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Allied pilots suffered quite as much fatigue, but from other sources.

I really do not think the excercise in seeking ways to make the theory of Japanese dominance fit the contradictory facts is productive. Sometimes in these discussions it seems like no finicky detail is too small when searching for ways to, err, excuse results that were not favorable to the Japanese, whereas any result that was not favorable to the Allies is encompassed by the sweeping myth of Japanese combat supremacy.

The range/fatigue issue is a red herring. Getting away from Guadalcanal, in 1942 you still see USN pilots doing as well or better than Japanese pilots at ranges that generally favored the Japanese.

I think you have expressed your case against any fundamental
Japanese Superiority elequently and at length. There are points
and specific incidents that could be argued "ad nauseum"---but
the basis of your argument is established. Personally, I find them
pursuasive.

But one thing we have to take into account in this discussion
is that 2by3 is in business to SELL games. And the general consecensus among the gaming public seems to be a belief in
Japanese early war superiority. To fly totally in the face of that
prejudice would be "shooting yourself in the foot" in terms of
sales potential. The best we can hope for is to keep the "facts"
as historically justified as possible by reducing this percieved
superiority to reasonable levels and limiting the length of time
they are effective. It won't be exactly the game we want, but
at least it will sell to some potential opponants. Would you
accept this as one of those annoying "truths" that we all have to
live with?

To fly totally in the face of that prejudice would be "shooting yourself in the foot" in terms of sales potential.

I'm not certain that it would shoot themselves in the foot. Especially not if the victory conditions produced a balanced game despite the fact that Japan wil be unable to invade Hawaii, Australia, or India, and that the IJN ships and aircraft aren't going to be handed a material victory in every non-Midway aerial engagement or in every night surface action.

"To fly totally in the face of that
prejudice would be "shooting yourself in the foot" in terms of
sales potential."

Hi, I believe the game is being designed for play by the designers.
They want the game to be accurate. The fact they can also sell the game to other persons is what allows the work to proceed full time.

Originally posted by mdiehl


The range/fatigue issue is a red herring. Getting away from Guadalcanal, in 1942 you still see USN pilots doing as well or better than Japanese pilots at ranges that generally favored the Japanese.

First I did not say US pilots didnt suffer from fatique. I simply said operateing at extreme range has an effect on performance levels.

Second, I am not sure what you mean regarding USN pilots flying at range in 1942. Single carrier engagements, even at extreme range are hardly applicable to a continous air campiagn over a period of many months. I am curious to know just how many continuous F4F missions were flown at maximum range in 1942. It was my understanding there were no raids of F4Fs on Rabaul that originated from GC (could they even reach?) in 1942. The raids in 1943 originated out of intermediate range airfields on Rendova, Munda and Vella la Vella and were flown mainly by Marine F4Us IIRC. and Army P-38s.

Second it is a known fact that on average IJN/IJA a/c field matainence was greatly inferior to USMC/USAAF a/c field maintence. Which could only be compounded when flying continually at maximum ranges. In general terms the average daily performance levels of individual a/c favored the US, who's pilots and aircraft flew less hours and benefited from superior mantainence. Combine that, with what you repeatedly point out , they were flying an aircraft in many ways inferior even at optimal performance levels, its pretty evident that they were operateing at an disadvantage. In game terms, this should be reflected in generally higher operational losses and slower repair rates for IJN/IJA a/c particularly when flying at extended ranges.

Originally posted by mdiehl
I'm not certain that it would shoot themselves in the foot. Especially not if the victory conditions produced a balanced game despite the fact that Japan wil be unable to invade Hawaii, Australia, or India, and that the IJN ships and aircraft aren't going to be handed a material victory in every non-Midway aerial engagement or in every night surface action.

Japan, could have *INVADED* all three. They just would be unable to *CONQUER*any of them, with the exception perhaps of a very slight possibity of *BRIEFLY* conquering one of the Hawain Islands.

As been stated repeatedly, UV does not hand Japan, material victory in "every non-Midway arial engagement" or "every night surface action". I would say its quite to the contrary and there is no reason to believe WitP will not be the same

Originally posted by mdiehl
I'm not certain that it would shoot themselves in the foot. Especially not if the victory conditions produced a balanced game despite the fact that Japan wil be unable to invade Hawaii, Australia, or India, and that the IJN ships and aircraft aren't going to be handed a material victory in every non-Midway aerial engagement or in every night surface action.

