Mate, you've been peddling your Yankee Doodle Fanboy agenda for so long, I'm surprised your legs haven't fallen off by now.
To deploy the term "Fanboy" you have to have a clue wtf it means.
Are you still using Joseph Czarnecki's analysis for the IJN figures in your claim? I wouldn't have expected that he would agree that the allies were on par with the IJN in torpedo attack effectiveness -
Cute. Only I did not say that US torpedo attack effectiveness was on par. I said the hit rates under comparable, favorable circumstances were similar. Clearly since IJN torps packed a much more lethal charge, and were much mroe likely to detonate (in 1942), IJN torps were better in re "effectiveness" in 1942.
"The acumen of World War Two Imperial Japanese Navy cruiser and destroyermen in torpedo attack is an accepted fact. The range and power of their Type 93 torpedo (dubbed the “Long Lance” by historian Morison) have become the stuff of legend. To call the Japanese surface forces the best at torpedo attack is easily defensible."
I agree that it is the "stuff of legend." I also agree that the Japanese brought torpedo attack to a more effective level than any other navy. Were the phrase "torpedo attack" homologous to "night combat effectiveness" (accuracy of gunfire, observation, cohesion, CAC, and not ramming another ship in your own formation are for some reason disregarded when one talks about night combat abilities), then one would have to say that the Japanese were superior at night combat.
Or maybe he's just another Axis Fanboy?
Morrison had many agendas. He's inconsistent in his criticism of the IJN and the USN. He louds, for example, IJN performance at Savo but heavily criticises USN performance at Balikpapan. He attributes the Savo victory to Japanese superior night fighting. A more nuanced and better informed POV would not that the US TF had been at high alert for 48 hours, that the disposition of USN covering forces in the area were poor, and that in WW2, the odds tended to favor attacking surface forces over defending forces.
So what are the agendas, conscious or not? 1. Praise for a worthy foe turned ally during the Cold War. 2. Praising the defeated increases ones own prestige (so Morrison has simply followed in the footsteps, for example, of Julius comment on Vercingitorex). 3. Emphasising the lack of naval preparedness, training and force in early 1942 is a good way to get the US Senate and House to keep appropriations money flowing during teh cold war. Basically "Hey, if Japan could do this to us because we did not spend enough money, imagine what the USSR could do! So Spend More Money on the Navy." When you consider the interservice rivalry at the time, and the increasing emphasis on the USAF strategic bomber forces, there's alot of "context" to mull over.
As to torpedoes. This is largely non-sequitur because I did not suggest that the Americans were equally effective with torpedoes. but, for the record-- ]
Japanese modal hit rate: 0. That means in most BATTLES, the "typical" result in any Japanese torpedo attack will be zero hits for the entire enagement. Mean hit rate: about 3%. Mean night time hit rate: 8%. Hit rate under exceptional circumstances (for example, fatigued crews unalerted to presence of enemy at Savo, about 12%. Same as Balikpapan. BTW, the targets at Balikpapan were not all stationary.).
What this ought to tell you is that the outcome of an engagement had nothing to do with simplistic panglossian pap like "Combatant X was better at night combat because according to the theory they should have been better." You must instead focus on the circumstances in which a significant victory can be achieved. Savo was very much like Balikpapan.
Were I writing this is a set of CRTs for example for a boardgame, the flowchart for resolving combat (assume I'm talking about a grand strategic game like PTO) would be something like this. (Bear in mind that this is not really a tactical game, so things like range are not tracked).
1. Determine whether attacking or defending TF is taken by surprise. This would have to account for tactical info from decryption or, from the more likely source, aerial recon. In the Solomons/New Guinea area, coastwatchers would matter.
2. Determine whether the attacking or defending TF is fatigued. A TF that had previously conducted a shore bombardment mission, fought off a significant aerial attack, or been engaged in another surface combat mission in roughly the same time frame would automatically come with this modifier.
3. Determine whether the engagement is at night.
Roll a die. Low dr/DR equate with a complete miss on all torpedo attacks for the engagement. The result table would be structured such that roughly 60% of the time (it depends on the number and kinds of dice), the result is a complete miss on all attacks.
For each of the above conditions met, a positive DRM is applied. When "some hits achieved" is a result go to another table.
Number of hits achieved = # torpedoes fired x (.06+3% for a night engagement, +/-3% if surprising the enemy/surprised by the enemy, +/-3% if enemy is fatigue/you are fatigued).
For IJN torps. All hits come in clusters of 3. The Japanese player may assign hits to targets at this time but any target must be struck by at least three of the torps. Remnant fraction may be applied to another target.
For USN torps, in 1942, if the firing TF includes any vessel that is not torpedo armed, halve the number of hits in order to account for use of gun doctrine tactics and dud torpedoes. The Allied player may then apply hits in pairs to targets as desired. Any remnant hit is discarded.
If one player has acheived a "surprise" attack, following resolution of torpedo attack, that player may withdraw. If neither player has achieved a surprise attack, go to gun combat. A Wild melee ensues. The CRT "to hit" will be comparable for all participants, but fatigued units will suffer an adverse to hit drm.
