Matrix Games Forums

Here is my stab at the heavy cruiser Mikuma.

[4390 Mikuma - by Robert Jenkins]
.B Engine(s) output: 152,000 hp
.B Top Speed: 35 knots
.B Main armament: 10 x 8-inch (203mm), 8 x 5-inch (127mm) guns
.B Displacement (full load): 13,668 tons
.B Thickest armour: 4-inch (belt)
.P The four ships of the Mogami-class were originally built for the Imperial
Japanese Navy (IJN) under the terms of the 1930 London Naval Treaty. They were
designated light cruisers, and were constructed between 1931 and 1937. Two
additional ships of the class, were ordered in 1941, but neither were completed.
.P Their original design had major problems, caused by trying to construct too
much ship on too little hull, and they went through two major reconstructions in
order to iron out the defects. Ultimately, they became heavy cruisers; exchanging
their fifteen 6.1-inch guns for ten 8-inch.
.P The main armament was fitted in five twin turrets, three forward and two aft.
The secondary armament was eight, 5-inch dual-purpose guns, again fitted in twin
turrets. Close-range weaponry was provided by eight 25mm and four 13.2mm guns,
but these were increased appreciably as the war progressed.
.P The IJN favoured the deployment of torpedoes on their cruisers and the Mogamis
were no exception, having twelve 24-inch torpedo tubes mounted in four triple
mounts. Two catapults were fitted and there was room for up to three aircraft.
.P Armour protection was similar to the preceding Takao-class, although the
horizontal protection was increased to 2.4-inches. Belt armour was 4-inches with
an extra inch added around the magazines.
.P The result of all the reconstruction work and modifications was that the ships
were massively overweight, although as the Japanese had renounced the 1936 London
Naval Treaty, this was of no consequence. They were ultimately to prove powerful
ships with a sensible top speed of 35 knots.
.P In December 1941, Mikuma was part of the 7th Cruiser Squadron (CS) that was
deployed to provide cover for the invasion convoys heading for Thailand and
Malaya (see Amphibious Counter 4434). She took part in the search for the Royal
Navy`s Force Z - the battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Repulse -
although played no part in their destruction (see Chokai). After the success of
the initial landings in Malaya, a second wave was launched on the 13th December
that would being the remainder of Yamashita`s 25th Army to Malaya. Mikuma once
more provided support for this operation.
.P Later that month Mikuma was ordered to sail to the west of Sarawak, northern
Borneo, where she provided support for the landings at Kuching which took place
on the 23rd December.
.P In the New Year, Mikuma was deployed in the South China Sea once more, first
as part of an offensive sweep after erroneous reports were received of British
capital ships at Singapore, and then as part of a covering force protecting
further re-supply of forces in Thailand / Malaya. She also covered landings that
took place at Endau on the 23rd.
.P The invasion of the Dutch East Indies had begun in the eastern islands of the
Dutch colony, and by the middle of February, the Japanese turned their attention
to the large island of Sumatra, located south and west of the Malayan peninsular.
The first target was Palembang, on the southeast coast. The invasion convoy set
out from Camranh Bay on the 9th February (see Transport Counter 4447) and Mikuma
was part of the covering force for the invasion convoy.
.P The invasion of the many islands that make up the Dutch East Indies went very
well for the Japanese. With the bulk of the main islands under Japanese control,
at the end of February, they turned their attention to the main administrative
centre; the island of Java (see Amphibious Counter 4439). The 7th CS provided
cover for the Western Force that was responsible for landing troops east and west
of Batavia, the capital, and Mikuma played an important part in the Battle of the
Sunda Strait on the night of the 28th February. This battle resulted in the
sinking of the Allied cruisers USS Houston and HMAS Perth (see Natori).
.P Mikuma`s next operation began on the 8th March. She was one of five heavy
cruisers that provided distant cover for the troop transports taking army units
to Iri and Sabang in northern Sumatra. She then remained in the region to cover
the operations to reinforce units in Burma and for the assault on the Andaman
Islands two weeks later (see Kashii).
.P Between the 1st and 2nd April Mikuma was part of Vice-Admiral Ozawa`s Malay
Force that sailed into the Bay of Bengal to attack Allied shipping there; this
raid succeeded in sinking around 100,000 tons of shipping (see Ryujo). Upon her
return from the Indian Ocean, Mikuma underwent a period of refit and exercises in
preparation for the most important of battles yet faced by the IJN.
.P After the stunning successes enjoyed by the Japanese armed forces in the first
six months of war, the high command suddenly found themselves unsure of what to
do next. As usual, the IJN and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had different
priorities, but even within the IJN itself there was discord over what course of
action should be pursued. Lack of IJA co-operation ruled out any possibility of
landings in Australia or India, and this left two alternatives to be explored.
One was a territorial expansion in the southwest Pacific, involving the capture
of the numerous island chains east of Australia, which would have the effect of
disrupting the link between the US and Australia. This would make it more
difficult for the US to use the latter as a springboard from which to attack the
Japanese defensive perimeter. The second possibility was to attack in the Central
Pacific, expanding the perimeter eastwards and threatening Pearl Harbor itself.
This was the option favoured by Admiral Yamamoto, essentially because he figured
that this was the best way to bring the US Navy carriers to battle. The
fascinating story of how the final decision was reached is outside the scope of
this write-up, but the path chosen proved to be a dangerous mix of both options.
In pursuing both aims, and spreading resources too thinly, the runaway successes
enjoyed by the Japanese were to come to a crashing halt.
.P Yamamoto won his argument to pursue a Central Pacific strategy; the key to
which, was an invasion of Midway, a small island 1,300 miles west of Hawaii (See
Transport Counter 4449). This attack would, to Yamamoto`s thinking, compel
Admiral Nimitz to order his fleet from Pearl Harbor to try and stop the invasion;
a move that would result in their destruction. At the same time as this operation
- code-named MI - was underway, the IJN would also launch Operation AL, an attack
on the inhospitable, northern Pacific, Aleutian Islands, south-west of Alaska
(see ASW Counter 4427).
.P But Yamamoto won the argument at a price. Operations in the south-west Pacific
were to begin before the Midway operation, and crucially, the Japanese commander
had to release the two carriers of CarDiv 5, Shokaku and Zuikaku, to enable them
to assist the planned invasion of southern New Guinea and the initial IJN moves
into the Solomon Islands. During the ensuing battle in the Coral Sea (see Shoho)
