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Tristanjohn wrote:Again, there's no way to know exactly. Case in point: Vincennes was steaming somewhat north of Jarvis when the latter was struck, and the latter was generally north of Turner's transports, meanwhile the Japanese attack ran south to north. In other words, Vincennes undoubtedly was screened to one degree or the other by a whole lot of ship profiles--considerably screened is my best guess. (Please always keep in mind that these Bettys did not fly in at 200 feet, no matter what the simulation says. They came in at around 50 feet, or lower still. If you don't believe me I'd be happy to direct you to some pictures of the action that day. Anyway, my contention is most of these ships we're using for this test never had a bead on these airplanes once they got down near the water for the reason the gunners couldn't see these planes.).
Do try, by all means, to give the TF its due allotment of CAP.

Where are you getting your info?

Most accounts I've read for 8th Aug '42 have the Vincennes well placed (3000 yds out from the main transport body) to engage the approaching torpedo bombers. She was even using her 8" guns with effect.

Those same accounts also partly explain why she had such a freedom of fire at the incoming Bettys. The enemy attack on the transport group approached from the NE rather than the South.

Drongo wrote:Where are you getting your info?

Most accounts I've read for 8th Aug '42 have the Vincennes well placed (3000 yds out from the main transport body) to engage the approaching torpedo bombers. She was even using her 8" guns with effect.

Those same accounts also partly explain why she had such a freedom of fire at the incoming Bettys. The enemy attack on the transport group approached from the NE rather than the South.

The citation of a S-N torpedo run was a simple late-night mistake on my part, Drongo. I'd just gotten off work and never bothered to closely re-read all I'd written to TIMJOT. (Bad idea that.) I'll go back and correct this compass error now so that it doesn't confuse or mislead someone else down the road.

Good catch on your part. Thanks.

As for Vincennes: if she loosed her 8" rifles at the attack (and mind you I don't doubt she did--I imagine there were Marine officers firing their side weapons at the Japanese ) it would likely have been when the planes maneuvered on their NE-SW swing from around the tip of Florida into Nggela Channel. I don't know but that must be seven or eight miles anyway. You might do a search on Vincennes and see if that ship's history gives a detailed account of this particular action.

The point I'm driving at overall is that a ship's AA armament is mainly placed to either side so unless that ship's beam is pointed directly at an attack not all of the guns could possibly be brought to bear. Turner in fact endeavored to do this, but how many ships not part of his transport flock managed to do so, and to what degree of coordination, is also unknown to me. I think it's safe to say that a percentage of the AA present for this battle was not able to engage at one time or another due to a host of reasons.

After the Bettys began their final run into the convoy at levels from 25-50 feet off the water there is no possibility that more than a fraction of the AA technically available to the convoy and its escort could have been a factor. You apparently do see and accept this conclusion. Yes?

What we don't know (perhaps you do if you've hung around the boards long enough and Mike or somebody got into it) is how AA is modelled exactly inside UV. Do the AA numbers we can see for individual ships represent some discounted total averaged defensive fire potentiality? Beats me. For a game of this scale anything's possible, though it's a better bet if AA is discounted to a "working average" this would reflect more an attack on a convoy "at sea" with planes all around taking this "collective fire."

My guess is that whatever these numbers want to say, for the purposes of our test it's odds on that the USN will have more effective flak than it actually enjoyed historically. How that might affect the test result is also anyone's guess.

Go check on Vincennes and get back to us, Drongo.

Favorite word for the past two days is...(drum roll)... "ad hominem" :rolleyes:

Bushmaster wrote:Favorite word for the past two days is...(drum roll)... "ad hominem" :rolleyes:

Yes, people practice this technique all the time in speech and writing. What's amazing is how many of these same people couldn't tell you what it actually means, or could care less for that matter.

Drrrrrrrrrrrumm roll indeed.

Tristanjohn wrote:Go check on Vincennes and get back to us, Drongo.

Yeah, Drongo, you menial little creep. You've got your marching orders, so now go do our bidding.

pasternakski wrote:Yeah, Drongo, you menial little creep. You've got your marching orders, so now go do our bidding.

You're something of a troublemaker, aren't you?

Here's a suggestion: when you have nothing intelligent to say or productive to contribute keep your lips zipped and do nothing at all. Otherwise you remove all doubt.

Your choice, of course.

