Matrix Games Forums

AndyMac: Yes Bevis is good, some of his earlier material uses my sources. I do have a couple of quibbles with his Coronet section: The 116th/117th RM Brigades were very third-rate material disbanding as the war ended; the 34th RM Support Regiment had reached India as early as May 7th, 1945 and would, I suspect, have operated with the Indian contingent; it is highly unlikely that all of the sixteen commando battalions would have been sent to the Pacific - apart from time-discharge (many of the men were very long serving), all four brigades were already short of men - hence my suggestion that the two NW Europe brigades (the 1st and 4th) would have been the only ones sent.
 
On the Indian division arrival times some minor amendments might be needed:
- 8th Division leaves Taranto June 11th, 1945, reforming at Jhansi in July. However it is short three battalions and all but the anti-tank artillery. It was designated to serve in Burma (probably as an occupation force)
- 10th Division lead elements arrive at Bombay on December 17th, 1945 (less the same assets)
- 4th Division leaves Greece at the end of January 1946 (also lacking all artillery and three battalions)
My caveat about their use is the shortage of replacement artillery in India and the need for experienced internal security troops in a period when the new Labour Government had sent signals about Independence. But that is all speculative.
 
I concur that it makes little difference in game terms whether CW or US equipment is used. What does matter is where the CW troops would have moved to Japan from, or even what route they would have taken to the Pacific. There is distressingly little information on this, though I suppose we can rule out India as the facilities there would have been already overstretched. My guess (and it is no more) is that the troops would have based in Australia using the facilities already built for the British Pacific Fleet.
 
J Boomer: Glad you could clarify where the 6th Division re-equipment issue came from - I wonder if this contributed to the decision to equip the Army with US stuff in the early '50's. Yes also on the word 'militia' - it caught me yet again - I just cannot get used to a wording (I suppose it was a legal issue) that called everyone - regulars, conscripts, volunteers etc 'militia'!
 
I did some research on where the men were coming from. The regimental histories (mind you they were not particularly interested in this period) imply that the regulars were shipping as intact units, while the remainder would have come from all sorts of sources and then (as you suggest) placed in new units. What does puzzle me is the lack of any identifiable armoured unit(s) as by this time a Canadian infantry division was used to operating with an entire armoured brigade in support. Maybe they would have used the two British armoured brigades - difficult to determine - the 4th was probably picked because it had used DD tanks to cross the Rhine, while the men of the 9th had been using amphibious equipment in Italy. If the same logic held true then presumably the Canadian unit would have been the 2nd Armoured Brigade (or part thereof) which used DD tanks at Normandy. It was apparently easy to equip with DD tanks but very difficult and time-consuming to train men to operate them with confidence (!). It is interesting that when the 9th Armoured was selected its tankers were flown to NW Europe, (leaving their equipment behind), although there were dozens of experienced armoured regiments already there.
 

mariandavid

6th Can div was organized along American lines, Regiments instead of brigades, etc. They were even considing adopting the American rank strucure for the Div and ranks were being adjusted. This was an ALL volunteer force and a completely new divison. As per American organization there was a Tank Bn (Canadian Grenadier Guards) and a Recce Troop (from Montreal?).

As for the term milita. From Confederation through WWII Militia was the name of the Army. Prior to WWII it was devided into the following; Permanent Acitve Militia (Full time) and Non-permanent Active Militia (reserves). The NPAM Bns were mobilized during the war and the other regiments (Bns) were reformed in various forms. The name of the Army was changed after the war. However to this day the official term for the reserves is Militia; however it is rarely used.

J Boomer:
 
It is certainly irrelevant to Admiral's Edition but our discrepancy is interesting. My sources say men/units told would be shipped to Canada from Europe to the Pacific, yours that they were all volunteers! I keep wondering about the timing factor here: The plans obviously well predate VE day, the allocations of units are obviously post VE (for example the Canadian Grenadier Guards are serving with the 4th Armoured Brigade in Europe. All very interesting.
 
On a personal note on arriving in Canada in 1970 and being used to the British Army I was utterly baffled by the mention of 'militia', which in Britain carried the same image as the Home Guard!