Shokaku was badly damaged and Zuikaku lost much of her air group; as a result,
these two carriers were removed from the Midway order of battle with disastrous
consequences for the Japanese Empire.
.P The Operations to take Midway Island and the Aleutians involved almost every
ship in the IJN. As usual, the Japanese plan was hugely complex and involved a
great number of task forces. For Midway, these were split as follows: The First
Carrier Striking Force contained the fleet carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu
under Vice-Admiral Nagumo. These carriers, central to the entire Japanese plan,
were supported by the fast battleships Haruna and Kirishima; the heavy cruisers
Tone and Chikuma; and eleven destroyers led by the light cruiser Nagara.
Operating west of Nagumo was the Main Body, Yamamoto`s powerful force that
consisted of: Battleship Division 1, Yamato, Nagato and Mutsu; the carrier Hosho;
and eight destroyers led by the light cruiser Sendai.
.P Operating south of the two main forces was the Midway Invasion force, which
was split into a number of sub-groups. The Main Body, commanded by Vice-Admiral
Kondo, contained the battleships Kongo and Hiei; the heavy cruisers Atago,
Chokai, Myoko and Haguro; and seven destroyers, led by the light cruiser Yura.
This force also had a carrier presence provided by the light carrier Zuiho. The
Close Support Group, commanded by Vice-Admiral Kurita, contained the four heavy
cruisers of the 7th CS: Kumano, Mikuma, Mogami and Suzuya, escorted by two
destroyers. There was a Seaplane Tender Group and a Minesweeper Group, the former
consisting of Chitose and Kamikawa Maru whose purpose was to bring aircraft that
could quickly be operating from a seaplane base the Japanese would construct on
Midway. Last but not least was the Transport Group commanded by Rear-Admiral
Tanaka. Fifteen troop vessels carried the five thousand, army and navy troops
that were to land on Midway. They were closely escorted by ten destroyers that
were led by the light cruiser Jintsu. All the groups had their own tankers for
re-supply purposes.
.P The first sighting of the Japanese forces was on the morning of the 3rd June,
when long-range Catalina flying boats sighted the Midway Invasion Force. This
sighting - at extreme range - meant that the only response then available to the
Americans was to send nine B-17 Flying Fortress bombers from Midway. It was only
at around 1640hrs that the American bombers reached the Japanese ships. Bombing
from high-altitude, none of the bombs found their target and Tanaka continued his
eastward journey. A second attack was ordered later that evening and this time
four Catalina`s, all fitted with torpedoes, would be used. This second attack,
that took place in the early hours of the 4th, resulted in a hit on one of the
Japanese tankers, although she was able to continue her journey toward Midway.
.P A third attack would have headed their way, but by the early morning of the
4th June, the Americans had found the Kido Butai to the north. The B-17 bombers
that would have made the attack were instead diverted to attack Nagumo`s carriers
and no more effort would be wasted against the invasion force. From this point,
the Battle of Midway centred upon the epic duel between the four carriers of the
Kido Butai and the three US carriers together with the Midway based aircraft (see
Kaga).
.P Unfortunately for the Japanese, during the course of ten terrible minutes that
morning, three of their carriers were put out of action, courtesy of Dauntless
dive-bomber attacks from Yorktown and Enterprise. The fourth carrier was also hit
that afternoon; all would eventually sink, taking with them any hope that the
Japanese could win the battle, or indeed the war.
.P After being informed of the events taking place north-west of Midway Island,
Yammamoto's response was one of stunned disbelief. Eventually, he resolved to try
and recover the situation; first ordering the invasion force north-west in order
to stay out of range of Midway`s aircraft. He then ordered Kondo`s Main Body to
join with Nagumo in the hope of bringing the Americans to battle at night. The
7th CS meanwhile would make for Midway in order to bombard the island during the
night. Yammamoto also requested that Rear-Admiral Kakuta`s Second Mobile Striking
Force leave the Aleutians and head south with the carriers Ryujo and Junyo,
although this order was received too late for Kakuta to act in time.
.P Ultimately, Yammamoto knew the game was effectively up and he countermanded
his own orders later that evening, ordering all forces to rendezvous with the
main body ahead of withdrawal back to Japan. However, by the time 7th CS received
the order to turn around, they were not far from Midway and it was to be touch
and go as to whether they would be clear of enemy aircraft range come daylight.
For two of the cruisers, the answer to this question was to come quicker than
they expected. As Kurita's four ships sailed away from Midway line astern at high
speed, a submarine was spotted in the distance. All four ships were ordered to
turn from north to north-west, but the execution of the manoeuvre was less than
ideal; each cruiser taking a different bearing. The result was that Mikuma and
Mogami collided with each other. Mikuma was not badly damaged with the exception
that one of her fuel storage tanks was holed, as a result of which she left a
thick trail of oil behind her. Mogami was more seriously damaged, a section of
her bow being almost sheared off, meaning that her speed was dramatically
reduced. Suzuya and Kumano were ordered to continue sailing away from the danger
area as quickly as possible while Mikuma escorted Mogami at much reduced speed.
.P Ultimately, most Japanese forces met up with Yammamoto's Main Body and the
retreat back to Japan would eventually be ordered on the 7th. But for the two
damaged cruisers, things would not be so straightforward. They were found by the
Americans in the early hours of the 5th June and were attacked a number of times
that day by aircraft from Midway. However, their luck held out and both ships
continued to sail away from Midway. Their good fortune could not continue for
ever, and having been found once more on the morning of the 6th, the cruisers
were attacked by aircraft launched by Enterprise and Hornet that afternoon. Five
bombs dropped by Dauntless dive-bombers from Enterprise hit Mikuma in quick
succession, causing fires to breakout throughout the ship. The biggest problem
was the fire that had taken hold near her torpedoes, and when these ignited,
Mikuma was enveloped in a gigantic fireball that completely destroyed her aft
superstructure. It was soon obvious that she could not be saved and she sank with
the loss of over 700 officers and men. Mogami had been further damaged during the
attack, being hit numerous times and losing over 80 of her crew, but she had
previously jettisoned her stock of torpedoes and this action no doubt saved her
from the fate that befell her sister ship. Mogami eventually limped back to Truk.
Operation MI had been an unmitigated disaster for the IJN and henceforth, the
initiative would remain with the US Navy for the remainder of the war.

