Sorry, WS1 - I wasn't aware it was me you were missing. That said, I really do not have the time for this now, I have a new Project going - Saving MacArthur - for which I had planned to use the WitP as a sort of filing instrument. However, my computer and WitP is not cooperating very well so it's taking much of my time to reason out the problems. But, here comes:
I am quite happy you brought up the Crete Campaign as it is quite relevant (just my opinion) as a comparison to Sealion, except as you write, the Luftwaffe had air supremacy over Crete, in spite of operating from bases many times the distance from the actual area as over the Channel. While the Sealion air support would operate from a hundred well-prepared airfields in Belgium and France - Holland, too, the German Luftflotte in Greece flew from a few dusty, ill-prepared fields in Greece, they had only been there for a couple of weeks. Not to mention that the Sealion Luftwaffe was many times larger.
The RN had exactly the same problem as they would have had in the Channel, that to depart their bases, or patrol area outside Luftwaffe range, early afternoon or after dark to arrive in the operational area several hours later (those being nearest) and leave it long before dawn to be back in their base before that. That is the naval problem. The Luftwaffe took the naval problem very seriously. Around Crete the myth that the Luftwaffe couldn’t hit moving targets was crushed. Well, Dunkirk and the Kanalkampf showed that well enough, but nevertheless.
Crete also showed something else, the difference in quality between the German and British armies. How can it be described otherwise with a 25.000 man strong army, among them the cream of the Commonwealth, The Anzacs, in prepared positions, supported by a Greek regiment and a warlike population - updated daily by Ultra messages revealing the enemy’s intentions - chased away in ten days by a German parachute division that was half-massacred during the landings and a part of an air-lifted mountain division. How many British troops were captured, was it 12.000? I’m not sure.
Oh, yes – a caigue convoy carrying a mountain infantry battalion was intercepted. That battalion never made it to Crete. The other convoy got away, that one also remained in Greece. In other words, the Mountain division that was air-lifted to Crete was somewhat reduced. To that came that the German mountain division only had two infantry regiments. Originally, the convoys had planned to travel during daytime to reach Crete in the afternoon but their departure was delayed which gave the RN their opening.
Incidentally, the Kriegsmarine wanted to cross the Channel in daylight but the army insisted on landing at dawn. As the Kriegsmarine would control the resupply they could as well have used the daytime for resupply. It should be mentioned that the invasion fleet also consisted of about 170 freighters, averaging 4.000 tons displacement. It is interesting to note that the British War Office in its “Notes on the German preparations for invasion of the United Kingdom” estimated the available German ship’s pool to 5.350 vessels totaling five million tons. That added to, in all, the 3.200 rebuilt invasion barges – only 1.150 were to be used on S-day, indicates a generous reserve pool.
Warspite1 wrote: The point being made was that, even if you believe the nonsense about the RAF (who I repeat were winning the BoB at that time) taking no action against the invasion fleet…
Firstly, the BoB did not take place over the Channel. What took place over the Channel was the Dunkirk evacuation and the Kanalkampf. On both occasions RAF fighters were not able to keep the Luftwaffe away from their ships. A little story from the Channel. As German aircrafts approached them the CO of destroyer Atherstone reported.
“The navigational position of the attack could hardly have been better chosen as the ships had no maneuvering room and minesweepers were just passing ahead of the escort in order to stream their sweeps. Convoy was in single line ahead with Atherstone leading and Fernie in the rear. In order to attack the convoy the bombers had to pass over Atherstone. Eleven of the 21 attacked Atherstone from the bow and right ahead, the remaining ten being held in reserve until the escort had been dealt with. During their descent two broke off to attack the mine-sweepers, the remaining nine synchronised their attack from right ahead and fine on the bows. In all, the ship received three direct hits and five misses within 60 yards of the ship. During the dive bombers’ attack Messerschmitt 110’s machine-gunned the ship and possibly one or two of the ships in the convoy. During both the raids fighter assistance was asked for but was not forthcoming. The same thing occurred during convoy CW10. The reasons for this are not known”.
Atherstone survived to fight another day. She was towed back to Nore, but was crippled for a long time. During speed trials after repairs in Portsmouth she hit a mine and went down. This example shows how the minefields not only could sink ships but also expose them to other dangers by limiting the maneuvering freedom of the intruder.
As for Dunkirk, some would say: “But the RAF had to fly all the way from England”. Well, the Germans had it no better, they had still not moved forward and operated from their airfields in Germany. Both parties flew about 1.500 fighter sorties over Dunkirk – in other words parity. Still, about 230 allied vessels were sunk, most of them by aircraft bombs, but also by U-boat and S-boats. About 80 were commissioned ships. Both parties lost about 100 planes but the German were all types and some shot down by AAA. Of course, a day after the landings the Home Chain, the British early warning radars, would go down.
