great battles - see the Russo Japanese War - with a whole series of both naval and land victories.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

I see you've responded while I posted myself.

Ok, this weekend I'll work up some semi-detailed taskings for us to begin discussions around.

REPLY: Excellent.


P.s. If the IJA has 21 changes to make in-game... I would like to reserve about 10 of these for changing the preparation targets of my units to fit in with my invasion plan.

REPLY: These are changes in LOCATION of land or air units. You may also request a change in location of a task group under your control WITHOUT counting against that limit. The preparation is supposed to reflect the pre war planning of the scenario - and changes to that should be done in game time. However - IF you have proposals that involve things of GENERAL interest (units that operate in respect to the SRA one should expect all players to tend to like) I will put them in. When we finish - we have a general scenario release - not a special one for this one game. Anyway - anything not "Nemoesque" (likely to be unique to Nemo's thinking) can be incorporated into the standard EOS game start. Send me your list. There is NO limit whatever on this - in the sense of count. Just the principle it must be part of the scenario start. If it is a good EOS start for a general SRA offensive - it can be part of the pre war planning without a problem - nor a limit.


E.g. most divisions would have Kuala Lumpur or Singapore set as their invasion target. Also, I've done an analysis of the IJA pilot requirements and comparing them to the IJN pilot requirements giving the IJA 150 versus the IJNs 216 leaves the IJA with too few pilots graduating relative to the IJN.


REPLY: Presumably you mean JAAF and JNAF. I am not sure the sort of analysis you refer to - but these are not things that are made of dreams, air, or what someone felt like. The general RHS numbers (non-EOS scenarios are 150 vs 108). ONLY EOS has the larger number for JNAF - and that ONLY because we cut training time (and reduced training output skill levels) to those of JAAF. JNAF is in fact larger - so its schools can produce more graduates IF they operate on a similar training sillibus. [It was more complex than that IRL. JNAF has TWO ENTIRELY DIFFERENT training school systems: a float one and a land plane one. They are combined here because that is required to work with WITP] Anyway - since the JNAF starts out bigger - and becomes much bigger - your analysis either involves some strange operational assumptions (JAAF loses more?) or it is flawed. The RELATIVE proportion of pilots is almost perfect! JNAF gets about 60% of the slots for pilots - and it gets 59% of the pilots. How to get it closer than that is a mystery to me. Nevertheless - go ahead and explain what you have in mind?

IOW the number of graduating pilots per plane is lower for the IJA than IJN.


REPLY: What is an IOW? Do you mean IRL? The numbers are explained above.

Are you willing to discuss this as I think it is reasonable to believe that the IJA would have formed a more reasonable appreciation of its training needs and bumped up graduation to achieve at least the same ratio as the IJN.

REPLY: This is confusing. What does "at least the same ratio" mean? It got a bigger number before due to its training program length. The Navy has adopted the same standard - at the cost of losing replacement skill points. You want to NOT be at the same skill level? Seems odd. Anyway - I need to evaluate this carefully worked out set of numbers and skill levels - in human play - before considering changes. But I can explain how you can make changes on your own if you want? The problem is that we are forced to make some awful compromises here: a real program is dynamic - subject to change - and we are frozen as it were. But the basic principle is that you cannot get more pilots quickly UNLESS you drop the output quality level. The reverse is also the case: IF you will accept half the present number of replacements, you can add a full 10 points to your rating. But it is a diminsing returns function - going the other way - you won't double your numbers for a drop in 10 points. [IJN did that because it was at the flat end of the training curve - took twice as long to get the extra 10 points. Very inefficient at that part of the curve.] We also probably are at the limit of effectiveness: that drop in 10 points is costing the navy dramatically in losses in AI vs AI tests.