Perception is a powerful thing. Even among the fans excited
enough about this project to participate in this forum (and who
I'm certain 2by3 hopes constitute less than 5% of the potential
buyers), we see a number of questions/opinions expressed that
prove that "a comprehensive knowledge of military history is
not a pre-requisite for enjoying historical simulation games".
Just looking over the responses your arguments have aroused
proves that most players BELIEVE the Japanese pilots and the
IJN in general had an EDGE at the beginning of the war.

Telling the majority of your potential customers that they are
just WRONG may be satisfying, but it's not a good sales technique
unless you can offer very persuasive arguments/facts/figures to
go along with statement. 2by3 can't afford to publish a 100 page
manual with the game just to "prove" your point. Just seems to
me they would be better off to offer "lip-service" to "conventional
wisdom" while controlling it's game effects. In the end, 2by3 will
make the decision, so all we can really offer is encouragement.

Hi, In UV I have never worried over Zero versus Wildcat or Iron dog results. I just try to send more ac then the enemy can put up. If I can't close a field by bombing, I switch to TF bombardment
(or night attack) I've never had a problem except when faced with TF (IJN or USN) that contained too many CV for me to break through. I've always felt the CAP that destroyed whole strikes of 150+ AC were not realistic. (I've had games where I lost in excess of 400 Japanese planes without a single one ever breaking through to drop a bomb-never mind score a hit)
I think the last patch has done alot to correct that (but it will take a while to be sure)(And yes I am on the testing team but it takes a lot of examples since any outcome might be possible as an isolated case) Over all I'm happy with UV. Since WITP will use the UV engine it should produce like results. The Japanese advantage is they get to pick where the battles take place. This should always permit them to arrive in greater numbers before the Allies can react and transfer assets. In UV I am very carefull not to overuse my air units. (There is a decided change in outcome when fresh units are compared to tired burnt out units.

First I did not say US pilots didnt suffer from fatique. I simply said operateing at extreme range has an effect on performance levels.

Sorry. Since the principal effect of extreme range is on pilots in teh form of fatigue, I figured that's what you were talking about.

Second, I am not sure what you mean regarding USN pilots flying at range in 1942. Single carrier engagements, even at extreme range are hardly applicable to a continous air campiagn over a period of many months.

They're quite comparable, if pilot fatigue is that to which you referred.

I am curious to know just how many continuous F4F missions were flown at maximum range in 1942.

It's immaterial if you're talking about the Guadalcanal campaign, unless for some reason you are implying that the Cactus pilots' only source of fatigue was lack of rotation. I think the night raids and bombardments, the greatly inferior quartering and provisioning (compared with Rabaul) conditions, the dearth of proper maintenance supplies and so forth through September, clearly points to the conclusion that the Rabaul pilots were much more favorably situated, wear-and-tear-wise and fatigue-wise, than the USMC/USN pilots at Guadalcanal.

It was my understanding there were no raids of F4Fs on Rabaul that originated from GC (could they even reach?) in 1942.

No they could not reach Rabaul. I'd have to recheck Frank's and Lundstrom's volumes to see whether or which raids were launched from Guadalcanal.

Second it is a known fact that on average IJN/IJA a/c field matainence was greatly inferior to USMC/USAAF a/c field maintence. Which could only be compounded when flying continually at maximum ranges.

The first part I agree with. I do not see how the second part matters. To be sure, the A6Ms undoubtedly had more operating time, but then Rabaul was a very comfortable base that had far better maintenance facilities than Guadalcanal did in 1942. If US maintenance was superior in these circumstances, it had nothing to do with the distance from Rabaul to Guadalcanal, and everything to do with superior Allied maintenance procedures and crew. That would be strategically important factor whether the range was 60 miles or 600.

In game terms, this should be reflected in generally higher operational losses and slower repair rates for IJN/IJA a/c particularly when flying at extended ranges.

