I still don't see any evidence that Japanese pilots substantially "beat up" ANY allied pilots except where Allied pilots were flying truly outdated aircraft (the F2A3) or when Japanese pilots had tactical surprise. In stand up meeting engagements the Japanese victory ratio, even when they WON engagements in Burma and Malaya, came nowhere near 10:1. Indeed, in fights with large number of a.c., rarely greater than 1.5:1.
So it doesn't count unless the allied pilots are fresh, at altitude, ready and waiting, with modern equipment and tons of supplies? Does that mean we should also throw out all the statistics from battles where surprise, logistics, et al benefitted the Allies.
You seem to want to define their success by only one measurement: kill ratio. The problem with kill ratios is that it includes all types of aircraft, not just fighters. Now if you can offer a detailed listing of fighter vs fighter combats and their results. Obviously, the best way would be to stage a 1 on 1 contest between each of the types. Maybe we could coax Sakai, Thach, Hill and others back from the dead and place them in an aerial coliseum and really see a ture result.
You seem to forget that the Japanese also had many supply issues during this time. Their rate of advance was so fast in many areas that the Japanese quartermaster forces couldn't keep up particularly in Burma.
It wasn't the 'lack of a target rich environment that prevented the Japanese from running up a great ratio.' It was the fact that the Japanese weren't sufficiently superior in either training, tactics, experience, or a.c. specifications, to get anywhere near that kill ratio.
I agree with you on tactics. In fact, I have said all along it was the development of new tactics that allowed US pilots to do as well as they did in mid-late 42. Early in the war, the allies had no clue and no counter.
The rest is pure hogwash. Look at Burma and the vaunted AVG.
When you consider that the 64th and 77th Sentais in Burma had only transitioned to the Ki-43 Oscars just prior to the campaign, they did remarkably well. Considering that the P-40 had a huge speed and firepower advantage over the Oscar and the Nate, why didn't the P-40 achieve a better kill ratio against both? The P-40s were on the defence, over friendly territory and more likely to be returned to their units if shot down.
Oh, that's right... you say the alllies didn't have the gas, the bullets, spare parts or fancy airfields that the Japanese did. Forget the fact that the AVG and Brits forces in Burma flew from one of the most modern airbases in the theater, Mingaladon airbase. Forget, that at the time of Rangoon's capture that the retreating allied forces destroyed over 900 trucks, 19000 tons of lendlease stocks, over a million rounds of ammo and a several allied fighters still in their crates.
Consider the following from Dan Ford's collection:
In early February the operational strength of the 5th Air Group was about twice as strong as the Allied force in Burma. Fighter strength was more closely matched with the 77th and 50th mustering only 43 operational fighters against Allied operational figures of 20 Tomahawks, 11 Hurricanes, and four Buffaloes. The Allies had several advantages, however. They had numerous all-weather airfields in Burma and these were well stocked with fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. The Japanese were hundreds of miles from their nearest depot and sometimes had to borrow supplies from the Thai Air Force to continue in operations. The British also had an early warning radar station at Rangoon....snip
This was the climax of the 77th FR's first Burma campaign. Rangoon soon fell and equally as important so did the Netherlands East Indies. Fighters and bombers from that front quickly joined the 5th Air Group (soon to become the 5th Flying Division or Hikoshidan). The 77th FR was replenished and by March 20th had built up its strength to 35 Type 97 fighters. In the following days it flew escort missions during the raids on Magwe that crippled the remaining Allied air power in central Burma. After the Japanese occupied Magwe in April the 77th FR provided air defense for the base. Most of the air combat during this period fell to the Type 1 fighters of the 64th FR and the Type 97 fighters of the 1st and 11th FRs....snip
The 77th FR suffered heavy losses (12 pilots) but it stood up to the highly successful (legendary) Flying Tigers and competent RAF opposition. Indeed, it had on several occasions bested them; and, overall, destroyed more enemy aircraft than it lost.
This hardly represents an overwhelming advantage in airstrength and supplies for the Japanese as you claim. In fact, the original number of fighters available on both sides was pretty close through out the campaign.
And as I posted yesterday, the AVG, by their own accounting, claimed 78 Nates and 11 Oscars during the entire campaign. However, Ford says the 77th lost only 12 pilots during the entire campaign to all causes. The AVG lost 5 pilots in air-air combat. That makes a ratio of about 2.5:1 in fighter to fighter combat if all losses are attributed to fighters. That doesn't sound so impressive when you consider that the AVG was fighting over friendly territory, had an early warning net, and often picked the time and circumstance of their interception. I'm also sure that the Brits probably accounted for a few of the 77th losses.