You are right about it being irrelevant, however here is one good link about the CAPF http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp ... ahq016.pdf

They were having trouble getting as many voluteers as possible and plans were thrown around about who would be voluntold. It never got to that point as the dropping of the A-Bombs made the whole issue moot.

The war in Europe was over when plans were being implimented for 6th Div. The names of units were just that, names and were reused. Volunteers from Europe were given priority transit home and 30 days leave upon return.

There were Veterns Guard units here in Canada during the war which were very much like the home guard. In BC they defended many RCAF bases.

Further to J Boomer's comments above, have just consulted the Canadian Army Official History, pp291-2, which is essentially a good precis of the large PDF to which he linked.

The context for the reformation of 6th Canadian Division was a parliamentary statement by the PM on 4 April 45. He promised that the Division would concentrate in Canada before deploying to the Pacific, that no-one currently serving in Europe would be expected to serve in the Pacific without having gone home first, and that the force would be 100% volunteer.

There was no shortage of volunteers, but there was a shortage of suitable volunteers. 9,943 officers and 68,256 ORs in Europe volunteered for Pacific service, but only 2,796 + 36,386 were judged wholly suitable (age, fitness, etc). The problem was that the planning estimate was for 30,000 all ranks in the Canadian expeditionary force with a further 33,600 reinforcements/replacements in training.

The infantry battalions were to use the same identities as those in 1st Canadian Div, to mark their history as the first to deploy overseas in the war. Although using US organisation, each "Regiment" was to be commanded by a Brigadier, not a Colonel. The Recce "Troop" was the Royal Montreal Regiment.

The 13th Bde used on Kiska was definitely not part of the force, having been withdrawn in Jan 44 since Japanese interest in the Aleutians had vanished, although it had set a bit of a precedent by being at least notionally reorganised along US lines, albeit with the odd variation - a fourth infantry battalion in lieu of a combat engr bn. And of course one third of the personnel in the US 1st Special Service Force's six infantry battalions had been Canadian.

With regards to mariandavid's musing on the routing of CW troops to theatre, the July 45 directive to Mountbatten to my mind suggests that via India was not totally out of the question - Mountbatten might have whinged about Indian resources, but whether London would have been suitably sensitive is perhaps debateable. They were certainly warning him off to provide two divisions' worth of assault lift - whether London would have envisaged that being sent all the way across the Pacific for a US or Canadian rendezvous seems perhaps questionable.

Returning to J Boomer's linked PDF, what is interesting are the quotes on pp106-7 regarding the mooted CW Corps. The way I interpret that is that the British and US were agreed in principle on the desirability of a three divisional CW Corps, and assumed that the 6th Canadian would be part of this; but that the Canadian CGS was not inclined since he thought that the Division's integration with the US was too far advanced. To my mind this suggests that the CGS was not convinced that the supposed reorganisation and logistic support of the CW Corps along US lines would not be as comprehensive as that which the Canadians had already implemented.

The link I provided was interesting, until last night I'd only read a smaller version of the that document which only mentioned the volunteer part. I do recall however from talking from some vets that they were statring to draw volunteers from the Bns that never deployed such as 2 C SCOT R. I'm currently looking at a doc from the same source on coastal defences.

ORIGINAL: Andy Mac

David I sorta agree on tyhe equipment front but have chosen to go with my sources over my own common sense AT guns are not that important (often the lighter 2 pounder was more use v the japanese anyway)

The only logic for equipping them with 17 pounders is if it came to a shooting war witht he soviets !!!

Andy you forget that the 17 Pdr had a useful HE round, whereas the lighter guns did not.

I also do not accept that our force would have re-equipped with US kit. Notwithstanding the low regard many items of US equipment was held in the British Army, your arguments ignore several factors.

Wars are fought be Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen on behalf of politicians, so whatever pandering was done to the sensibilities of the JCS by CW politicians, in the final analysis the commanders on the ground would have the veto and the ability to say 'I told you so' when it all goes pear shaped. There is no way that certain types of kit would be traded in except perhaps medium and heavy artillery were the US pieces were significantly better.

REME and the RE spent years getting to know the quirks of their own kit, so how would they have got on with kit they did not know.

We had some excellent support tanks (late model Churchills, Centurions, Crocodiles and AVRE's) - we had no 'bloody Omaha' in part due to this kit.