For the other 10-11 available "changes" do you have any ideas as to what would and wouldn't be fair game? I am thinking of asking for things like the movement of certain units to different bases so that they can load onto APs immediately instead of being stranded inland.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Still though, we have the problem that you haven't given ANY indication of a timeline of operations for 1941 to 1942 around which we can begin discussing force allocations, phasing etc and what sort of perimeter we want to have established by the end of 1942. It is my opinion that this is where our discussions should focus. After all this is the sort of stuff the IJA and IJN disagreed with during the war.

But the starting position is the plan as it is.

REPLY: OK - keep it simple: You allocate a divison to IJA - count it gone forever.

I don't think the idea I have to withdraw a unit at a certain time - in the context of operational events I cannot predict or control - is good strategy. Do you?

Aside from the tiny fact I don't think you would give me the troops

In case you missed it - I believe that you should control Northern and Western Borneo.

REPLY: You are forgetting these units already have a second stage mission: DEI. The SAME units that take PI take Java. Further - SOME units from Malaya ALSO hit Java - at the same time.

By 1943 I expect to have a dozen divisions as such, an equal amount in small units (only a third of these latter being Navy because - that is all there is - and probably some of those will be in your areas farther west and in the north).

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

But the starting position is the plan as it is.

LOL!!! Which means that you get huge portions of the IJA while I don't get access to new ships since those aren't assigned to new areas... No Sid. You don't get your cake and get to eat it too.

REPLY: Actually - as usual - I disagree - and you have it wrong. It is prefectly obvious that ships are assigned to certain operations. And I cannot responsibly say "you cannot have them." Same for air units. In spite of the gigantic risk involved in moving to take the Central Pacific - I am not taking the Navy with me!


It is really simple... I am prepared to be quite generous as regarding assigning units to your forces BUT I will not surrender the principle that Army units assigned to the Southern Area Army are under MY control unles specifically stated otherwise.

REPLY: Nor did I ask you to. But note that Southern Area Army is a vast area - and we HAVE stated otherwise with respect to forces related to PI and DEI. You once objected to a need to "renegotiate." I now raise the same objection in reverse. The PI ops mean I control Formosa, Palau, and a number of other points and units, where the forces involved happen to be - and basically need to be - in order to do the op. And these units are neither available for Southeast Fleet (as you suggested above) nor return to you - they have ANOTHER mission in the plan already - DEI. Unless you propose to give me entirely different units for that mission. But why? it is more efficient for units forward on a vector to keep moving on that vector.


I'm quite happy for units in the 4th Fleet to be yours but the Southern Area Army is an IJA institution and that means if you want the units from it then you must bargain for them. You cannot just say "Well historically they went to place X and place X is in my area of operations which means that unit is mine." We're playing a wargame in which the warplan on Day ONE is different from history so your argument is internally consistent.

REPLY: Generous! 4th Fleet is the smallest of all Japanese commands in everything but area. I don't think it has a single Army unit. And it is the force that is going to face the main American offensive - assuming they cannot get going in the South Pacific or Australia any time soon. Anyway - as usual - you are about 90% wrong. Southern Area Army is not really an IJA institution. It is the greatest of the Japanese combined arms institutions. Yamashita has a Navy Captain assigned that his radical chief of staff - Tsuji - has nothing but praise for. Because it IS a joint staff and a joint institution - properly integrated - almost the only example of this in Japan. If that is not enough - WE have split the command - East and West - and it is split - because - as you like to say - your word is your bond. Do don't try to unsplit it now.


Have a little faith that I'm not going to cripple your offensive by leaving you with too few ground combat formations and quit trying to have irrevocable control over army units through clever stipulation of pre-game positions.

REPLY: OK - IF you have a little faith I am not trying to play games with my team mate. I am truly a fan of Yamashita - and I will designate any unneeded unit as available to transfer - and otherwise strategic reserve - from day one.
I don't want to feed anything I don't need forward - and I will leave as much in Japan as I dare - even of second and third echelon forces. I don't want to draw down my stocks forward, and I want my naval units repaired up. Planes won't upgrade distant from supply or HQ either. And our great advantage is interior lines. So I will stay as central as possible with as much as possible - so it is in good shape - requires minimal supply shipping - and is able to rapidly move in ANY direction - including YOURs.



