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Originally posted by Yogi Yohan:
By 1944 Hitler was *INSANE*. Insane people rarely make good commanders. But he was NOT insane all along. Ruthless, evil, yes. But not insane.

It doesn't matter whether he was insane, my point was he took command authority from his professional military leaders and exercised that authority personally, without guidance. This occurred early on when he was still sane, despite my example of it happening in '44.

So, the geist of my point is that in 1944-45, Hitler is a lunatic, and as such an awful military commander. But the earlier, sane Hitler was really good. Not the best ever, but clearly a cut above most of his contemporaries.

Well, this boils down to who you believe, I guess. Hitler was a good judge of politics early on. It allowed him to gain power and it helped during the early period when Germany retook the Rheinland, annexed Austria, and occupied Czechoslovakia, but it failed him when he misread French and British willingness to fight for Poland, and as for a military commander starting with Barbarossa, I can't say he was "really good".

Agree, that is my conclusion as well. Leningrad was priority 1. Leningrad and the Baltic coast were targets for logistic reasons, Moscow was merely the follow up AFTER the destruction of the Red Army. And since Leningrad had not been reduced, an advance on Moscow was still out of the question. As Hitler saw it, the groundwork had still not been laid.

Moscow merely a followup? That is not the impression I get from the Barbarossa plans.
Besides, who do you think will be defending Moscow? The best elements of the Red Army of course. So to defeat the Red Army you must end up heading for Moscow *anyway* since that is where you'll find the strongest elements of the Red Army. When you say "Red Army" you must be thinking of the Army in existance on 22/6/41, but that is not the total of the the USSR Army. Almost all of that army was destroyed, but by this time substantial new forces had been activated. There are the replacements coming in from mobilization, new units activated, existing units reorganized, and reinforcements coming from Siberia. So Germany really can't destroy the Red Army without taking away some important geographical locations that prevent the Red Army from becoming strong, and that means the cities of Leningrad and Moscow, at the least.

I think there can be no doubt that when Hitler decided to embark on the Ucrainian campaign it was because in and around Kiev was the single strongest undefeated force of the Red Army, and the resulting battle ended in the destruction of about half the remaining effectives of the Red Army.

Yes, and the other half of the Red Army was digging in around Leningrad and Moscow, receiving replacements and reinforcements on a daily basis. The destruction at Kiev, no matter how impressive a feat, turned out to be, I believe, a mistake in hindsight. We now know Germany couldn't defeat the Red Army without inflicting much more damage, and the only way to do that was to take the key cities and militarily important locations like resources and oil away from it. Yes, half of the Red Army was destroyed. A major military accomplishment. The problem is Germany still lost the war despite doing that, so where does that leave things? To me that leaves us with the other thing spoken about in the Barbarossa plans, and that is the high importance of taking Leningrad and Moscow.

The aim was not geographical but military - that is why I say that any good commander without the benefit of hindsight would probably do the same mistake.

Probably true.

(if indeed it was a mistake. I'm still not convinced it was.)

And I'm not convinced it wasn't.

Schwarzkopf did not drive for Baghdad - he surrounded the enemy forces in Kuwait instead.

Come on now. It is impossible to compare WWII to the Gulf War. The politics was completely different, the belligerents were completely different. The military situation was completely different. There is no comparison. For Pete's sake, taking Baghdad was a political impossibility from day one. Stormin' Norman never had that option on his plate.

Lets not forget that Hitler was not going "insane" due to military loses.

Dr Morrel should bare the brunt for that.
With the medication he prescribed Hitler was losing motor function rapidly and slowly sliped into a world of using pills and injections to enable to go about his "normal daily life".

The medication was increased towards the end of the war and is an explaination as to way a political mastermind and average armchair strategist made increasing mistakes and fell into a world of a make believe Wagnerian oprea.

Originally posted by Muzrub:
Lets not forget that Hitler was not going "insane" due to military loses.

Dr Morrel should bare the brunt for that.
With the medication he prescribed Hitler was losing motor function rapidly and slowly sliped into a world of using pills and injections to enable to go about his "normal daily life".

The medication was increased towards the end of the war and is an explaination as to way a political mastermind and average armchair strategist made increasing mistakes and fell into a world of a make believe Wagnerian oprea.

Has anyone ever heard what type of drugs Hitler was being given? How much aware was Hitler as to what his doctor was giving him? Always wondered about that.