As an example on how the British air forces would have fared I believe the Channel Dash is a good example. An operation fully expected, and planned for by the British, that was totally bungled.
One problem for the RAF (Fighter Command) was that the German low-level air defense was so murderous, as shown by the fate of the AASF in Belgium and France. They were massacred by the same weapons that followed the invasion fleet. FAA….some Swordfish planes, some Skuas, two squadrons of torpedo Beauforts which still wasn’t operational on torpedo. Bomber Command I honestly don’t know other than at the time they were massacred as soon as a German fighter was in the vicinity. During daytime, anyway. Bombing fixed and known congested installations on the Continent was one thing, targets spread along the beaches or in the Channel another. Coastal Command…they had their regular missions, the waters around UK had to be kept under supervision. Remember, Churchill feared an invasion across the North Sea from Norway. Actually much of the British defense was disposed for such an eventuality. Same goes for the British auxiliary naval units. They all had their daily chores, sweeping, guarding, patrolling, moving torpedo nets and harbour hindrances all around the UK.
A fighter strafing the invasion low-level would have met several times its fire power every time it dived down. The invasion fleet bristled with 20 mm automatic cannons and 37 mm guns, but most of all the venerable MG34’s. Every barge had two fixed ones and the infantry were to have their own mg’s mounted on deck. As a personnel transport the medium-sized barges would carry 70-80 soldiers. That amounts to approx. 10 MG34’s in addition to the AAA on tugs, escorts and the large transports. This weapon was not inferior to those carried by the Hurricane and Spit. A towing train consisted of three tugs each towing two barges. As to low-level attacks the invasion fleet could take care of itself.
….or the beaches as you state, all it would require was a reasonable sized naval force to get in amongst the head of the invasion flotilla to cause total and utter carnage.
Oh, yes – every BFB’s wet dream….But first they had to pass Dönitz’s submarine screen, the minefields (no jokes), the radar-guided coastal artillery (which guarded
the minefields and was never used for its proper purpose), the outer escort, the inner escort, the armed transports, the dedicated artillery ships, the S-boats,
the R-boats, the porcupine barges, the 1,200 small motor boats meant for command control and maneuvering of the barges close to shore. In the dark they would
probably be perceived as S-boats by the wary RN crews. Talk about congestion of targets…..Oh yes - I forgot - the Luftwaffe wasn't unknown to the art of night flying, either.
Once I made a cool scenario on this in the Silent Hunter's game editor. It was quite illustrative.
Remember we are talking about attacking vulnerable, slow moving, low in the water, barges and tugs.
Except from all the other vessels, yes…..that said, how low in the water is a barge of 750 tons displacement carrying four tanks each weighing 15 tons? Tugs...low in the water...getting desperate now...?
This would be at night so your vaunted Luftwaffe and the cowardly and quite useless RAF are not factors.
Oh, yes naval night fighting….I wonder, who excelled in that. The statistics are clear but nevertheless misleading. This wouldn’t be a scenario where the U-boats, S-boats and the Luftwaffe went for the civilian ships first, thereby losing their opportunity for the first shots at the enemy war vessels.
Finally – to Warspite1:
You never got back to me confirming which Pink List you are quoting, did you? It doesn’t matter really because the Pink Lists weren’t what you have used it for, anyway. The Pink Lists said very little about where a ship actually was, or its condition. It merely states what Naval Command it was assigned to. I am not sure if you were aware of this but if you were, what you are stating here…..:
Warspite1 wrote: Note: All the above are readily available in September i.e. there are no units above undergoing repair or otherwise out of action. No allowance has been made for vessels used for convoy purposes – which of course can be recalled in extremis. Finally I have referred to the Town-class as CA (the 6-inch/8-inch distinction was blurred by then).
….is not good. If you are not aware of it, it’s merely ignorance. That can be forgiven.
As an example, at this time ships also operating in escort service in the Western or North-Western Approaches, and other areas for that matter, were usually (officially) assigned to the Portsmouth Command. Therefore they can easily be read as actually being based (or present) in Portsmouth, which they weren’t. The list also did not specify if ships were out of service or in repair.
This exact question generated one of the more laborious tasks in my book, to check each destroyer for its whereabouts in the last part of September 1940. The result was quite depressing (for a BFB, anyway). Of the 26 (6 French) destroyers (in four flotillas) listed as stationed in Portsmouth, Southampton and Plymouth my investigation found that only very few was actually based in the Channel end of September, excepted the six French of which I had no information. I may be faulted on details in this but the general impression is overwhelming. Almost the same applies to the Eastern side of the Channel.
All this said, the Germans had all the advantages an attacker always has.
Fred