Hmmm. Good point. I am unfamiliar with the KB performance versus the British fleet units in the Indian Ocean operation. How would you rate them there?
I'd rate them quite highly. But as I recall, vs
Exeter and whatsisnuts there was a 2 CV strike and again vs
Hermes a 2 CV strike. The other major well coordinated >2 CV strike was vs. Columbo (the port that is). I do think that having a non-moving target greatly simplifies the calculus.
[Me: You need to read Shattered Sword if you have not.]
I have. <snip> I have, and I thoroughly enjoyed it.
Bueno, I couldn't be sure. No harm intended.
However, the idea is to launch a (credible) strike as soon as possible. That might turn out to be too late, especially if the enemy has spotted you first. But you won't (generally) know that until the events have played themselves out. Strike! Strike early! Or get the heck out of dodge.
Sure. To do so Nagumo would have to have NOT brought the spotted anti-ship strike back into he hangers for the Midway strike. And, Nagumo would have had to do something that was manifestly contrary to Japanese doctrine. Which is why I can't fault Nagumo in particular, and why I can't get behind the idea that this was a small local error that might well have gone differently but for better flash judgement. That is, I don't subscribe to the "given a better dice roll things might have gone differently with that decision" model. I don't think "some other dice roll" could have occurred. Because it was Japanese doctrine at work, rather than a flash judgement between two alternative courses of action well known to the IJN. "Fast, small strikes" weren't in the IJN play book, even in the appendix.
Nagumo did not strike as soon as he could have. He could have struck (with the reserve group) before the fatefull 10AM USN attack. But he dithered in an attempt to get the largest strike package possible together. But that was not the correct doctrine. He needed speed, not power. (The disjointed USN attacks showed that it was possible to be successfull with smaller sized attacks.)
But that was the point in Shattered Sword. He really could not have struck back because after 8 AM he was constantly cycling CAP and his ships were evading attacks.
The range was fairly short as it was. If I recall, when the Hiryu started launching (at about noon?) the range had fallen to about 100 miles. 2 hours (10am to noon) steaming time is what, 50 miles? Both sides closing (*thinks out loud*)... So, 250-280 miles at 9 AM. Doesnt that seem to be the optimum range for IJN? PH attack was the same range, and they expected a bigger counter attack then...
They were much closer when the
Hiryu strike was launched because both Nagumo and Spruance/Fletcher had closed range. 250-280 does not seem to me to be optimal range for the IJN. It's too long. You can optimize against a land installation because islands don't move. Against moving targets that may change course, especially given the reptilian quality of the Japanese recon reports that morning, anyone would have closed the range.
True, launch and recovery operations that morning were hectic. However, I am gonna guess that they could have made time, if there was a fire brand on the bridge... I forget, and could be wrong about this. But I think there was time, somewhere.
Sure you can make time available but at what cost? You must both forego cycling your cap or you steer your ship in a straight line into the wind. At the time nobody knew for sure that a B17 from 10K couldn't hit a proverbial bull in the ass with a bass fiddle. And who knows, with a non-maneuvering target maybe even a B17 could hit one. Then there were the torpedo bombers. At Coral Sea the US TBDs put seven torps into that Japanese CVL. So the TBDs were rightly viewed as a compelling threat and you have to maneuver to dodge torps or you have to keep up a good CAP cycle.
Again, the 7:45 time was to beat the American punch.
Sure but that could EASILY have been badly botched. If you launch at the obviously erroneous contact report then you risk wasting an entire launch. Japanese radios weren't particularly reliable (something which factored into Midway in multiple ways), and given the vague contact report Nagumo would have wanted to avoid a repeat of the Sims/Neosho attack at Coral Sea (two US ships reported as a CV and a CA were respectively a DD and an oiler). So from Nagumo's POV, launching at 7:45 was a high risk idea. I can't blame him for not deviating from doctrine in order to launch a quicky assault on an enemy TF of unknown composition in an obviously erroneous position report.
That does not mean that any time after that, he could not have launched, or that a partial strike launched before 10am would not have done any good. Of course it would have.
I think it does indicate that he could not have launched before 10 AM. At least not rationally. He'd have just have to have gambled on a hunch that the ambiguous contact report would lead his air groups to a real threat.
The other thing to remember here is Midway itself. People often overlook the fact that as an unsinkable deck, Midway potentially dominated the waters around it for hundreds of miles. It was home to some 180 a.c. at the time. Had they all been PBYs and B17s for scouting, and SBDs and F4Fs for attacking, I submit that Nagumo's force would have been badly hurt whether any American CVs would show up at all. And the Japanese knew that before the battle began, and they expected to have to follow up their first strike on Midway with a second strike, before the battle began.
The two puny strikes (less then 30 strike aircraft) from the Hiryu later show that. It's just that, after 8am, the American strikes were inbound, and he was in for a world of trouble.
Assuming everything goes right, the strike package finds Yorktown, and damages or sinks her. Nagumo still loses three CVs (because as you note trouble was already on the way). And when trouble arrives he has less CAP (because he's been launching a strike rather than cycling CAP). I can't see how this materially affects the outcome of the battle.
What, then, was the purpose of holding out half of the aircraft in the KB from the midway strike, if it was not to attack (or counter attack) other threats, as or when they materialise? Does this not indicate that the "doctrine" was not as inflexible as you make it seem?
The operational plan was a really bad operational plan. It required the Japanese to obtain perfect results and time all launches and recoveries perfectly. The op plan held that half the planes would be armed for attacks against ships but of course expected that said ships would never show up. Likewise planners expected the first attack to be more or less insufficient to suppress Midway and that those a.c. held as an anti-ship strike would probably have to be rearmed for anti island duty.
The long and the short of it was that the Japanese sent 4 CVs to do the job of 6 (or I think more realistically 7) CVs *and they knew that they were sending an inadequate force for the job.* As a result the 4 Japanese CVs were multitasking a suite of mutually incompatible missions (given the available force) on the assumption that one of these missions (anti ship) 'really wasn't going to be needed anyhow.' Because it was assumed that the US ships would be wherever Yamamoto wanted them to be.