Originally posted by Ed Cogburn:

Moscow merely a followup? That is not the impression I get from the Barbarossa plans.
Besides, who do you think will be defending Moscow? The best elements of the Red Army of course. So to defeat the Red Army you must end up heading for Moscow *anyway* since that is where you'll find the strongest elements of the Red Army.

Disagree. In August 1941, there was only debris between AG Centre and Moscow. That's why Guderian felt that the road was open. The one strong, undefeated force that remained to the Russians at that time was the one in and around Kiev, and that force was still being reinforced daily. So if you want to destroy the forces of the Red Army, Kiev is the place to do it in August of 1941.

Originally posted by Ed Cogburn:

...coming from Siberia. So Germany really can't destroy the Red Army without taking away some important geographical locations that prevent the Red Army from becoming strong, and that means the cities of Leningrad and Moscow, at the least.

Agree with all of this. But the Red Army is also not destroyed if half a million well equipped and entrenched men remain on the right flank of AG Centre at the onset of winter. So, by taking Leningrad and Moscow you prevent the creation of new forces, by taking Kiev you destroy existing ones. The latter has priority in my book.

And finally, I think it is not a valid argument aginst the Ucraine campaign that Barbarossa ultimately failed. You would have to show at least in what way the Moscow first strategy would lead to ultimate victory. The fall of Moscow would not in itself have ended the war, that much I think is clear.

My guess is that it would have went much like this:

AG Centre pushes right on towards Moscow, ignoring Buddeny's forces on its right flank. These are tied down by the Luftwaffe and AG South and short on fuel and ammo, so they represent no immediate threat. With nothing to stop them except fragments of broken units, the Germans advance quickly and manage to capture Moscow by a pincer movement before the onset of the rasputsa.

Comes winter. The Siberian divisions mass at Gorki and attack the German forces east of Moscow. Being in prepared positions, they fare somewhat better than they did historically at the gates of Moscow, but at the same time Buddeny's 500.000 men, now well stocked with fuel and ammo and uninpaired by the grounded Luftwaffe counterattack north into the open right flank of AG Centre.

The result is a total disaster for the German army and 60 years later, in a Matrix discussion Forum, some gamers amaze over the sheer stupidity of leaving a strong force undefeated on your flank.

Sometimes, you can do everything right and still loose.

Yogi:
Disagree. In August 1941, there was only debris between AG Centre and Moscow. That's why Guderian felt that the road was open. The one strong, undefeated force that remained to the Russians at that time was the one in and around Kiev, and that force was still being reinforced daily. So if you want to destroy the forces of the Red Army, Kiev is the place to do it in August of 1941.

"Thus was created the Moscow Defence Zone, which had to be held by the troops of the Moscow garrison, units of the police and other paramilitary organizations, popular militia hastily formed in the whole district of Moscow, and the troops detached from the reserve of the Supreme Command."
http://ussr.boom.ru/Moscow/moscow.htm


There were significant forces in Moscow and more coming, but true, none between Moscow and the AGC at the time. Less than a month and a half later, Zhukov counter-attacked with over 100 divisons, and I can't imagine all 100 of them coming from the Far East in just 6 or 7 weeks, meaning many of them were in the Moscow area early on.

Yogi:
So, by taking Leningrad and Moscow you prevent the creation of new forces, by taking Kiev you destroy existing ones. The latter has priority in my book.

Woe Nelly! Good heavens but we really disagree here!

Yogi:
AG Centre pushes right on towards Moscow, ignoring Buddeny's forces on its right flank. These are tied down by the Luftwaffe and AG South and short on fuel and ammo, so they represent no immediate threat. With nothing to stop them except fragments of broken units, the Germans advance quickly and manage to capture Moscow by a pincer movement before the onset of the rasputsa.

Comes winter. The Siberian divisions mass at Gorki and attack the German forces east of Moscow. Being in prepared positions, they fare somewhat better than they did historically at the gates of Moscow, but at the same time Buddeny's 500.000 men, now well stocked with fuel and ammo and uninpaired by the grounded Luftwaffe counterattack north into the open right flank of AG Centre.

The result is a total disaster for the German army and 60 years later, in a Matrix discussion Forum, some gamers amaze over the sheer stupidity of leaving a strong force undefeated on your flank.

You assume the Soviet forces in the south are somehow capable of doing things no other Soviet forces have been able to do since the invasion. Soviet forces so far haven't been able to mount competent attacks or good counter-attacks, never mind being able to break out of a pocket. Why else did so many fall into the pockets and were not able to get out? This is not an issue of German skill, but rather Soviet incompetence. The Soviets got the lesson and the Germans never created any major pockets during the war in the south in '42. Anyone who's played an Eastern Front game knows the Germans can take risks in '41 that they wouldn't dare do later on. The Soviets in the south were not "strong", they were closer to a disorganized rabble, at the time when the AGC turned south.