I don't view that as being, at all, within the ethos of dividing the Japanese into an Army CO and Navy CO who MUST work together if they are to get anything done. You are trying to create a situation in which you have access to sufficient army units due to clever pre-game manouevring that you don't actually need my OK to do much.

REPLY: I thought it was YOUR doctrine "each commands his theater with minimal involvement of the other." And indeed- we hardly can negotiate over - what - 13,000 units? Line by line? It seems logical to me that the units assigned are the starting point - unless there is a clear reason to change them. And it won't be efficient in our planning time, game political points, time to move, or logistic costs, if we make major changes to that plan. I am trying to be reasonable - simple - logical - all at one time. You appear to be paranoid - or a control freak. I am not seeking control of what isn't mine: EVERYTHING needed for my ops IS mine already. To the extent that isn't so - I will say something. And vice versa. The big place things get ambiguos is Japan - and also reinforcements.
EOS (and PPO) have NO theater assignment for most units - we must spend pp - and have them to spend. But you cannot tell by looking "this is 4th fleet" - even if it is. And those places will take a lot of thinking. I think reinforcements are better decided at the time - we don't know the situation now.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121


It is fine if you want to do that but you will do that without me. I've learnt that I can argue all I want about things but only the reality that I am quite happy to walk away rather than commit to a multi-year game I won't enjoy ( and let you bring in another player) ever seems to effect change. It is unfortunate but there you go.

REPLY: This seems to be a negative attitude. Our problem appears mainly to be one of mis communication.
Why should it be different now? I feel exactly the same way you do: that you have sprung an outrageous surprise - having agreed to a division of theaters "with control to the commander" now suddenly I am left with nothing but a few battalions of naval units I can count on. And months of negotiation for the minority of units that have IJA or JAAF prefixes I need. I note that you seem completely unreasonable about units with IJN prefixes: you will no doubt say "I don't want ANY of those - unless I ask" - but really - I am to take away Saigon or Singapore naval base forces?
I am not to send any to Ceylon or Rangoon? That is silly. Nor do I expect a unit sent (or already at) those locations with a long term mission to come back to my control in some later month or year. Nor do you - if you are really honest. You know that some things are defined by function and geography. So act like you know it. I am tired of bickering over what you must already know is reasonable. You said you could behave like a team. You said not to say "I get my way or I quit". So honor those principles yourself. And do so in good humor. As I am.

REPLY: OK - keep it simple: You allocate a divison to IJA - count it gone forever.

No. This is what you would LIKE. It is not what will ALWAYS happen.


REPLY: This is a cryptic medium. Of course it will not ALWAYS happen. But it does solve the problem of "you have to say how long you want something." I don't want to say that for the 1000 or 2000 units I need, line by line. So I am trying to make it easy: count em gone and the list gets short! But really - if I know this is for a certain limited purpose - I will say so. "I am about to engage a major invasion fleet. I need the Me-264 force to compliment my mobile and land based air forces. This will take two days to stage - three days to execute - and win - lose or draw I will disengage every long range air unit - mine as well as yours - in 7 or 8 days." On the other hand, a land unit sent well forward in PTO vs the American front is not likely to return. It will probably eventually be overrun or isolated by enemy operations. Some offensive units we should exchange for garrsion units - but they will move on to other operations nearby - not go 1/3 of the way around the world to India or Siberia - at least as the general case.


It might turn out to be what usually happens in-game but I'm not prepared to concede that it will ALWAYS happen.


REPLY: And I am not prepaired to spend a man month listing what I guess might be the case for every unit with an IJA prefix of interest to me. Such an effort is silly: it won't work out as I guess anyway. All I was doing was responding to an unreasonable demand I say "I need this unit for four weeks." I also have no intention of risking major convoys to return units over the vast ocean just because X weeks have passed. This is fatal to efficient operations - and I am shocked you think otherwise (if you are thinking at all about the implications of your unreasonable demand).


