By special request from BigBadWolf, an update from the front in Burma!
Since the campaign in this theatre has extended over weeks and months, as compared with the few days of a major naval clash, it doesn’t readily lend itself to my usual narrative style. Nonetheless, I don’t want to describe it by publishing endless reams of accumulated combat reports. Instead, I will try to give an impressionistic view of how the campaign has developed, and to describe how and why I have conducted operations as I have, with particular emphasis on air ops. Please feel free to point out the errors I have made – I am sure there are plenty, since this is my first game against a human opponent – and to suggest how I might improve the Japanese conduct of operations.
Japan’s invasion of Burma was conducted strictly on a shoestring, with initially little more than two divisions, a brigade and an armoured regiment as the main hitting power. The objective of the Japanese plan was to occupy the Irrawaddy basin and capture Myitkina, thereby severing the Burma Road. Additionally, Akyab was seized by a coup de main staged by naval paratroops. Attainment of all these Japanese objectives was assisted by an Allied command decision to stand at Imphal and Kohima rather than on the banks of the Irrawaddy, although modest Allied forces were trapped and annihilated at Rangoon. By mid-1942, Chinese forces had been ejected onto the trails leading east from Lashio, whilst a contingent of Yokosuka SNLF paratroops sufficed to seize Myitkina, where they were initially reinforced by nothing more than an army base force. Thus, the entirety of the Japanese garrison of Burma remained confined to the excellent internal transport net that extends as far as Myitkyina from Rangoon. The only exception to this was the garrison at Akyab, which was progressively enlarged to weak divisional strength.
The Japanese command has throughout remained acutely aware of the nightmare predicament in which an amphibious attack into the Gulf of Martaban might place its army in Burma. Hence, steps have been taken to bring forward ample supplies to the dumps at Rangoon and Mandalay (where Burma Area Army now has its HQ), and to provide an adequate garrison against such an attack at both Rangoon and Moulmein. The capacity of the available forces to resist an attack against Moulmein in particular is a continuing source of concern, and it is relative to this concern that all forward deployments of Japanese troops to the north and east of Mandalay have to be assessed.
The problem of avoiding exposure of Rangoon/Moulmein became the more acute when, with the onset of autumn, Allied columns were observed to be moving south both from Imphal towards the Irrawaddy crossings and from Ledo towards Myitkyina. The force coming down from Ledo is substantial, including 18th British Div, a Chindit brigade and a substantial armoured unit. Not yet being ready to permit re-opening of the Burma Road, the Japanese move the best part of two divisions to Myitkyina plus substantial engineering and anti-aircraft contingents as soon as it became clear that this base was the focus of the growing Allied offensive effort. And so began a protracted aerial struggle, in which the Allies have variously sought to close the airfields at Myitkyina or to write down the strength of the Japanese defenders. The Japanese have responded by seeking to take the sting out of the Allied bombers’ onslaught, whilst avoiding significant losses through attrition.
The means by which the Japanese have sought to achieve their objectives in the air battle are as follows:
First, they have depended heavily upon the services of their most highly skilled army fighter pilots, so far as possible deploying only sentais whose experience levels are in the high seventies or better. They have been only partially successful in this: the introduction of some less experienced units has proved unavoidable, though the lowest experience level of any unit employed has been 73.
Second, the Japanese have concentrated their best army fighter equipment on this front. No Type 1 fighters now operate in the theatre; all are Types 2 and 3 (Shoki and Hien). My subjective impression is that the Type 2 Shoki is the better aeroplane: it hits more often with its centre line gun and seems to enjoy better serviceability rates than the Type 3 Hien.
Third, the Japanese have done their utmost to avoid accumulations of damaged machines at bases vulnerable to Allied attack. In this they are assisted by the Allied concentration upon the strips at Myitkyina and comparative disregard of other Japanese fields. As soon as a fighter unit’s flying strength drops appreciably it has been rotated out of its forward base completely, damaged machines being simultaneously transferred overland to the rear base for repair and recuperation. The pattern has been for the replacement unit to stage forward initially to Mandalay, then making the short onward hop to Myitkyina with minimal fatigue when the unit it is to replace is rotated out. This ceased to be feasible once the Allied point unit entered the Myitkyina hex, so that LRCAP operations above that base have now become the order of the day.
Fourth, the Japanese have confined themselves strictly to fighter defence of their own bases rather than offensive sweeps, thereby seeking to conserve precious pilots from loss over enemy territory.
Finally, the Japanese have mounted intensive reconnaissance against an ever-changing range of Allied bases so as to conceal the identity of those targets against which the Japanese send an occasional raid. Again, the Japanese have been assisted by an Allied tendency to over-concentrate their four-engined bombers at Chittagong with inadequate fighter defence. On two occasions this has permitted the Japanese to mount raids of 70-80 Type 1 Navy Land Attack aircraft against Chittagong’s airfields with good results. The principal deterrent to such operations has been the abominable weather that cloaks this theatre for so much of the time, and the need to disperse the attackers immediately following a strike. As an example of such a strike:
11/10/42
Day Air attack on Chittagong , at 31,25 (at 11000 feet)
Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 36
G4M1 Betty x 76
Allied aircraft
Hurricane IIb x 7
Japanese aircraft losses
G4M1 Betty: 30 damaged
Allied aircraft losses
Hurricane IIb: 2 destroyed, 4 damaged
Liberator III: 5 destroyed
A-20B Boston: 2 destroyed
P-38F Lightning: 2 destroyed
Allied ground losses:
59 casualties reported
Guns lost 2
Airbase hits 11
Airbase supply hits 12
Runway hits 47
In fact results were much better than this, a dozen or so Liberators having been destroyed on the ground in this raid alone. The damage done to Allied aircraft also tends to produce a lessening in the intensity of the Allied attack in the days following the raid. I think he also has some serviceability and/or aircrew morale problems.
To conclude, I’ve included a graphic showing comparative losses with their causes for those aircraft most active in this theatre Almost all Liberator III and A-20 casualties and most Ki-44 losses to date have occurred in this theatre, so the table may help to give some indication of the combatants’ relative success.