I do not accept that the Indian Army would not have been used, SEAC was told to expect to lose 3+ division from the OB needed to retake Malaya and Singapore. My father served in the Punjab Regt as a Bn 2 I/C. They were training for Coronet from late Spring 45 until it was realised that this would not happen. In addition as already pointed out, here was an army that had beaten the Japanese at their own game, not just island hopping to the fringes of the Empire proper. Indeed the Aussies with their 'side show' in Borneo that so infuriated the Australian CGS (another example of MacArthur's ego in overdrive) vested in that army more skills than the US could muster. Add to this the warrior culture of two of our larger 'Indian' Regts (Gurkha's and the Punjabs) and you have a force to be reckoned with.

In the final analysis it is a good job it never happened as between MacArthur's over-inflated ego (surrounded as he was by 'yes men') and the anglo-phobes on the JCS, these men would have visited a national tragedy on the US nation like that visited on the smaller populous of Canada during the Dieppe raid, only on a scale that would make all previous casualty lists (including that on the Western Front in 1916) pale into insignificance. On the back of that the whole face of the US would have been different for I doubt an ex-General would have been elected President.

I am sure the whole issue could be solved with a week at Kew as just a cursory search turned up hundreds of candidate files and documents (I was looking for AIR files for Tiger Force at the time). It's a pity I don't have the time for the next 9 years.

BSQ Neither Macarthur or King wanted CW forces involved in their war.
 
Roosevelt forced them to accept the BPF without Roosevelt no one can know what would have happened.
 
Indian forces includign the returning 4th 8th and 10th Divs and 31st Ard Div all make an appearance so there are no shortage of Indian Army forces to send to Coronet if required but they arrive fromt eh ME so are not part of the forces assembling in Canada/USA.
 
10th Corps is part of these forces and are included the only question is whether they would be trained and equipped on US lines and whether the RM Div is to strong.
 
There is clear evidence for the Canadian Div being reassembled and the Aus Div is taken from one of the existing Divs.
 
The only real debate is over the TOE and Equipment of 3rd Div and the two Armoured Bdes.
 
Would the British really have insisted on using Churchills/Comets/Centurions when Shermans had been used for by British Forces for a long time - I think it is more than likely despite in many ways better tanks being available they would have used Shermans as they were ready and convenient and they were familiar kit.
 
Would they have re equipped with US Arty and MMG's and AT Guns honest answer is no one can know but if it was a precondition of the force coming from PH/SF then I actually believe its likely they would.
 
I accept its possible they would not but the intention in the papers I have indicates that were the Div to be formed it would be organised and equipped on US lines that was the agreement
 
 

I would think it foolhardy to hook into the US logistic system with British kit.

p.s. I was warned not to do never weres and to leave it to modders and just end the reinforcement list 10/45 sometimes I wish I had listened !!!!

I'm glad that you didn't!

In the final analysis it is a good job it never happened as between MacArthur's over-inflated ego (surrounded as he was by 'yes men') and the anglo-phobes on the JCS, these men would have visited a national tragedy on the US nation like that visited on the smaller populous of Canada during the Dieppe raid, only on a scale that would make all previous casualty lists (including that on the Western Front in 1916) pale into insignificance. On the back of that the whole face of the US would have been different for I doubt an ex-General would have been elected President.

Lets not open up that can of worms...

and there is more than one can there!

ORIGINAL: bsq

ORIGINAL: Andy Mac

David I sorta agree on tyhe equipment front but have chosen to go with my sources over my own common sense AT guns are not that important (often the lighter 2 pounder was more use v the japanese anyway)

The only logic for equipping them with 17 pounders is if it came to a shooting war witht he soviets !!!

Andy you forget that the 17 Pdr had a useful HE round, whereas the lighter guns did not.

I also do not accept that our force would have re-equipped with US kit. Notwithstanding the low regard many items of US equipment was held in the British Army, your arguments ignore several factors.

Wars are fought be Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen on behalf of politicians, so whatever pandering was done to the sensibilities of the JCS by CW politicians, in the final analysis the commanders on the ground would have the veto and the ability to say 'I told you so' when it all goes pear shaped. There is no way that certain types of kit would be traded in except perhaps medium and heavy artillery were the US pieces were significantly better.