Tristanjohn wrote:Yes, people practice this technique all the time in speech and writing.

Your remarks indicate that your knowledge on the subject is lacking, as well. "Ad hominem" is not a "technique," as you suggest, but rather, an error in rhetoric.

So, suppose you enlighten us on the extent of the knowledge you purport to possess. I am interested in seeing the degree to which you understand that your posts here are informed by this very mistake in argument.

pasternakski wrote:Your remarks indicate that your knowledge on the subject is lacking, as well. "Ad hominem" is not a "technique," as you suggest, but rather, an error in rhetoric.

So, suppose you enlighten us on the extent of the knowledge you purport to possess. I am interested in seeing the degree to which you understand that your posts here are informed by this very mistake in argument.

You come across as someone with a bad education, someone with nothing positive to add, someone who, regardless of his years, possesses a juvenile mentality. So instead of intentionally trying to cause trouble here why not just run away and play somewhere else?

That's a good boy, now.

Tristanjohn wrote:You come across as someone with a bad education, someone with nothing positive to add, someone who, regardless of his years, possesses a juvenile mentality. So instead of intentionally trying to cause trouble here why not just run away and play somewhere else?

That's a good boy, now.

Your remarks indicate that your knowledge on the subject is lacking, as well. "Ad hominem" is not a "technique," as you suggest, but rather, an error in rhetoric.

So, suppose you enlighten us on the extent of the knowledge you purport to possess. I am interested in seeing the degree to which you understand that your posts here are informed by this very mistake in argument.

Tristanjohn wrote:As for Vincennes: if she loosed her 8" rifles at the attack (and mind you I don't doubt she did--I imagine there were Marine officers firing their side weapons at the Japanese ) it would likely have been when the planes maneuvered on their NE-SW swing from around the tip of Florida into Nggela Channel. I don't know but that must be seven or eight miles anyway. You might do a search on Vincennes and see if that ship's history gives a detailed account of this particular action.

I was of the understanding that you were the one who had already referenced the "ship logs, sailor diaries, analysis of track charts and so on".

The Vincennes only started firing her 8" batteries as the first of the low flying G4Ms came into full view about 2-3 miles away. She was screening the main body of transports as stated. The main body of transports (and the Vincennes) were well to the SW of the eastern tip of Florida. Aircraft flying at 20-50 ft would not have been trackable at 7-8 miles. At the range she did engage, she had a very clear line of fire on the bombers as they approached/passed by.

The point I'm driving at overall is that a ship's AA armament is mainly placed to either side so unless that ship's beam is pointed directly at an attack not all of the guns could possibly be brought to bear. Turner in fact endeavored to do this, but how many ships not part of his transport flock managed to do so, and to what degree of coordination, is also unknown to me. I think it's safe to say that a percentage of the AA present for this battle was not able to engage at one time or another due to a host of reasons.

After the Bettys began their final run into the convoy at levels from 25-50 feet off the water there is no possibility that more than a fraction of the AA technically available to the convoy and its escort could have been a factor. You apparently do see and accept this conclusion. Yes?

I don't see it as a major determining factor as to the result.

As I understand it,
The G4Ms were flying at 20-50 feet at the time they crossed the Florida Islands. The main body of the transports were some distance away, manuevering in what was to become known as Iron Bottom Sound. Almost the whole time from when the Japanese first appeared at wavetop height to when they left for home, they were under heavy AA fire. First by the ships around Tulagi, then by the warships screening the transports on their attacked quarter, followed by the transports themselves and then finally by the ships of the western screen (as the surviving bombers exited).

The bombers altitude gave them scant protection from the AA fire of ships along the initial flight path, the final approach and then the exit. These were where the majority of bombers were downed (or effectively downed from damage), rather than in the relatively crowded area of the transport main body (where I agree that tracking and firing were difficult). Many of those bombers that did reach the transports before crashing had already been doomed by earlier fire from the escorts.

I'd suggest you go read those logs, diaries, etc. That way you may understand just how effective the ships with relatively clear fields of fire were on low flying bombers passing close by at near wavetop height. I would expect you would then be less concerned with how the AA from the main body of transports was affected.

What we don't know (perhaps you do if you've hung around the boards long enough and Mike or somebody got into it) is how AA is modelled exactly inside UV. Do the AA numbers we can see for individual ships represent some discounted total averaged defensive fire potentiality? Beats me. For a game of this scale anything's possible, though it's a better bet if AA is discounted to a "working average" this would reflect more an attack on a convoy "at sea" with planes all around taking this "collective fire."