Here we go:

"After the success of
the initial landings in Malaya, a second wave was launched on the 13th December
that would being the remainder of Yamashita`s 25th Army to Malaya. Mikuma once
more provided support for this operation.

[&:]

".P After being informed of the events taking place north-west of Midway Island,
Yammamoto's response was one of stunned disbelief."

"Yammamoto also requested that Rear-Admiral Kakuta`s Second Mobile Striking
Force leave the Aleutians and head south with the carriers Ryujo and Junyo,
although this order was received too late for Kakuta to act in time.
.P Ultimately, Yammamoto knew the game was effectively up and he countermanded
his own orders later that evening, ordering all forces to rendezvous with the
main body ahead of withdrawal back to Japan. "

Yamamoto.



Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.

"P Ultimately, most Japanese forces met up with Yammamoto's Main Body and the
retreat back to Japan would eventually be ordered on the 7th.

same [:D]

ORIGINAL: Josh

Here we go:

"After the success of
the initial landings in Malaya, a second wave was launched on the 13th December
that would being the remainder of Yamashita`s 25th Army to Malaya. Mikuma once
more provided support for this operation.

[&:]

".P After being informed of the events taking place north-west of Midway Island,
Yammamoto's response was one of stunned disbelief."

"Yammamoto also requested that Rear-Admiral Kakuta`s Second Mobile Striking
Force leave the Aleutians and head south with the carriers Ryujo and Junyo,
although this order was received too late for Kakuta to act in time.
.P Ultimately, Yammamoto knew the game was effectively up and he countermanded
his own orders later that evening, ordering all forces to rendezvous with the
main body ahead of withdrawal back to Japan. "

Yamamoto.



Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.

"P Ultimately, most Japanese forces met up with Yammamoto's Main Body and the
retreat back to Japan would eventually be ordered on the 7th.

same [:D]

Warspite1

Cheers Josh [:)] - amendments made. Why on earth did I suddenly start calling him Yammamoto [:(]?

Thanks, you did write it correct at first, then you changed it. [:)]
Well it's darn easy to write it wrong without ever noticing it, but everyone else reading it *would* notice it.

Say, you also changed the bad sentence I mentioned at the top? Because I don't have a clue what it means.... could be me ofcourse.

ORIGINAL: Josh

Thanks, you did write it correct at first, then you changed it. [:)]
Well it's darn easy to write it wrong without ever noticing it, but everyone else reading it *would* notice it.

Say, you also changed the bad sentence I mentioned at the top? Because I don't have a clue what it means.... could be me ofcourse.

Warspite1

I did - it should be:

"After the success of the initial landings in Malaya, a second wave of troops was landed on the
13th December; this operation brought the remainder of Yamashita`s 25th Army to the colony,
and Mikuma provided cover for the troop convoy."

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Josh

Thanks, you did write it correct at first, then you changed it. [:)]
Well it's darn easy to write it wrong without ever noticing it, but everyone else reading it *would* notice it.

Say, you also changed the bad sentence I mentioned at the top? Because I don't have a clue what it means.... could be me ofcourse.

Warspite1

I did - it should be:

"After the success of the initial landings in Malaya, a second wave of troops was landed on the
13th December; this operation brought the remainder of Yamashita`s 25th Army to the colony,
and Mikuma provided cover for the troop convoy."

December 13th

or

13th of December

Almost finished Midway!!