Also from Dan Ford:
In August 1943 the 77th FR gave up its aging Type 97 fighters and received a new aircraft - the Type 1 fighter model II (Ki 43-II).
That means the 77th fought the entire Burma campaign flying old, obsolete Ki-27s... Nates!!!
You can continue to mouth national-centric views but the fact is that the Japanese were successful against the best the allies had to throw at them at the time. And if that makes you want to denigrate their victories as undeserved because the allies were in disarray and possessed obsolete aircraft, go ahead. People can say anything they want. Just don't forget that the Nate could hardly be considered "modern."
And I reject a priori the inference that the absence of data from the period from Dec 1941-March 1942 vis a vis F4Fs vs A6Ms therefore logically implies that the A6Ms would have held some sort of qualitative advantage during that interval. The claim seems derived from a perceptio of the merits of A6M vs USAAF/RAF/RAAF pilots -- and yet even there one cannot find compelling evidence for the alleged qualitative superiority held by A6M drivers.
Yawn... Your illogical argumentation attempts to apply data from a later time period to an early time period and only produces a theory... an unsubstantied, unprovable and highly biased theory. One that ignores several salient facts such as the allies flying new, markedly superior aircraft with overwhelming majority of numbers and replacements in the latter half of the war against a bunch of half-trained pilots flying mostly obsolete aircraft in comparison.
You can only get horrid loss ratios of the sort that the Japanese Supremacy Club imagines to have existed when you have the Japanese ambushing aicraft during landings, taking off and so forth. Better IMO to analyze the reasons why they were able to successfully set up those sorts of occasions than to blindly attribute it to some other cause.
That's right. I keep forgetting that the Japanese could only achieve an aerial victory if their opponent was taking off or landing. I believe that you are "blindly" attributing Japanese successes to anything except the what the Japanese had and did.
The Zero, for all its flaws, had outstanding range. And Allied bases, in the early war, pretty much universally lacked radar (in the PTO). Since it was logistically not feasible to keep a CAP going constantly at the primitive bases in SE Asia/ N. Australia. Absent radar, and given the very fast Japanese operational tempo, surprise raids were reasonably common.
A reasonable argument... Its ability to show up where it wasn't expected created quite the consternation for the allies. However I disagree as to the state of allied airfields. Most allied airfields that were operational at the start of the war were pretty well established all-weather fields and Rangoon at least had radar. I would expect Singapore to have had it also though I haven't found a confirming source. It was only as the allies were forced to retreat did material shortages become an issue. The list of supplies that were destroyed or captured at Rangoon is simply amazing. There was enough there to fully support flight operations for months to come.
One can note that the same disadvantages plagued the Japanese as the war progressed. The major Truk Raid was an engagement where the Japanese actually had a reasonable body of reasonably well trained pilots to hand. But absent sufficient early warning, they were vulnerable to massed USN CV strikes.
My god... I think hell has frozen over. We actually agree on something here. Surprise does tend to produce much better results. I would have to say that the "body of reasonably well-trained pilots" is overstating the case. They had some pilots with considerable experience but the majority were replacements with little if any combat experience.
Surprise was crucial for success in many battles and both sides sought to employ it at every opportunity. That loss ratios were higher when surprised is a fact of life but you can not just arbitrarily remove a significant tactical advantage because it doesn't fit your view of things.
Success in combat is not often the result of a single entity. It is comprised of far more factors than we could ever relate. Surprise, luck, training experience, doctrine, tactics and equipment are just small parts of the equation. The Japanese airforces were superior quantitatively and qualititatively by virtue of their combat experience at the start. They got the job done. You can't say that because they didn't have a such and such kill ratio that they weren't either effective of superior to their opposition.
When I say that the Zero was superior to the Wildcat, its because it was. In a 1 on 1 combat, my money would be on the Zero every time. What made the difference wasn't the Wildcat itself, it was the development of tactics that allowed it to maximize its strong points and increase its chances of survival. Being on the defensive also helped. But more importantly, it was men like Flatley, Thach and Chennault that refused to adopt a defeatist attitude that so many other leaders did. They found ways to win.
Chez