My guess is that whatever these numbers want to say, for the purposes of our test it's odds on that the USN will have more effective flak than it actually enjoyed historically. How that might affect the test result is also anyone's guess.

Perhaps if you'd just conduct the test, you'd be one step closer to seeing exactly what those test results for the UV model would be in these circumstances.

Remember, your claim is that UV gives unreasonable results when the events of 8th August '42 are run through its model. You are yet to even finalise a test which show these results. How the internal workings of UV would produce these results is currently irrelevent.

The historical event indicates sufficient ships with good fields of fire were able to effectively engage and destroy the majority of the Japanese bombers. That should at least equate to whatever general assumptions back the internal UV model in its dealing of a Japanese torpedo attack on a well defended TF. Set up the situation and let the model do the rest.

To represent the TF from 8th August, I think you could safely include all involved cruisers (which excludes the San Juan) and take your pick of the destroyers from scenarios starting invasion/bombardment/surface combat TFs. There should be no reason worry about putting in all 15 transports from the X-Ray group as the historical 20-30 G4Ms will only result in a max of about 10 ships being targeted in UV and the number of transports present does not influence torpedo accuracy against an individual ship.

Based on that, 6 cruisers + 9 destroyers + 10 transports should give a TF that well represents the event for UV.

As suggested in a previous post, one thing I would add to your test for representing the historical situation is the sailing of the Allied transports in an empty condition. That way they will be considered by the model to be at sea (not stopped and unloading) if attacked at Lunga.

Good Luck.

pasternakski wrote:Your remarks indicate that your knowledge on the subject is lacking, as well. "Ad hominem" is not a "technique," as you suggest, but rather, an error in rhetoric.

So, suppose you enlighten us on the extent of the knowledge you purport to possess. I am interested in seeing the degree to which you understand that your posts here are informed by this very mistake in argument.

Actually Pasternaski, the variant of ad hominem you see practiced on these forums, is a common tactic of several established posters.

It would indeed lose a debate for the person doing it if this were a debate forum. In addition it is childish and simply rude. But doesnt seem to slow them down at all. If you were serious you would blast all who do it.

Since you dont, we can infer several things.

Drongo, you've basically repeated, in slightly different form, what I've stated twice or more.

You make my point re flak totals insofar as you come to agree (whether you realize it or not) that whatever AA fire was delivered during the battle came from one local pocket of defense or the other, not as a single collective wall of ack-ack from all ships present at one time. The latter case is how I believe it is modelled in UV, but I can't be sure as this remains undocumented as far as I know. There may or may not be some modifier at work which would attempt to model a Lunga-Point scenario, but frankly I doubt it.

As for reading the individual ship logs, action reports and whatnot, that's really the work of professional historians; it is rare to find lay with the time, resources and opportunity to conduct this research, which is why the public relies on the work of these historians. If you've found an online site with such information that you've already accessed please step forward with the address. I've interest and I'd be happy to check it out.

As for the test: I've stated that after several runs with the scenario developed from the editor all I've seen are bombings of PM with no attacks on the convoy around Lunga. I've also stated (somewhere in the greater thread) that my original test using a stock scenario gave results which reflected my overall concern for the accuracy of the air model. None of that has changed.

If it's true UV planes perceive unloaded convoys as "at sea" as opposed to "in port" it's news to me--to my knowledge this is also undocumented. Where do you come by this information, where might it be found? For that matter, how would Japanese planes know if an Allied convoy were loaded, empty or bound for China? How about what its cargo was or had been? I suppose a designer might make a case for knowing after the fact that the convoy had been carrying troops if those troops were seen to have landed, and an inference could be made when ships sail away from that place that the troops were no long aboard, and yet in just such a case we see the Japanese to have staged a raid the following day on these kinds of transports--which, as it turned out, happened to have been still loaded. But again, I haven't read anything about this dynamic being active in UV.

This is rather beside the point (in a way, though it must bear on the issue at some juncture), but the more I read the Matrix boards the more I come to realize that precious few people who bother to post are all that concerned with the niceties of the simulation and much more concerned with amassing the necessary points in game terms to claim a "win" over this guy or that. In view of this it ought to come as no surprise there is resistance to upward pressure from anyone to enhance the realism of this simulation, this to include the developers who, I notice, are on record as stating further work on UV was to focus on new features, with no mention to getting correct what's already in there. Why would there be clamor for such a thing if the majority used it only as some glorified naval version of Panzer General?