[4332 Kaga - by Robert Jenkins]
.B Engine(s) output: 127,400 hp
.B Top Speed: 28 knots
.B Main armament: 10 x 8-inch (203mm), 16 x 5-inch (127mm) guns
.B Aircraft: 90 (Operational Maximum 66)
.B Displacement (full load): 43,650 tons
.B Thickest armour: 11-inch (belt)
.P The carrier Kaga began life as a battleship, having been designed as such
for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) at the end of the First World War. She was
to have been the name ship in a class of two battleships laid down in 1920.
.P Construction work was halted on both ships in February 1922 as a result of the
signing of the Washington Naval Treaty which limited capital ship construction.
That would have been the end for Kaga, but she received a reprieve from an
unexpected source. Under one of the provisions of the Treaty, the IJN were
allowed to convert two capital ships into aircraft carriers. For this they chose
to convert the battlecruisers Akagi and Amagi, then under construction. But when,
in 1923, Amagi was destroyed by an earthquake, Kaga was chosen to replace her.
.P Kaga was finally completed as an aircraft carrier only in March 1928 and was
then reconstructed in the mid-thirties. The technical details above are as at the
time of Pearl Harbor.
.P Her modernisation saw an additional thirty-four feet added to her length as
well as anti-torpedo bulges. An island structure was also added and placed on her
starboard side.
.P As a result of her modernisation, Kaga`s aircraft carrying capacity was
initially increased to ninety aircraft, although increases in aircraft size and
practical problems with operating that many aircraft ultimately limited Kaga to a
complement of less than seventy. She was fitted with a full length flight deck
and her two extended hangars were served by three lifts. As standard for all
Japanese carriers in World War II, there was no catapult to assist aircraft take-
off, but nine arrester wires were fitted to provide the necessary stopping power
when landing her aircraft.
.P Protection was minimal. Kaga benefitted from eleven-inch belt armour, courtesy
of her original battleship design, but her horizontal armour was limited to just
a thin 1.5-inch armoured deck, which provided little protection for her hangars,
magazines or her aviation fuel stores.
.P Defensive weaponry consisted of ten eight-inch guns, but these were fitted in
case-mates, fitted aft and low down, so restricting their use in poor weather.
Her anti-aircraft (AA) armament consisted of eight, twin 5-inch AA guns and
fifteen, twin 25mm close-range weapons.
.P Kaga proved a valuable addition to the carrier fleet, capable of operating a
large air group, but like all Japanese carriers she was vulnerable to attack from
either enemy aircraft or plunging shell fire.
.P Kaga was named after a former Japanese province.
.P Kaga was part of the 1st Carrier Division (CarDiv) within Vice-Admiral
Nagumo`s 1st Air Fleet that carried out the attack on Pearl Harbor in December
1941 (See Akagi). Following the Hawaiian Operation, Kaga and the other ships of
the 1st Air Fleet (Kido Butai) were sent to support the invasion of the islands
of New Britain and New Ireland in the Bismarck Archipelago (see Transport Counter
4446). This operation went without problem and she then sailed for Truk, where
she arrived on the 25th January. At the end of the month the 1st Air Fleet were
ordered to sea in response to American carrier raids against the Marshall and the
Gilbert Islands (see Katori). No engagement resulted from this sortie however.
.P After returning to Palau, Kaga ran aground, damaging her hull on a reef. She
was able to continue operations after temporary repairs however, and when the 1st
Air Fleet were tasked with launching an air raid on the northern Australian port
of Darwin between the 15th and 19th February, Kaga took part in the attack (see
Soryu).
.P Then, with barely time for replenishment, Kaga was sent south of Java at the
end of February as part of the Japanese invasion of that island. The 1st Air
Fleet were tasked with stopping Allied shipping from fleeing to Australia or
India from Java, and to stop any reinforcement of the island (see Chikuma). Upon
completion of this operation Nagumo`s hard pressed force were ordered to the
Indian Ocean to attack the British Eastern Fleet in Ceylon. However, Kaga was not
to take part in this raid, and instead she was sent for repairs to the damage
inflicted against the reef previously. After completion of the repair work, Kaga
was once more re-united with Akagi within the 1st CarDiv for their next
operation.
.P On the 27th May 1942, co-incidentally the anniversary of the IJN`s great
victory over the Russian Fleet at Tsushima, the four carriers of the Kido Butai
left their anchorage at Hashirajima for the last time. They were about to take
part in MI, an operation designed to bring the US Navy - and in particular the
enemy carriers missed during the attack on Pearl Harbor - to battle. The outlying
island of Midway, at the end of the Hawaiian Island chain and 1,300 miles from
Honolulu, would be invaded and this action, so it was thought, would bring the US
Navy to sea. For a detailed background to the wider operation and the order of
battle please see Mikuma; this write-up will deal purely with the Kido Butai and
their destruction on the 4th June at the hands of three American carriers.
.P Nagumo's First Carrier Striking Force contained the following fleet carriers
and their air groups: Akagi, sixty aircraft; Kaga, seventy-three; Hiryu, fifty-
seven; and Soryu; also fifty-seven. Included within these numbers were aircraft
from the 6th Air Group that were planned to operate from Midway once the island
was taken. In the meantime they were available to Nagumo for use in the MI
operation. These carriers, central to the entire Japanese plan, were supported by
the fast battleships Haruna and Kirishima; the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma;
and eleven destroyers led by the light cruiser Nagara. Five tankers were on hand
to provide the necessary fuel for the journey.
.P The plan put together by Admiral Yamamoto, was typical of IJN plans during the
Second World War; the plan was complex, rigid and did not allow for what the
enemy may do. Yamamoto believed he would achieve surprise in attacking Midway and
that as a result, Nagumo would be able to position his Kido Butai, undetected,
north-west of the island. From there he would launch the air strikes that would
neutralise the island's defences, allowing an invasion to take place. Only then
would the American Fleet turn up; and be promptly dispatched to the bottom of the
Pacific; simple....
.P Armed with these orders, Nagumo`s Kido Butai arrived at its allotted place in
the early hours of the 4th June. The First Wave of one hundred and eight aircraft
took off from the four carriers at 0430hrs and proceeded toward Midway, led by
Lt Tomonaga. At the same time, to guard against air attack launched from the
island, eleven Zeros were launched to form the Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over the
carrier force. The Japanese launched a reconnaissance flight of seven aircraft,
one each coming from Kaga and Hiryu and the remainder from the battleships and
cruisers. However, the reconnaissance mission was very poorly planned and
executed. As well as having far too few aircraft given the area to be searched,
three of these - from the cruisers Tone and Chikuma - were late taking off.
Meanwhile, Nagumo's reserve aircraft were to be held back in reserve and the
Kates armed with torpedoes in order to deal with any surface threat should it
materialise.
.P The Americans on Midway had search plans of their own and an hour after
Tomonaga`s First Wave was launched, a long-range Catalina found Nagumo's carrier
force. Unlike at Pearl Harbor, Tomonaga would find few if any, American aircraft
on the ground this day; on hearing the news of the sighting, nearly all of
Midway's aircraft were soon heading for Nagumo's carriers. When the First Wave
finished their work over Midway and were returning to their carriers, Tomonaga
sent a message back to Nagumo at 0700hrs confirming that a second strike would be
required. At around the same time that this message was being received by Nagumo,
the first of the enemy aircraft from Midway began to arrive over the Kido Butai.
.P The first of these was a force of torpedo bombers, six brand new Grumman TBF's
making its combat debut, and four B-26 Marauder medium bombers. The former
attacked Hiryu and the latter headed for Akagi. The CAP fighters made short work
of the attackers and only one Avenger and two Marauders made it back to Midway
having hit nothing.
.P It would be around 0800hrs before the next attack from Midway came along, but
that did not mean that Nagumo had time to spare to consider his next move. The
sudden arrival of the American aircraft from Midway, along with Tomonaga`s
message, convinced Nagumo that he should order his reserve aircraft to be fitted
with bombs rather than torpedoes, and this order was given at around 0715hrs. But
then, at 0740hrs, Nagumo finally heard from one of his search planes; an American
surface force had been located north-east of Midway. Deeply troubled by the news,
Nagumo ordered the re-arming to be reversed, although it would be another forty
minutes before it was confirmed that a carrier was among the US ships.
.P As Tomonaga`s First Wave began to reach their carriers, so the next wave of
attacks from Midway began; Tomonaga would have to circle while these battles were