REME and the RE spent years getting to know the quirks of their own kit, so how would they have got on with kit they did not know.

We had some excellent support tanks (late model Churchills, Centurions, Crocodiles and AVRE's) - we had no 'bloody Omaha' in part due to this kit.

I do not accept that the Indian Army would not have been used, SEAC was told to expect to lose 3+ division from the OB needed to retake Malaya and Singapore. My father served in the Punjab Regt as a Bn 2 I/C. They were training for Coronet from late Spring 45 until it was realised that this would not happen. In addition as already pointed out, here was an army that had beaten the Japanese at their own game, not just island hopping to the fringes of the Empire proper. Indeed the Aussies with their 'side show' in Borneo that so infuriated the Australian CGS (another example of MacArthur's ego in overdrive) vested in that army more skills than the US could muster. Add to this the warrior culture of two of our larger 'Indian' Regts (Gurkha's and the Punjabs) and you have a force to be reckoned with.

In the final analysis it is a good job it never happened as between MacArthur's over-inflated ego (surrounded as he was by 'yes men') and the anglo-phobes on the JCS, these men would have visited a national tragedy on the US nation like that visited on the smaller populous of Canada during the Dieppe raid, only on a scale that would make all previous casualty lists (including that on the Western Front in 1916) pale into insignificance. On the back of that the whole face of the US would have been different for I doubt an ex-General would have been elected President.

I am sure the whole issue could be solved with a week at Kew as just a cursory search turned up hundreds of candidate files and documents (I was looking for AIR files for Tiger Force at the time). It's a pity I don't have the time for the next 9 years.

I am constantly amaze at those folks waiting in the wings to jump in on an opportunity to push forward their opionions (right or wrong) and their agenda as to how the war should have be fought. All this is very much history and not "would of, could of, should of" stuff. If you feel strongly about your agenda, then create a mod and if not, seek out a forum or thread that loves to discuss such matters (not that I am able to dictate what should be on this forum).

I don't know. I always learn some history from these types of threads.

Well, for my sins I started this issue and I think it is now comfortably closed. Perhaps in the fullness of time there may be some amendments to the Commonwealth Invasion of Japan ground OB; alas the issue of where the units would have staged from will forever remain unknown (or perhaps until some brave soul decides - as Buck Beach suggested -  to mod the whole extravanganza); and I accept AndyMac's position that the origin of infantry equipment is not particularly germane to the game in 1945. I will no doubt take up the peculiarly Canadian issues elsewhere.

Scenario 001:

Unit #6249 has a typo; it lists as "RNZF OTU Wellington" instead of "RNZAF OTU Wellington".

Thanks!
fbs

Scenario 001:

Unit #6248: Christchurch Base Force is the only named base force in New Zealand that is mobile; it should be static like the other named base forces (Nelson, Invercargill, etc...).

Thanks,
fbs

First, Andy:

Is this a good place to post what we think are bad choices by the AI? I don't want to give away what it's doing and do have a spoiler notice.

Second:

The AI made what I think was a bad choice using a large unescorted TF for a minor task. It used 50 ships (based on looking at the game from the IJ side so there is no FOW) to land a single IJ garrison unit at a size 0 port. I suspect they chose all those ships to unload fast over the beach, but this put a lot at risk for very little gain. They took the port but lost essentially all of the ships on the way back. They ran into first PTs at Port Moresby, then a surface combat group patrolling south of New Guinea (one battle with that group which then retired out of ammo) then by that time I got an Air Combat Group there from Brisbane. 50 ships lost for little gain.

I like the aggressiveness of the AI, but I think it shouldn't put so many ships into a minor operation for minor gain, with no real escort (1 or 2 PC only). You may want to tell the AI "No more than 15 or 20 ships unless this is a major op/division sized invasion" or similar. What contributed to their loss was that they were far from home so they could be pounded by a series of forces on the return trip (I regarded a 50 AK fleet as worth chasing).

Regards,

Drew S.

Your assuming I have that level of control in any event if its the one I think it is I have already fixed the order of it.
 
Better to email or PM me with bonehead moves just accept I cannot always fix them
Andy

I don't think the TF was built to pickup that small unit up but was instead diverted from an earlier completed mission to go and pickup the small unit so maybe some tweeking to be done for diverted TFs.