If people start leaving this thread in droves because of what TIMJOT and I are having to do, its your fault. Troll! :p
Posted by Mdiehl
"Axis Fanboy" describes a mindset.
Yes, I've picked up on that. I just think your use of it with the posters in the threads is often unwarranted. I know you will rarely call a poster that directly but whenever someone is in disagreement with your POV, the term does have a funny habit of appearing in your posts under the guise of a general observation.
I think you misread my comments on the torps. Suffice it to say that range and warhead weight matters in re torps, and in re "Night Combat" torpedo action is only one part of the equation. I really don't think this POV is new to you. It's very clearly quite difficult for some in this forum to grasp.
Interesting, I've read that it was primarily the Type 93s speed and warhead that made it such an effective torpedo. Its extreme range tends to be considered as nothing more than a useful (but sometimes spectacular) attribute. It's a sexy beast though.
I agree that "Night Combat" torpedo action is only one part of "Night Combat" overall but I'm still interested to have you clarify exactly how you agree with the statement that the IJN brought torpedo attack to a more effective level than any other navy and yet still can say, when using your figures, that there was no real difference between the IJN and USN in hit rates when in comparable situations?
How then do you then measure night "torpedo attack" effectiveness without including hit rates? If the hit rates are on par, in reality then the effectiveness is on par unless you are possibly placing the effectiveness entirely around the capabilites of the Type 93. That was certainly not what Czarnecki stated. No biggie.
Badoeng Strait (19-20 February)
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Phase I
1 hit of 13 shots, it is not clear whether Pope or Ford got the hit. Ford fired six shots, Pope seven. Hit rate (night, good range) 7.7%.
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Phase II
26 shots fired with three hits, yielding a hit rate of 11.5%.
From ONI?
OK, a few things here. I appreciate the effort you must have made to gather this info. However, what is really needed is access to a solid historical academic analysis where claims made in combat reports have been substantiated or dismissed by research. Even I would not ask you to take on that task.
I am yet to see such a work which is why I asked you what your source on the Allied hit rates were. Until such information is brought to light, any claims that the Allies were on par with the IJN in torpedo hit rate capability, must be considered unsubstantiated.
ONI - took me a bit to work out that it was the Office of Naval Intelligence. I found one on the internet which was dated 1943 (same as yours?). As I understand it, these are accounts written during wartime that are based on the actual combat reports from those involved from the Allied side only. A detailed account of events from the Allied side, but not an analysis. That means that claims of torpedo hits are just that, claims made in the heat of battle. I could not be even certain as to whether the reported hits were first cross checked to eliminate double claiming, etc. Do I assume yours fits that description?
However, I've read the account and, with judicious use of pen, paper and swearing, noted the following -
Badoeng strait :
Phase I (steal underpants)
You mentioned 13 shots for 1 claimed hit. Ford fired 6, Pope 7.
I made it 18 shots for 2 hits (9 torps at the transport or Katori class cruiser for 1 claimed hit and later 9 at a destroyer for one possible claim). Ford fired 8, Pope fired 10.
The text makes it unclear whether the first hit was from gunfire or torpedo but I'll assume torpedo.
Since I don't have a handy, dandy analysis reference on the battles of the Asiatic Fleet, I'll refer to Vincent O'Hara's article on the battle from this website -
www.microworks.net/pacific/battles/
All I know about Mr O'Hara is that he contributes to WWII magazine and does not give references (naughty boy) but his account closely matches most of the others I've read. Where he skips over details, I've used the most common account from other references to fill in the details. Anyway -
His analysis of Phase I
Ford and Pope fired between 10-12 torpedoes at the transport Sasago Maru and claimed a single hit (none reported by the IJN). They then clashed with either IJN DD Oshio or Asashio where at least one, possibly both, of the USN DDs fired a full salvo (5-10). No hits were scored.