I am quite prepared to be reasonable about this and accept it is probable but I am not going to give you a blanket ability to just that an IJA division in the Southern Area Army is YOURS from Day 1 and for the rest of the war.


REPLY: That isn't being reasonable. Odds are long most of these units will die in the field - or be defending something vital - sooner or later. What is the point of taking Java if I don't defend it? Or anything else? And what is the point of running ships to move units back - and others forward to relieve them? [Maybe if morale was a factor - but it isn't]
It probably is the normal case that units that go forward won't come all the way back. If they succeed they will move to a nearby forward place for other ops - or defend what they took. It is much more efficient than planning to return them every one. And I am close to saying what you said above - if you don't shift gears and really be reasonable. I am not being unreasonable at all - and I believe you must have very paranoid views of me to think otherwise. We are a team. AND we are responsible for our areas. If I send a division of subs to North and East - because I insist on that - under your control - I expect to have to replace your losses - not get them back.

I'd be an idiot to fall for that. Now, you can either deal with me or find someone else who is stupid enough to grant you the right to all IJA units which appear in IJN areas or with planning set to bases in the IJN areas.

REPLY: Only because I do not think you are an idiot or stupid am I disappointed in your attitude - which is short sighted - and impractical.

Turn it around: suppose I said "I agree - Everything that has an IJA prefix is yours - AND everything with an IJN prefix is mine - no matter its location, planning, loading, function, name it." Now imagine the taske before us to sort this out. IF we made a long list of what we might want to do - we would find hundreds or even thousands of cases we had tasked the same unit for different tasks. We would need years of political points to reassign them. We would waste a vast amount of our supplies and shipping shuffeling them - assuming we ever agreed that "these 488 units go East - those 466 units go west" or whatever - just day one. And this 1744 units move south as reinforcements - while that 2766 units move west as reinforcements - and 199 move north etc." Is that what you think is reasonable?

Of course if you do find someone who falls for that then they are likely to be a poor player. Your choice, you can either be reasonable and give me the benefit of the doubt that I understand it is in my interests to have your operations succeed ( which requires me giving you enough ground forces) OR you can be all control-freaky about it and push on with this current rather silly idea and find another player.


REPLY: Interesting mirror imaging! I am the control freak - I who said I require you have IJN forces - even beyond what you ask for. But you - who demand control of everything IJA - are not a control freak. And I am the unreasonable one. I suggest you reconsider. Really I do. I also said if you had something positive and simple in mind - please state it. That was not an invetation to be accused of being unreasonable. That was an invetation to explain why your idea really is easy - why it only takes 7 minutes of my time to list what you want? Or whatever.
I see a principle here - and I could use virtually every phrase you are using: I am just being more polite and team spirited than you are doing and not using such language. In fact - in this thread - you long said you would not tell me what to do - then lately you started saying "send PI units to the South Pacific" - ignoring their role in DEI - or in some cases- defense of the vital center squares of the naval chessboard. Send the units from Hawaii there. Send them back to me. Sounds like you are doing what you said you don't like me doing. I see lots of contradictions - but no trace of reasonable. Yet I am refraining from ultimatums - and I am refraining from saying listening to your demands would make me a fool or stupid. I have taken a different tack: if there is an easy fast way to do what you want - explain it to me? It appears you want a list longer than playing the game - before we ever begin.

I don't think the idea I have to withdraw a unit at a certain time - in the context of operational events I cannot predict or control - is good strategy. Do you?

It is no worse than the idea that a unit assigned to you for invading the Phillipines is lost to the IJA for the next FOUR YEARS [8|].


REPLY: Not much news here - but I disagree with you. I note, however, the implication you admit it is not good strategy. Why should we make promises we are not likely to be able to keep? Will that foster trust? In general - and there will no doubt be exceptions - I expect a unit that moves vast distances forward will - whatever its fate - not end up being moved back so it can go to Siberia. If there were some exceptional reason - then that would warrant our attention - agreement - supplies and shipping.