True. But I was not talking about operational losses. I was talking about combat losses in head to head engagements between fighters. There's no particular evidence in Lundstrom's discussions, for example, that the Japanese consistently were plagued by poor maintenance in 1942. No pilot accounts where someone says, "Oh, well, poor Hideki took that old crate up anyhow and was never seen again." No "Maneuvering to close on the rear of the Wildcat, my overused engine started missing on two cylinders and the F4F walked away from me, so I had to withdraw."

No. The Japanese got fought to a draw on Guadalcanal on terms that, if anything, favored the Japanese.

I dont think that the designers would intentionally go against historical accuracy for the sake of the fans...they basically said they were making the game of their dreams and hoping that someone buys it.

The difficulty will be setting things up so the Japanese can capture the areas they did by their historical timetable, but not be able to easily capture more than that.

Originally posted by Snigbert
I dont think that the designers would intentionally go against historical accuracy for the sake of the fans...they basically said they were making the game of their dreams and hoping that someone buys it.

The difficulty will be setting things up so the Japanese can capture the areas they did by their historical timetable, but not be able to easily capture more than that.

The point I was trying to make was for MDIEHL's benefit, and
it was that even if his arguments were totally valid, they went
against the "generally accepted truth" that most gamer's accept.
I'm sure the guys at 2by3 have their own take on this, and will,
as you say, make the game of their dreams and hope someone
will by it.

And I agree with you that the real "test" of the game will be
it's ability to recreate the early Japanese successes without
resorting (as many unfortunately have) to "bennies" that make
such foolishness as invading the USA or India possible. Got my
fingers crossed....

Hi, The present supply system will make invasion of distant areas very difficult. (Of course if you capture a base you get supply but unlike PacWar the West Coast of the US has very strong defense that can not be moved. (70x155mm guns will put a lot of holes in transports) Level 9 forts with built in infantry and engineers.
(not to mention any unit waiting transfer to Pacific)
What allows the Japanese to expand often is the target bases are empty. (but still the supply problem exists. The Japanese have to eliminate enemy airfields to allow transfer of resources.
All this is not to say the Japanese will not have enough force to, around May 42 launch a major offensive. It will just have to be into an area that has the supply tail already established.
(and be limited in objective to what current supply levels both at home and in this forward area can maintain)

"(70x155mm guns will put a lot of holes in transports)".

Now this is a piece of historical nonsense that works! It wasn't
a bunch of 155mm field artillery that made the US West Coast
unattractive, but the Coast Defense's 8", 10", 12" and 14" rifles,
and 12" mortars. But the 155's do the job game-wise of preventing silly invasions, so it works. But I do wonder why they
didn't do it right..., after all, 2by3 should have had to work the
real weapons into the game system to cover Hawaii and the
Philippines. An acceptable "fudge" for the West Coast is totally
unacceptable in the Philippine Islands---the "on-map" areas
should have the correct forces and defenses. So what is the
story? Mogami???

No. The Japanese got fought to a draw on Guadalcanal on terms that, if anything, favored the Japanese

An interesting opinion.

Another interesting opinion below:

In addressing the reasons for the outcome of the air campaign we must first divide it into two parts. The initial and decisive phase extended from the date of the landing to the end of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. During this period the Japanese enjoyed almost continuous numerical superiority both in seagoing and shorebased aircraft. Thus, their failure may not be ascribed to a disperity in numbers. What did account for this result was their fundemental error of negligently accepting battle under serious handicaps. In the fore of these was the lack of an air base closer to Guadalcanal than Rabaul, and later Buka. The 565 miles seperating the Japanese aviators from their objective introduced a series of impediments. First, it effectively halved the Zero escort force precluding the use of the Model 32 Zero. Second, the long, time consuming flights impelled the Japanese into a routine of operations that simplified the defender's tasks. Third, the long hauls created excessive wear on aircraft and crews that subtly wore away their numbers and combat effectiveness. Fourth it turned many damaged aircraft into outright losses--together with their crews.

From the American perspective, several factors stand out. General Vandegrift stated that he could say "nothing too lavish in praise" of the entire coastwatcher organization, and it was in the context of the air campaign that the coast watchers made their greatest contribution. Their warnings, supplemented by radar equipment later, prevented the Wildcat's modest climbing characteristics from fatally undermining the defense of Henderson Field. We must again note that the 35 to 45 minute alerts of impending raids allowed just enough time for the Grumman fighters to achieve the altitudes from which they could effectively intercept the bomber formations and deal defensively with the Zero escorts. Next come the clever dive and climb, overhead pass tactics, originated by Major Smith and copied with success by subsequent units, that maximized the Wildcat's capabilities. The sturdiness of the Wildcat earns a place on this list, and the tireless work of the ground crews and supporting personnel who kept the planes of the Cactus Air Force servicable under apallingly primitive conditions also merits mention.