You also seem to imply the AGS just disappears at this point. The Kiev pocket was closer to them than AGC was to Kiev. Even if they don't create a pocket, they are plenty strong enough to deal with the Soviet forces in the south at this time. They would probably manage to make smaller pockets and reduce the Kiev pocket in the end, just not as fast as with the help of the panzers of the AGC. I don't see a competent counter-attack coming from the Kiev area towards Moscow as long as the AGS is here to keep them busy. Remember, under my theory the plan is Leningrad and Moscow, so AGS would be used to aid the AGC instead of having their own objectives further east and south.

Sure, they may take Moscow back (but the damage has been done, and Germany will probably retake it in '42), but a "total disaster"? Buddeny's rabble getting by AGS and coming to the aid of Moscow? Sorry but I don't see that.

Originally posted by Ed Cogburn:



You assume the Soviet forces in the south are somehow capable of doing things no other Soviet forces have been able to do since the invasion. Soviet forces so far haven't been able to mount competent attacks or good counter-attacks, never mind being able to break out of a pocket. Why else did so many fall into the pockets and were not able to get out? This is not an issue of German skill, but rather Soviet incompetence. The Soviets got the lesson and the Germans never created any major pockets during the war in the south in '42. Anyone who's played an Eastern Front game knows the Germans can take risks in '41 that they wouldn't dare do later on. The Soviets in the south were not "strong", they were closer to a disorganized rabble, at the time when the AGC turned south.

You also seem to imply the AGS just disappears at this point. The Kiev pocket was closer to them than AGC was to Kiev. Even if they don't create a pocket, they are plenty strong enough to deal with the Soviet forces in the south at this time. They would probably manage to make smaller pockets and reduce the Kiev pocket in the end, just not as fast as with the help of the panzers of the AGC. I don't see a competent counter-attack coming from the Kiev area towards Moscow as long as the AGS is here to keep them busy. Remember, under my theory the plan is Leningrad and Moscow, so AGS would be used to aid the AGC instead of having their own objectives further east and south.

Sure, they may take Moscow back (but the damage has been done, and Germany will probably retake it in '42), but a "total disaster"? Buddeny's rabble getting by AGS and coming to the aid of Moscow? Sorry but I don't see that.

Unless the Ucrainian campaign is fought, there is no "Kiev pocket". That pocket was created (and reduced) through the offensive you deplore. The Kiev army was not "rabble", it was a huge force that was very badly led and in august was very short on supplies. Without an Ucrainian campaign, it would have had open lines of communication to the industrial areas of eastern Ucraine and the oil industry in the Caucasus. It's not unreasonable to assume that they would be albe to replenish their stocka of supplies if left basicly alone from august to december.

The reason AG Center was diverted to the Souht was because AG South was unable to destroy Buddeny's forces on their own. Otherwise, do you think Hitler would have passed up the chance to do both things at once?

As to the ability to attack: in December, the Russians were able to successfully attack everywhere. Why not north from Kiev?

So, it all comes down to, can AGS keep the Kiev army busy enough to prevent it from attacking north? In december, I don't think so.

As to Leningrad, the only way to be able to take in time it is to assign TWO Pzgruppen to AG North, leaving AG South without any. This makes it even less plausible that AG South alone can prevent the Kiev Army moving north in December.

The Soviets did commit significant forces against AGC in early August - it was not a rabble that had escaped from Smolensk only. Basically, beginning in early August, they began launching a series of strong attacks against the Yelnia salient southeast of Smolensk, causing heavy losses to the Germans there. Yelnia had been seized and held by Guderian as a launching point for further attacks toward Moscow. When ordered by von Bock to seal off the Smolensk salient in July, abandoning the salient if need be to generate the troops to do so, he refused to leave the salient, he considered it so important, thus allowing significant numbers of Soviets to pull out of the pocket before it was finally sealed.

The Soviet attacks caused at least 25-30 thosuand casualties to the Germans by the time they ended in early September with the German withdrawal from the salient. The losses in this one relatively small area totalled around 8% of the German total up to this point in the war, in all fronts (about 400,000 or so by the end of August). One of the big problems for the Germans was a severe shortage of artillery ammunition as they were having problems getting enough supplies up to the front to keep Guderian going south and deal with these Soviet attacks.

