As of January 1944 there was no need for a 2nd front due to everything Soviet had already recived during 1943.
In 1941-1943 there was a need. But as of 1944 there was no need. That is what MACCA is saying.
Two questions. First, in terms of the outcome of the war (who won, who lost, the nature of the surrender [conditional/unconditional], how long the war took, the negative ramifications for any additional duration of war, etc.), what do you mean by "there was no need?"
With respect to the matter of the outcome of the war, there are at least two (and indeed two is a minimum) different meanings that your statement might have. (1A) There was no need because the Soviets could have achieved an equally crushing victory and unconditional surrender without a land-offensive in the West. (1B) There was no need because the Soviets could have achieved a victory, albeit perhaps not an equally large victory, i.e., some sort of conditional surrender.
Second, the military and political outcome of the war is only one potential layer of meaning in your statement "there was no need." Another layer is the subsequent social and political geography of Europe after VE day. Here there are also at least two meanings that your statement could (and others possible as well): (2C) There was no need for the Western allies to bother with a Western land offensive because Either (1A) or (1B) would have been true, and the Soviets would have gladly divided up the post-war political boundaries roughly like they did in actual history. (2D) There was no need for the Western allies to bother with a Western land offensive because Either (1A) or (1B) would have been true, and the Soviets would have gladly extended their hegemony over the whole of German-occupied Europe, and the Cold war would started with West Germany, France, and the Low Countries as sateillite states of the USSR.
I think several guys here have made reasonable rebuttals to concluding that either (1A) or (1B) are likely alternate history outcomes, and that is not my area of expertise, nor interest, so I won't belabor it. Except to say that, first of all, as I stated above, because of the contingent nature of history, it is simply not possible to reach such firm conclusions as you seem to have reached about alternate histories. Take away any single element of the Western Powers war on Germany from 1943 and 1945 and, because of the interactive, contingent, and curvilinear dynamics among factors that shape events, it becomes effectively impossible to do more than make vague arguments from the standpoint of probabilities. In short, opinions. Yet you argue as if this were a physics experiment that is incontrovertible based on the data at hand, and which the rest of us are just too dumb or too biased to acknowledge. Fallacious rhetoric at best.
Second, an appeal to logical triangulation of historical facts. Correct me if I'm wrong here, but Stalin had in 1941 made ardent pleas to the Western powers to get into the war and put pressure on Germany from the West, correct? If I am not mistaken, Stalin continued to pressure the allies all the way through 1944, no? If you are arguing for either (1A) or (1B) above, then why did Stalin continue to pressure the allies to get going with the Western land offensive all the way up to and through D-Day? Or did he not do so? He attended the Tehran Conference where he and the other two leaders spent days discussing the details of Operation Overlord. If it was such a 'sure' thing that (1A) or (1B) was going to be achieved without the allies bothering with an offensive in France, then why did Stalin even bother participating in this planning? Why did he not try to undermine it, discourage it, or demand that it not happen instead of continuing to work as part of an allied team planning it?
Now, as to the social and political geography issues involved in meanings (2C) and (2D)
(2C) There was no need for the Western allies to bother with a Western land offensive because Either (1A) or (1B) would have been true, and the Soviets would have gladly divided up the post-war political boundaries roughly like they did in actual history. (2D) There was no need for the Western allies to bother with a Western land offensive because Either (1A) or (1B) would have been true, and the Soviets would have gladly extended their hegemony over the whole of German-occupied Europe, and the Cold war would started with West Germany, France, and the Low Countries as sateillite states of the USSR.
I think the events of the Cold War are pretty clear indicators that (2C) would _NEVER_ have occurred. Had the allies not taken control of France, the Low Countries and West Germany, the Soviets would have done so, and instead of only ~2/3 of Europe being subjected to Soviet domination for decades, something like ~3/4 would have suffered that fate. Indeed, with France, and all of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, etc., under their control, perhaps the Cold War would not have ended so happily in the long run after all.
Perhaps by 1943 the Soviets _did_ have enough power to defeat the Germans singlehandedly had the Western Powers never launched Overlord, but that is frankly a silly alternate universe. Why for heavensake would the allies have gone to the trouble of helping the Soviets to survive the winter of 1942 with massive lend lease, as well as bombing the smithereens out of Germany, and driving them out of North Africa and Italy, and then at the end of 1943, called off their continued offensive in the West? Given the allies ability to predict that (2D) was the likely consequence if they were to slack off in 1943-44, I can think of no reason whatsoever why they would not seek to liberate France and Germany from the Nazis, and prevent a possibly even worse outcome: having those societies fall under the hegemony of "communist" totalitarianism?
No sir, no matter how many numbers you provide, and no matter how powerful you can prove to me the Soviets were in 1943 or how able they were to beat the Germans, alone, with one hand tied behind their back, I simply cannot accept the logic, nor the ethical soundness of such an argument.
Overlord, and the continued allied combined arms war (including strategic bombing) against Germany were not only a necessity they were the ONLY reasonable path for two reasons: (i) to maximize the probabilty that Naziism fell in the most timely manner with the least expenditure in blood and treasure and; (ii) to insure that at least _some_ of Europe was liberated from not just Naziism, but Stalinism, and that the hope of a just and democratic Europe was kept alive.
ADDIT: and another thing! If it was such a surefire thing that the Russians had the Germans beat in 1943, then why did Stalin--given his intimate knowledge of the D-Day planning---not SABOTAGE the allies efforts at D-Day. It would have been fairly easy in the weeks leading up to D-Day to leak intell that would have tipped off the Germans about the allies plans (general days and times) and if Stalin had also coordinated some shifting of troops around so that the Germans might feel comfortable pulling a division or two off the Eastern front to head back West, I would think that Stalin could have had his cake and eaten too. Did Stalin do anything like this? As far as I know he did not. He had top secret information which he could have used to undermine the Allied success in Overlord, but he didn't. If you're argument holds any water, how do you account for this fact?
I'll tell you how you account for it: Stalin just like any of the leaders at that time knew that it wasn't over till the fat lady sang. He didn't have a crystal ball, he didn't know that they had the Germans licked and that " there was no need for a 2nd front due to everything Soviet had already recived during 1943." He wanted to WIN! and he knew his best probability of winning at the least possible cost was if the allies were keeping the Germans busy on the other side.
Even if the sheer math of your argument for (1A) or (1B) has any probabilistic value in projecting alternative histories (which I am quite skeptical about frankly) it is nonetheless, probabilistic arm-waving about fancifal alternate historical events based on the hindsight of 60 years of learning about the events of that period.
In my opinion, nothing at all wrong with "probabilistic arm-waving about fanciful alternate histories" on a forum like this. Indeed, I think it is a lot of fun myself to hear what others have to say, and hear what others think of what I have to say. But when somebody starts treating their arm-waving as if it is some sort of rock-solid experimentally proven FACT . . . well, it ain't so much fun anymore.