Richard Frank, "Guadalcanal"

Not to mention maximum individual effort by the Grunts guarding henderson field... Any number of Banzai charges were stopped from breaking through only after intense hand-to-hand combat. There's probably any number of assaults by the Japanese that could have gone either way...

Also, what if the Japanese hadn't turned around after the Savo debacle and had instead mauled the invasion force?

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
----------------------------------------------
They're quite comparable, if pilot fatigue is that to which you referred.
----------------------------------------------



I was refering to the "cumulative" effects of fatique on both pilots and a/c during a sustained air campaign as per GC. Single individual carrier engagements with long periods of down time, allowing pilots and a/c time to recoup are not applicable.



(quote)
---------------------------------------------
, the dearth of proper maintenance supplies and so forth through September, clearly points to the conclusion that the Rabaul pilots were much more favorably situated, wear-and-tear-wise and fatigue-wise, than the USMC/USN pilots at Guadalcanal.
---------------------------------------------


I see no evidence that the IJNs maintence and supply situation was any better than that of the Cactus airforce. The high raitio of operational losses as compared to the Cactus airforce seems to suggest the opposite. I have read that the derth of qualified IJN/IJA maintence personal ment that even lightly damaged a/c had to be written off.




(quote)
-------------------------------------------------
To be sure, the A6Ms undoubtedly had more operating time, but then Rabaul was a very comfortable base that had far better maintenance facilities than Guadalcanal did in 1942. If US maintenance was superior in these circumstances, it had nothing to do with the distance from Rabaul to Guadalcanal, and everything to do with superior Allied maintenance procedures and crew. That would be strategically important factor whether the range was 60 miles or 600.
--------------------------------------------------



Huh..... Who tied allied superior US maintence to Japanese flight times? I agree the distance from Rabaul to GC had no effect on US maintenance. It did howere compound the effects of IJN inferior maintenance. Longer flight times + inferior maintence = Lower performance.



(quote)
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True. But I was not talking about operational losses. I was talking about combat losses in head to head engagements between fighters.
------------------------------------------------



If operational losses can be attributed to pilot and aircraft fatique
manifesting itself as such things as lack of pilot concentration and equipment failure, then it follows that it also contibutes to combat losses.




(quote)
-----------------------------------------------
There's no particular evidence in Lundstrom's discussions, for example, that the Japanese consistently were plagued by poor maintenance in 1942. No pilot accounts where someone says, "Oh, well, poor Hideki took that old crate up anyhow and was never seen again." No "Maneuvering to close on the rear of the Wildcat, my overused engine started missing on two cylinders and the F4F walked away from me, so I had to withdraw."
-----------------------------------------------



Like wise, there is no evidence to the contrary. We have no idea how many combat losses that can be attibuted to equipment failure or pilots reactions slowed by fatique. Of course that goes for US losses too, but one would think the US pilot rotation system, shorter flight times, superior maintenance and more robust aircraft were mitagateing factors.




(quote)
---------------------------------------------
No. The Japanese got fought to a draw on Guadalcanal on terms that, if anything, favored the Japanese.
---------------------------------------------



Look its impossible to determine one way or the other without a comparable US sustained long-range air capaign under similar conditions utilizeing the same aircraft and with similar pilot quality levels. Even with that, it probably wouldnt be completely applicable due to the significant disparity in max ranges for the a/c in question.

This whole debate is quite pointless because, baring player mistakes UV consistingly gives the historical 1-1 ratio F4F vs A6M
regardless of the reasons. If anything, its been my experience that if you attempt anything near the pace of the historical air campaign will yeild a higher loss ratio for the Japanese player.

BTW why are we talking about this at all in a Allied Tactics thread?


I'm out

Interesting extract, Nikademus.