concluded. The first attack came from sixteen Dauntless dive-bombers flown by an
inexperienced Marine unit led by Major Henderson. Their target was Hiryu, but
despite half the bomber force getting through to the carrier, no hits were
registered. No sooner had the surviving Marines left the scene than the next
attack began; a high-level attack by twelve B-17s led by Lt-Col Sweeney. Their
bombs were dropped from high altitude and although both carriers of CarDiv 2 were
surrounded by huge plumes of spray, neither was actually hit. As with the
previous high level attack, no enemy aircraft were shot down by the Zeros or the
largely ineffective Japanese AA guns. The third and final Midway based attack
followed hot on the heals of the B-17`s and came via another Marine unit. This
contained eleven Vindicator aircraft led by Major Norris and their target was
Haruna, which managed to succesfully avoid damage through skilful evasive moves
by her commander, Rear-Admiral Takama.
.P With the last of the US aircraft departed from the scene, Nagumo could at last
order his First Wave to land and shortly after 0830hrs, Tomonaga`s strike force
began landing on their carriers. At the same time, Nagumo ordered a course north-
east in order to close the gap on the US ships. All four carriers completed the
recovery of their aircraft by 0910hrs and they were swiftly removed from the
flight-deck and taken to the hangars below. However, having achieved this
milestone, the next attack on the Kido Butai began just ten minutes later.
.P This attack, the first that morning from carrier borne aircraft, was led by
Lt-Cdr Waldron from the carrier Hornet. Unlike his fellow squadron commanders,
Waldron correctly guessed where he was likely to find the Japanese fleet and his
was to be the only squadron from Hornet to engage the Kido Butai. He had fifteen old
Devastator torpedo bombers with which to attack while the Japanese had over
twenty CAP fighters available to pounce on them. All but one American aircraft
was blown out of the sky before they had a chance to drop their torpedoes, and
the lone torpedo that was dropped was easily evaded by the target, Soryu.
.P The various American attacks that had been mounted throughout the morning had
been uncoordinated and devoid of fighter cover. Importantly though, the American
sacrifices had not been in vain. The incessant attacks had meant that Nagumo did
not have the opportunity to launch aircraft against the known position of the US
carrier found earlier. But what was far worse for the fortunes of the Kido Butai
was that the Americans were about to be hit with the first coordinated attack of
the morning; an attack that would devastate Nagumo`s once proud carrier force.
.P Shortly after 1000hrs there were three formations from the carrier Yorktown
on their way to attack the Kido Butai: VF-3, consisting of six fighters led by
Lt-Cdr Thach; the torpedo bombers of VT-3, led by Lt-Cdr Massey and dive-bombers
of VB-3 led by Lt-Cdr Leslie. By chance, at the same time, a dive-bomber group
from Enterprise, under the command of Lt-Cdr McClusky, also arrived from another
direction. The latter were VB-6 and VS-6, led by Lt Best and Lt Gallaher
respectively. By now, thanks to the events of that morning, Nagumo`s ships were
no longer in their box formation, but were instead roughly line abreast, with
Soryu, Hiryu, Akagi and Kaga respectively in a rough north-east / south-west
line.
.P First to begin their attack was the Devastator torpedo bombers of VT-3 which
targeted the northern most of the carriers, Soryu. This time they had Wildcat
fighter support. During the approach, Massey`s aircraft switched target to the
Hiryu, which was closer, but the end result was no different to that of the
earlier Devastator attacks. Zeros soon pounced on Massey`s aircraft, shooting
down all but five; of these, just two were able to get back home but no hits on
Hiryu were recorded.
.P Meanwhile, with the CAP engaged with the US fighters and the torpedo bombers,
the remaining three units took the opportunity of positioning themselves for
their own attacks almost unnoticed. Leslie's Dauntless dive-bombers were some way
behind Massey and they continued on to attack Soryu as Massey headed for Hiryu.
To the south-west, Best and Gallaher lined up their Dauntlesses to attack Kaga.
It was 1024hrs. Kaga spotted her attackers late, but immediately put her AA
weaponry into effect; downing one Dauntless. It would not save her. Kaga was hit
in quick succession by four bombs: the first aft, followed by a hit on the
forward hangar, the third scored a direct hit on her bridge and lastly one fell
amidships. With this much damage, and her senior officers almost all killed, it
was soon readily apparent that there was no hope of saving the ship; however her
crew courageously fought the blaze for many hours.
.P Soryu was the next victim five minutes later, and she too belatedly put up
desperate AA fire, all to no avail; three hits were taken and fires rapidly
spread in the packed hangars below. No doubt as a consequence of her lack of
armour protection, Soryu was the worst of the three carriers affected, one bomb
exploding deep within her. Fires raged through the carrier, and there was soon no
hope of saving her. The final victim was Nagumo`s flagship. Akagi, which was
attacked by just three aircraft and was hit just once. Unfortunately for her, the
bomb tore through her flight deck near her middle lift and exploded in the hangar
below. Fires began to burn that her damage control parties could not get to grips
with and they increased in intensity to the point of no return. All three ships
would ultimately be scuttled.
.P However, while the crews of the three carriers were forlornly trying to save
their doomed ships, the IJN still had one carrier intact. Rear-Admiral Yamaguchi
was determined to close the US Navy carrier or carriers (even at this stage of
the battle they were unsure how many carriers the enemy had) and extract revenge
for what had just happened. He ordered the launch of twenty-four aircraft, a mix
of dive-bombers and fighters led by Lt Kobayashi, and they took off from the sole
remaining flight deck available to the Japanese at 1100hrs. Twenty Wildcat
fighters flying CAP for Yorktown were waiting for them, together with a heavy AA
screen of cruisers and destroyers that surrounded the carrier. A terrible toll
was exacted on the dive-bombers and escorting Zeros, but despite this, a number
of aircraft emerged unscathed and their pilots continued relentlessly toward
Yorktown. The first bomb hit the carrier near her aft lift, a second caught her
amidships and a third hit her forward lift. Six Japanese aircraft, five Vals and
one Zero, returned to Hiryu quite understandably thinking they had put Yorktown
out of action; they were wrong. The damage control skills of the US Navy were far
in advance of those of the IJN, and within a short space of time Yorktown had her
fires under control and ultimately extinguished.
.P While this had been taking place, Nagumo, who had transferred his flag to
Nagara, had decided upon attacking the US forces at night using his battleships,
cruisers and destroyers. He resolved to close the gap to the Americans, who he
thought, would be heading toward his force with the intention of finishing them
off.
.P Meanwhile, at 1330hrs, Hiryu had launched a second wave of aircraft, this time
under the command of Tomonaga who would be on a one way mission as damage to his
aircraft would not allow a return trip. For this attack, just sixteen aircraft
were available; ten torpedo bombers and six fighters. Tomonaga believed that a
second carrier had been found as there was no evidence of damage to their new
found target. However, the object of the attack was indeed the patched up
Yorktown. For the loss of eight attacking aircraft, the Japanese achieved two
torpedo hits on the Yorktown and these caused serious flooding and a loss of
power. Yorktown would eventually succumb to submarine I-168 the following morning
(see submarine Counter 4453).
.P However, Hiryu`s operational life would only last until mid-afternoon. Having
just recovered her surviving aircraft from the second attack and put in place the
largest CAP component she could, the men aboard Hiryu began preparations for a
third strike; it was never to be launched.
.P After search planes had located Hiryu once more earlier that afternoon, forty
Dauntlesses from Enterprise and Hornet were dispatched by the Americans without
fighter cover. The attack proved every bit as devastating as the earlier dive-
bomber attacks on the Kido Butai. Hiryu was hit forward by no less than four
bombs and was effectively out of action as a carrier immediately. She burned
through the night and did not eventually sink until after 0900hrs the following
morning after her planned scuttling had been botched.
.P The remaining ships of Nagumo`s force were unscathed in the attack; only
Nagumo's carriers were vulnerable this day. That evening Nagumo was ordered to
head west to rendezvous with Yamamoto`s Main Body and eventual withdrawal back to
Japan. In the waters off Midway Island Kido Butai had left behind four fleet
carriers, 2,181 officers and men and 110 aircrew. Kaga alone had lost 811 and 21
of these respectively. Yamamoto's dream of dispatching Nimitz`s carriers to the
bottom of the Pacific had turned into a nightmare. Never again would the Japanese
hold the initiative in the Pacific War; Japan's long road to total ruin began in
earnest on the 4th June 1942.