Phase I summary - You can see how messy it can get. How many torpedos were actually fired? The ultimate proof is when you get a mention of a ship having exhausted its torpedos. Unfortunately, there is no mention here.
So, making a judgement call, the 2 USN DDs fired at least 15 torps and at most 18 (pending any mention of "exhausting torpedos stocks") at what appears to be 2 seperate targets, the transport and one of the 2 IJN DDs. The result? No reports of any hits (dud or otherwise) are mentioned from the IJN side in these accounts. Given the (in)accuracy of combat claims, I would suggest (opinion only) that maybe there was a possibility that a single dud may have hit the slow moving transport. If you accept that you will get a hit rate of 1 in 15 (you have to look at total shots vs total hits in this engagement as specific details are unclear).
This gives a hit rate of 6.7% and that possible hit was most likely on a very slow moving (6-8 knots) and unmanueverable merchant vessel, not the same type of target the IJN routinely engaged in getting their hit rate (ie, to make it comparable). Still could be counted but...
Using the same approach to Phase II
You mentioned 26 shots for 3 hits. Stewart 11, Parrott 12 and Edwards 3.
I made it 12 in the first salvo (6 each from the Stewart and Parrott) for no hits then an unknown amount in another salvo at a vessel of the port quarter and then another 14 at "ships to starboard" for 3 hits. Total 26+ for 3 claimed hits.
O'Hara and other sources - Stewart and Parrott fires 6 each and Pilsbury fires 3 in first salvo. The targets were the Oshio, Asashio and Sasago Maru. No hits. Next, a salvo from Edwards of 2 (2 others became stuck in their tubes) at the 2 IJN DDs which had now sortied from the anchorage. No hits. The final salvo was conducted during a gun battle with another pair of IJN DDs, the Arashio and the Michishio. Parrott was not part of the fight as she had temporarily run aground and become seperated. The Stewart and Edwards both fired 6 and the Pilsbury fired 3. They claimed 3 hits. The IJN destroyers were hit by gunfire. No received torpedo hits (dud or otherwise) were reported by them. For clarification, the Japanese DDs in both phases reported seeing various torpedo salvoes passing near them. It cannot be assumed they would be unaware of being hit by a dud torpedo just because they were taking gunfire.
Phase II summary - (estimate as per before) 32 shots for a maximum of 3 hits. There is no evidence that even one torpedo hit the manuvering IJN DDs but assuming that the 3 claims stemmed from one dud hit on an IJN DD, you get 32 for 1 or 3%.
I'm using 32 shots as that is about average with most of the analysis I've read.
Of course that's best case. No researched analysis that I've seen will credit the Allies with even one hit (dud or otherwise) during Badoeng Strait. The best they say is that dud hits could have occured but there is no evidence proving so.
I made this response because you've obviously made an effort to back your claim but there is no way I want to continue going over your claims to this extent while you are using what appears to be a wartime account based on unsubstantiated combat claims.
From the ONI combat narratives, Balikpapan comes out with 7 hits, 3 uncertains, and 23 misses. Ignoring the "effect unknown" shots, that's 7 hits from 30 or 31 fired, or about 23% "effective" hits.
For the same reasons that I mentioned above (and that TIMJOT has now specified) ONI details of torpedos fired and hits gained can not really be taken as a fact. Morrison and others (including O'Hara for what its worth) all have different figures to the ONI's (refer TIMJOTs post).
The bottom line is that a daring raid by 4 USN DDs against transports and auxilliary craft that were sitting primarily at anchor is not really something that is useful to compare with IJN battles like Savo. Despite some similarities in the starting conditions, Savo was an engagement between two opposing combat naval forces that, amongst other differences, were both moving at the time of battle. It does make a difference to the torpedo attack effectiveness. I would still include Balikpapan in the Allied figures but I'd think the hit rate would have to be weighted downwards when compared to Savo. Just my opinion.
Cheers (I still haven't had the time to read the rest of your earlier post yet).:p