Another point: ALL these units belong to Japan. It sounds like CONTROL is what matters to you - not the team - not the mission that could not be achieved without IJA assets. If I don't need it - you will find it listed on the daily list of assets available for reassignment.


As I said you can choose to try to push for total control and the IJA losing all control over IJA formations once they ever enter an IJN zone of operations OR you can be flexible and rely on the fact that if I know I'll be getting units back once a give objective is achieved I'll probably be a LOT more generous.


REPLY: Wow. I am almost in despair. I don't think you have any idea what is about to happen. Lets surrender China and not fight this war! I said it above - but you were not listening (as usual):

I need some units to start and more units later on. Most units will not be coming back. These are not like Kiddo Butai - which can sail in and sail out - and must do so (being needed in other places badly). Now SOME mobile units - particularly long range air units and army ships - may be different: I am speaking of a typical army unit in the general case.

IF you suffer under the illusion I can take this area - and then not need to defend it - but can send most of these forces back so (what? they can conquer Siberia?) - we have a major problem Houston. I am not going out there to just hand it back to the enemy.

I believe in phasing operations sequentially and massing the same overwhelming force against a series of enemy positions.

REPLY: And I believe there is a lot more to operations than just the assault forces. I believe that a base must have a support force and a garrison - and probably air units - or there is little point it taking it. NONE of those local base units or garrisons or air units is EVER coming home - although they may move around from time to time. MOST will die in the field - unless the mobile air forces (land and sea based) can win decisive battles. Your doctrine makes sense for certain assault units and associated air units - for a while. But some day we will face enemy armies - real armies - not corps misnamed as armies. THEN we will need these major units just to contest an area - and we probably won't be overwhelming enemy positions with them - at least not all the time. If you are not prepaired to build up military forces to the point that SOME points can be contested by major land units - the former assault forces - we won't hold much for long.

I am prepared to give many divisions to the IJN once I've taken care of China so that the IJN can mount operations with large numbers of divisions

REPLY: I don't recall asking for "many divisions" to "mount operations with large numbers of divisions." In general, in PTO a division is a big thing. I don't like putting a corps or an army into a hex - and risk losing it. Or even have to feed it - under pressure of enemy air attack. To the extent I will need "many divisions" it is mainly so I can erect points of major resistence across a vast area (1/3 of the globe - being conservative - MORE than 1/2 is on our map)
forcing the enemy to concentrate to engage: I hope to hurt his efforts by striking his LOC - defeating him in detail.
But these units will not generally be mounting offensive operations in the usual sense. It is like ASW - ASW seems to most to be defensive warfare - but it is almost purely offensive warfare. I use land units to create a network of points - mostly defended by brigades - a few by divisions - that both support the fleet and air units - and are supported by them. The enemy needs to mass slow transports with troops to take them - and I sink those. It is not fair or elegant - but it works.


BUT I am not prepared to give those divisions if that means never getting them back, That's just plainly idiotic.

REPLY: Then perhaps I am an idiot. I am perfectly serious: most units are going to go to a place and operate from there - as long as they can - until they die. After a while many units will not be able to withdraw even if I want them to - assuming the enemy ever gets an offensive going. Once he has air control of an area sending in transports is a great way to lose them.

In reality the IJA would never have assigned 3 divisions to invading Pearl Harbour if it knew they would NEVER be given back and replaced by lesser-quality IJA and IJN garrison formations.