Just a quick glance, busy playing Advanced Tactics [:)]

".P The plan put together by Admiral Yamamoto, was typical of IJN plans during the
Second World War; the plan was complex, rigid and did not allow for what the
enemy [r]may[/r] do."

Might do ?

Also noticed that now you use both ` and ' together? Nagumo's carriers..., Japan's long road..., Hiryu`s operational life...

"After search planes had located Hiryu once more earlier that afternoon, forty
Dauntlesses from Enterprise "

Fourty, right? /edit, nope: “Four” loses its U when it changes to “forty.”

" But what was far worse for the fortunes of the Kido Butai
was that the Americans were about to be hit with the first coordinated attack of
the morning; an attack that would devastate Nagumo`s once proud carrier force"

"To be hit", or "to hit"?

"P Then, with barely time for replenishment, Kaga was sent south of Java at the
end of February as part of the Japanese invasion of that island. The 1st Air
Fleet were tasked with stopping Allied shipping from fleeing to Australia or
India from Java, and to stop any reinforcement of the island (see Chikuma). Upon
completion of this operation Nagumo`s hard pressed force were ordered to the
Indian Ocean to attack the British Eastern Fleet in Ceylon. However, Kaga was not
to take part in this raid, and instead she was sent for repairs to the damage
inflicted against the reef previously. After completion of the repair work, Kaga
was once more re-united with Akagi within the 1st CarDiv for their next
operation. "

They wanted to repair the reef? repairs to the damage inflicted *by* the reef... right?

ORIGINAL: Josh

Just a quick glance, busy playing Advanced Tactics [:)]

".P The plan put together by Admiral Yamamoto, was typical of IJN plans during the
Second World War; the plan was complex, rigid and did not allow for what the
enemy [r]may[/r] do."

Might do ?

Also noticed that now you use both ` and ' together? Nagumo's carriers..., Japan's long road..., Hiryu`s operational life...

"After search planes had located Hiryu once more earlier that afternoon, forty
Dauntlesses from Enterprise "

Fourty, right? /edit, nope: “Four” loses its U when it changes to “forty.”

" But what was far worse for the fortunes of the Kido Butai
was that the Americans were about to be hit with the first coordinated attack of
the morning; an attack that would devastate Nagumo`s once proud carrier force"

"To be hit", or "to hit"?

"P Then, with barely time for replenishment, Kaga was sent south of Java at the
end of February as part of the Japanese invasion of that island. The 1st Air
Fleet were tasked with stopping Allied shipping from fleeing to Australia or
India from Java, and to stop any reinforcement of the island (see Chikuma). Upon
completion of this operation Nagumo`s hard pressed force were ordered to the
Indian Ocean to attack the British Eastern Fleet in Ceylon. However, Kaga was not
to take part in this raid, and instead she was sent for repairs to the damage
inflicted against the reef previously. After completion of the repair work, Kaga
was once more re-united with Akagi within the 1st CarDiv for their next
operation. "

They wanted to repair the reef? repairs to the damage inflicted *by* the reef... right?

Warspite1

Josh, remind me again, which one of us is English and which Dutch? [:D][;)]

You are right on all counts as usual [:)] - I have made the amendments. The ` and ' is something that I am correcting as and when able so for some of these there will be a mixture, at least temporarily.

LOL yeah I'm the wooden shoes wearing guy.

/off topic, saw this documentary on BBC Entertainment called the "Coast" .... stunningly beautiful, breathtaking landcapes. Last episode was in the Outer Hebrides, and on some of these islands people still live.

S! Warspite, I see you enjoyed Shattered Sword pretty much [;)]

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

S! Warspite, I see you enjoyed Shattered Sword pretty much [;)]

Warspite1

Enjoyed does not begin to cover it - what a truly brilliant book [:)]. The fact that unusually, it was written from the Japanese perspective, was a most welcome change and it was really interesting to read the operational aspects and what getting a strike launched involved. Yet it is all done in an easy to read style - SUPERB!

I wanted to post a thread; WIF ART/IMAGES because I eat these screenshots up. If the beta guys are allowed, please show me anything and everything you can. maybe i should start the thread.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Almost finished Midway!!

[4332 Kaga - by Robert Jenkins]
<snip>
.P Kaga proved a valuable addition to the carrier fleet, capable of operating a
large air group, but like all Japanese carriers she was vulnerable to attack from
either enemy aircraft or plunging shell fire.
.P Kaga was named after a former Japanese province.
.P Kaga was part of the 1st Carrier Division (CarDiv) within Vice-Admiral
Nagumo`s 1st Air <snip>

Tiny (and probably inconsequential) note. I would have thought that the origin of the name would be better right at the start of the write up rather than some paragraphs in. That having been said, I love all the detail that you are able to add to the game.

Chris

ORIGINAL: christo

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Almost finished Midway!!

[4332 Kaga - by Robert Jenkins]
<snip>
.P Kaga proved a valuable addition to the carrier fleet, capable of operating a
large air group, but like all Japanese carriers she was vulnerable to attack from
either enemy aircraft or plunging shell fire.
.P Kaga was named after a former Japanese province.
.P Kaga was part of the 1st Carrier Division (CarDiv) within Vice-Admiral
Nagumo`s 1st Air <snip>

Tiny (and probably inconsequential) note. I would have thought that the origin of the name would be better right at the start of the write up rather than some paragraphs in. That having been said, I love all the detail that you are able to add to the game.

Chris

Warspite1

You may be right, but unfortunately, all the write-ups have the naming detail at the end of the introduction - it would be too much effort to change them at this stage so this will stay in place.

Mike Dubost has been assisting with the US submarine write-ups (much thanks Mike). Please see two examples. The first is the slightly revised Nautilus (taking into account Midway) and the second is the USS Tench. Two more examples to follow in due course for the usual comment.