By September 1 the Soviets had at least 100 divisions in the area facing AGC and in reserve around Moscow, although many were either new divisions or units that had escaped from earlier fighting. A drive on Moscow would not have begun until the latter part of August, so most of these units would have already been in place.

The key to an immediate drive on Moscow in my mind would be the supply situation, and getting the infantry pushed up to the city. I have very few doubts that the Panzers could have reached Moscow without major problems, but the infantry would have been held up in cleaning up the still large forces of the Soviets that would have been bypassed. This is what happened in October and November also. However, the German infatry was tired, short of supplies and would have been strung out defending the southern flank and so would have had problems reaching Moscow in significant numbers, leaving the attack on the city to the panzers.

I agree with Ed that the threat from the south was minimal, but still divisions would have been tied up holding that flank. Thus, could the Panzers have taken Moscow on their own? I personally don't think that Moscow would have fallen before the rains hit, but it would have been a close run thing, and I think would depend on the infantry divisions reaching Moscow in early October with enough supplies to attack into the city, or to enable the Panzers to then envelope Moscow. Until the infantry divisions reached the area, the Panzers would not have enough strength to bypass Moscow and hold the lines.

Originally posted by Yogi Yohan:
Unless the Ucrainian campaign is fought, there is no "Kiev pocket". That pocket was created (and reduced) through the offensive you deplore. The Kiev army was not "rabble", it was a huge force that was very badly led and in august was very short on supplies. Without an Ucrainian campaign, it would have had open lines of communication to the industrial areas of eastern Ucraine and the oil industry in the Caucasus. It's not unreasonable to assume that they would be albe to replenish their stocka of supplies if left basicly alone from august to december.

The reason AG Center was diverted to the Souht was because AG South was unable to destroy Buddeny's forces on their own. Otherwise, do you think Hitler would have passed up the chance to do both things at once?

As to the ability to attack: in December, the Russians were able to successfully attack everywhere. Why not north from Kiev?

So, it all comes down to, can AGS keep the Kiev army busy enough to prevent it from attacking north? In december, I don't think so.

As to Leningrad, the only way to be able to take in time it is to assign TWO Pzgruppen to AG North, leaving AG South without any. This makes it even less plausible that AG South alone can prevent the Kiev Army moving north in December.

AGS was on the verge of pushing the Soviets back in the south on its own. Their panzer forces created the Kremenchung bridgehead on their own, and only a few divisions were ever moved from facing them to face Guderian. GAs by itself would not have been able to destroy the Soviets as happened, but the threat from the south would have been reduced by December as AGS would have been able to keep the Kiev forces occupied and pushed them eastward some distance.

Guderian moved south with his whole panzer group because he did not want it split. The original plan was to use just part of it to clear AGCs right flank around Roslavl and Gomel, while resting the other units, but he convinced Hitler to send his whole group south, and then the plan was expanded to continue south and take out the Soviets around Kiev.

Of ocurse, the key here is how many units were kept back to defend the flank of an advance on Moscow. That is the key, and I think these forces would have kept the Germans from capturing Moscow, but again it would have been close.

Ed Cogburn


Has anyone ever heard what type of drugs Hitler was being given? How much aware was Hitler as to what his doctor was giving him? Always wondered about that.



Dr Morell:


Won Hitlers confidence by curing eczema of the leg and made a fortune manufacturing patent medicines under Hitlers patronage.

He was also bitterly attack by the other Doctors who attended Hitler. He was described as being a " Gross but deflated old man, of cringing manners, inarticulate speech, and the hygenic habits of a pig".

It was said Hitler himself never trusted Morell. He resented his dependence upon him, but his dependence was incontestable.
At every meal Hitler took a considerable number of tablets prepared by Morelll and had frequent injections as well every day during the last two years of his life.

The list of drugs Morell admitted to have used on Hitler contains the names of Twenty eight different mixtures of drugs, including his own proprietary brand of Sulphonamide ( which was condemed by the pharmacological faculty of Leipzig University as harmful to the "Nerves") various fake medicines, narcotics, stimulants and aphrodisiacs.

After the attempt on Hitlers life in '44 Dr Giesing examined Hitler and found that to relieve his pains in the stomach, Morell had been giving him for two years at least a drug knowen as Dr Koester Antigas Pills which was compounded of "Strychnine" and "Belladonna".
Giesing believed that Hitler was being slowly poisoned by these pills and that this accounted both for the intensifaction of the pains and for the progressive discolouration of Hitlers skin.
The only result, however of telling Hitler was the dismissal of his other Doctors, who supported Giesing, and the end of Giesings own visits to Hitlers headquarters.
Dr Brandt, who was Hitlers personal surgeon for 12 years, was abruptly dismissed from all his offices. Not content with this Hitler waited for an opportunity to have him imprisoned and condemed to death a few months later. Thus Morell remained unchallenged until the end.