REPLY: Perhaps - instead of reasoning by assumption - you might read the official history? Or translations of summaries? There is no evidence IJA expected any of those divisions to return. I am much more cautious and conservative - and I intend to leave only half of them there: I want the "divisions" in the form of two divisions and three brigades/regiments. One division will defend Oahu - to make it stiff - and I want it reinforced by a tank battalion and a real CD unit of some kind. One brigade will defend the other island with a good port/airbase. Naval units will defend Hilo and other points in the area. And one division and two brigades - assuming they have not been lost - will return to the area of Rabaul - hopefully to move on Noumea - Port Moresby - Fiji - etc. If that works out well - I expect the division to defend Rabaul for the duration. Rabaul is the most distant point Japanese historicans think Japan can make a MAJOR logistic effort.

Aside from the tiny fact I don't think you would give me the troops

On the understanding that they'd be given back once NZ was captured and replaced by lower-quality garrison troops ( some of which would be IJN and some of which would be IJA), yes I would happily give you the necessary troops.


REPLY: Noted. I don't have any chance of having enough base units or garrison units to contemplate defending NZ - wish it were otherwise. There is also the matter of fuel/ship range etc. The only ships able to make the trip are far to valuable to risk so far forward. If they were not - they need to be hauling resources - not troops. Ships cannot to both at once - and the pie is only as large as we allow it to be - logistically speaking. I really am a logistician - and a naval one. Japan is not the USA. This isn't a realistic or wise op.


Of course you don't have to go there if you don't want to. It is your theatre and unlike some people I'm not going to try to dictate o you what you can and cannot do in your theatre. I will offer to support some operations and leave you the option of undertaking them. If you don't want to undertake them then you don't get the formations you would need to undertake them. Simple.


REPLY: Agreed. Didn't ask - not an issue. Sorry for the snyde remark. I was wrong. You would send the troops.

In case you missed it - I believe that you should control Northern and Western Borneo.

No, I asked for this before and you argued long and hard I shouldn't have northern and western Borneo. In the end I settled for Sumatra and the eastern base on Ceylon. I'm a man of my word. I made an agreement and I make a point of never violating something I've agreed to. If there are things you should have agreed with me but didn't then, sure, I'll utilise them to my advantage but in this case we were clear. Northern and Western Borneo are yours at least in part to help support your Grand Escort Command etc etc.

REPLY: OK - you missed it. It is posted. Doesen't matter. I think this is a good idea - and at one point you had suggested drawing a line THROUGH Borneo - so essentially I am agreeing with your position.

I've made my agreement and I would need far more compelling reasons to go back on it than this.... YOu should take note of this... I fight so hard before agreeing to something because once I've agreed I, generally, won't renegotiate and will stick to the letter of the agreement even if you offer something more favourable to me. If you wanted me to have northern and western Borneo you shouldn't have argued so hard against it a few pages ago.

REPLY: Nor - apparently - does it matter I later said otherwise. I framed it in terms of sea control - and I worry you don't understand that. I note you several times said things about not wanting ASW units - and really we won't have enough. Our only hope of managing submarines is statistical attrition at all times from all possible directions/methods.



Your plan re: shifting forces and maintaining uncertainty while stockpiling the means of production seems sound and I support it in general.

REPLY: Noted.

REPLY: You are forgetting these units already have a second stage mission: DEI. The SAME units that take PI take Java. Further - SOME units from Malaya ALSO hit Java - at the same time.

Historically they did. We are playing a game and not constrained by this history. From December 7th 1941 our path will diverge from history

REPLY: The Japanese centrafugal offensive is one of the great events of military history. Many aspects of it were sound - and sound for very simple reasons. Once a unit is forward on a vector - it is easier to move it farther on that vector. IF you want me to take DEI after PI - I need some units. It is far easier to know the units and plan their movements than to send them back to Japan and get new ones. I don't think it is wise to diviate for its own sake - when what they did makes sense. And the scenario starts our units in their starting positions with their planning. Changing that a lot is not very practical either.


and I certainly do not intend to be bound by taskings from 1941 when deciding what goes where. Now, with that said, if it took 3 divisions in real life I will do my best to allocate 4 or 5 or 6 divisions to it in this game BUT I am not prepared to concede the following:
i) allocating a division to a task in the IJN area means it is under IJN control for the duration. That's silly.