[4261 Submarine - by Mike Dubost]
.P These World In Flames counters represent a number of submarines rather than
any specific individual submarine. The dates printed on the back of the counters
do not relate in any meaningful way with build dates for the various classes of
United States Navy (USN) submarine class and therefore the counter date in most
cases should be ignored. These US submarine write-ups contain the usual technical
data, followed by a brief history of one or more submarines from each of the main
classes that saw action during the Second World War.
.P When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the USN had a total of one hundred
and eleven large and medium submarines, of which fifty-five large and eighteen of
the medium type were assigned to the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets. There were a
further seventy-seven under construction. The average large fleet submarine had a
displacement of around fifteen hundred tons, while the smaller S-boats had
displacements of approximately one thousand tons, and the largest fleet submarine
displaced around two thousand seven hundred tons.
.P At the time of the outbreak of war in Europe, the US was a signatory to the
London Naval Treaty of 1930, which prohibited unrestricted submarine warfare
(Article 22 required attackers to first place passengers, crew, and ship’s papers
in “a place of safety”). USN sub doctrine therefore emphasized attacks on capital
ships, especially battlecruiser types and larger. On the 7th December, the day of
the attack on Pearl Harbor, the USN concluded that the survival of the US was at
risk in the war, and consequently ordered the use of unrestricted air and
submarine warfare. According to Samuel Eliot Morison, combat vessels were still
considered prime targets, but attacks on merchant ships were of major importance.
.P Unlike German U-boats which operated in so-called wolf-packs for greater
effectiveness, US submarines typically operated alone, due in part to the large
distances which had to be covered from their few bases. US submarines would
usually attack while submerged, using periscope observations to gather the data
to input into the mechanical targeting computer.
.P Initially, US torpedoes were defective. However, once the torpedo faults were
corrected, US submarines became very effective attackers. Nearly one third of
Japanese combat vessels lost were due to the submarine service, as well as nearly
two thirds of Japanese merchant losses.
.P
.P This write-up looks at the two-ship Narwhal-class. This class provided two of
the eight submarines that, together, were known as the V-class. The "V-class"
contained four individual classes of submarine that were completed between 1924
and 1934. They were designed to perform a variety of roles in the vast Pacific
Ocean areas.
.P The Narwhals were large, cruiser submarines. They would prove to be the
largest submarines built by the USN until the construction of the first nuclear
submarines. They were fitted with six torpedo tubes and a pair of six-inch deck
guns. The larger size needed for a second deck gun meant that this class was
easier to detect and with clumsier handling, although they were faster on the
surface than the older S-boats.
.P Four additional torpedo tubes were fitted in the early forties and they also
received a change in propulsion unit, moving to a diesel-electric unit to try and
cure the poor reliability problems suffered pre-war.
.P This write-up specifically looks at the USS Nautilus.
.P
.B Name: USS Nautilus
.B Engine(s) output: 5,633 hp (Surfaced) 1,600 hp (Submerged)
.B Top Speed: 17.44 knots (Surfaced), 8 knots (Submerged)
.B Main armament: 6 x 21-inch torpedo tubes and 2 x 6-inch (152mm) gun
.B Displacement (Fully Submerged): 3,960 tons
.B Diving Depth: 300 ft
.P USS Nautilus was launched in March 1930 at Mare Island Naval Shipyard in
San Francisco Bay and completed four months later. She completed a total of
fourteen war patrols, stretching from Midway to the Solomon Islands to the Kurile
Islands.
.P On her first war patrol in June 1942, Nautilus participated in the battle of
Midway, during which she was commanded by Lt-Cdr Brockman. She located the
carriers of Vice-Admiral Nagumo`s Kido Butai early on the 4th June and sought to
attack the enemy. Although she never got close enough to make an attack on a
carrier during the morning, she did manage to fire off a torpedo at Nagara, one
of the escorting cruisers. This had the effect of bringing a destroyer, Arashi,
on the scene, and from around 0900hrs until just before 1000hrs, Arashi and
Nautilus fought a game of cat and mouse as the destroyer tried to sink the
American submarine with depth charges. Although Arashi was unsuccessful in this
task, she did at least manage to keep Nautilus from engaging the carriers.
.P Having survived the attack, Nautilus was indirectly to make a significant
impact on the course of the battle. Having failed to sink Nautilus, Arashi`s
captain sought to return to Nagumo`s fleet, now some distance away. As she closed
on Nagumo`s fleet she was spotted and tracked by USS Enterprise`s dive-bomber
group, led by Lt-Cdr McClusky. Unknowingly, Arashi led McClusky straight to the
carriers she was trying to protect - with dire consequences for the Kido Butai
(see USS Yorktown for the story of the battle).
.P After three of Kido Butai`s carriers had been mortally damaged by dive-bombers
from Yorktown and Enterprise, they remained afloat for many hours while fire took
control and ultimately destroyed each vessel. In the early afternoon, Brockman
came across the stationary Kaga. Nautilus finally had the opportunity to sink a
Japanese carrier. Unfortunately, the one torpedo that hit, failed to explode and
instead of sinking Kaga, suddenly Nautilus was assaulted from all angles by the
carrier`s escorts. Once again Nautilus found herself in a life and death struggle
and once again she survived her ordeal; escaping with light damage from nearby
depth charge explosions.
.P Towards the end of her first patrol, Nautilus achieved further success while
patrolling off the Japanese coast. On the 25th June she found the destroyer
Yamakaze, while the latter was sailing alone and returning to the Inland Sea.
Nautilus managed to torpedo and sink the destroyer.
.P Her second war patrol was the raid on Makin in August 1942 (see USS Argonaut).
Following this, she undertook three further patrols between September 1942 and
April 1943 that netted seven merchant ships sunk. In the last of these three
patrols she took carried troops for landings on Attu.
.P Her sixth war patrol began in September 1943 and was a photo-reconnaissance
mission to the Gilbert Islands prior to the invasion of Tarawa. For her seventh
war patrol, she was sent back to gather last-minute surf and weather readings.
During this mission, she was struck by friendly fire from the destroyer Ringgold.
Despite significant damage to the conning tower, she was repaired and
successfully completed the mission.
.P Subsequent patrols saw her in the southwest Pacific, operating off the
Philippines. During her thirteenth war patrol, she was called upon to destroy the
US submarine Darter, which had run aground on a reef and could not be recovered.
Efforts to keep the submarine out of enemy hands by destroying her with torpedoes
failed due to the shallow water around the reef, so the 6-inch deck guns of the
Nautilus were used to accomplish the task.
.P After completing her fourteenth war patrol, Nautilus was sent back to the US
to be decommissioned.
.P USS Nautilus was scrapped in November 1945.