The above information can be found in Hitler a study in tyranny by Allan Bullock.

I have another book somewhere were it states that Morell had the rights to supplying lice powder to the army and it was released in huge quantities, though it was known it caused server allergic reactions and burned the users skin in the majority of cases. He also made other Medicines for public and military use all of which were released by the Government but were considered dangerous. But with the protection of Hitler of which whom was dependent on him Morell could not put a foot out of place.

In short: who needs Stalingrad or Overlord when you have Dr. Morell?

Originally posted by Muzrub:

...
{snip}
...

Just incredible...

Hmmm, maybe we have Dr. Morrel to thank for Hitler's "insanity".


Thanks for the info.

Originally posted by RickyB:

Of course, the key here is how many units were kept back to defend the flank of an advance on Moscow. That is the key....

How about using the best of the AGS to guard the AGC flank? As you all know by now, my strategy is Leningrad and Moscow in '41, collapse of the USSR in '42. AGS's only role would have been to guard the AGC flank and keep the surviving Soviet forces in the south busy. If this could be done by going on the offensive to destroy all, or some, of those troops, then all the better, but either way the real targets were in the north. The southwest had no immediate value to the German effort, I would have gladly given up Kursk, Kharkov and Stalino for the 2 above mentioned cities.

Also apart from the fact it is believed that Hitler also had Parkinsons disease.

I propose that Dr Morell was the greatest Allied leader of all time. But seriously I believe Germany could have survived a great deal longer if not for leadership, and you cant squarely blame Hitler you also have to look at the henchmen behind him and his and others (Goering) failing mental state.

How much did drugs and ill health hinder the German war machine?.

Originally posted by jager506:


Yes, Hitler was personally shaken after Stalingrad, and slowly starting to descend into insanity even then. Kursk was largely planned by the professionals, by it was supposed to happen immediately after the spring thaw (late April/early May 1943) not two months later, giving the Russians ample time to turn the area into an impregnable fortress. Yet Hitler as supreme commander agreed to postponing the attack at least 2 or 3 times. And even though he told Guderian "Every time I think of Kursk, my stomach rolls over".

Why then couldn't he have trusted his instincts? He could have ordered the cancellation of Kursk at any time. But because he was unable to accept that a well conducted strategic defense WITH strong panzer reserves (such as the Ostheer possessed prior to July 5) could very well have attained some form of stalemate in Russia, allowing him the possibility of reaching some arrangement with Stalin, he ordered it to go ahead anyway.

That's easy Jager. The point is that one should look not only from military point of view but from political and economical also. Soviet Union had fastly growing war economy and Western Allies were also not sleeping. So there really was no chance to make separate peace at this state of war on two fronts.

Guderian states in "Panzer Leader" that if it wasn't for Hitler's involvement, 2nd Panzer could have taken Moscow, infantry and all. Hitler was the one that made the decision to use 2nd Panzer to cut off the Soviets in Kiev.
Of course, how would history have changed if Stalin would have taken Zhukov's advice and evacuated Kiev instead of standing and fighting?

Originally posted by RickyB:

AGS was on the verge of pushing the Soviets back in the south on its own. Their panzer forces created the Kremenchung bridgehead on their own, and only a few divisions were ever moved from facing them to face Guderian. GAs by itself would not have been able to destroy the Soviets as happened, but the threat from the south would have been reduced by December as AGS would have been able to keep the Kiev forces occupied and pushed them eastward some distance.

Guderian moved south with his whole panzer group because he did not want it split. The original plan was to use just part of it to clear AGCs right flank around Roslavl and Gomel, while resting the other units, but he convinced Hitler to send his whole group south, and then the plan was expanded to continue south and take out the Soviets around Kiev.

Of ocurse, the key here is how many units were kept back to defend the flank of an advance on Moscow. That is the key, and I think these forces would have kept the Germans from capturing Moscow, but again it would have been close.

Aphrodisiacs? No wonder Hitler put the gays in concentration camps. He wasn't a notorious ladies' man, so he probably feared that some sissy boy would get him.

Originally posted by Muzrub:
Ed Cogburn


Has anyone ever heard what type of drugs Hitler was being given? How much aware was Hitler as to what his doctor was giving him? Always wondered about that.