So Frank Black, lead singer of the now defunct band "The Pixies" and a part-time historian between gigs, sees the factors influencing the decisive part of the air battle above Guadalcanal as the following -

Japanese effectiveness heavily penalised by extreme range of missions.

Coast watchers and radar give US fighters the ability to gain positional advantage from which they are then able to use to carry out attacks in a manner which maximises the strengths of the F4F while avoiding exposing its weaknesses. Their planes are ably backed by the ground crews efforts.

What rubbish. Where is the bit about how USMC pilots took on their more experienced opponents on equal terms and then kicked **** using superior gunnery, formation tactics, radios and plain old airmanship?

This guy's nothing more than a joke.
Stick with singing, Frank Black.

Posted by madflava13

Not to mention maximum individual effort by the Grunts guarding henderson field... Any number of Banzai charges were stopped from breaking through only after intense hand-to-hand combat. There's probably any number of assaults by the Japanese that could have gone either way...

Maybe one or two of the Japanese assaults could have succeeded but I doubt that the success would have been anything other than temporary. Except for Ichiki's "suicide" charge across the river (stream), the other attacks were made by half starved, unsupported troops that were near exhausted from days of moving through the dense, humid jungle. I wouldn't like their odds of holding against the first serious Marine counter-attack that would be launched at them in their newly won positions. The fact that they were up against troops like the marines didn't help either.

Also, what if the Japanese hadn't turned around after the Savo debacle and had instead mauled the invasion force?

Realistically, Mikawa's force pretty much did all they could reasonably do. It certainly was possible to go for the Transports to get the hatrick but it would have required Mikawa to commit to the probable (in his mind) destruction of his cruiser force the next morning by airstrikes from the 2-3 nearby USN CVs (which he didn't know had left the area). On top of that, (IIRC) he had no idea whether there were further allied surface forces around that could intervene.

Had he somehow known that Savo Island was to be the only realistic chance of gaining the advantage in the future land campaign, I'm sure he would have at least had a go at the transports. Whether he would have then automatically wreaked havoc amongst them is anyone's guess.

A lot of historians are critical of Mikawa's decision to turn back but hindsight is a wonderful thing. And if those said historians are people of the caliber of Nikedemus's Frank Black, they need all the help they can get.:p

Maybe one or two of the Japanese assaults could have succeeded but I doubt that the success would have been anything other than temporary. Except for Ichiki's "suicide" charge across the river (stream), the other attacks were made by half starved, unsupported troops that were near exhausted from days of moving through the dense, humid jungle. I wouldn't like their odds of holding against the first serious Marine counter-attack that would be launched at them in their newly won positions. The fact that they were up against troops like the marines didn't help either.

I think that the attack which resulted in the Battle of Bloody Ridge was the closest the Japanese came to succeeding in taking Henderson. They forced the Raiders/Paratroopers to fall back to their final position before the airfields, and the only unit behind them was (IIRC) the 5th Marines HQ which was called on to help back the Raider/Paratrooper lines in case the Japanese managed to push them back one final time.

Originally posted by Snigbert
.

I think that the attack which resulted in the Battle of Bloody Ridge was the closest the Japanese came to succeeding in taking Henderson. They forced the Raiders/Paratroopers to fall back to their final position before the airfields, and the only unit behind them was (IIRC) the 5th Marines HQ which was called on to help back the Raider/Paratrooper lines in case the Japanese managed to push them back one final time.

I agree...close call there for the USMC. Just bought and read the excellent "Bloody Ridge" by Michael S. Smith.

Drongo-
You raise several interesting points. However, I think Snigbert alluded to something important - there were several times that the USMC had no reserves. Although a USMC counter-attack might have killed off the Japanese eventually, if they had made it to Henderson (which is historically a possibilty), I can only imagine the damage the Japanese could have inflicted.. Scratch the Cactus air force and all the support mechanisms that were in place. Coupled with Japanese dominance of the waters in the area (at least at the beginning of the campaign) and you've got a lot of dead Marines because no reinforcements were coming any time soon...

As for Mikawa's choice to turn back, yes its true he didn't know the US Carriers had left, which is probably the #1 deal breaker for him. But there's no question he would have mauled the transports. Only one Australian CA and 3-4 destroyers were left guarding the beaches up close...

As it turned out, the US got lucky in that regard.