[4262 Submarine - by Mike Dubost]
.P These World In Flames counters represent a number of submarines rather than
any specific individual submarine. The dates printed on the back of the counters
do not relate in any meaningful way with build dates for the various classes of
United States Navy (USN) submarine class and therefore the counter date in most
cases should be ignored. These US submarine write-ups contain the usual technical
data, followed by a brief history of one or more submarines from each of the main
classes that saw action during the Second World War.
.P When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the USN had a total of one hundred
and eleven large and medium submarines, of which fifty-five large and eighteen of
the medium type were assigned to the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets. There were a
further seventy-seven under construction. The average large fleet submarine had a
displacement of around fifteen hundred tons, while the smaller S-boats had
displacements of approximately one thousand tons, and the largest fleet submarine
displaced around two thousand seven hundred tons.
.P At the time of the outbreak of war in Europe, the US was a signatory to the
London Naval Treaty of 1930, which prohibited unrestricted submarine warfare
(Article 22 required attackers to first place passengers, crew, and ship’s papers
in “a place of safety”). USN sub doctrine therefore emphasized attacks on capital
ships, especially battlecruiser types and larger. On the 7th December, the day of
the attack on Pearl Harbor, the USN concluded that the survival of the US was at
risk in the war, and consequently ordered the use of unrestricted air and
submarine warfare. According to Samuel Eliot Morison, combat vessels were still
considered prime targets, but attacks on merchant ships were of major importance.
.P Unlike German U-boats which operated in so-called wolf-packs for greater
effectiveness, US submarines typically operated alone, due in part to the large
distances which had to be covered from their few bases. US submarines would
usually attack while submerged, using periscope observations to gather the data
to input into the mechanical targeting computer.
.P Initially, US torpedoes were defective. However, once the torpedo faults were
corrected, US submarines became very effective attackers. Nearly one third of
Japanese combat vessels lost were due to the submarine service, as well as nearly
two thirds of Japanese merchant losses.
.P
.P This write-up looks at the Tench-class. This class consisted of a series of
Fleet Submarines designed by the USN during the Second World War. They were an
improvement of the preceeding Gato-class. They were slightly larger than the
Gatos with an improved internal layout. The Tench-class was also built more
strongly to allow deeper dives, adding an extra 100 feet to the test depth in
comparison to the Gatos.
.P Initial plans called for a total of one hundred and forty-six boats to be
built, but the majority were cancelled in the final year of the war. A total of
thirty-one were commissioned between 1944 and 1951.
.P This write-up looks specifically at USS Tench.
.P
.B Name: USS Tench
.B Engine(s) output: 5,400 hp (Surfaced) 2,740 hp (Submerged)
.B Top Speed: 20.25 knots (Surfaced), 8.75 knots (Submerged)
.B Main armament: 10 x 21-inch torpedo tubes and 1 x 5-inch (127 mm) gun
.B Displacement (Fully Submerged): 2,440 tons
.B Diving Depth: 400 ft
.P The name ship of the Tench-class was launched in July 1944 at the Portsmouth
Navy Yard in New Hampshire, and completed in October 1944. The submarine’s
sponsor was Lady Bird Johnson, whose husband Lyndon Johnson, was to become
President in the 1960`s.
.P After a brief training period Tench began her first war patrol from Pearl
Harbor on 7th of February 1945. After refueling at Saipan, she joined three other
submarines to form a wolf pack. The wolf pack rotated duties in anti-shipping,
weather-reporting, photo-reconnaissance, and air-sea rescue. During her first
stint on rescue duties, she responded to a report of a dye marker seen near Akune
in Kyushu. Entering the shallow bay, she found the reported dye marker was just a
reflection from a shoal area, and was exiting the bay on the surface, in water
too shallow to dive. A sighting by enemy aircraft gave her crew a scare, but they
turned out to be from a US carrier aircraft returning from an attack on Nagasaki.
.P On 3rd of April, Tench was spotted by a Japanese aircraft and forced to spend
the majority of the day submerged. On this patrol, Tench was ordered to serve as
a part of the submarine picket force watching for a possible sortie by the IJN
heavy surface forces in response to the invasion of Okinawa. Tench was positioned
on the west coast of Japan and so failed to intercept the battleship Yamato and
her small task force as it sailed through the eastern exit of the Inland Sea.
After the USS Threadfin sighted Yamato, and the picket line was dispersed, Tench
sailed for Guam.
.P On her second war patrol, Tench patrolled Japanese shipping lanes between the
Kurile Islands. Her first contact with Japanese shipping on this patrol was the
sighting of a periscope, and Tench evaded the enemy submarine. In several
successful attacks, Tench sank a number of freighters and tankers, while dodging
enemy anti-submarine forces. During this time, Tench’s closest call was with one
of her own torpedoes that circled back towards the submarine. Tench was unable to
evade the torpedo, but it ran deep enough to pass under her stern. On the 16th
June, she set course for Midway, so ending her second patrol.
.P Her third and final war patrol took Tench to the East China Sea. During this
patrol, Tench only attacked ships too small to be credited as kills. She did take
the Korean crew of a lugger as prisoners, but shortly released them in a small
boat off the Korean coast. After releasing the prisoners, Tench conducted shore
bombardment against Osei To, a small island off the western coast of Korea. Her
final action occurred on the 9th August when two Japanese planes dropped bombs
near her, but without causing her damage.
.P Tench remained on patrol station until the 28th August and then returned to
New London, Connecticut.
.P USS Tench was scrapped in 1973.

Does anyone know the grammatical rule for when Germans use ß rather than ss?

I see that a number of German ships in WIF use the ß symbol - they are all "what if" counters. However, there was a Friedrich der Grosse in the First World War and Conways spells her name with an ss rather than a ß.

The main reason for asking though is that, regardless of the rules, the aircraft carrier Peter Strasser I think should be ss and not ß, Peter Strasser being the name of the head of the Zeppelin airships in WWI.

Is anyone in a position to answer the first point and can we change Peter Straßer to Peter Strasser?

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Does anyone know the grammatical rule for when Germans use ß rather than ss?

I see that a number of German ships in WIF use the ß symbol - they are all "what if" counters. However, there was a Friedrich der Grosse in the First World War and Conways spells her name with an ss rather than a ß.

The main reason for asking though is that, regardless of the rules, the aircraft carrier Peter Strasser I think should be ss and not ß, Peter Strasser being the name of the head of the Zeppelin airships in WWI.

Is anyone in a position to answer the first point and can we change Peter Straßer to Peter Strasser?

This always confused me when I tried to learn the German language but I did find a webside that... eh... clarifies it to the point that I do not understand it.

But you might get it.

http://german.about.com/library/weekly/aa092898.htm

Yup, it's Peter Strasser and Friedrich der Große.

When in doubt German Wiki is a good source.

The rules for ss and ß were complicated in the past.
In a very German way they were "reformed" a few years ago and made even more complicated for non-natives. Now it depends on the spoken word.

When a vocal letter (a, e, i, o, u, ä, ,ö, ü and combinations thereof) is intonated in a short way, afterwards it's ss.
When a vocal letter is intonated in a long way, afterwards it's ß.

So it's Strasser and Grooooße.

There could be exceptions from this rule with historical names. But in this specific case old customs and new rules fit.

You see, very easy.

Regards

P.S.: Strasser was commander of ze Zeppelins under Reichsmarine for recon/bombing in WW 1

ORIGINAL: wosung

Yup, it's Peter Strasser and Friedrich der Große.

When in doubt German Wiki is a good source.

The rules for ss and ß were complicated in the past.
In a very German way they were "reformed" a few years ago and made even more complicated for non-natives. Now it depends on the spoken word.

When a vocal letter (a, e, i, o, u, ä, ,ö, ü and combinations thereof) is intonated in a short way, afterwards it's ss.
When a vocal letter is intonated in a long way, afterwards it's ß.

So now it's Strasser and Grooooße.

There could be exceptions from this rule with historical names. But in this specific case old customs and new rules fit.

You see, very easy.

Regards

P.S.: Strasser was commander of ze Zeppelins under Reichsmarine for recon/bombing in WW 1

Warspite1

Thanks Wosung - I will e-mail Froonp and ask him to change the Peter Strasser counter and leave the others as is.