Dr Morell:


Won Hitlers confidence by curing eczema of the leg and made a fortune manufacturing patent medicines under Hitlers patronage.

He was also bitterly attack by the other Doctors who attended Hitler. He was described as being a " Gross but deflated old man, of cringing manners, inarticulate speech, and the hygenic habits of a pig".

It was said Hitler himself never trusted Morell. He resented his dependence upon him, but his dependence was incontestable.
At every meal Hitler took a considerable number of tablets prepared by Morelll and had frequent injections as well every day during the last two years of his life.

The list of drugs Morell admitted to have used on Hitler contains the names of Twenty eight different mixtures of drugs, including his own proprietary brand of Sulphonamide ( which was condemed by the pharmacological faculty of Leipzig University as harmful to the "Nerves") various fake medicines, narcotics, stimulants and aphrodisiacs.

After the attempt on Hitlers life in '44 Dr Giesing examined Hitler and found that to relieve his pains in the stomach, Morell had been giving him for two years at least a drug knowen as Dr Koester Antigas Pills which was compounded of "Strychnine" and "Belladonna".
Giesing believed that Hitler was being slowly poisoned by these pills and that this accounted both for the intensifaction of the pains and for the progressive discolouration of Hitlers skin.
The only result, however of telling Hitler was the dismissal of his other Doctors, who supported Giesing, and the end of Giesings own visits to Hitlers headquarters.
Dr Brandt, who was Hitlers personal surgeon for 12 years, was abruptly dismissed from all his offices. Not content with this Hitler waited for an opportunity to have him imprisoned and condemed to death a few months later. Thus Morell remained unchallenged until the end.

The above information can be found in Hitler a study in tyranny by Allan Bullock.

I have another book somewhere were it states that Morell had the rights to supplying lice powder to the army and it was released in huge quantities, though it was known it caused server allergic reactions and burned the users skin in the majority of cases. He also made other Medicines for public and military use all of which were released by the Government but were considered dangerous. But with the protection of Hitler of which whom was dependent on him Morell could not put a foot out of place.

Now, I realise this bears little relevance to the discussion(or should I say argument) raging on,and is a response to an old message, but I noticed a myth I feel should be dispelled.

Hitler was the "genius" who insisted the Me262 be made a fighter-bomber, despite the desperate need for high-powered fighters to stop the bombing of the Reich from the West. This delayed the arrival of the Me262 by about a year. Military brilliance? Yea, right

This was NOT Hitler's doing, the reason for the year delayed was the Jumo004 engine which dragged on in development due to teething problems.

That put aside, in regards to the original topic, I think the honorific for the Best German General Of The War should go to von Mannstein. This is of course only a board newbie's opinion so you're free to flame it.

Originally posted by Don Shafer:
Guderian states in "Panzer Leader" that if it wasn't for Hitler's involvement, 2nd Panzer could have taken Moscow, infantry and all. Hitler was the one that made the decision to use 2nd Panzer to cut off the Soviets in Kiev.
Of course, how would history have changed if Stalin would have taken Zhukov's advice and evacuated Kiev instead of standing and fighting?

Altough Hitlers decision it was Guderian that then prompted and convinced him on moving the whole panzergroup south. Maybe Guderians mistake(Bock and Kluge were not to happy) cost Germany Moscow...beacuse what if substansial panzerforces hade been kept in AGC. Could that have speeded up operation typhoon by some crucial weeks?

Originally posted by Mikser:
This was NOT Hitler's doing, the reason for the year delayed was the Jumo004 engine which dragged on in development due to teething problems.

"Hitler ordered the Me262 to be put into full scale production, stripping the tooling from some factories, and replacing it with the new Messerschmitt jigs. By now, the Reich's war production was becoming severely disrupted, and a shortage of the new Jumo004 engines became a prime factor in the downfall of the 262."

"This, coupled with the insistence by Hitler that the new design should be used offensively as a bomber, instead of defensively as a fighter, caused severe problems to the already burgeoning project. Hitler, even under extreme pressure from Messerschmitt himself, Generaleutnant Adolf Galland, and Hermann Goering, could not be reasoned with and as a result Galland fell from favour with Hitler."


http://www.stormbirds.com/schwalbe/history/history2.htm

Ok, so we're both right.

That put aside, in regards to the original topic, I think the honorific for the Best German General Of The War should go to von Mannstein. This is of course only a board newbie's opinion so you're free to flame it.

I've always liked General Heinrici.



Mighty Muzrub.