REPLY: I don't think it is silly. I have no idea how to estimate how long I need a unit for. I have no idea what will happen to that unit in operations. You got a crystal ball? Am I missing something obvious to you?


ii) that because a unit went to a particular place in the real war means it must go there in this game. If I wanted to replay the war I'd look at a documentary and forget about WiTP.

REPLY: OK - but UNLESS you propose DIFFERENT units for DEI - it pretty much must be the same ones. Since you want so much control - it easier to say "give me this - I can count on it " and I don't need something else. Nor the process ( not fun ) of asking for it. I see no good reason not to use the units for both ops. Do you? I see no good reason to ask for more or different units? Do you?

Within those confines I am prepared to be generous BUT I am amused by your desire to have as few rules as possible in large areas but then insist that in other areas we must conform with reality ( when it results in the IJN getting control of a load of IJA units) [:D]. Talk about flip-flopping to your own advantage.

REPLY: I don't follow this. A dislike of house rules is not germane to this point. So what is your point? I also think you are somehow missing a big point: IJN units - even a major IJN command - are yours. No fuss from me. I expect you to need naval units and forces appropriate to your commands. And I don't expect them to come to Taan and report for duty in six months.

By 1943 I expect to have a dozen divisions as such, an equal amount in small units (only a third of these latter being Navy because - that is all there is - and probably some of those will be in your areas farther west and in the north).

Well, what you expect and what will happen will depend upon what sort of case you make for these allocations in-game. I am opposed to the concept that you can set rules in place which obviate most of the need to actually discuss anything with the IJA.

REPLY: Since I have not done that, please erase and reset your mind. There is no rule involved here. There is nothing that eliminates a need to discuss things with IJA. I cannot imagine where such concepts come from?
But they are not in my mind. So you are making them up - presumably by assumption. Possibly by misunderstanding what I mean or intend. This isn't the way I think.


These rules you are trying to institute pretty much torpedo the whole idea of this tag team game. If you want the forces PROVE you need them and can use them and you will get them.


REPLY: How can I do that? I submit I have done above in a general sense. I submit that it would take us years to start if I have to do a Pentagon type document for every micro operation and every unit. Again - if you actually have something feasible, reasonable, simple, easy and fast in mind - explain it. So far ALL I hear is you want CONTROL of ALL units with an IJA prefix - a justification for TEMPORARY loss of that control - and a FIRM time line for that loss.
I don't think I am even interested in what that sounds like - but assuming I really am a dunce - I will allow you to show me what simple easy thing I have overlooked. Go ahead - tell me how to justify - or even name - all the units I need for initial ops - in a few minutes - and how I can know - case by case - exactly how long they are needed - and how we can afford the supplies fuel and ships to sail both ways to bring them back from places with no resources - and I will then plug in the data to your simple idea and send it to you - in about 30 minutes. But I must admit - I have not one clue how to do any of these things?


Have a little faith that I will analyse the situation and come to reasonable conclusions and stop trying to control-freak everything so that the IJN can build up large ground forces without ever having to talk to the IJA.


REPLY: I see a great deal of demand for control by you - not by me. I am about to take on the greatest naval powers on the planet - with not only a smaller navy - but only part of it (you have some, and we have some in the Grand Escort Command which is NOT engaged in front line actions). I need to have some things I can count on not already in the force. Tell me how to do that - and be reasonable. And why thinking a unit assigned - say - to garrison Rabaul or Truk or Kwajalein or Soerabaja will ever return? MOST of the units under my control are assigned to missions at a location and do not move once they get there. And most of my offensive operations are small or medium scale- often simultaneous - and in an operational sense entirely improvised from what is nearby. One cannot know what recon will disclose - and one must move appropriately to what it has disclosed - not restricted to a plan made before one knew it.
I have fought enemies that had to stick to plan - and I found it was a severe disadvantage -- for them.