All of that's an old story.

For my part, I always argue for greater accuracy in my wargames. It's always the case that I'm in the minority, more so today than a ten years ago, another unhappy reality. But some of "us" bother to press on anyway; I tend to be vocal.

There is more than one reason so few of "us" post on these boards. For one thing "we" are older, for another "we" are usually well-educated, and in general "we" view the uncouth behavior so prevalent in these venues as worse than a little unsatisfactory. I can't tell you how many serious wargamers of long standing I've seen fall by the wayside over the years, primarily for that last reason in my view. For whatever reason, in truth, there are not that many of "us" left, and I sometimes wonder what keeps me going.

I appreciate what effort you've made.

Chiteng wrote:Actually Pasternaski, the variant of ad hominem you see practiced on these forums, is a common tactic of several established posters.

It would indeed lose a debate for the person doing it if this were a debate forum. In addition it is childish and simply rude. But does seem to slow them down at all. If you were serious you would blast all who do it.

Since you dont, we cab infer several things.

I don't want to add to this digression but there are a number of different forms of "ad hom" argumentative technique. Also, it isn't always the case the perpetrator realizes he employs this bad method of argument. On the other hand, when that is the case then this rhetorical method assumes its most despicable identity of all.

When all is said and done the world is full of many different types--fools, ignorant people, wise men and downright nice guys--and the thing is you never know who might be lurking around the next corner. It's a lottery out there.

Yes, in a formal debate the user of ad hominem argument would right away go south. But that's in educated circles of formal debate; this forum and others of its ilk are not of any such description.

As for "infer": we can assume anything we like but what's the point in that?

Troublemakers are not hard to find no matter where you go and they will always enjoy a certain percentage of support. Some people will snicker immaturely along the walls at these sophomoric antics while others try to ignore them best they can. The thing is there is no law in the universe to dictate everyone must be born or act out their lives intelligently. My counsel would be to keep your sense of humor . . . and your left up.

Tristanjohn wrote: For my part, I always argue for greater accuracy in my wargames. It's always the case that I'm in the minority, more so today than a ten years ago, another unhappy reality. But some of "us" bother to press on anyway; I tend to be vocal.

There are those of us who appreciate the effort

I've only recently started playing UV so I'm not in a position to comment on the accuracy of the combat modelling within the game. However, I read the interview with Gary Grigsby on 'The Wargamer' site and I would make the following observation. The model in UV is probably of the the most sophisticated of any wargame currently available. Grigsby himself has said that he feels that the modelling is almost too complex and would like to implement a simpler system. My experience in researching history at a high academic level reveals that the more detail is uncovered the more diverse the opinion that is expressed. Ultimately in history there is no 'truth', there are only 'facts' and their interpretation. I suspect that the same could be true of this game.

"The latter case is how I believe it is modelled in UV, but I can't be sure as this remains undocumented as far as I know. There may or may not be some modifier at work which would attempt to model a Lunga-Point scenario, but frankly I doubt it."

If you searched the forum for previous discussions on this subject, you would find that you are incorrect.


"There is more than one reason so few of "us" post on these boards. For one thing "we" are older, for another "we" are usually well-educated, and in general "we" view the uncouth behavior so prevalent in these venues as worse than a little unsatisfactory. I can't tell you how many serious wargamers of long standing I've seen fall by the wayside over the years, primarily for that last reason in my view. For whatever reason, in truth, there are not that many of "us" left, and I sometimes wonder what keeps me going."

It must be comforting to be a member of such an elite few. Do most of these other wise old scholars feel a need to move amongst the rabble pointing out their superiority and the errors of those beneath them, or do they prefer other forms of self gratification? Having only played wargames for about 20 years I'll consider myself ignorant and defer to your overwhelming command of the subject.

"All ignorant that soul that sees thee without wonder"

Snigbert wrote:If you searched the forum for previous discussions on this subject, you would find that you are incorrect.

Possibly, but with your kind of help in the matter that isn't likely, now is it?

If you know something useful, Snigbert, why not just impart the information for the good of all? Why should someone have to spend untold time searching the database of this forum with lord only knows how many key words, then have to read through a thousand posts just to find out how the game operates?

I've spent considerable time today accomplishing very litte with regard to the test. I get a lot of bad weather as a rule in the beginning of Scenario #14 and so nothing much flies that otherwise might have. I did come up with the following AAR after rearranging a few things.

As I was unable to get many Bettys to fly on their own at first I started over and transferred the Nells in Truk to Rabaul. Even so, as you're about to see there still weren't enoyugh bombers over the TF to simulate the concentration of action of 8 August.

All Japanese bombers were set for 10% naval search to enhance the likelihood of their spotting and attacking the USN TF.

The results:

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR 08/07/42

Weather: Clear

Air attack on TF, near Lunga at 38,40

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 20
G3M Nell x 14

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 19

Japanese aircraft losses
G3M Nell x 1 destroyed
G3M Nell x 10 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat x 1 destroyed
F4F-4 Wildcat x 1 damaged

PO2 M. Endo of F1/Tainan Daitai is credited with kill number 2

Allied Ships
CA Australia, Torpedo hits 1, on fire
CL Hobart, Torpedo hits 1, on fire

Attacking Level Bombers:
4 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
4 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
2 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
3 x G3M Nell at 200 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air attack on TF, near Lunga at 38,40

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 17
G4M1 Betty x 4

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 12

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero x 1 destroyed
G4M1 Betty x 2 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat x 1 damaged

Allied Ships
CA Vincennes, Torpedo hits 1

Attacking Level Bombers:
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air attack on TF, near Lunga at 38,40

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 12
G3M Nell x 5
G4M1 Betty x 4

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 11

Japanese aircraft losses
G3M Nell x 4 damaged
G4M1 Betty x 2 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat x 2 destroyed

LCDR T. Coleman of VF-6 bails out and is CAPTURED

Allied Ships
CA Australia, Torpedo hits 1, on fire
AK Alhena, Torpedo hits 1, on fire
AP Barnett, Torpedo hits 1, on fire

Attacking Level Bombers:
4 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
1 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet



For the USN CAP I sent the Wildcats from Enterprise, distance three hexes (CV TF in first full sea hex southeast of Guadacanal). I didn't bother to use historical transports and gave the support force Vincennes and Chicago} along with Australia, Canberra and Hobart, fleshing out with DDs (again. not historical in this case).

In all I gauge Allied AA defensive fire to have more or less equalled (or better still) that available on 8 August 1942.

It's a shame we can't get just about 40 Bettys to fly in with the appropriate escort of Zeroes on command. That's what I want to see, but haven't achieved this yet.

As this combat result differs somewhat from what TIMJOT reported I don't know what to say. Maybe results in the game are randomized even more than I thought, with potentially wild swings in the bottomline from one battle to the next. Who knows?

Here are the results from my second test. Check out the date. That is how long it took to get the Japanese bombers to fly even one mission.

The Particulars are the same as before.

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR 08/12/42

Weather: Partly Cloudy

Air attack on TF, near Lunga at 38,40

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 24
G4M1 Betty x 21

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 17

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero x 1 destroyed
G4M1 Betty x 12 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat x 1 damaged

Allied Ships
CA Chicago, Torpedo hits 5, on fire, heavy damage
CA Australia
DD Jarvis, Torpedo hits 1
CL Hobart

Attacking Level Bombers:
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
1 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

P.S. Chicago sank if anyone's interested (or was in doubt ).

T was curious to see what might happen the next day if I ran the second test for another turn. Here's the result.

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR 08/13/42

Weather: Partly Cloudy

Air attack on TF, near Lunga at 38,40

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 21
G3M Nell x 12

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 17

Japanese aircraft losses
G3M Nell x 12 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat x 1 destroyed

Allied Ships
CA Australia, Torpedo hits 1, on fire
AP Neville, Torpedo hits 1, on fire

Attacking Level Bombers:
4 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
4 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
2 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
2 x G3M Nell at 200 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

After two more tests I think I"ll retire this run.

No Japanese sortied on the 14th, but on 15 August we had this minor action.

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR 08/15/42

Weather: Partly Cloudy

Air attack on TF, near Lunga at 38,40

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 11
G4M1 Betty x 4

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 15

Japanese aircraft losses
G4M1 Betty x 4 damaged


Allied Ships
AP President Adams

Attacking Level Bombers:
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet

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